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Abstract 
This  thesis  assesses  British  naval  and  military  co-operation  in  the  form  of  combined 
operations  during  the  Nine  Years  War,  1688-1697,  and  the  War  of  the  Spanish 
Succession,  1702-1713.  The  operational  history  of  the  joint  actions  is  related  and  used  to 
drive  forward  the  determination  of  two  inter-related  themes.  These  are,  how  combined 
operations  might  be  defined  as  an  instrument  of  warfare  during  this  period;  and  secondly, 
the  place  of  such  operations  within  the  military  component  of  Britain's  wartime  Grand 
Strategy.  With  respect  to  the  former,  previous  definitions  embodying  the  benchmarks  of 
objectives  and  composition  of  force  are  set  against  the  history  and  bunt  upon  to 
incorporate  three  ftirther  categories  of  definition:  theatre  of  war,  bureaucratic  control  and 
command  structure.  As  a  result,  it  is  argued  that  no  blanket  definition  for  combined 
operations  can  be  arrived  at,  but  that  any  one  of  the  five  categories  can  provide  insights 
into  combined  operations  as  an  instrument  of  warfare.  The  second  theme  places  the 
strategic  objectives  of  these  operations  within  the  context  of  British  war  policy  and 
explores  their  relationship  to  the  'Maritime'  and  'Continental'  strategic  traditions.  While 
it  becomes  clear  that  combined  operations  were  thought  to  possess  neither  an  independent 
nor  a  war-wfiuýiing  strategic  capability,  they  do  appear  to  have  consistently  filled  a  role  in 
Grand  Strategy  which  acted  either  simultaneously  or  separately  in  support  of  the  naval 
and  military  strategic  interests.  With  the  categories  for  definition  and  a  strategic  role 
established  for  such  joint  anny-navy  ventures,  the  thesis  concludes  by  considering  whether 
during  these  wars  there  were  any  factors  common  to  the  more  successful,  and  conversely 
to  the  failing,  combined  operations.  Although  a  pattern  or  mould  for  a  successful 
combined  operation  cannot  be  established,  it  is  shown  that  the  origins  of  the  developed 
historical  practice  of  this  type  of  warfare  -  demonstrated  to  such  effect  later  in  the 
eighteenth  century  -  can  be  traced  to  the  two  wars  considered  in  this  study. 3 
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Introduction 
1:  The  Revolution  of  1688  as  a  Combined  Operation. 
At  only  six  old  pence,  A  New  Map  of  Sea  Coasts  ofEngland,  France  and  Holland,  might 
have  been  shrewd  investment  for  James  VII  &  11  in  the  late  autumn  of  1688.  It  would  have 
provided  him  with  an  increased  knowledge  of  the  coastal  topography  to  better  defend  his 
kingdom  from  the  invasion  by  his  daughter's  husband  and  Stadholder  of  the  United 
Provinces,  William,  Prince  of  Orange,  which  was  completed  within  four  days  of  the  map 
being  advertised.  ' 
On  I  November  1688,  the  Prince  of  Orange's  military  and  naval  force  of  three 
divisions  comprising  about  50  warships  and  less  than  half  that  again  of  fireships  along  with  a 
transport  flotilla  of  near  300  vessels  with  excess  of  15  000  'fighting  men"  on  board  made  a 
second  and  successful  egress  from  Hellevoetsluis  in  the  River  Maas.  The  fleet  had  previously 
set  out  on  19  October  only  to  be  forced  back  by  a  heavy  lightning  storm,  thus  prompting  fears 
that  possible  losses  and  damage  would  make  any  future  attempt  doubtful?  The  whole  fleet 
had  though  -  save  arguably  for  one  fly-boat  -  made  it  back  to  the  Dutch  coast,  albeit 
dispersed  throughout  a  variety  of  ports.  '  Gargantuan  efforts  were  made  within  the  following 
ten  days  to  effect  the  necessary  repairs,  replace  a  good  number  of  the  horses  that  had 
suffocated  when  the  holds  in  some  transports  had  been  secured  at  the  start  of  the  storm,  and 
reassemble  the  fleet.  Crucially,  the  Prince  also  held  his  nerve  in  the  face  of  a  renewed 
representation  of  doubts  by  his  colleagues  as  to  the  sense  of  the  operation  at  this  late  time  of 
the  year.  That  he  did  so  was  a  tribute  to  the  assiduousness  of  his  preparations  and  a  firm 
belief  in  the  role  he  perceived  for  himself  within  the  international  states  system  as  champion 
of  a  coalition  of  states  to  balance  the  power  of  Louis  XIV's  Catholic  and  absolutist  France. 
1  London  Gazelle,  No.  2395,29  Oct.  to  I  Nov.  168  S. 
2  j.  Carswell,  The  Descent  On  England.  A  Study  of  the  English  Revolution  of  1688  and  Its  European 
Background  (London,  1969),  p.  170,  uses  'fighting  men'  to  denote  the  fact  that  the  number  does  not  just 
represent  the  rank  and  file  but  also  officers  and  'gentleman'  volunteers. 
3  NUL,  PwA  2195,  unf:  'Verdeelinghe  van's  Landts  Vloote';  NUL,  PwA  2196,  unf.:  'Liste  van't 
Embarquement  vande  Iniuntiriern  de  Dragonders';  Carswell,  The  Descent  On  England,  pp.  168-70,170  n.  *, 
176-7;  S.  B.  Baxter,  William  111  and  the  Defence  ofEuropean  Liberty,  1650-1702  (London,  1966),  p.  23  7. 
4  There  seem  to  be  differing  views  on  whether  any  of  the  fleet  were  lost.  Whittle,  An  Exact  Diary,  p.  22,  and 
Original  Letters  Illustrative  ofEngfish  History,  ed.  IL  Ellis  (Second  Series,  1828),  iv.  137:  Letter  CCCLXI11, 12 
Prior  to  the  Prince  of  Orange  issuing  the  C.  -in-C.,  Admiral  Arthur  Herbert,  his  orders 
on  6  October,  there  had  occurred  a  debate  amongst  William's  colleagues  as  to  how  the  fleet 
should  cross  the  Channel  in  order  best  to  effect  a  landing.  Bumet  recorded  that  John 
Wildman  was  prominent  in  marshalling  the  arguments  for  a  two  phase  crossing:  the  men-of- 
war  would  secure  command  of  the  sea,  either  by  fighting  the  English  fleet  or  hastening  them 
back  into  port;  then  the  transports  would  make  a  safe  and  unimpeded  passage.  The  Prince 
however  rejected  this  in  favour  of  a  one  step  crossing,  with  the  warships  and  transports 
comprising  one  naval  entity.  In  this  respect,  he  was  probably  conscious  of  the  potential  for 
further  delay  that  might  occur  under  the  two  phase  conception,  recognising  that  the  fleets 
might  lie  in  sight  of  each  other  for  sometime  and  that  each  day  longer  the  army  and  horses 
were  at  sea  reduced  their  capability.  '  Implicit  in  this  decision  was  William's  -  albeit 
unexpressed  -  desire  to  avoid  engagement.  Politically,  it  was  important  that  he  avoided  the 
image  of  'invader-conqueror',  while  it  was  also  recognised  that  a  campaign  which  set  out  to 
spill  blood  would  most  probably  invoke  recent  memories  of  the  Anglo-Dutch  Wars  and 
galvanisc  the  English  of  whom  it  was  said,  'our  countrymen  love  no  cause,  nor  man,  so  well 
as  fighting'.  '  William's  decision  for  a  single  phase  dash  for  the  coast  was  however  largely  a 
product  of  the  debate  as  to  which  English  coast  he  was  headed  for  and  the  exact  landing  site 
thereon. 
Arthur  Herbert's  sailing  orders  were  less  than  specific.  There  has  always  been  a 
question  as  to  whether  the  Prince  knew  himself,  and  kept  his  colleagues  guessing  in  deference 
to  operational  secrecy;  or  whether  he  was  also  uncertain  about  his  intentions  when  he  set  sail. 
It  is  easy  to  identify  the  factors  which  would  influence  such  a  decision;  and  the  Prince's 
preparations  did  not  omit  compiling  important  information  on  the  state  of  the  country, 
including  detailed  information  about  the  garrisons.  Obviously,  wherever  the  critical  mass  of 
King  James's  troops  were  would  carry  significant  weight  in  any  decision.  This  is  clear  from  a 
survey  of  potential  landing  sites  completed  prior  to  sailing  which  stated  that  if  disembarkation 
was  to  take  place  on  the  north-east  coast  then  Yorkshire  was  the  most  southerly  point  at 
which  it  could  be  effected  due  to  the  strength  of  James's  army  in  London  and  its  immediate 
27  Oct.  1688,  both  state  that  a  ship  was  lost  and  yet  Carswell,  The  Descent  on  Engl=4  p.  178,  states  that  no 
ships  were  lost.  He  might,  however,  have  been  referring  only  to  capital  ships. 
3  G.  Burnet,  History  ofMy  Own  Time,  ed.  M.  J.  Routh  (Oxford,  1833),  iii.  324-5. 13 
environs.  This  document  was  not  however  prescriptive,  and  another  assessed  coasts  and  sites 
as  far  apart  as  Tynemouth  and  Falmouth! 
Dr  Clyve  Jones  has  produced  a  most  concise  summary  of  the  landing  site  question,  by 
looking  at  how  it  was  conceived  on  both  sides  of  the  Channel.  8  His  was  an  attempt  to  move 
the  debate  on  from  the  Whig  myth  that  the  Protestant  wind  brought  William  to  Torbay  and 
Professor  J.  P.  Kenyon's  contention  that  political  considerations  -  namely  the  need  to  avoid 
being  dependent  upon  Thomas  Osborne,  earl  Danby  and  his  band  of  northern  supporters 
including  the  Earl  of  Devonshire  in  Derbyshire  and  Lord  Lumley  at  Durham  -  dictated  the 
choice  on  the  south-west  coast.  Dr  Jones  agrees  with  Professor  Kenyon  that  William  had 
decided  prior  to  departure  to  proceed  in  that  direction  but  suggests  that  his  motives  were  as 
much  military  as  political.  Dr  Jones  argues  that  the  need  to  avoid  an  engagement  both  at  sea 
and  at  land  (upon  landing)  meant  that  -  to  the  extent  that  the  wind  would  allow  -  William  had 
decided  upon  the  south  or  south-west  coast.  9 
The  relevant  document  is  a  memorandum  of  a  meeting  aboard  Herbert's  flagship  on  I 
November.  The  memorandum  indicates  that  the  discussions  were  partly  counter-factual  as 
the  participants  outlined  various  contingencies.  "'  Dr Jones  views  the  important  passage  as 
that  which  deals  with  the  point  of  disembarkation.  He  argues  that,  although  no  explicit 
landing  site  is  mentioned,  the  fact  that  a  southerly  course  was  to  be  set  evidences  a  decision 
by  William  for  the  south  or south-west  coast.  The  course  was  for  'de  Hooffden'  -  (Dutch  for 
the  southerly  part  of  the  North  Sea  which  stretches  down  around  into  the  Channel)  -  and  then 
to  continue  along  the  English  coast  to  such  places  as  Cowes,  the  Southampton  river,  Poole, 
and  even  as  far  as  Exmouth.  "  However,  arguably,  Dr  Jones  derives  more  from  the  evidence 
6  Buckingham,  John  Sheffield,  Duke  of,  The  Works  ofJohn  Sheffield,  Earl  ofMulgrave,  Marquis  of 
Nornumby  and  Duke  ofBuckingham  (fourth  edn,  1753),  p.  70. 
7  NUL,  PwA  2204,  unf.:  'Instructie,  Bij  Sij  Hoogheijtjejaren  ainden  Heer  Arthur  Herbert';  NUL,  PwA  2082, 
unf:  Letter  to  Bentinck  containing  the  numbers  thought  to  be  employed  in  the  English  Garrisons;  NUL,  PwA 
2083,  unf:  Document  detailing  the  Governors/Commanders  of  different  Garrisons  in  England;  NUL,  PwA 
2185-6,  unf  :  Papers  Relating  to  the  State  of  England,  1688;  NUL,  PwA  2199,  unf.:  Paper  Relating  to  the 
Fleet  and  Troops  for  Embarkation,  1688;  Correspondenlie  van  Willem  III  en  van  Hans  Willem  Benfinck,  ed. 
N.  Japikse,  ('s-Gravehage,  1927-1928),  ii,  no.  570,  pp.  617-18:  'Memorie  Van  De  Plaetsen,  Die  Bequaem. 
Geoordeelt  Worden  In  Engelandt',  [?  ]  Oct.  1688;  E.  B.  Powley,  The  English  Navy  in  the  Revolution  of  1688 
(Cambridge,  1928),  pp.  20-1,62. 
8  Clyve  Jones,  'The  Protestant  Wind  of  1688:  Myth  and  Reality',  ESR  iii  (1973),  201-21. 
9  ibid.,  pp.  201-9. 
10  Correspondentie  van  Willem  III  en  van  Ilans  Willem  Bentinck,  ii,  no.  576,  pp.  623-4:  'Memorie  Met  Den 
Luitenant-Admirael-Generael  Herbert  En  Den  Luitenant-Admirael  Eversen',  II  Nov.  1688  [NS]. 
"  Jones,  'The  Protestant  Wind',  p.  211. 14 
than  it  bears.  Undoubtedly  the  south  and  south-west  coasts  were  strongly  mooted  as 
potential  landing  sites,  but  this  was  not  to  the  exclusion  of  other  options.  Indeed,  the 
contingent  nature  of  the  other  decisions  taken  during  this  meeting  also  extended  to  the  south- 
westerly  option.  This  is  a  point  that  J.  L  Anderson  makes  clear  when  he  argues  that  the  wind 
was  the  detennining  variable.  He  develops  this  further,  arguing  that  too  many  historians  have 
assessed  the  operation  in  purely  naval  terms  by  focusing  on  the  general  coastal  area  without 
looking  at  the  operation's  combined  character.  This  put  a  premium  on  the  effect  of  the 
weather  conditions  at  the  actual  point  of  disembarkation  in  determining  whether  the  landing 
would  take  place  under  a  weather  or  lee  shore.  "  Both  J.  L  Anderson  and  Dr  Jones  agree  that 
the  Dutch  fleet's  tack  to  the  south  on  the  night  of  2/3  November  did  not  represent,  as  Bumet 
states  and  Whittle  implies,  a  change  of  mind  by  the  Prince.  "  Though,  given  the  poverty  of 
the  contemporary  evidence,  J.  L  Anderson's  flexible  argument  is  more  appropriate.  For  what 
is  certainly  true  is  that  the  wind  greatly  shaped  the  two  key  moments  of  the  naval  crossing. 
Firstly,  the  strong  easterly  gale  allowed  the  Dutch  to  proceed  to  the  south  and  then  along  to 
the  south-west  coast,  while  the  same  wind  trapped  the  English  fleet,  commanded  by  Lord 
Dartmouth,  at  the  Gunfleet.  Secondly,  it  was  a  change  in  the  wind  to  the  west  which  allowed 
the  fleet  to  come  safely  to  anchor  in  Torbay  Bay  under  a  lee  shore,  thus  permitting  a  secure 
embarkation  on  the  5  November;  a  day  redolent  with  positive  religious  symbolism  for 
William. 
While  theoretically  of  equal  importance,  William's  subsequent  military  operation  was 
on  this  occasion  of  less  interest.  it  comprised  a  near  unimpeded  march  by  William  at  the  head 
of  his  force  to  London  which  he  entered  on  18  December  in  a  commanding  political  and 
military  position.  No  pitched  battle  occurred  and  little  blood  was  shed  aside  from  around  50 
men  killed  at  skirmishes  at  Wincanton  and  Reading.  "  Three  factors  can  perhaps  be  isolated 
as  of  significance  in  shaping  the  history  of  the  land  campaign  in  1688.  Firstly,  the  Prince  was 
well  prepared  with  detailed  marching  routes  and  plans  where  to  quarter  troops.  "  Also,  the 
12  J.  L.  Anderson,  'Combined  Operations  and  the  Protestant  Wind:  Some  Maritime  Aspects  of  the  Glorious 
Revolution  of  1688',  GC  ix  (1987),  96,99-107. 
13  Burnet,  History  ofMy  Own  Time,  iii.  325-6;  Whittle,  An  Exact  Diary,  pp.  29-34. 
14  Whittle,  An  Exact  Diary,  pp.  57-9,68-9;  FIMC,  Seventh  Report,  Graham  MSS,  p.  417:  Grahame  to  [his 
brother]  Preston,  21  November  1688;  The  Portledge  Papers,  eds.  R.  J.  Kerr  and  1.  Coffin-Duncan  (London, 
1928),  pp.  50-2:  Lapthome  to  Coffin,  17  Nov.,  II  Dec.  1688. 
15  NUL,  PwA  2207-11,2214,  unf:  Papers  Connected  with  the  Voyage  to  England  of  William,  Prince  of 
orange  and  Marches  of  Cavalry,  Nov.  and  Dec.  1688. 15 
Prince  made  a  similar  effort  on  land  as  at  sea  to  avoid  a  battle.  A  period  of  indecision  at 
Exeter  where  he  held  up  progress  for  ten  days  proved  useful  in  allowing  political  support 
within  the  country  to  gather  momentum;  but  of  greater  significance  was  William's  decision  at 
Salisbury  over  the  course  of  two  days  (4  to  6  December)  to  proceed  to  Oxford  rather  than  to 
seek  to  crush  the  King's  army  which  had  just  been  disordered  by  James's  retreat.  This 
decision  is  rarely  remarked  upon  for  it  is  correctly  assumed  that  the  significance  of  Oxford 
was  as  a  gateway  to  securing  the  west,  and  that  ultimately  the  Prince  never  went  through  the 
University  town  as  the  pace  of  events  drove  him  directly  on  from  Abingdon  through  the 
Thames  Valley  to  London.  "  Yet  militarily,  the  decision  was  important,  for  to  have  proceeded 
otherwise  would  have  led  to  a  tactical  repositioning  of  his  army  in  order  to  fight.  William 
must  have  recognised  that  this  would  serve  no  other  purpose  than  to  alter  a  strategy  which 
had  to  that  point  proved  effective.  King  James's  pusillanimous  decision  to  retreat  from 
Salisbury  and  then  his  despairing  order  to  his  commander,  the  Earl  of  Fevcrsham,  to  disband 
his  army  prior  to  his  first  attempt  to  flee  the  country,  is  the  second  significant  factor  which 
aided  the  Prince  on  his  march.  James  may  have  been  psychologically  weakened  by  the 
desertion  of  senior  members  of  his  officer  corps,  including  his  most  able  Lieutenant-General, 
John  Churchill.  Certainly,  the  confidence  of  the  Prince's  camp  as  to  the  potential  for 
disloyalty  within  the  English  army  was  such  that  Bentinck  had  even  prepared  a  note  on  the 
towns  to  which  deserting  English  troops  were  to  be  sent.  However,  above  all  else,  the 
military  campaign  was  never  going  to  amount  to  more  than  a  tense  march  if  the  King  did  not 
offer  battle.  Finally,  as  the  Prince's  army  drew  much  of  its  power  and  supply  from  the  lines  of 
communication  leading  back  to  the  fleet  and  which  also  kept  open  an  exit  route,  the  dispersal 
and  disabling  of  the  English  navy  by  a  storm  on  the  19  November  when  it  neared  the  Dutch 
vessels  was  of  critical  significance  for  the  security  of  the  march  upon  London.  "  It  has  been 
noted  that  there  is  a  lack  of  awareness  of  this  final  point,  "  yet  it  truly  underscores  the 
essential  character  of  combined  operations:  the  mutual  support  and  interplay  of  the  army  and 
navy. 
'6  Burnet,  History  ofMy  Own  Time,  iii.  330,338-9,550-1. 
17  NUL,  PwA  2212,  unf:  Papers  Connected  with  the  Voyage  to  England  of  William,  Prince  of  Orange  and 
Marches  of  Cavalry,  Nov.  and  Dec.  1688;  FMC,  Dartmouth  MSS,  iii.  57-9,66-7:  Journal  of  Captain 
Grenville  Collins;  Entry  Book  of  Correspondence  of  Lord  Dartmouth  from  the  Fleet. 
18  L.  K.  J.  Glassey,  'Introduction',  in  L.  K.  J.  Glassey  (ed.  ),  7he  Reigns  ofCharles  HandJames  VII  &H 
(London,  1997),  p.  5. 16 
11:  British  Warfare  1688-1713:  William  of  Orange's  Invasion  as  Pattern  and 
Precedent. 
Undoubtedly,  the  Prince  of  Orange's  successful  combined  operation  was  a  prelude  and 
essential  precipitant  to  the  important  constitutional  and  political  watershed  in  the  early 
modem  history  of  the  'British'  archipelago:  an  event  that  has  been  labelled  the  'Glorious 
Revolution'.  Though  one  might  lay  to  one  side  the  implication  of  the  word  'glorious'  that  the 
Revolution  was  necessarily  a  positive  and  celebratory  event,  it  is  difficult  to  deny  the  radical 
nature  of  the  changes  which  followed.  Most  obviously,  with  the  flight  of  James  from  his 
kingdoms  on  23  December,  it  produced  a  change  in  the  monarch  and  recast  Parliament  to  a 
strengthened  position  within  the  polity.  These  changes  and  the  other  alterations  contained 
within  the  subsequent  Revolutionary  Settlement"  have  ensured  the  operation's  place  within 
the  enduring  Whig  historiography.  " 
The  historical  narratives  of  these  political  and  constitutional  changes  -  content  to 
afford  the  Prince's  operation  the  role  of  harbinger  and  of  trigger  -  ignore  any  potential 
significance  for  the  military  and  naval  history  of  the  late  seventeenth  and  early  eighteenth 
centuries.  To  suggest  otherwise  is  not  to  make  a  claim  for  the  Prince  of  Orange  in  terms  of 
originality  in  mounting  such  an  operation  for  the  occurrence  of  combined  operations  can  be 
dated  from  Caesar's  time.  "  Rather,  it  points  to  the  fact  that  the  Prince's  operation 
inaugurated  a  dual  role  for  British  warfare  over  the  course  of  two  'World'  Wars  between 
1688  and  1713,  which  requires  explanation.  Immediately  it  gave  rise  to  a  continental 
commitment  and  an  increased  emphasis  on  the  primacy  of  the  battlefleet.  Both  trends  became 
manifest  as  orthodoxy  throughout  the  Nine  Years  War,  1688-1697  and  the  War  of  the 
Spanish  Succession,  1702-1713;  and  yet,  there  also  occurred  throughout  these  wars  several 
combined  navy  and  army  operational  deployments.  "  Such  a  bald  analysis  of  the  history  of 
warfare  may  belie  a  more  subtle  and  variegated  role  for  combined  operations  as  they 
19  This  is  the  label  generally  given  to  the  legislation  of  the  'Convention  Parliament'  which  sat  from  January  to 
the  end  of  February  1689  before  declaring  itself  a  Parliament,  which  was  not  dissolved  till  6  February  1690. 
20  See  for  example  Lord  Macaulay,  Ihe  History  ofEngland  From  the  Accession  ofJames  The  Second,  ed. 
C.  H.  Firth  (London,  1913-15),  iii.  1304-12. 
21  T.  M.  Molyneaux,  Conjunct  Fxpedtions:  or  Expeditions  7-hat  Have  Been  Carried  On  Jointly  hy  the  Fleet 
and  the  Army,  with  a  Commentary  on  Littoral  War  (London,  1759),  Part  II,  pp.  1-2;  J.  Keegan,  A  History  of 
Warfare  (Pimlico  edn,  London,  1994),  pp.  255-7. 
22  Obviously  there  were  other  wars  during  this  period  like  the  Great  Northern  War  (1700-21),  but  the  two 
identified  are  those  in  which  Britain  was  a  principal  participant. 17 
developed  throughout  this  period.  A  step  can  be  made  towards  determining  this  by 
considering  two  complimentary  lines  of  enquiry  which  the  Prince's  operation  gives  rise  to. 
The  suggestion  that  the  operation  has  significance  for  military  and  naval  history 
presupposes  that  in  the  late  seventeenth  century,  combined  operations  were  perceived  as  a 
form  of  warfare,  just  as  an  explicit  naval  deployment,  a  set  piece  land  battle  or  counter- 
insurgency  methods  might  be.  Thus,  the  first  line  of  inquiry  will  seek  to  arrive  at  an 
appropriate  definition  which  comprehends  all  aspects  of  combined  operational  form,  including 
strategic  objectives  and  administrative  base.  The  consideration  of  the  distinctiveness  of 
combined  operations  also  requires  an  assessment  of  how  they  were  conceived  of  as  an 
instrument  of  warfare  even  if  not  deployed.  Again  the  Prince  of  Orange's  operation  provides 
a  springboard.  By  setting  it  within  the  diplomatic  context,  it  will  be  possible  to  comprehend 
the  role  it  fulfilled  in  the  wider  strategy  of  opposition  to  what  the  Prince  perceived  were  the 
continental  ambitions  of  the  French  King,  Louis  XIV.  Hence,  the  second  line  of  enquiry  will 
comprise  a  strategic  theme  with  an  assessment  of  the  role  of  combined  operations  as  part  of 
British  war  policy  from  1688  through  to  1713. 
Together,  these  two  themes  cannot  provide  a  comprehensive  operational  history  of 
the  two  wars  concerned  with  here;  an  operational  narrative  will  however  drive  forward  the 
determination  of  the  themes  to  illustrate  the  perceptions  of  combined  operations  held  by 
Britain's  military  and  political  elite  from  1688  to  1713.  An  understanding  of  how  successive 
ministries  and  their  senior  service  personnel  comprehended  the  operational  form  and  strategic 
function  of  combined  land  and  sea  actions  during  wartime  will  help  explain  the  dual  role  for 
British  warfare  (referred  to  above)  inaugurated  by  the  Prince  of  Orange's  combined  operation 
in  1688.  In  so  doing,  it  will  account  for  the  increased  British  practice  of  this  type  of  warfare 
in  the  wars  following  the  1688  revolution  and,  in  addition  to  the  development  of  its  military 
form,  the  political  motivations  underpinning  combined  operations  within  war  policy  will  be 
elucidated.  In  turn,  this  will  raise  the  significance  of  combined  operations  as  a  strategic  form 
of  warfare,  fulfilling  a  vanguard  role  in  the  imperial  development  of  Britain  as  a  world,  and 
particularly  Atlantic,  power.  The  geographical  scope  and  territorial  breadth  of  Britain's  first 
empire  up  to  the  loss  of  the  American  colonies  in  1783  was  secured  and  remained  dependent 
upon  the  combined  projection  of  land  and  sea  forces.  Significant  advances  in  respect  were 
undoubtedly  made  in  the  mid-to-late  eighteenth  century  but  it  will  be  shown  that  these  were 18 
dependent  upon  the  development  of  contemporary  perceptions  of  this  type  of  warfare  earlier 
in  the  century.  However,  before  these  arguments  can  be  advanced,  it  is  necessary  first  to 
elucidate  the  two  themes  from  which  they  will  derive. 
III:  A  Distinct  Form  of  Warfare?:  The  Problems  of  Definition. 
The  presupposition  that  in  1688  a  combined  operation  was  considered  a  specific  form  of 
warfare  should  mean  that  it  possess  certain  recognisable  features  when  set  against  more 
orthodox  forms.  At  first  glance,  it  might  be  argued  that  there  was  no  specificity  in  1688 
because  the  distinctive  features  of  combination  were  actually  illusory-,  that  the  navy  was 
merely  providing  a  taxi  service  to  a  body  of  troops  which  were  then  to  undertake  a  standard 
military  land  campaign.  This  suggests  a  minimal  level  of  administrative  and  operational 
interdependence  for  each  service  which  the  history  of  the  invasion  of  November  1688  does 
not  bear  out.  It  does  nonetheless,  correctly  demonstrate  that  definitions  are  central  in  the 
case  for  distinctiveness. 
There  is  not  a  substantial  body  of  historiography  solely  interested  in  combined 
operations  for  the  period  immediately  concerned  with  here.  This  study  hopes  to  make  some 
contribution  to  filling  that  lacuna.  Instead,  taking  their  cue  from  J.  S.  Corbett's  England  in 
the  Seven  Years  War,  "  historians  have  largely  concentrated  on  assessing  the  combined 
operations  of  the  second  half  of  the  eighteenth  century,  with  the  Elder  Pitt's  use  of  them  as 
strategy  proving  of  enduring  interest.  "'  Arguably,  a  product  of  this  scholarship  has  been  a 
distorted  view  of  the  history  of  warfare  such  that  it  is  not  considered  odd  to  make  the  claim 
that  it  was  during  the  Seven  Years  War,  1756-63,  and  the  War  of  the  American  Revolution, 
1775-83  that  the  British  determined  to  achieve  proficiency  in  the  'complex  skills  and 
techniques"'  of  this  type  of  operation  and  that  the  methodology  of  this  warfare  originated 
then  . 
2"  An  attempt  to  revise  this  consensus  has  nonetheless  begun.  Professor  Harding's 
,  4mphibious  Warfare  in  the  Eighteenth  Century  focuses  on  the  disastrous  expedition  to  the 
23  J.  S.  Corbett,  England  in  the  Seven  Years  War.  A  Study  in  Combined  StrateU  (2  vols.,  London,  1907;  2nd 
edn  with  introduction  by  C.  Duffy,  London,  1992). 
24  C.  Duffy,  'Introduction',  in  Corbett,  England  in  the  Seven  Years  War,  i,  pp.  v-xxxiv,  provides  a  review  of 
the  subsequent  trends  in  the  literature  and  includes  a  useful  bibliography. 
25  D.  Syrett,  'The  Methodology  of  British  Amphibious  Operations  During  the  Seven  Years  and  American 
Wars',  MM  lviii  (1972),  269. 
26  ibid.,  pp.  269-80;  D.  Syrett,  'The  British  Landing  at  Havana:  An  Example  of  an  Eighteenth-Century 
Combined  Operation',  MM  tv  (1969),  325-3  1. 19 
West  Indies  conducted  by  General  Wentworth  and  Admiral  Vernon  between  1740  and  1742, 
providing  a  reinterpretation  of  its  failure  from  which  more  general  points  about  amphibious 
warfare  are  advanced.  "  Most  obviously  this  pushed  the  analysis  into  the  first  half  of  the 
eighteenth  century;  but  also  it  includes  a  penultimate  chapter  which  recognises  a  historical 
lineage  of  some  length  for  combined  operations  like  the  failure  of  the  plan  to  descend  on  the 
French  coast  in  the  summer  of  1692  and  the  attack  on  Cidiz  in  1702.  "  It  is  however 
Professor  Harding's  emphasis  on  the  importance  of  definitions  which  is  of  particular  interest 
for  the  argument  concerning  the  distinctiveness  of  this  type  of  warfare.  " 
The  first  point  to  make  is  that  linguistically  the  combined  operational  deployment  of 
an  army  and  navy  can  obviously  be  denoted  as  a  'combined  operation',  but  that  its  generic 
combat  term  should  be  'amphibious  warfare'.  This  term  though,  as  Professor  Harding  has 
made  clear,  lacks  definitional  exactitude  and  suggests  only  the  participation  of  an  army  and 
navy  of  an  undefined  size  and  scale.  It  has  already  been  made  plain  that  this  remains 
unsatisfactory;  amphibious  warfare  so  defined  might  merely  comprise  the  navy  providing  a 
transport  service.  As  this  study  concerns  the  history  of  an  archipelago,  this  could  therefore 
arguably  cover  all  military  and  naval  operations  undertaken  or,  at  least,  mean  that  each  had  a 
dominant  amphibious  component.  "  It  is  thus  unhelpful  as  a  means  of  achieving  a  greater 
historical  understanding  of  the  component  characteristics  of  a  combined  operation. 
Theorists  of  warfare  are  generally  of  little  help  in  seeking  a  working  definition  of 
combined  operations.  Few  theoretical  treatises  on  combined  operations  as  amphibious 
warfare  appeared  before  the  late  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  centuries  when  Colonel 
Charles  E.  Callwell  began  to  publish  his  work.  "  There  was  one  exception  to  this  trend 
namely,  Thomas  More  Molyneaux,  who  had  his  work  on  what  he  termed  'Conjunct 
Expeditions'  published  in  the  year  that  Britain  conquered  Canada  by  taking  Quebec  through  a 
combined  operation.  "  While  this  text  is  singularly  instructive,  its  historical  treatment  is  based 
27  R  Harding,  Amphihious  waoýwe  in  the  Eighteenth  Century.  The  British  Expedition  to  the  West  Indies, 
1740-1742  (Woodbridge,  Suffolk,  199  1). 
28  ibid.,  pp.  150-97. 
29  Harding,  Amphihious  Warfare,  pp.  1-2. 
30  ibid. 
31  His  principal  historical-theoretical  works  on  amphibious  warfare  are  C.  E.  Callwell,  7he  Effect  ofMaritime 
Command  on  Land  Campaigns  Since  Waterloo  (Edinburgh,  1897)  and  C.  E.  Callwell,  Military  Operations 
and  Maritime  Preponderance:  Their  Relations  and  Interdependence,  ed.  C.  S.  Gray  (Annapolis,  Maryland, 
reprint,  1996). 
32  Molyneaux,  Conjunct  Expeditions.. 20 
almost  wholly  on  naval  sources  and  thus  overlooks  the  army's  input.  Consequently,  it  tends 
to  conceive  of  amphibious  warfare  as  merely  an  appendage  of  naval  strategy  which  in  turn 
does  not  provide  a  firm  ground  from  which  to  establish  the  lineaments.  This  is  a  trend 
detected  in  other  theoretical  treatises  such  as  P.  H.  Colomb's  work  on  naval  warfare;  a 
thoroughgoing  Mahanite  text"  in  its  promotion  of  seapower,  it  conceived  combined 
operational  success  to  be  solely  determined  by  regional  sea  command.  "'  In  this  genre,  J.  S. 
Corbett's  Some  Principles  ofMarilime  Strategy  should  be  considered  an  anomaly.  Its 
rejection  of  a  purely  naval  strategy,  in  favour  of  a  maritime  strategy  which  did  not  dismiss  the 
use  of  armies  as  part  of  a  continental  commitment  meant  that  Mahan's  contempt  of  combined 
operations,  was  eschewed.  "  Instead,  amphibious  warfare  was  written  of  positively  as  a 
central  component  of  British  combat.  "'  Overall  though, the  significance  of  these  works  (and 
in  particular  Corbett's)  for  amphibious  warfare  lies  mainly  in  its  role  within  strategy  which 
will  be  treated  in  this  study  but  does  not  in  the  first  instance  provide  a  working  historical 
definition  of  combined  operations. 
one  person's  definition  entails  another's  omission,  however.  Drawing  on  an 
explanation  by  the  sailor-scholar,  Admiral  Richmond,  Professor  Harding  argues  for  its 
33  That  is  a  text  following  the  notion  that  'command  of  the  sea'  was  the  principal  end  of  naval  warfare  as 
outlined  in  A.  T.  Mahan,  The  Influence  ofSeapower  Upon  History  1660-1783  (New  York,  reprint  of  5th  edn 
1894,1987). 
34  P-11.  Colomb,  Naval  Warfare.  Its  Ruling  Principles  and  Practice  Historically  Treated  (2nd  edn,  London, 
1895);  A.  Gat,  7he  Development  ofMilitary  Thought:  7he  Nineteenth  Century  (Oxford,  1992),  pp.  207-11. 
35  j.  S.  Corbett,  Some  Principles  ofMaritime  Strategy,  ed.  E.  J.  Grove  (Great  Britain,  reprint,  1988),  pp.  15-30; 
J.  T.  Sumida,  Inventing  Grand'Strategy  and  Teaching  Command.  ý  The  Classic  Works  ofAlfred  Thayer  Mahan 
Reconsidered  (Washington  D.  C.  and  London,  1997),  p.  45. 
36  Corbett,  Some  Principles  ofMaritime  Strategy,  pp.  15-87,280-304.  The  first  citation  relates  to  Corbett's 
discussion  of  the  theory  of  war  in  which  the  importance  of  the  interdependence  of  army  and  navy  within  a 
maritime  strategy,  through  to  its  role  in  'unlimited'  and  'limited'  wars,  is  emphasised.  With  reference  to  the 
latter,  pp.  60-71,  Corbett  argued  that  combined  operations  were  the  standard  'limited'  war-making 
methodology.  Corbett  stated  that  this  methodology  might  involve  the  taking  of  territories  -  the  limited  object 
of  the  war  -  or  alternatively  it  might  mean  a  development  of  Clausewitz's  notion  of  'war  by  contingent,  and 
thus  demonstrate  that  Britain  possessed  great  potentiality  in  'limited'  interference  in  an  'unlimited' 
continental  war  through  her  amphibious  capability.  The  second  citation  refers  to  a  more  practical  outline  of 
methods  of  exercising  combined  command.  See  E.  J.  Grove,  'Introduction',  in  Corbett,  Some  Principles  of 
Maritime  Strategy,  pp.  xxiv-xxix;  B.  D.  Hunt,  'The  Strategic  Thought  of  Sir  Julian  S.  Corbett',  in  J.  B. 
Hattendorf  &  R.  S.  Jordan  (eds),  Maritime  Strategy  andthe  Balance  of  Power  (London,  1989),  pp.  110-35; 
G.  Till,  'Sir  Julian  Corbett  And  The  British  Way  In  Naval  Warfare:  Problems  of  Effectiveness  And 
Implementation',  in  K.  Neilson  &  E.  J.  Errington  (eds),  Navies  and  Global  Defence:  Theories  and  Strategies 
(London,  1995),  pp.  23-50;  and  D.  M.  Schurman,  The  Education  ofa  Navy:  The  Development  of  British 
Naval  Strategic  Thought,  1867-1914  (London,  1965),  pp.  147-84;  Gat,  The  Development  ofMilitary 
Yhought,  pp.  218-25. 21 
broadening  so  as  to  define  amphibious  warfare  by  both  objectives  and  composition  of  force.  " 
However,  the  contention  is  that  this  approach  omits  elements  of  the  historical  experience  of 
combined  operations  during  the  two  wars  considered  within  this  study.  Specifically,  it 
excludes  some  operations  -  such  as  the  attack  on  Toulon  in  1707  -  because  they  did  not 
involve  a  self-contained  land  force  launched  from  the  sea;  and,  despite  Professor  Harding's 
original  emphasis  on  the  composition  of  the  force,  the  definition  does  not  seem  to  cover 
operations  undertaken  by  a  body  of  troops  whose  function  was  ambiguous  in  the  late 
seventeenth  century.  "'  While  the  current  Royal  Marines'  oldest  battle  honour  on  their 
Colours  is  the  conquest  of  Gibraltar  in  1704,  that  was  undertaken  by  their  third  mutation  of 
form  since  the  Restoration  when  a  pattern  had  first  emerged  of  raising  regiments  for  'sea 
service'  in  emergency  which  were  then  subsequently  disbanded.  These  troops  were 
commonly  referred  to  as  'Marine  Soldiers',  and  were  mustered  and  paid  as  standard  infantry 
privates  when  on  shore.  Yet,  they  were  quickly  to  come  under  the  administrative  and 
operational  direction  of  the  Lord  High  Admiral  and  could  aspire  to  be  Able  Seamen.  Indeed, 
a  permanent  Corps  was  not  established  until  1755  and  it  is  only  from  the  late  1730s  that 
scholars  date  the  beginning  of  the  resolution  of  the  Marines'  ftinctional  and  doctrinal 
ambiguity.  Nonetheless,  their  earlier  equivocal  status  -  as  either  land  soldiers,  defacto  seamen 
or  as  a  wholly  new  group  of  servicemen  -  means  that  operations  undertaken  solely  by  them  in 
conjunction  with  the  navy  could  be  considered  as  a  combined  army-navy  venture.  " 
An  alternative  way  forward  might  be  to  keep  the  dual  feature  of  Professor  Harding's 
definition  -  objectives  and  composition  of  force  -  but  consider  whether  the  historical  narrative 
of  the  operations  yields  additional  categories  of  definition.  Indeed,  primafacie  three 
categories  seem  of  particular  significance.  When  analysing  types  of  warfare,  it  is  appropriate 
to  understand  in  conjunction  how  the  operation  reached  the  point  of  deployment  (or  indeed 
failed  to  reach  that  point),  and  its  perfortnance  and  fulfilment  of  objectives  when  deployed. 
Thus,  the  administrative  process  which  produced  the  combined  operation,  including  especially 
the  concerns  of  the  developing  early  modem  bureaucracy,  should  be  addressed.  Alone  among 
37  Harding,  Amphibious  Warfare,  pp.  1-2. 
38  Anon.,  A  Letter  to  a  Member  ofParliament  Concerning  the  Four  Regiments  Commonly  Called  Mariners 
(London,  1699);  Anon.,  A  Short  rindication  ofMarine  Regiments,  in  Answer  to  a  Pamphlet  Entitleg  A  Letter 
to  a  Member  ofParliament,  Concerning  the  Four  Marine  Regiments  (London,  1699). 
39  AL,  MSS  12  I/XVI:  Corbett's  Naval  Precedents,  Marines;  AJ.  Marini,  'Parliament  and  the  Marine 
Regiments,  1739',  MM  Ixii  (1976),  55-65. 22 
the  theorists,  Callwell.  touched  upon  this  to  an  extent  in  his  final  chapter  in  Military 
Operations  and  Maritime  Preponderance,  but  unfortunately  the  focus  was  in-theatre  as 
opposed  to  prior  planning.  "  Secondly,  the  manner  in  which  the  governments  sought  to 
regulate  the  in-theatre  relationship  between  the  two  services  would  not  only  have  shaped 
contemporary  perceptions  of  combined  operations  but  also  their  historical  development.  It 
would  seem  probable  therefore  that  the  structure  of  operational  command  would  emerge  as 
an  important  additional  category  of  definition.  And  lastly,  as  the  form  and  function  of  any 
combat  situation  is  largely  contingent  upon  the  in-theatre  environment,  the  exigencies  of  the 
war  theatre  in  which  the  combined  operations  were  deployed  will  need  to  be  considered  in 
any  attempt  to  arrive  at  a  definition  for  this  type  of  warfare. 
This  study  aims  therefore  to  treat  not  only  the  first  elements  of  the  definition  - 
objectives  and  composition  of  force  -  but  draw  from  the  narrative  other  categories  with  a 
particular  focus  placed  upon  the  bureaucratic  processes,  the  structure  of  command,  and  the 
in-theatre  environment. 
IV:  The  Role  of  Combined  Oi)erations  in  Grand  Strateav. 
The  second  theme  emerges  from  the  diplomatic  context  of  William  III's  operation  and  to  an 
extent  provides  an  explanation  for  the  chosen  period.  As  has  already  been  noted,  it  could 
never  be  argued  that  combined  operations  are  unique  to  1688-1713  but,  paradoxically, 
William's  army-navy  descent  on  the  English  coast  in  1688  might  be  explained  by  events  upon 
the  European  continent  which  did  not  embrace  amphibious  warfare. 
Contemporaries  and  historians  have  considered  that  William's  Declaration  published 
on  30  September  1688,  despite  only  setting  forth  his  concern  for  Anglicanism.  and  English 
political  liberties,  was  a  cloak  for  his  own  continental  aspirations.  "  This  turns  on  an 
assessment  of  the  wellsprings  of  Louis  XIV's  foreign  policy  since  the  beginning  of  his 
personal  rule  in  1661,  which  had  been  directed  towards  the  need  for  France  to  gain  a  secure 
frontier  with  the  states  of  central  Europe.  The  historical  debate  centres  upon  whether 
Louis's  ambition  derived  from  a  warmongering  desire  to  assert  la  gloire;  or,  alternatively,  on 
40  Callwell,  Military  Operations  andMaritime  Preponderance,  pp.  431-44. 
41  Sir  James  MacKintosh,  Ifistory  ofthe  Revolution  in  England  in  1688  (1834),  pp.  692-702;  Works  ofJohn 
Sheffield;  for  historians  favouring  this  interpretation  see  for  example  G.  Holmes,  Me  Making  ofa  Great 
Power:  Late  Stuart  and  Early  Georgian  Britain;  1660-1722  (London,  1993),  pp.  246-7;  D.  McKay  &  H.  M. 
Scott,  The  Rise  ofthe  Great  Powers  1648-1815  (New  York,  1983),  p.  44. 23 
whether  the  vulnerability  and  defensive  concerns  of  national  security  dictated  the  extension  of 
France's  perceived  natural  geographical  frontiers.  "'  Professor  Hatton  has  been  credited  with 
rescuing  Louis  from  the  moral  opprobrium  central  to  the  argument  which  emphasises  the 
pursuit  of  la  gloire  as  part  of  a  conscious  policy.  In  this  respect,  French  vulnerability  to  the 
Habsburgs  since  the  Peace  of  Pyrenees  (1659)  is  cited  along  with  a  fluid  international  states 
system  that  responded  to  the  type  of  personal  statecraft  or  kingship  inherent  to  la  gloire.  "' 
Recent  scholarship  has  aspired  to  a  more  balanced  interpretation,  though  not  by 
splitting  the  difference  between  the  two  interpretative  extremes.  Instead,  a  synthesis  has  been 
sought  by  suggesting  that  one  can  trace  a  critical  evolution  in  Louis's  foreign  policy.  It  is 
now  argued  that  the  policy  can  be  divided  into  three  discrete  phases.  The  first  period  covering 
1661-1675  was  characterised  by  the  pursuit  of  la  gloire;  the  second  phase  from  1675-1697 
was  dominated  by  defensive  concerns  and  the  final  period,  1697-1714,  was  consumed  by  the 
hoary  question  of  the  Spanish  succession.  "  The  merit  of  this  interpretation  is  its  coherence  in 
that  la  gloire  and  a  defensive  national  security  posture  are  not  mutually  exclusive.  It  also 
explains,  though  not  necessarily  resolves,  the  paradox  at  the  heart  of  the  second  phase 
whereby  defensive  ends  were  sought  by  aggressive  means.  The  significant  point  for  those 
who  attribute  William's  combined  operation  to  England  in  1688  to  his  continental  ambitions 
is  that  the  Dutch  Prince's  formative  experience  had  been  marked  by  such  conflicts  as  the  War 
of  Devolution  of  1667-1668  and  of  the  Dutch  War,  1672-1678/9.  During  both,  France 
sought  increased  territory  principally  at  the  expense  of  the  United  Province's  security. 
Furthermore,  William  had  also  seen  that  the  advent  of  peace  did  not  mean  that  Louis  was 
territorially  satisfied;  nor  that  peace  would  necessarily  result  in  the  alleviation  of  the  insecurity 
felt  by  those  states  on  the  French  eastern  frontier.  The  period  1679-1684  heralded  the 
implementation  of  the  French  monarch's  rdunion  policy  -a  policy  of  territorial  aggression 
which  Louis  sought  to  justify  with  reference  to  the  diplomatic  vagueness  and  inconsistencies 
of  the  treaties  of  Westphalia  (1648)  and  Nijmegen  (1679)  underpinned  by  French  military 
"'  J.  Black,  'Louis  XIV's  Foreign  Policy  Reassessed',  SCFSx  (1998),  199-212;  R.  M.  Hatton,  'Louis  XIV: 
Recent  Gains  in  Historical  Knowledge',  JMHxlv(1973),  279-80;  J.  A.  Lynn,  7he  Wars  of  Louis  A7171667- 
1714  (London,  1999),  pp.  27-32JI-L  Shennan,  Louis  XIV(London,  1997),  pp.  32-3;  P.  Sahlins,  'Natural 
Frontiers  Revisited:  France's  Boundaries  Since  the  Seventeenth  Century',  AHR  xcvii  (1990),  1423-52. 
41  J.  Black,  'Louis  XIV's  Foreign  Policy  Reassessed',  pp.  199-205;  Hatton,  'Louis  XIV:  Recent  Gains',  pp. 
279-80. 
44  Lynn,  Ae  Wars  ofLouis  XIV  1667-1714,  pp.  324  1. 24 
power.  "  Accordingly,  Louis  is  portrayed  as  aiming  for  France  to  be  the  hegemonic  European 
power  and  William  as  seeking  to  thwart  that  development.  William  understood  however  that 
the  military  and  demographic  resources  of  the  United  Provinces  were  insufficient  to  position 
him  in  the  vanguard  of  the  opposition  to  France.  Hence,  the  French  King's  invasion  of  the 
Rhineland  and  the  Palatinate  in  September  1688  -a  product  of  his  failure  to  secure  the 
election  of  the  French  candidate  to  the  Archbishopric  of  Cologne  and  his  frustration  that  the 
Truce  of  Ratisbon  (1684)  had  not  been  made  a  permanent  settlement46  -  can  be  described  as 
the  opportunity  for  William  to  descend  on  England  in  order  to  hitch  that  country's  resources 
to  the  conflict  against  France 
. 
4'  This  interpretation  of  the  'Glorious  Revolution'  is 
strengthened  by  William's  subsequent  action,  namely,  that  on  acceding  jointly  to  the  English 
Crown,  William  brought  England  into  the  defensive  coalition  against  France.  The  pre- 
existing  League  of  Augsburg  formed  in  1686  comprising  the  Empire,  Spain  and  several 
German  Princes  evolved  to  become  the  Grand  Alliance  with  the  addition  of  England,  the 
United  Provinces  and  Savoy.  This  continental  alliance  founded  in  the  nascent  balance  of 
power  diplomacy  as  an  instrument  to  regulate  state  relations  and  principally  to  balance  French 
power  remained  the  bedrock  of  policy  through  to  the  death  of  Queen  Anne  in  1714.  Indeed, 
the  Grand  Alliance  was  reconstituted  in  1701  to  deal  with  the  perceived  threat  posed  to 
European  peace  on  the  death  of  the  childless  Spanish  King,  Carlos  11.  Then  a  culmination  of 
events  saw  Louis  break  the  Second  Partition  Treaty  (1700),  aggressively  promote  and  defend 
French  interests  throughout  the  Spanish  Empire  arguably  using  his  grandson  -  the  new 
Spanish  King,  Philip  V-  as  cipher,  while  threatening  Bourbon  domination  of  west  central 
Europe  by  issuing  Letters  Patent  which  declared  that  Philip  (as  Duc  d'Anjou)  retained  his 
right  to  succeed  to  the  French  throne.  Louis  further  inflamed  Anglo-French  relations  by  his 
recognition  of  the  late  King  James's  son,  the  Old  Pretender,  as  James  III,  thus  contravening 
the  spirit  and  letter  of  the  Treaty  of  Rijswijk  (1697)  which  had  settled  the  last  war. 
Meanwhile  the  Emperor,  seeking  to  reclaim  Milan  and  other  areas  of  northern  Italy  which  he 
45  ibid.,  pp.  161-71. 
46  This  Truce  was  a  twenty  year  agreement  between  France  and  the  Emperor,  certain  German  Princes  and 
Spain  to  accept  the  continued  French  occupation  of  Lorraine,  her  hold  on  Strasbourg  and  the  reunion  lands. 
See  Sherman,  Louis  XIV,  p.  37,  and  Lynn,  The  Wars  of  Louis  XIV  1667-1714,  pp.  191-9. 
47  McKay  &  Scott,  The  Rise  of  the  Great  Powers,  pp.  43-5;  Powley,  The  Naval  Side  of  King  William's  War, 
pp.  17-20;  or  most  famously  due  to  her  concentration  on  this  argument,  L.  Pinkham,  William  III  and  the 
Respectahle  Revolution:  The  Role  Played  by  the  William  of  Orange  in  the  Revolution  of  1688  (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts,  1954). 25 
considered  Imperial  territory,  had  increased  the  tension  by  sending  in  an  army  of  occupation 
even  before  the  Grand  Alliance  had  been  signed.  As  a  check  to  this,  French  troops  were  soon 
acting  in  proxy  for  the  new  Spanish  King's  army.  "' 
The  relevance  of  this  brief  synopsis  of  William's  motives  in  1688  set  against  the 
current  historiography  on  Louis  XIV's  foreign  policy  emerges  from  a  consideration  of  the 
concept  of  Grand  Strategy.  This  is  a  relatively  modem  analytical  focus  for  scholars  and  it  is 
viewed  as  multi-layered  concept  applicable  in  peace  as  well  as  war.  In  the  analysis  of  war,  it 
is  used  to  denote  the  coherent  direction  of  the  instruments  of  state  power  and  resources, 
including  less  quantifiable  elements  such  as  national  morale,  towards  the  immediate  military 
objectives  but  also  with  a  view  to  the  type  of  peace  that  is  sought.  "'  Under  these  precepts, 
the  armed  force  of  a  state  has  a  dual  role:  a  constituent  element  of  the  Grand  Strategy  but 
also  an  active  means  of  its  implementation.  In  peacetime,  that  second  role  would  be  reduced 
to  one  of  potentiality  and  threat.  Some  have  counselled  against  the  use  of  strategy  as  a  means 
to  explain  the  history  of  warfare,  arguing  that  it  has  a  reductive  effect  through  seeking  such 
an  explanation  by  a  'system  of  essentials'.  'o  Analytically  this  prematurely  links  two  issues:  the 
understanding  of  one  particular  strategy  and  the  subsequent  derivation  of  universal  principles 
from  it.  It  seems  quite  correct  to  be  chary  of  this  link  for  although  one  sympathises  with  J.  S. 
Corbett's  view  that  these  principles  should  properly  be  looked  upon  as  a  fertilising  agent  of 
judgement,  their  pretensions  to  universality  can  obscure  the  shading  in  ihe  historical  picture  if 
the  principles  are  derived  from  one  age  only  to  be  applied  crudely  to  another.  This  should  not 
mean  however  that  contextual  strategy  is  dismissed  wholesale  as  a  means  of  enquiry  in  the 
history  of  warfare.  It  has  also  been  suggested  that  the  method  is  anachronistic  because 
unalloyed  strategy  was  an  unknown  concept  before  the  nineteenth  century.  There  might  be 
some  foundation  in  this  charge  with  reference  to  the  period  concerned  with  here  in  the  sense 
that  the  protagonists  did  not  use  the  jargon  laden  language;  but  that  did  not  mean  that  they 
did  not  face  a  series  of  options  or  make  certain  decisions  -  political,  economic  and  military  - 
as  to  how  they  would  prosecute  the  war.  The  culmination  and  interplay  of  these  decisions 
48  Thomson,  'Louis  XIV  and  the  Origins  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession',  pp.  140-61;  Baxter,  William 
Iff,  pp.  379-401. 
49  P.  Kennedy,  'Grand  Strategy  in  War  and  Peace:  Towards  a  Broader  Definition',  in  P.  Kennedy  (ed.  ),  Grand 
Strategies  in  War  andPeace  (London,  1991),  pp.  1-7;  P.  Kennedy,  'Grand  Strategies  and  Less-Than-Grand 
Strategies:  A  Twentieth  Century  Critique,  in  L.  Freedman,  P.  Hayes,  &  R.  O'Neill  (eds),  War,  Strategy,  and 
International  Politics:  Essays  in  Honour  ofSir  Michael  Howard  (Oxford,  1992),  pp.  227-9. 26 
formed  Grand  Strategy.  To  assess  the  choices  made  as  to  the  direction  of  the  state's  armed 
force  is  to  outrme  that  element  of  Grand  Strategy.  And,  as  has  been  noted,  to  do  so  should 
provide  for  a  greater  understanding  of  a  more  germane  strategic  theory  associated  with  it.  " 
The  question  to  be  posed  is  that,  while  recognising  William's  continental  aspirations  which 
inaugurated  a  committed  British  presence  in  the  European  theatre  at  the  head  of  a  coalition 
against  France,  what  form  in  pursuance  of  the  Grand  Strategy  did  warfare  take? 
The  older  orthodox  military  and  naval  histories  of  this  period  stick  to  their  own  in 
explaining  the  warfare  of  Grand  Strategy.  "  The  former  concentrate  on  the  set  piece  land 
battles  best  exemplified  by  Marlborough's  famous  four  victories  over  Louis  XIV  at  Bleinheim 
(1704),  Ramillies  (1706),  Oudenarde  (1708)  and  Malplaquet  (1709)  with  the  main  historical 
debate  focused  on  the  tactical  minutiae  of  military  manoeuvre  and  engagement.  "  The 
navalists  seek  to  demonstrate  the  period's  significance  in  the  establishment  of  British 
supremacy  at  sea,  usually  tacking  between  the  respective  merits  of  the  guerre  descadre  and 
the  guerre  de  course.  `More  modem  works  have  continued  to  emphasise  the  distinctiveness 
of  land  and  naval  operations,  while  recognising  that  an  island  power  must  seek  a  blend;  this 
though  was  usually  meant  to  signify  no  more  than  an  attempt  to  achieve  appropriate  and 
proportional  priorities  between  the  land  and  sea.  "  Combined  operations  as  amphibious 
warfare  are  ah-nost  always  condemned  as  a  strategical  subordinate  either  directly  or  by 
implication. 
so  J.  Keegan,  The  Mask  of  Command  A  Study  ofGeneralship  (London,  1999),  p.  2. 
51  Keegan,  The  Mask  of  Command,  pp.  1.11;  It  Strachan,  'Soldiers,  Strategy  and  Sebastopol',  HJ  xxi  (1978), 
305;  Corbett,  Some  Principles  ofMarilime  Strategy,  p.  10;  H.  Strachan,  European  Armies  and  the  Conduct  of 
War  (London,  reprint,  1992),  pp.  2-3,6. 
52  1  recognise  that  this  statement  is  to  an  extent  counter-factual  because  not  all  the  older  histories  would  have 
been  written  recognising  the  concept.  The  key  difference  lies  in  their  perception  of  writing  the  history  of  war 
strategy  in  the  round,  solely  in  terms  of  the  direction  of  armies  and  navies  instead  of  as  an  elemental  part  of  a 
larger  whole  known  as  Grand  Strategy.  The  impact  of  this  perception  with  regard  to  the  older  histories  is 
clearly  difficult  to  calculate.  Nonetheless,  it  is  arguable  that  their  analysis  of  war  strategy  as  a  whole  could  be 
substituted  as  the  constituent  part  in  Grand  Strategy. 
33  See  for  example,  Sir  John  Fortescue,  A  History  ofthe  British  Army  (London,  19  10),  i.  397-553;  H. 
Delbruck,  The  Dawn  ofModern  Warfare  (transl,  Bison  edn,  London,  1990),  pp.  302-3. 
54  See  for  example,  Sir  William  Laird  Clowes,  The  Royal  Navy.  A  History  From  the  Earliest  771mes  to  the 
Present  (London,  1898),  ii.  253-417,418-534.  Guerre  descadre  is  naval  warfare  as  a  clash  of  battle  fleets; 
guerre  de  course  is  naval  warfare  directed  against  commerce.  For  a  concise  description  of  each  see  Lynn,  The 
Wars  of  Louis  XIV  1667-1714,  pp.  93-102,  and  for  a  more  evolutionary  treatment  see  R.  Harding,  Seapower 
and  Naval  Warfare  1650-1830  (London,  1999),  pp.  3  7-120;  G.  Symcox,  The  Crisis  of  French  Sea  Power 
1688-1697:  From  Guerre  DEscadre  to  the  Guerre  De  Course  (The  Hague,  1974),  pp.  5-8. 27 
There  have  been  some  noteworthy  exceptions  to  this  trend.  "'  Generally  though,  for 
this  period,  these  have  focused  upon  British  pretensions  to  become  a  Mediterranean  power  or 
on  the  extension  of  overseas  possessions.  "  Such  works  have  provided  the  student  with  a 
much  clearer  understanding  of  the  role  of  combined  operations  in  Grand  Strategy  and  have 
crucially  highlighted  the  personal  commitment  to  this  type  of  warfare  displayed  by  William  III 
and  Marlborough  as  the  principal  directors  of  the  armed  force  element  of  Grand  Strategy 
during  the  two  wars  considered  in  this  study.  A  further  historical  debt  is  also  owed  to  these 
histories  through  their  raising  of  the  profiles  of  other  naval  and  army  commanders  such  as 
Admiral  Sir  George  Byng  and  James  Stanhope,  who  rose  to  prominence  through  being 
closely  concerned  with  such  operations.  Nonetheless,  due  to  the  geographical  exclusiveness 
of  such  literature  with  its  focus  on  the  Middle  Sea  and  the  Americas,  it  seems  to  fall  short  of 
being  a  full  analysis  of  the  role  of  combined  operations  within  Grand  Strategy. 
Hence,  with  the  first  line  of  enquiry  seeking  to  establish  the  occurrence  and 
distinctiveness  by  definition  of  combined  operations  as  amphibious  warfare,  there  will  be  a 
concomitant  illumination  of  their  role  in  Grand  Strategy.  This  will  challenge  the  focus  of  the 
orthodox  histories  and  develop  with  more  wide  ranging  evidence  some  of  the  themes  of  those 
works  which  proved  the  exception.  From  this  it  will  be  shown  whether  the  mode  of  warfare 
which  William  adopted  to  invade  Britain  in  order  to  make  good  his  continental  ambitions 
actually  came  to  fulfil  a  consistent  role  in  Britain's  Grand  Strategy  at  the  beginning  of  the 
eighteenth  century. 
55  P.  Padfield,  Maritime  Supremacy  and  the  opening  ofthe  Western  Mind  Naval  Campaigns  that  Shaped  the 
Modern  World  1588-1782  (Pimlico  edn,  London,  2000),  p.  158;  J. Childs,  'Secondary  Operations  of  the 
British  Army  During  the  Nine  Years  War,  1688-1697',  JSAHR  Ixxii  (1995),  73-98. 
56  C.  T.  Atkinson,  Marlborough  and  The  Rise  of  the  British  Arm  (London,  192  1);  LIL  Owen,  War  at  Sea  y 
Under  Queen  Anne  1702-1708  (London,  1938).  Although  obviously  army-centric  the  former  recognises  and 
stresses  Marlborough's  understanding  of  naval  warfare  and  covers  the  combined  operations  in  which  he  was 
involved  well  and  the  latter  despite  oddly  stopping  in  1708  when  there  were  still  four  more  years  of  war  at  sea, 
covers  the  main  set-piece  combined  operations  in  some  depth. 
57  See  for  example,  J.  S.  Corbett,  England  in  the  Mediterranean:  A  Study  of  the  Rise  and  Influence  ofBritish 
Power  Within  the  Straits,  1603-1713  (London,  1904),  ii.  143-315;  J.  Ehrman,  'William  III  and  the  Emergence 
of  a  Mediterranean  Naval  Policy,  16924',  CHJ  ix  (1947-1949),  268-92;  S.  F.  Gradish,  'The  Establishment  of 
British  Seapower  in  the  Mediterranean,  1689-1713',  C/Hx  (1975),  1-16;  CK  Phillips  'Navies  and  the 
Mediterranean  in  the  Early  Modern',  and  It  Coutau-Begarie  'Seapower  in  the  Mediterranean  from  the 
Seventeenth  to  the  Nineteenth  Century',  in  J.  B.  Hattendorf  (ed.  ),  Naval  Policy  and  Strategy  in  the 
Mediterranean:  Past  Present  and  Future  (London,  2000),  pp.  3-28,30-47;  C.  T.  Atkinson,  'Queen  Anne's 
War  in  the  West  Indies:  Parts  I&  11,  Jamaica  and  the  Windward  Sphere',  JSAHR  xxiv  (1946),  100-9,183-97; 
N.  T.  Moses,  'The  British  Navy  and  the  Caribbean,  1689-1697',  MM  Iii  (1966),  13-40. 28 
The  two  thematic  lines  of  enquiry  will  be  applied  to  the  two  wars  which  form  the 
separate  chapters  of  this  study.  The  subdivision  therein  is  dictated  by  the  character  of  each 
wars'  theatres.  Perforce,  both  chapters  will  contain  a  colonial  theatre  sub-section,  though 
only  the  chapter  on  the  Nine  Years  War  will  consider  Ireland;  while  the  incidence  of 
operations  in  the  Mediterranean,  including  those  on  the  Peninsula,  during  the  Spanish 
Succession  War  means  it  will  form  a  sub-section  in  that  chapter.  The  end  of  each  chapter  will 
present  some  conclusions  on  the  two  lines  of  enquiry  based  upon  the  foregoing  descriptive 
and  analytical  narrative.  Essentially  this  will  be  a  historical  progress  report  to  show  at  each 
stage  throughout  the  period  1688-1713  the  extent  to  which  a  definition  of  combined 
operations  had  been  arrived  at  so  that  its  distinctiveness  as  a  form  of  warfare  can  be  rated; 
and  also  to  demonstrate  the  scope  of  such  operations  within  the  armed  force  component  of 
Grand  Strategy.  These  strands  will  be  brought  together  in  a  final  section,  which  will  consider 
the  reasons  for  the  success  of  only  some  of  the  operations.  The  historical  detail  will  allow  for 
certain  conclusions  to  be  drawn  about  the  perceptions  of  the  form  and  the  deployment  of 
combined  operations  during  the  period  1688-1713.  These  will  focus  upon  their  strategic 
emergence  alongside  Britain's  post-  168  8  continental  commitment  and  also  upon  their 
operational  articulation  by  the  political  and  military  elite.  At  a  broader  level,  this  analysis  of 
some  25  years  of  operational  experience  should  prompt  comment  on  the  existing 
interpretation  of  warfare.  Firstly,  the  orthodox  view  of  largely  static  warfare  (naval  or 
military)  punctuated  by  the  set  piece  battle  might  seem  less  relevant  as  Britain  moved  to  a 
more  mobile  conception  of  war.  Secondly,  where  before  Britain's  development  and 
deployment  of  combined  operations  as  a  practice  of  warfare  has  been  established  in  the  mid- 
to-late  eighteenth  century,  it  might  now  be  possible  to  locate  the  substantive  wellsprings  of 
this  practice  in  an  earlier  period.  In  turn,  this  should  also  push  back  to  the  early  eighteenth 
century  the  nascent  contemporary  comprehension  of  the  type  of  warfare  in  early  modem 
history  which  proved  germane  to  Britain's  imperial  extension.  1688,  as  a  military  and  naval 
event,  combined  with  British  involvement  in  both  the  Nine  Years  War  and  the  War  of  the 
Spanish  Succession  can  therefore  begin  to  assume  a  primary  role  in  Britain's  emergence  as 
the  preponderant  world  power  in  the  eighteenth  century. 29 
Chapter  I 
The  Nine  Years  War,  1688-1697. 
Section  1:  Combined  Operations  and  the  Reconquest  of  Ireland 
During  the  Nine  Years  War,  1688-1697. 
Li  Ireland  as  a  Theatre  of  War. 
In  the  wake  of  King  James's  second  (and  successful)  flight  to  France  on  23  December  1688, 
elections  were  held  for  a  Convention  Parliament  that  was  to  determine  England's  future 
monarch,  who  would  also  be  the  monarch  in  Ireland  by  virtue  of  legislation  in  Henry  VIII's 
time.  One  contemporary  pamphlet  outlined  why  Ireland  should  rightly  be  considered  as  part 
of  a  wider  English  dominion  and,  thus,  accept  the  Convention's  resolutions.  More 
significantly,  the  pamphlet  also  told  of  the  atrocities  allegedly  then  being  committed  against 
the  Protestants  in  Ireland,  and  of  the  significant  military  commitment  which  the  author 
believed  would  be  required  to  reclaim  the  island  for  whoever  was  to  occupy  the  English 
throne.  '  Well  before  the  formal  offer  of  the  crown  to  the  Prince  of  Orange  and  Mary  in 
England,  the  fight  to  obtain  Ireland's  recognition  of  the  'Glorious  Revolution'  had  already 
begun. 
Ireland  had  descended  into  a  state  of  violent  confusion  when  news  of  the  Revolution 
filtered  through.  Unlike  Scotland  which  -  despite  the  efforts  of  the  Presbyterians  in  the  south- 
west  -  initially  turned  to  the  constitution  in  the  form  of  the  Convention  of  the  Estates,  in 
Ireland  the  spectre  of  the  1640s  held  sway  with  rumours  of  invasions  and  of  Protestants  and 
Roman  Catholics  massacring  each  other.  That  as  a  result,  a  greater  number  of  Protestants 
fled  to  England  through  the  winter  of  1688  was  principally  due  to  the  continued  presence  of 
James's  Lord  Deputy,  the  Earl  of  Tyrconnell.  A  strict  Roman  Catholic,  Tyrconnell  had  been 
appointed  by  James  in  February  1687  to  push  forward  plans  to  enhance  the  Crown's  authority 
by  allowing  his  co-religionists  amongst  the  'Old  English'  to  occupy  civil  and  military  office. 
Numerous  Protestant  soldiers,  justices,  judges  and  even  whole  town  corporations  were  turned 
out;  and,  as  preparations  were  made  for  a  Parliament  which  looked  likely  to  threaten  the 
1  P-  Coxe,  Aphorisms  Relating  to  the  Kingdom  of  Ireland,  Humbly  Submitted  to  the  Most  Noble  Assembly  of 
Lords  and  Commons  at  the  Great  Convention  at  Westminster  (London,  1689). 30 
Restoration  land  settlement,  those  who  returned  to  England  spoke  of  the  steady  eclipse  of 
Protestant  Ireland. 
Nonetheless,  there  is  also  evidence  to  suggest  that  on  receiving  news  of  the  King's 
flight,  Tyrconnell  sought  calm  and  initially  thought  of  negotiating  with  the  Prince.  This  was 
the  impression  subsequently  given  in  depositions  by  several  Irish  Protestants  to  the  enquiry  of 
the  House  of  Lords  into  the  miscarriages  in  Ireland.  More  immediately,  on  the  Irish  Solicitor- 
General,  Sir  John  Temple's  recommendation,  William  concluded  that  the  Lord  Deputy  would 
prove  receptive  to  an  emissary  and  the  cavalry  officer  convert,  Richard  Hamilton,  was  sent  to 
demand  Tyrconnell's  submission?  This  tactic  did  not,  however,  have  universal  support. 
Danby  spoke  out  against  it,  arguing  instead  that  a  display  of  preponderant  force  in  the  form  of 
a  squadron  would  more  likely  induce  Irish  quiescence;  and,  indeed,  underlying  his  point  was 
an  accurate  assessment  of  the  probable  reason  for  Tyrconnell's  apparent  even-handed 
reaction  to  the  Revolution.  "  Since  September,  when  James  had  ordered  half  the  Irish  army  to 
England  to  shore  up  his  defences,  the  Lord  Deputy  had  lacked  the  necessary  troops  to  secure 
the  whole  country;  and,  in  the  febrile  atmosphere  attending  news  of  the  Revolution,  he  had 
obviously  struggled  to  contend  with  both  the  endemic  banditry  and  the  pockets  of  militant 
Protestant  resistance  which  were  emerging  as  organised  'associations'  for  the  Prince.  In  the 
short-term,  Danby's  opposition  proved  apposite  for,  once  in  Ireland,  Hamilton  treacherously 
never  asked  for  Tyrconnell's  sword  and  instead  urged  resistance  to  William.  ' 
2  HMC,  Ormonde  MSS  NS,  viii.  356:  'A  Diary  of  Events  in  Ireland  from  1685  to  1690%  The  Life  ofJames  the 
Second,  (ed.  )  J.  S.  Clarke  (London,  18  16),  ii.  94-8;  W.  King,  The  State  of  the  Protestants  of1reland  Under  the 
late  King  James's  Government  (3rd  edn,  London,  1692),  pp.  I-I  10  provides  the  most  wide-ranging  account  of 
this  sense  of  Protestant  eclipse  and,  despite  the  author's  unalloyed  prejudice,  the  text  affords  an  insight  into 
the  likely  views  of  many  contemporary  Irish  Protestants.  See  also,  J.  Miller,  'The  Earl  of  Tyroonnell  and 
James  11's  Irish  Policy,  1685-1688',  HJxx  (1977),  803-23;  Sir  Charles  Petrie,  7he  Great  Tyrconnell.,  A 
Chapter  in  Anglo-Irish  Relations  (Ireland,  1972),  pp.  143-53;  P.  W. Sergeant,  Little  Jennings  andFighting 
Dick  Talbot:  A  Life  ofthe  Duke  and  Duchess  of  Tyrconnell  (London,  1913),  ii.  353-72;  J.  G.  Simms,  Jacobite 
Ireland  1685-1691  (London,  1969),  pp.  19-43;  J.  C.  Beckett,  The  Making  ofModern  Ireland  1603-1923  (new 
edn,  London,  198  1),  pp.  139-141;  C.  Rose,  England  in  the  1690s  (Oxford,  1999),  pp.  210-11. 
3  Simms,  Jacobite  Ireland  1685-1691,  pp.  48-52;  FIMC,  Twelfth  Report,  House  oftords  MSS,  1689-1690,  pp. 
137-44:  Depositions  by  the  following:  Mr  John  Phillips;  Sir  Robert  Colvill;  Mr  Luke  King;  Sir  Richard 
Rivers;  the  Archbishop  of  Dublin. 
4  A.  Browning,  Thomas  Osborne,  Earl  ofDanby  and  Duke  ofteeds,  1632-1712  (Glasgow,  1944),  ii.  159-61: 
'Memorandums  att  my  first  coming  out  of  the  North  to  the  Prince  att  St  James'. 
5  P.  G.  Melvin,  'The  Irish  Army  and  the  Revolution  of  1688',  IS  ix  (1969),  288-307  &  'Irish  Troop 
Movements  and  James  11's  Army  in  1688',  IS  x  (1970),  87-105;  RMC,  Twellih  Report,  House  of  Lords  MSS, 
1689-1690,  p.  141:  Deposition  of  the  Archbishop  of  Dublin;  HMC,  Ormonde  MSENS,  viii.  356-9:  'A  Diary 
of  Events  in  Ireland  from  1685  to  1690%  Simms,  Jacobite  Ireland  1685-1692,  pp.  48-52;  H.  Murtagh,  'The 
War  in  Ireland,  1689-169  1',  in  W.  A.  Maguire  (ed.  ),  Kings  in  Conflict:  The  Revolutionary  War  in  Ireland  and 
IrsAftermath,  1689-1750  (Belfast,  1990),  p.  65. 31 
Positive  judgements  of  Tyrconnell's  character  have  been  used  to  bridge  the  credibility 
gap  between  his  actions  in  1687-8  and  his  apparent  neutrality  at  the  time  of  the  Revolution,  6 
but  these  largely  founder  upon  the  clear  indications  given  in  the  first  months  of  1689  that  he 
was  actually  intent  upon  securing  Ireland  for  James.  Large  numbers  of  Catholic  troops  were 
raised;  Protestants  were  disarmed;  a  leading  Protestant  nobleman,  Mountjoy,  was  sent  to 
Paris  to  be  arrested  under  false  pretences;  officers  from  France  were  received  in  Ireland  to 
assess  what  help  Louis  XIV  might  give;  meanwhile  the  ever  increasing  army  -  albeit  mainly 
comprised  of  ragged  and  raw  recruits  -  tightened  Tyrconnell's  control  across  the  whole 
country!  Informed  of  Hamilton's  treachery  and  kept  abreast  of  the  other  developments  by 
the  Protestant  refugees,  William  concluded  in  the  spring  that  only  a  military  force  could  bind 
Ireland  to  the  Crown.  On  8  March,  Parliament  was  informed  of  his  intention  to  dispatch  an 
arrny  of  20  000  men.  The  King  also  resolved  to  send  Richard  Hamilton's  nephew,  James,  to 
the  Governor  of  Londonderry,  Robert  Lundy,  with  the  latter's  commission,  arms,  money,  and 
encouragement;  while  preparations  were  to  begin  for  the  immediate  dispatch  of  two  infantry 
regiments  as  relief  for  the  north.  '  William  had,  however,  acted  too  late,  for  as  he  revealed  his 
intentions,  the  exiled  King  James  had  already  begun  his  sea  crossing  from  Brest  to  Ireland 
with  a  French  expeditionary  force  led  by  several  French  Generals.  Also  embarked  aboard  the 
squadron  was  a  considerable  amount  of  war  supplies,  though  a  detachment  of  up  to  5000 
troops  was  not  to  sail  until  a  second  convoy  left  Brest  three  weeks  later.  On  12  March, 
James  landed  at  Kinsale  and  within  a  fortnight  he  had  reached  Dublin  for  the  summoning  of  a 
Parliament  which  was  designed  to  provide  a  sense  of  constitutional  propriety  to  his 
enterprise! 
6  For  example,  Simms,  Jacobite  Ireland  1685-1691,  pp.  48-52,  is  complimentary  towards  Tyrconnell, 
claiming  on  p.  50  that  he  'played  a  difficult  hand  with  skill',  and  on  p.  52,  that  his  was  essentially  a  'tentative 
approach'  which  would  have  succeeded  if  William  had  engaged  the  Irish  problem  before  James  landed. 
7  HMC,  Ormonde  MSS  NS,  viii.  14:  Mountjoy  to  Ormonde,  10  Jan.  1689;  HMC,  Twelf1h  Report,  House  of 
Lords  MSS,  1689-1690,  pp.  180-2:  Letter  from  Mr  W.  Howell  to  Sir  Robert  Southwell,  3  Mar.  1689;  Letter 
from  Edward  Boyle,  Bishop  of  Cloyne  to  Henry  [Compton],  Bishop  of  London,  4  Mar.  1689;  The  Journal  of 
John  Stevens,  ed.  R.  H.  Murray  (Oxford,  1912),  pp.  60-1,60  n.  1;  King,  The  State  of  the  Protestants,  pp.  119, 
123-3  1;  N6gociations  de  M.  Le  Comte  DAvaux  en  Irelande  1689-1690,  ed.  J.  Hogan  (Dublin,  1934),  p.  6: 
'Mdmoire  du  Roy  pour  servir  d'instruction  au  Sieur  de  Maumont,  Mardchal  de  camp,  16  fivrier  1689'  [NS]. 
8  W.  Cobbett,  Parliamentary  History  ofEngland  (London,  1809),  v.  163-4;  HMC,  Tweyllh  Report,  House  of 
Lords  MSS,  1689-1690,  pp.  161-2:  'The  humble  Representation  of  several  of  the  Nobility  and  Gentry  of  the 
Province  of  Munster',  read  on  20  Feb.  1689;  G.  Walker,  A  True  Account  ofthe  Siege  ofLondon-Derry 
(London,  1689),  in  P.  Dwyer,  (ed.  ),  The  Siege  ofLondondeny,  in  1689  (Republished  1893  edn,  London, 
1971),  p.  14;  PRO,  ADM,  1/5247,  p.  13:  Minute  at  Whitehall,  27  Feb.  1689. 
9Anon,  A  Full  and  True  Account  of1he  Landing  and  Reception  of  the  Late  King  James  at  Kinsale  (London, 
1689);  Nigociations  de  M.  Le  Comte  DAvaux,  pp.  22-5:  d'Avaux  i  Seignelay,  16  mars  1689  [NS];  d'Avaux 32 
It  was  largely  at  Louis  XIV's  behest  that  James  had  gone  to  Ireland.  Although 
England  had  not  yet  officially  declared  war,  the  French  King  viewed  the  country  as  an  ideal 
diversionary  theatre  in  which  to  embroil  William  away  from  French  military  action  in  Europe. 
His  war  minister,  Louvois,  had  disagreed  but  his  opposition  probably  had  more  to  do  with  his 
personal  contest  with  the  minister  for  the  navy,  Seignelay,  for  Louis's  preferment:  clearly 
Seignelay  had  more  to  gain  from  conflict  in  a  theatre  that  would  necessarily  rely  upon  the 
navy.  Even  so,  Louvois  reportedly  had  little  faith  in  the  Jacobites'  commitment,  of  which 
James's  initial  lethargy  as  he  settled  in  at  St  Germain-en-Laye  stood  as  testimony.  Early 
expeditionary  planning  did  not  assume  that  James  would  lead  the  force  in  person. 
Nonetheless,  the  exiled  King  did  appreciate  that  the  local  context  of  the  conflict  between 
Louis  and  William  held  the  potential  for  him  to  reclaim.  the  throne  by  securing  Ireland,  and 
then  using  it  as  a  springboard  for  entering  England  via  Scotland  where  potent  opposition  to 
William  was  also  emerging.  "  To  that  end,  the  first  task  which  faced  the  Jacobites  once  in 
Dublin  was  to  eliminate  those  centres  of  Protestant  resistance  in  the  north  which  -  after 
Richard  Hamilton's  successful  sweep  through  eastern  Ulster  in  March  during  which  he 
defeated  Mount-Alexander's  Protestant  band  at  the  'break  of  Dromore'  and  advanced  north 
through  Coleraine  to  fall  down  into  county  Tyrone,  east  of  the  River  Foyle  -  were 
concentrated  in  Londonderry  and  Enniskillen.  "  The  battle  for  Ireland  had  clearly  beenjoined. 
The  current  military  historiography  of  the  war  in  Ireland  embraces  two  complications. 
The  first  -  and  a  theme  well  outside  the  scope  of  this  study  -  has  been  its  entry  into  the 
modem  political  lexicon  as  propaganda  for  both  sides  of  a  religious  divide.  "  The  second 
pertains  to  the  many  excellent  scholarly  studies  of  the  conflict.  "  These  tend,  understandably, 
au  Roy,  23  mars  1689  [NS];  AH,  xxi,  nos.  42,68,  pp.  18-19,29-30:  'Instruction  pour  M.  de  Maumont,  16 
f6vrier  1689'  [NS];  [Louvois]  A  Bouridal,  10  mars  1689  [NS];  S.  Mulloy,  'The  French  Navy  and  the  Jacobite 
War  in  Ireland,  1689-1691',  IS  xviii  (1990-1992),  22-4. 
10  AH  xxi,  nos.  24,5  1,  pp.  10-11,22-3:  'M6moire  concernant  un  projet  du  Roy  d'Angleterre  sur  VIrlande,  31 
janvier  1689'  [NS];  [Louvois]  A  Maumont,  23  fdvrier  1689  [NS];  Nigociations  de  M.  Le  Comte  DAvaux,  P. 
52,61:  d'Avaux  A  Louvois,  4  awil  1689  [NS];  d'Avaux  au  Roy,  16  avril  1689  [NS];  Mulloy,  'The  French 
Navy  and  the  Jacobite  War  in  Ireland,  1689-1691',  pp.  18-23;  Simms,  Jacobite  Ireland  1685-1691,  pp.  58- 
62. 
11  HMC,  Eighth  Report,  Talbot  de  Malahide  MSS,  pp.  493,496:  Tyrconnell  to  Hamilton,  14,17  Mar.,  3  Apr. 
[1689];  The  Montgomery  Manuscripts:  (1606-1706),  ed.  G.  Hill  (Belfast,  1869),  pp.  279-8  1;  HMC,  Ormonde 
MSS  NS,  viii.  3  61-3:  'A  Diary  of  Events  in  Ireland  from  16  85  to  1690'. 
12  R.  Cathcart,  'Ireland  and  King  Billy:  Usage  and  Abusage'  HT  xxxviii  (July  1988),  41-5;  J.  G.  Simms, 
'Remembering  1690',  SIQR  1xiii  (1974),  231-42. 
13  For  example,  J.  Childs  'The  Williamite  War,  1689-169  1  1,  in  T.  Bartlett  &  K.  Jeffrey  (eds),  A  Military 
History  ofireland  (Great  Britain,  1996),  pp.  188-2  10;  Simms,  Jacobite  Ireland,  1685-1691;  Beckett,  The 
Making  ofModern  Irelang  1603-1923,  pp.  13949;  Murtagh,  'The  War  in  Ireland,  1689-1691',  pp.  61-91. 33 
to  concentrate  on  the  three  land  campaigns  with  their  attendant  naval  manoeuvres,  but  this 
can  diminish  the  importance  and  understanding  of  alternative  forms  of  warfare,  and, 
especially,  of  the  combined  operations  mounted  to  relieve  Londonderry  and  to  capture  the 
Munster  ports  of  Cork  and  Kinsale.  Although  the  former  admittedly  does  not  lack  treatment 
(a  considerable  amount  of  which  suffers  from  the  first  complication  mentioned  above)"  it  has 
rarely  been  considered  within  an  amphibious  context;  while  the  latter  operations  can  be 
interpreted  to  shed  light  on  the  perceptions  and  reality  of  combined  operations  as  an 
instrument  of  warfare  during  the  Nine  Years  War. 
LH:  The  Relief  of  Londonderrv.  Mav-Julv  1689. 
The  two  regiments  first  sent  out  by  the  King  to  the  north  of  Ireland  were  not  precisely 
embarked  upon  an  active  combined  operation.  The  navy  was  involved,  but  merely  to  provide 
the  transports  and  a  small  convoy  whose  captains  were  subordinate  to  the  regiments'  colonels 
-  Cunningham  and  Richards.  Moreover,  they  were  restricted  to  landing  at  Londonderry  and 
helping  with  its  defence  only  if  the  city  remained  in  Protestant  hands;  otherwise  they  were  to 
try  entering  either  Carrickfergus  or  Strangford.  Though  again,  if  access  was  closed  off,  a 
landing  was  not  be  forced  and  the  troops  were  to  be  returned  to  Liverpool.  "  In  the  event,  as 
the  enemy  force  had  not  fastened  all  the  approaches  to  Londonderry,  Cunningham  and 
Richards  were  able  to  enter  the  town  on  16  April  to  attend  a  Council  of  War  called  by 
Governor  Lundy.  This  Council  determined  that  due  to  insufficient  resources  the  town  could 
not  be  held  and  the  regiments  would  not  be  required.  With  Caff  ickfergus  and  Strangford  in 
Jacobite  hands,  Cunningham  and  Richards  returned  to  England.  "' 
The  Williamite  sources  denounce  Lundy's  conduct  as  treacherous  inasmuch  as  he  had 
recommended  to  a  Council  whose  membership  was  ignorant  of  the  conditions  within  the  town 
14  For  example,  a  Williamite  perspective  can  be  found  in  the  contemporary  accounts  by  G.  Story,  A  True  and 
Impartial  History  of  the  Most  Material  Occurences  in  the  Kingdom  of  Ireland  during  the  Last  Two  Years, 
Part  I  (2nd  edn,  London,  1693),  pp.  4-5  and  A  Continuation  of  the  Impartial  History  of  the  Wars  of1reland 
(London,  1693),  pp.  4-5  and  also  in  the  modern  monograph  by  C.  D.  Milligan,  History  ofthe  Siege  of 
Londonderry  (Belfast,  195  1).  A  contemporary  account  from  the  Jacobite  perspective  can  be  found  in  A 
Jacobite  Narrative  of  the  War  in  lrelani4  1688-1691,  ed.  J.  T.  Gilbert  (  Dublin,  1892),  pp.  62-9,75-81,83-5; 
while  a  more  modern  version  can  be  read  in  H.  Belloc,  James  The  Second  (London,  1934),  pp.  23  8-50. 
15  PRO,  ADM  3/1,  pp.  1,3,6,13,17:  Board  Minutes,  9,12,14,21,27  Mar.  1689;  RMC,  Twelfth  Report, 
House  ofLords  MSS,  1689-1690,  pp.  170-1:  'Orders  and  Instructions  for  Col.  John  Cunningham,  and  upon 
his  death  or  absence  Col.  Solomon  Richards  or  the  Officers  in  Chief  with  the  regiments  whereof  they  are 
Colonels',  12  Mar.  1689. 
16  Walker,  A  True  Account  ofthe  Siege  ofLondon-Derry,  pp.  15-16;  J.  G.  Simms,  'Notes:  The  Garrison  of 
Carrickfergus,  1689',  IS  vi  (1963-1964),  118-19. 34 
and  of  the  inhabitants'  temper,  a  course  of  action  amounting  to  surrender.  "  Certainly  as 
Governor  and  Chair  of  the  Council,  and  as  one  possessed  of  a  superior  command  to  the 
newly  arrived  Colonels,  Lundy  was  powerfully  placed  to  control  proceedings.  Moreover,  he 
had  been  positively  ordered  to  defend  the  town  which  was  said  to  benefit  from  strong 
fortifications  built  upon  a  natural  defensive  aspect.  "  Even  if  the  strength  and  maintenance  of 
the  walls  since  the  conflict  of  the  1640s  is  moot,  it  is  undeniable  that  Londonderry's  position 
on  the  west  bank  of  the  River  Foyle,  which  discharges  through  Lough  Foyle  into  the  open 
sea,  was  well  placed  for  a  sea-based  supply  line.  With  posts  on  the  river  bank  and  occupation 
of  Culmore  Fort  situated  some  four  miles  down-stream  where  the  river  met  the  Lough,  there 
remained  a  reasonable  prospect  that  the  supply  route  could  remain  open  and  to  have  rejected 
the  assistance  of  troops  which  might  have  undertaken  these  tasks  was,  militarily,  an  act  of 
folly.  Nonetheless,  Lundy  had  to  grapple  with  the  other  realities  of  his  position  that  more 
appropriately  cast  him  as  a  defeatist  than  a  traitor.  "  High  ground  rose  to  the  west  and  east  of 
the  town,  providing  ideal  sites  for  the  besieging  batteries;  while  the  garrison's  ability  to  sally 
forth  was  obviously  prevented  by  the  river  to  the  east,  with  marshland  providing  a  significant 
obstacle  on  the  west.  More  importantly,  just  as  the  two  regiments  from  England  were 
arriving  in  Lough  Foyle,  separate  Jacobite  forces  under  Hamilton  and  Rosen  had 
rendezvoused  at  Strabane  to  force  a  passage  across  the  River  Foyle.  On  15  April,  this  was 
achieved  when  the  Protestant  forces  raised  from  Londonderry  and  the  surrounding  areas  were 
put  to  flight  by  Hamilton  at  Clady  and  by  Rosen  at  Lif[brd.  Back  inside  the  walls  that  the 
Council  had  decided  were  indefensible,  Lundy  either  sought  or  was  offered  (depending  upon 
the  political  interest  of  the  source)  terms  which  arguably  held  out  the  prospect  of  safety  for 
the  town's  inhabitants.  "  By  17  April,  the  town  under  Lundy's  leadership  faced  the  possibility 
17  Dwyer  (ed.  ),  The  Siege  ofLondonderry,  in  1689,  pp.  85-8:  A  letter  from  Colonel  Walker,  giving  a  Ul 
account  of  the  treachery  of  the  late  governor  of  Londonderry,  [n.  d.  ];  Story,  A  Continuation  of  the  Impartial 
History  of  the  Wars  of  Ireland,  p.  4;  Milligan,  History  of  the  Siege  of  Londonderry,  pp.  102-7. 
18  HMC,  Tweyth  Report,  House  ofLords  MSS,  1689-1690,  pp.  162-3,171:  'Instructions  to  our  trusty  and 
well-beloved  Lieut.  Col.  Lundy',  21  Feb,  1689;  'Instructions  for  Robert  Lundy  Esq.  ',  12  Mar.  1689;  HMC, 
Ormonde  MSS,  ii.  318-19:  Report  by  Lord  Dartmouth  and  Thomas  Phillips  on  the  fortifications  in  Ireland 
(Ulster),  24  Mar.  1686;  C.  D.  Milligan,  Ae  Walls  ofDerty.  Their  Building,  Defending,  and  Preserving,  Part  I 
(Londonderry,  1948),  pp.  79-82. 
19  Simms,  Jacobite  lrelan,  ý  1685-1691,  p.  10  1,  makes  th  is  judicious  judgement  of  Lundy. 
20  J.  Fitzjames,  Memoirs  ofthe  Marshall  Duke  ofBerwick  (London,  1779),  i.  44;  AH  xxi,  nos.  186-8,  pp.  87- 
90:  'Relation  de  cequi  s'est  passd  au  passage  de  la  Rivi&e  de  Fin,  29  avril  1689'  [NS];  'Article  d'une  lettre 
dscrite  par  le  Roy  d'Angleterre  A  Monsieur  de  Roze,  29  avril  1689'  [NS];  Maumont  A  Louvois,  29  avril  1689 
[NS];  Walker,  A  True  Account  of  the  Siege  ofLondon-Derry,  pp.  13-16;  J.  G.  Simms,  'The  Siege  of  Derry', 
IS  A  (1963-1964),  224;  Milligan,  History  ofthe  Siege  ofLondonderry,  pp.  115-16. 35 
that  there  would  be  no  siege  and  if  the  Governor's  conduct  lacked  implacable  courage  then  - 
provided  the  Jacobites  could  be  trusted  to  honour  any  agreement  -  it  perhaps  represented  a 
rare  instance  of  humanity  in  this  conflict. 
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Fig.  1:  The  Siege  ol'i,  ondonderry. 
Diflýring  perceptions  of  trust  were  to  determine  the  course  of  events  over  the 
following  days.  While  at  Omagh  with  Rosen's  detachment,  James  had  decided  not  to  proceed 
onwards  to  Londonderry;  but  on  his  return  to  Dublin  a  dispatch  from  the  Duke  of  Berwick 
reached  him  which  indicated  that  a  personal  appearance  before  the  town  might  indeed  bring  it 
to  surrender  quickly.  Anxious  to  force  the  campaign's  pace,  James  immediately  turned  back, 36 
despite  d'Avaux's  arguments  to  the  contrary.  The  exact  course  of  events  when  he  arrived 
again  in  Londonderry's  environs  on  18  April  remain  unclear  due  to  the  disagreement  of  the 
Jacobite  sources  as  to  whether  James  alone  decided  to  proceed  with  a  sizeable  force  to  the 
heights  overlooking  the  town,  or  whether  Rosen  was  complicit  in  this  advance.  "  The 
important  historical  point  is  that  the  inhabitants  of  the  town  perceived  that  by  this  action  the 
Jacobites  had  transgressed  a  commitment  made  by  their  vanguard  that  no  troops  would  come 
within  four  miles  of  the  town  while  terms  were  being  considered.  Lundy's  approach  was  thus 
laid  threadbare  and  the  Jacobites  were  viewed  as  an  untrustworthy  rabble  who  could  not  be 
relied  upon  to  guarantee  peace.  Consequently,  the  summons  sent  by  James  was  rejected  as 
shots  were  exchanged;  meanwhile,  Lundy  was  unofficially  replaced  as  Governor  by  Major 
Baker  and  the  clergyman,  George  Walker.  "  The  town  had  resolved  to  defend  itself  and  the 
siege  of  Londonderry  had  effectively  begun. 
While  James  and  Rosen  returned  to  Dublin  leaving  Hamilton  and  Maurnont  in 
command,  the  Jacobites  pulled  back  to  establish  headquarters  at  St  Johnstown  and  then  began 
fastening  the  access  points  to  the  town  in  preparation  for  the  advance  of  their  siege  works. 
Notably,  Culmore  Fort  at  the  mouth  of  the  River  Foyle  was  captured  ensuring  that  the 
Jacobites  were  well  placed  to  cut  off  the  sca-based  supply  route  which,  in  the  absence  of  an 
interior  relief  anny,  was  the  town's  main  hope  for  succour.  This  allowed  Hamilton  -  now  in 
sole  command  as  a  result  of  Maumont's  death  during  a  skinnish  for  Pennyburn  Mill  at  the 
rear  of  Culmore  -  to  dispose  his  besieging  force  of  4000  men  on  either  side  of  the  town.  The 
majority  closed  in  from  St  Johnstown  and  Carrigan  heights  on  the  west,  while  two  regiments 
with  some  mortars  were  posted  on  the  other  side  of  the  river:  one  in  Strong's  Orchard 
directly  opposite  Londonderry  and  the  second  in  a  wooded  area  to  the  south.  In  these  early 
stages,  the  town  with  some  7000  defenders  overcame  their  immediate  topographical 
disadvantages  to  mount  several  effective  sallies.  Indeed,  the  Jacobites  were  badly  galled 
holding  Pennyburn  Mill,  but  more  significantly  they  were  denied  the  important  post  of 
WindmillHill.  The  capture  of  this  elevation  just  500  yards  from  Bishop's  Gate,  which  was 
the  only  one  of  the  town's  four  gates  to  be  additionally  protected  by  a  ravelin,  would  have 
2'A  Life  ofJames  the  Second,  pp.  332-3;  A  Jacobite  Narrative,  p.  62;  Nigociations  de  M.  Le  Comte 
D  Avaux,  pp.  101  -6,109-13:  d'Avaux  au  Roy,  27  avril,  6  mai  1689  [NS];  AHxxi,  no.  190,  pp.  91-2:  Pusignan 
a  Louvois,  5  mai  1689  [NS]. 37 
provided  an  ideal  location  on  which  to  position  batteries  against  the  defenders'  strong  point 
and  close  in  the  siege.  "  Nonetheless,  even  if  General  Ramsay  had  been  successful  at 
Windmill,  it  is  arguable  whether  Hamilton  could  have  exploited  the  opportunity  due  to  his 
lack  of  heavy  siege  ordnance.  Indeed,  such  was  his  dearth  of  equipment,  that  it  has  been 
provocatively  questioned  whether  the  action  at  Londonderry  should  be  labelled  a  'siege';  the 
word  'blockade'  has  been,  instead,  suggested  as  more  appropriate.  "  Rosen's 
correspondence,  once  back  at  Londonderry  in  June,  leaves  little  doubt  that  the  Jacobites 
considered  their  operation  hindered  by  this  general  lack  of  war  supplies.  By  default,  blockade 
was  effectively  all  the  Jacobites  could  enforce,  and  their  chief  engineer  at  Londonderry, 
Massd,  considered  it  a  poor  blockade  to  boot.  Undoubtedly,  though,  the  inhabitants  of  the 
town  considered  themselves  besieged  and  this  was  significant  in  strengthening  their  resolve.  " 
Notwithstanding,  throughout  May  the  realisation  that  only  a  relief  operation  sent  up  the  River 
Foyle  could  prevent  Londonderry  being  secured  for  James  became  common  ground  for 
Jacobites  and  inhabitants  allke. 
London's  knowledge  of  the  unfolding  events  at  Londonderry  was  uneven.  As  the 
preparations  for  the  dispatch  of  Cunningham  and  Richards  were  reaching  completion,  the 
King  decided  to  send  an  additional  two  regiments  -  Major-General  Kirke's"  and  Sir  John 
Hanmer's  -  to  aid  the  defence  of  the  town.  Although  many  of  the  transports  for  these 
regiments  were  ready  from  10  April,  the  convoy  had  still  to  depart  when  news  came  through 
in  late  April  of  the  impending  return  of  Cunningham  and  Richards.  Initially,  this  was  thought 
to  signify  that  Londonderry  was  lost  and  some  supply  ships  which  were  just  about  to  depart 
were  ordered  to  stay.  Shortly  thereafter  came  the  accurate  report  that  the  troops  had  been 
sent  away  while  the  town  remained  in  loyal  Protestant  hands.  Furious,  William  focused  his 
22  C.  O'Kelly,  Macariae  Excidium,  or  The  Destruction  of  Cyprus,  ed.  J.  C.  O'Callaghan  (Dublin,  1850),  p.  33; 
Walker,  A  True  Account  ofthe  Siege  ofLondon-Derry,  pp.  16-19;  Simms,  Jacobite  lrelan4  1685-1691,  pp. 
99-100. 
23  AH  xxi,  no.  189,,  p.  90:  Pusignan  A  Rozc,  I  mai  1689  [NS];  NJgociations  de  M.  Le  Comte  DAvaux,  p.  117, 
160:  d'Avaux  A  Louvois,  6,18  mai  1689  [NS];  Walker,  A  True  Account  of  the  Siege  ofLondon-Derry,  pp.  9- 
10;  20-2;  Berwick,  Memoirs,  i.  48-52;  A  Jacobite  Narrative,  pp.  63-4. 
24  Simms,  'The  Siege  of  Derry',  pp.  221-2,232-3,  discusses  this  point. 
25  AH  xxi,  nos.  244,254,263,  pp.  168,175-7,182-3:  Roze  au  Roy  dAngleterre,  6,15  juin  1689;  Roze  i 
Melfort,  29  juin  1689;  Nigociations  de  M.  Le  Comte  DA  vaux  en  Irlande  (1689-1690),  Supplementary 
Volume,  ed.  J.  Hogan  (Dublin,  195  8),  nos.  [B]  1,  IV,  pp.  34-5,3  7-8:  Roze  i  d'Avaux,  18,28  juillet  1689  [NS]; 
Walker,  A  True  Account  of  the  Siege  ofLondon-Derry,  passim;  Story,  A  Continuation  ofthe  Impartial 
History,  pp.  3-4;  S.  Mulloy,  'French  Engineers  with  the  Jacobite  Army  in  Ireland,  1689-1691',  IS  xv  (1982- 
1983),  223. 38 
displeasure  into  ordering  four  regiments  to  be  sent  to  the  town  and  wrote  to  the  garrison 
about  his  determination  to  provide  for  their  relief.  " 
Within  a  couple  of  days,  this  decision  gained  a  sense  of  urgency  and  a  specific 
operational  context  when  the  King's  tactical  and  strategic  position  in  Ireland  suffered  a 
reverse.  On  I  May,  off  Ireland's  south-west  coast,  Admiral  Herbert  had  engaged  the  French 
squadron  commanded  by  Chfiteaurenauh.  "  Although  the  result  of  the  ship  battle  was 
ambiguous,  Chateaurenault  had  managed  to  escort  the  supply  vessels  with  troops  and 
provisions  aboard  safely  into  Bantry  Bay  for  unloading.  In  the  short  term,  the  Williamite 
resistance  in  Ireland  faced  an  augmented  and  better  provisioned  Jacobite  force  whose 
strategic  presence,  more  importantly,  seemed  secured  by  an  open  sea-based  supply  route  from 
France.  " 
Given  these  circumstances,  it  was  fortunate  that  the  preparations  previously 
completed  for  the  aborted  dispatch  of  Kirke's  and  Hanmer's  regiments  required  only 
augmentation  to  make  ready  the  new  force  for  departure.  As  these  two  regiments  were  still 
at  Liverpool,  they  were  chosen  to  be  sent,  while  the  other  half  of  the  force  could  be  swiftly 
supplied  by  the  two  returned  regiments.  Cunningham  and  Richards  were  not  however  to  be 
afforded  a  second  chance  at  Londonderry  and  they  were  relived  of  their  colonelcies,  to  be 
replaced  by  William  Stuart  and  Sir  George  St  George.  "  Colonel  Trelawny  was  put  in  charge 
of  the  remaining  organisation  of  this  force,  including  hiring  the  transports  and  procuring  the 
26  There  are  many  variations  in  the  spelling  of  both  Percy  Kirke's  forename  and  surname.  I  have  adopted  the 
versions  in  the  DNB  (London,  1909),  xi.  214. 
27  CPSD,  1689-1690,  pp.  77,80:  Nottingham  to  Herbert,  25  Apr.  1689;  Nottingham  to  the  Officer,  or 
Commander-in-Chief,  and  Magistrates  of  Londonderry,  28  Apr.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  3/1,  pp.  13,16,22-3,30: 
Board  Minutes,  21,26  Mar.,  6,16  Apr.  1689;  HMC,  Twelfth  Report,  House  of  Lords  MSS,  1689-1690,  pp. 
172,174-6:  At  the  Committee  [for  the  Affairs  of  Ireland],  18  Mar.,  5,6,8  Apr.  1689;  'Instructions  to  Peircy 
Kirke,  Esq',  3  Mar.  1689;  'Instructions  to  Sir  John  Hanmer',  3  Mar.  1689;  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  ii.  201,203-5: 
Nottingham  to  Herbert,  19,25,30  Apr.  1689. 
28  There  are  various  spellings  of  Chiteaurenault.  I  have  adopted  the  one  given  in  the  Dictionnaire  de 
Blographie  Francalse  (Paris,  1959),  viii.  778. 
29  Memoirs  Relating  to  the  Lord  Torrington,  ed.  J.  K.  Laughton  (London,  1889),  pp.  37-8;  S.  Martin-Leake, 
The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  ed.  G.  Callender  (London,  1918),  i.  21-2;  Life  of  Captain  Stephen  Martin,  1666- 
1740,  ed.  C.  R.  Markham  (London,  1895),  pp.  7-8;  J.  Burchett,  A  Complete  History  of  the  Most  Remarkable 
Transactions  at  Sea  (London,  1720),  pp.  416-17;  C.  de  la  Ronci6re,  Histoire  de  la  Marine  FranVaise  vi.  Le 
Cripuscule  du  Grand  Regne  LApogge  de  La  Guerre  de  Course  (Paris,  1932),  pp.  47-52;  P.  Le  Fevre,  'The 
Battle  of  Bantry  Bay,  I  May  1689',  IS  xviii  (1990-1992),  1-12;  Mulloy,  'The  French  Navy  and  the  Jacobite 
War  in  Ireland,  1689-1691',  pp.  24-5. 
30  PRO,  WO  4/1,  p.  133:  Schomberg  to  Trelawny,  I  May  1689;  PRO,  WO  515,  p.  150:  Order  to  Major- 
General  Kirke  and  Colonel  Trelawny,  2  May  1689;  SP  44/166,  p.  37:  Commissions  for  Sir  George  St  George 
to  be  Colonel  of  Colonel  Richards  Regiment  of  Foot  and  for  Colonel  William  Stuart  to  be  Colonel  of  Colonel 
Cunningham's  Regiment  of  Foot,  I  May  1689. 39 
provisions.  This  arrangement  may  have  been  a  consequence  of  the  increasingly  fractious 
relationship  which  had  emerged  between  the  General  Officer-in-Command,  Percy  Kirke,  and 
the  Navy  Board's  local  officers  when  he  had  been  previously  overseeing  the  intended 
departure  of  his  and  Hanmer's  regiments.  Or,  more  likely,  it  reflected  the  fact  no  naval 
captain  was  to  hold  a  senior  orjoint  command  in  the  crossing  to  Londonderry.  In  that 
respect  there  was  little  difference  between  Kirke's  Instructions  and  those  which  governed  the 
early  supply  of  troops.  However,  on  this  occasion  it  was  positively  prescribed  that  Kirke  was 
to  ensure  the  entry  of  his  troops  into  the  town  if  it  remained  in  Protestant  possession.  31  If 
faced  with  a  loyal  town  but  with  its  access  barred,  Kirke  was  to  fight  his  way  in.  There  had 
been  no  such  implication  arising  from  Cunningham's  and  Richards's  Instructions  and  this,  in 
part,  provided  the  combined  operational  context  as  distinct  from  a  straightforward 
transportation  procedure.  The  other  contributory  factor  was  the  significant  naval  input  when 
Kirke's  convoyjoined  Captain  Rooke's  Irish  station  squadron.  Since  the  engagement  at 
Bantry  Bay,  Rooke  had  been  plying  the  northern  reaches  of  the  Irish  sea  with  orders  to  give 
countenance  to  any  action  to  reduce  Ireland.  His  subsequent  disposal  of  his  small  squadron  in 
support  of  Kirke  completed  the  amphibious  operational  context  for  the  relief  of 
Londonderry.  " 
Kirke's  squadron  of  three  men-of-war  and  some  24  auxiliary  vessels  eventually  left 
Hoylake  on  30  May,  though  with  only  three  out  of  the  four  regiments  aboard.  St  George's 
men  had  been  billeted  separately  at  Chester  and  were  to  have  embarked  from  there,  but  it 
would  seem  that  some  confusion  occurred  over  the  number  of  transport  vessels  required. 
During  the  crossing,  the  wind  proved  variable  and,  at  one  stage,  Kirke  was  forced  into 
Ramsey  Bay  on  the  Isle  of  Man.  This  caused  a  four  day  delay  but  he  managed  to  complete 
the  rendezvous  with  Rooke's  squadron  at  Red  Bay  off  the  Antrim  coast  on  8  June.  The 
combined  force  then  sailed  on  a  north-westerly  course  but  again  encountered  veering  winds 
which  caused  a  further  four  day  delay  near  Rathlin  Island,  some  six  leagues  from  Lough 
Foyle.  Kirke,  nonetheless,  used  this  time  to  garner  intelligence  on  the  access  to  Londonderry 
31  SP  44/166,  pp.  32-7:  'Instructions  for  Our  Trusty  &  Welbeloved  Piercy  Kirk  Esq.  ',  29  Apr.  1689; 
'Instruction  for  Our  Trusty  and  Welbeloved  Charles  Trelawny  Esq.  ',  29  Apr.  1689;  Warrant  to  Commander  of 
Ship  ---------  29  Apr.  1689;  Warrant  to  Ships  hired  by  Colonel  Trelawny,  29  Apr.  1689;  PRO,  WO  4/1,  pp. 
128-9:  Blathwayt  to  Kirke,  5,6  Apr.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  1/3558,  f  115:  the  Navy  Board  to  the  Admiralty,  15 
Apr.  1689,  and  enclosure,  f  115:  Anderton  to  the  Navy  Board,  12  Apr.  1689. 
32  RMC,  Finch  MSS,  ii.  209,212,219-20:  Rooke  to  Nottingham,  II  May,  1,20  June  1689;  Anon,  The  Life 
and  Glorious  Actions  ofthe  Right  Honourable  Sir  George  Rooke,  P  (London,  1713),  pp.  3-10. 40 
by  dispatching  a  yacht  up  the  Lough.  It  brought  back  the  dispiriting  news  that  the  French  had 
made  attempts  to  blockade  the  river,  though  there  was  no  confmmation  about  the  nature  of 
the  obstacle.  " 
Spurred  on  by  news  of  the  relief  expedition,  the  French  had  blocked  the  access  up  the 
River  Foyle  by  placing  a  boom  across  a  narrow  part  of  the  river  just  above  Brookhall.  The 
naval  officer,  Pointis,  had  taken  responsibility  for  this  task  and  rather  incautiously  boasted  of 
its  strength,  though  he  also  indicated  that  additional  security  would  be  provided  by  the 
construction  of  a  second  boom  up-river.  It  has  been  shown  that  the  first  boom  sank  and  that 
only  the  second  -  constructed  from  fir  wood  instead  of  the  heavier  oak  -  remained  in  place. 
Even  if  Pointis's  description  is  unreliable,  the  second  boom,  with  heavy  gun  redoubts  at  each 
end,  was  a  formidable  obstacle,  particularly  as  the  natural  shelter  of  the  Lough  would  hinder  a 
vessel  building  up  any  momentum  with  which  to  strike  it.  "  This  was  how  it  seemed  to 
Kirke's  Council  of  War,  which  met  in  the  period  after  his  ships  and  the  three  smallest  vessels 
from  Rooke's  squadron  had  come  to  anchor  just  over  a  mile  below  Culmore  Fort  on  16  June. 
The  Council  concluded  that  the  river  was  impassable  and  resolved  to  await  reinforcements 
before  attempting  a  descent  elsewhere  on  the  coast.  "  This  decision  was  condemned  by 
contemporaries  and  subsequently  by  historians  as  a  prelude  for  weeks  of  inactivity"'  but, 
within  the  context  of  Kirke's  command  of  a  combined  operation,  the  charge  is  unjustified. 
Shortly  after  the  Council's  decision  to  await  reinforcements,  Kirke  began  to  consider 
alternatives  to  the  passage  up  the  river  which,  although  they  might  not  immediately  relieve 
Londonderry,  could  put  pressure  upon  the  Jacobites.  There  was  also  the  pressing  need  to 
exercise  his  soldiers  who  had  been  aboard  ship  for  nearly  a  month  and  now  faced  an  indefinite 
period  of  inaction.  The  Bonadventure,  the  Greyhound  and  the  Kingfisher  ketch  were  sent  to 
33  Anon,  A  Particular  Journal  of  Major  Gen.  Kirk's  Voyagefrom  Leverpoole,  to  his  Safe  Arrival  at  London- 
Derry  (London,  1689);  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  ii.  212:  Rooke  to  Nottingham,  I  June  1689;  Martin-Leake,  The  Life 
ofSir  John  Leake,  i.  25-6;  The  Life  and  Glorious  Actions  of  the  Right  Honourable  Sir  George  Rooke,  K!,  pp. 
3-5;  CSPD,  1689-1690,  pp.  219-20:  Schomberg  to  the  King,  II  Aug.  1689;  K.  Ferguson,  'The  Organisation 
of  King  William's  Army  in  Ireland,  1689-1692',  IS  xviii  (1990-1992),  64  n.  9. 
34  I-1MC,  Finch  MSS,  ii.  231,233:  Nottingham  to  Schomberg,  27  July  1689;  Nottingham  to  the  King,  2  Aug. 
1689;  CSPD,  1689-1690,  pp.  147-5:  Pointis  to  [the  King  of  France?  ],  13  June  1689;  Walker,  A  True  Account 
ofthe  Siege  ofLondon-Derry,  pp.  26-7. 
35  I-1MC,  Finch  MSS,  ii.  219-20:  Rooke  to  Nottingham,  20  June  1689;  Martin-Leake,  A  Life  ofSir  John  Leake, 
i.  26;  Anon,  The  Life  and  Glorious  Actions  of  the  Right  Honourable  Sir George  Rooke,  R,  pp.  4-5;  Powley, 
The  Naval  Side  ofKing  William's  War,  pp.  226-8,  includes  the  minute  of  the  Council  of  War  held  on  19  June. 
36  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  ii.  233:  Nottingham  to  the  King,  2  Aug.  1689;  Simms,  'The  Siege  of  Derry',  pp.  230-1; 
Murtagh,  'The  War  in  Ireland,  1689-1691',  p.  69  Milligan,  History  of  the  Siege  ofLondondeny  1689,  pp. 
229-34. 41 
reconnoitre  Inch  Island  in  Lough  Swilly.  Located  north-westwards  from  Londonderry,  Inch 
Island  could  provide  a  bridgehead  through  county  Donegal  and  allow  Kirke  to  establish  a  line 
of  communication  with  the  other  remaining  centre  of  Protestant  resistance  at  Enniskillen  and, 
more  importantly,  to  threaten  the  Jacobite  rear.  On  28  June  the  Bonadventure  reported  back 
and  four  days  later  -  at  a  post-dinner  Council  of  War  held  aboard  the  Swallow  -  it  was 
resolved  that  Rooke  and  Colonel  Stuart  would  lead  an  operation  to  capture  Inch  Island.  By 
10  July,  Stuart's  detachment  of  some  600  troops  had  landed  at  two  different  points  on  the 
island  and  within  six  days  a  bridgehead  to  the  mainland  had  been  secured  with  gun  redoubts 
on  either  side  of  the  passage,  supported  by  the  Greyhound  and  the  Kingfisher  ketch.  This 
success  allowed  Kirke  to  bring  a  majority  of  the  remaining  troops  up  out  of  Lough  Foyle  and 
to  land  them  on  Inch  Island.  Although  the  absence  of  any  opposition,  and  the  fact  that  it  did 
not  subsequently  give  rise  to  further  action,  may  subsequently  have  provided  grounds  for 
dismissing  this  operation,  this  was  certainly  not  Rosen's  attitude  at  the  time.  The  French 
General  clearly  saw  the  danger  for  the  Jacobites  of  being  caught  in  a  pincer  between  Kirke 
from  the  north  and  the  Enniskilleners  from  the  south.  "' 
Rosen's  fears  were  grounded  in  the  lack  of  progress  with  the  siege.  On  his  return  to 
Londonderry,  he  had  tried  to  force  the  pace  onwards  and  extra  equipment  was  brought  up  to 
facilitate  a  heavier  bombardment  of  the  town.  However,  a  second  attempt  to  take  Windmill 
Hill  in  the  first  week  of  June  had  been  bloodily  rebuffed  as  was  the  assault  led  by  the  Earl  of 
Clancarty  on  28  June  against  the  bastion  at  Butcher's  Gate.  Even  Rosen's  primitive  attempt 
at  psychological  warfare  by  driving  a  number  of  captured  Protestants  under  the  walls  failed, 
when  the  garrison  replied  in  an  equally  savage  manner  by  manufacturing  a  gallows  on  the 
walls  accompanied  by  the  threat  to  kill  the  prisoners  held  inside.  At  these  macabre  events, 
Hamilton,  with  whom  Rosen  had  an  uneasy  relationship,  ordered  those  under  the  walls  to  be 
released.  Jacobite  prospects  brightened  slightly  in  July  with  the  tentative  beginnings  of 
negotiations  with  the  garrison  but  the  inhabitants,  although  in  severely  straitened 
circumstances,  had  been  cheered  by  the  arrival  of  Kirke  (even  if  in  Lough  Swilly)  and 
37  Walker,  A  True  Account  ofthe  Siege  ofLondon-Derry,  p.  28:  Major  General  Kirk's  Letter  to  Mr.  Walker; 
Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  L  26;  Anon,  The  Life  and  GloriousA  ctions  ofSir  George  Rooke, 
R,  pp.  5-6;  AHxxi,  no.  239,  pp.  159-61:  Fumeron  A  [Louvois],  I  aoOt  1689  [NS];  Simms,  Jacobite  Ireland 
1685-1691,  p.  I  10;  Powley,  The  Naval  Side  ofKing  William's  War,  pp.  233-5. 42 
therefore  procrastinated.  "  In  effect,  by  mid-July,  the  Jacobites  hoped  that  the  town  would 
capitulate  due  to  starvation  before  Kirke  could  make  an  attempt  up-river  with  the  relief 
It  would  seem  that  the  decisive  factor  was  a  letter  Kirke  received  from  Londonderry's 
governors  Walker  and  John  Michelburne  who  had  replaced  Major  Baker  following  his  death 
from  disease  in  June.  This  correspondence  reinforced  previous  pleas  emphasising  the  town's 
dire  need  which  were  emotionally  focused  upon  alarming  images  of  dog  and  cat  forming  the 
inhabitants'  staple  diet.  More  importantly  it  claimed  (falsely)  that  the  Jacobites  had  removed 
their  ordnance  from  Culmore  Fort  and  that  the  boom  was  broken.  Encouraged  by  this  news 
Kirke  returned  to  Lough  Foyle  with  three  heavily  laden  merchantmen  determined  to  relieve 
the  town.  Preparatory  to  this  Kirke  asked  Rooke  to  provide  naval  support  for  the  riverine 
operation.  Then  patrolling  in  the  Irish  sea,  Rooke  received  Kirke's  letter  on  22  July  and 
immediately  sailed  for  Londonderry  in  the  Deptford  along  with  Captain  Leake's  Dartmouth.  " 
An  alternative  interpretation  of  these  circumstances  highlights  London's  increasing 
impatience  with  Kirke  which  led  the  King  to  positively  order  that  an  attempt  be  made  to 
break  the  boom.  Undoubtedly,  William  did  believe  Kirke's  assessment  of  the  boom's  strength 
to  be  a  guess  and  he  considered  it  reasonable  that  his  General  make  at  least  one  attempt  up- 
river;  but  by  agreeing  in  principle  to  despatch  reinforcements  if  the  boom  remained  intact,  he 
demonstrated  some  sympathy  with  Kirke's  alternative  amphibious  strategy.  More 
significantly,  E.  B.  Powley  has  shown  that  the  order  from  London  did  not  reach  Kirke  until 
after  he  had  decided  to  return  to  Lough  Foyle.  40 
In  earlier  correspondence  about  the  difficulties  he  foresaw  in  getting  through  to 
Londonderry,  Kirke  had  stressed  the  fact  that  the  strategically  placed  Culmore  Fort  was  held 
38  HMC,  Eighth  Report,  Talbot  de  Malahide  MSS,  p.  494-5:  Melfort  to  Hamilton,  7  June,  4  July  1689;  King, 
The  State  of  the  Protestants,  pp.  196-8;  A  Jacobite  Narrative,  pp.  79-80;  A  Life  ofJames  the  Second,  pp.  365- 
6;  Walker,  A  True  Account  of  the  Siege  ofLondon-Derry,  pp.  25-6,29-34;  Milligan,  History  ofthe  Siege  of 
Londonderry  1689,  pp.  203-11. 
39  Powley,  The  Naval  Side  ofKing  TVilliam's  War,  pp.  238-40  includes  a  copy  of  the  letter  of  19  July  to  Kirke 
from  Michelburne  and  Walker;  Walker,  A  True  Account  of  the  Siege  ofLondon-Derry,  pp.  8  8-92:  Walker  to 
'Sir'  [Kirke?  ],  26  June  1689;  Morney,  Limes,  and  Gbrastanes  to  'Sir'  [Kirke?  ],  26  June  1689;  Walker,  Baker, 
Michelburne,  Fortescue,  Morrison,  Strong,  and  Davys  to  'Sir'  [Kirke?  ],  n.  d.;  RMC,  Finch  MSS,  ii.  233-4: 
Rooke  to  Nottingham,  2  Aug.  1689;  Anon,  7he  Life  and  Glorious  Actions  of  the  Right  Honourable  Sir 
George  Rooke,  K,  pp.  6-7. 
"0  Macaulay,  The  History  ofEngland,  iii.  1519,1519  n.  2;  Simms,  Jacobite  Ireland  1685-1691,  p.  III  claims 
that  Kirke's  return  to  Lough  Foyle  was  a  product  of  both  Walker's  letter  and  the  King's  order;  Dwyer,  The 
Siege  ofLondonderry  in  1689,  pp.  208-9:  Schomberg  to  Kirke,  3  July  1689;  CSPD,  1689-1690,  p.  199: 
Schomberg  to  the  King,  26  July  1689;  Powley,  The  Naval  Side  ofKing  William's  War,  pp.  250-2. 43 
by  the  Jacobites.  "  Although  Kirke  had  been  told  that  the  guns  had  been  withdrawn,  he  could 
not  be  certain  and,  therefore,  in  this  attempt  up  the  Foyle,  the  Dartmouth  was  to  draw  the  fire 
from  the  fort  and  the  other  gun  batteries  possibly  mounted  nearby,  while  the  two 
merchantmen  -  the  Mounyby  and  the  Phamix  -  along  with  the  Swallow's  long-boat,  would 
proceed  up-river  in  an  attempt  to  break  the  boom.  On  28  July,  Captain  Leake  ably  executed 
this  task  and  the  other  vessels  -  taking  advantage  of  a  northerly  wind  -  safely  passed  by. 
However,  just  as  they  approached  the  boom  -  which  they  found  still  intact  -  the  wind  dropped 
and  only  the  Mounyoy  hit  the  obstacle  with  any  force.  Nonetheless,  her  momentum  was  not 
sufficient  to  take  her  clean  through  and  she  rebounded  on  to  the  nearby  bank,  effectively 
leaving  her  a  sitting  target  for  the  Jacobites  swarming  nearby.  With  the  Mounyoy's  Master 
dead,  the  crew  combined  the  recoil  from  the  discharge  of  the  vessel's  guns  with  a  rising  tide 
to  refloat.  Meanwhile,  the  sailors  in  Swallow's  long-boat  had  set  about  the  boom  with  their 
axes  and  cutlasses,  considerably  weakening  the  structure.  When  the  Pheenix  made  a  run 
against  the  boom,  she  was  able  to  break  clean  through  and  was  then  shortly  followed  by  the 
other  victualling  ships;  provisions  and  troops  could  now  be  landed  at  the  town's  Shipquay 
Gate.  42 
A  timely  English  combined  operation  had  relieved  Londonderry  and  opened  the  sea- 
based  supply  route.  Despite  a  desultory  attempt  to  continue  their  fire  from  the  trenches, 
within  a  couple  of  days  the  French  raised  the  siege  and  retreated  towards  Dublin.  "  It  is 
difficult  to  add  to  Simms's  judgement  that  this  operation  had  been  'an  astonishing  feat'  in 
dead  calm  conditions  and  under  such  close  range  fire,  though  at  the  time  the  defenders' 
resolve  was  equally  commended.  "'  Approximately  a  month  after  the  relief  of  Londonderry, 
the  London  book-seller,  Richard  Lapthorne,  wrote  to  his  Devon  correspondent,  Richard 
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Coffin,  that  Ireland  had  received  a  'death  wound  in  order  to  its  reduction'.  "'  In  many 
respects,  this  was  quite  correct.  In  conjunction  with  the  notable  successes  over  the  Jacobites 
around  Enniskillen,  and  in  particular  the  defeat  of  Mountcashel  at  Newton-Butler,  the  north 
had  been  secured  for  William.  He  could  now  land  his  army  of  20  000  men  to  effect  the 
conquest  of  the  whole  isle;  while  the  prospect  that  the  Irish  and  the  Scots  might  combine  their 
resistance  at  this  moment  seemed  unlikely,  especially  since  the  death  at  Killiekrankie  of  the 
Scottish  Jacobite,  Viscount  Dundee.  Nonetheless,  the  wound  would  fester  for  a  further  two 
years  before  proving  fatal,  and  during  that  time  a  second  combined  operation  undertaken 
against  south  Ireland  was,  militarily,  to  prove  as  significant  as  the  one  recently  completed  in 
the  north  at  Londonderry. 
I.  iii:  The  Capture  of  Cork  and  Kinsale,  September-October  1690. 
The  progress  of  the  war  in  Ireland  since  securing  the  north  of  the  country  in  the  summer  of 
1689  had  not  been  an  unqualified  success  for  William.  He  had  appointed  Marshall 
Schomberg,  to  command  his  army  in  the  country  but,  after  landing  with  the  troops  at  Belfast 
in  June  1689,  Schomberg  only  advanced  as  far  as  Dundalk.  There  he  encamped  for  the 
winter  but  the  site  was  so  ill-chosen  that  great  numbers  of  the  troops  died  of  sickness.  "" 
Frustrated,  William  crossed  to  Ireland  for  the  following  years  campaign  and  at  the  beginning 
of  July  1690,  defeated  James  at  the  battle  of  the  Boyne.  "  Undoubtedly  this  battle  caused 
James  to  flee  his  former  kingdoms  again  and  allowed  William  to  capture  Dublin;  however,  the 
Jacobites  were  not  yet  a  spent  force  and  they  still  held  towns  and  territory  in  the  west  and 
south  of  the  country.  After  the  Boyne,  a  Jacobite  rendezvous  had  been  effected  at  Limerick 
where  the  leadership  resolved  to  defend  the  line  of  the  River  Shannon.  William  did  flirt  with 
possible  peace  initiatives,  but  it  quickly  became  clear  that  their  political  cost  in  England  would 
be  too  great;  and  military  necessity  then  drove  him  forward  to  besiege  Limerick.  It  was  in 
front  of  this  town's  walls  that  Willliam's  1690  campaign  in  Ireland  ground  to  a  halt.  The 
progress  of  the  siege  through  August  was  slow,  hampered  not  only  by  poor  weather  but  also 
by  the  ambush  of  his  siege  train  at  Ballyneety  by  the  mercurial  Irish  Cavalry  officer,  Patrick 
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46  Sir  John  Dalrymple,  Memoirs  Of  Great  Britain  andIreland(2  edn,  London,  1773),  ii.  29-31,40-3,45-8, 
51-7:  Schomberg  to  King  William,  20  Sept.,  6,8,12  Oct.,  4  Nov.,  26,27  Dec.  1689;  J.  Childs,  'A  Patriot  for 
Whom?  "For  God  and  For  Honour":  Marshall  Schomberg',  HTxxxviii  (July  1988),  46-52;  J.  G.  Simms,  ' 
Schomberg  at  Dundalk,  1689',  IS  x  (1971-1972),  14-25. 45 
Sarsfield.  Although  an  assault  was  launched  in  late  August,  over  2000  troops  were  lost 
without  the  walls  being  breached  and  it  was  then  clear  that  the  siege  would  have  to  be 
raised.  " 
Contributing  to  William's  difficulties  in  Ireland  throughout  the  summer  was  England's 
unsettled  state  since  Tourville's  naval  victory  over  Torrington  at  the  battle  of  Beachy  Head. 
From  the  end  of  June,  the  French  unquestionably  had  command  of  the  channel  and  there  were 
grave  fears  in  England  that  Louis  would  exploit  this  circumstance  to  mount  an  invasion. 
Queen  Mary  and  the  Council  left  in  executive  control  of  the  country  by  William  during  his 
absence  urgently  requested  that  he  return  home  and  bring  with  him  regiments  to  bolster 
England's  defences.  The  King  agreed  to  transfer  up  to  a  total  of  ten  regiments  from  Ireland 
and  Flanders  but  he  did  not  himself  return  immediately;  and,  when  in  late  July  he  did  make  to 
leave  Ireland,  his  desire  to  direct  the  siege  of  Limerick  caused  him  to  change  his  mind  at  the 
last  moment.  In  the  event,  aside  from  a  brief  landing  at  Teignmouth  during  which  the  town 
was  burnt,  the  French  missed  the  opportunity  to  exploit  their  sea  command  but  there  still 
remained  much  unease  in  London.  ""  It  was  therefore  unsurprising  that  when  the  commander 
of  the  troops  in  England,  the  Earl  of  Marlborough,  proposed  an  expedition  to  capture  the 
southern  Irish  ports  of  Cork  and  Kinsale,  he  met  a  frosty  reaction. 
Marlborough's  concern  with  Ireland  had  been  motivated  by  his  perception  that 
William's  efforts  were  spluttering  to  a  standstill  in  front  of  Limerick  and  his  appreciation  of 
the  strategic  benefit  that  might  accrue  from  capturing  the  principal  ports  of  entry  for  French 
supply.  By  requesting  some  5000  troops  which  he  would  lead  in  an  assault  against  these 
ports  with  the  navy  providing  support,  Marlborough  recognised  amphibious  warfare's 
potential  to  reinvigorate  stalemated  military  circumstances  -a  quality  of  his  generalship  which 
was  to  be  more  fully  developed  when  he  commanded  the  Grand  Alliance's  armies  during  the 
War  of  the  Spanish  Succession.  Support  was  only  forthcoming,  however,  from  Secretary 
Nottingham  and  Admiral  Russell,  and  the  Executive  Council  resolved  to  reject  his  proposal 
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on  the  grounds  of  the  lateness  of  the  year  and  the  reduction  it  would  cause  in  England's  home 
defence.  The  Queen,  though  with  no  great  personal  liking  for  Marlborough,  did  acknowledge 
that  the  Council  had  not  been  unanimous  and  sent  the  plan  to  William  for  his  decision. 
Despite  opposition  from  his  fellow  Dutch  generals,  the  King  promptly  wrote  home  his 
approval.  " 
William's  crucial  support  of  Marlborough's  project  should  not  have  surprised  the 
Council.  For  the  King,  the  capture  of  the  two  Munster  ports  held  the  potential  to  redress  the 
tactical  failures  of  the  1690  campaign  as  it  got  bogged  down  besieging  Limerick.  William, 
like  Marlborough,  recognised  the  strategic  benefits  that  could  also  be  gained  from  closing  the 
Jacobites'  principal  supply  route  from  France  and  winning  for  the  Williamite  cause  two  well 
developed  ports  on  the  southern  Irish  coast.  "  William  had  previously  championed  a  similar 
operation  to  capture  Kinsale  in  late  1689.  Then,  intelligence  returns  indicating  that  Kinsale 
was  poorly  defended  by  only  one  regiment  accelerated  preparations  that  were  already  in  hand 
for  an  attack  upon  the  port.  Rear-Admiral  Lord  Berkeley  and  Colonel  Trelawny  were  to  have 
commanded  a  force  of  about  half  the  size  that  Marlborough  would  subsequently  lead.  Only 
the  onset  of  stormy  weather  at  the  end  of  November  when  the  squadron  was  ready  to  sail 
caused  the  operation  to  be  abandoned.  "  Marlborough's  proposals  in  August  1690  were 
therefore  (perhaps  deliberately)  pushing  at  an  open  door  in  terms  of  King  William's 
commitment  to  both  the  objectives  of  the  operation  and  its  character. 
Within  ten  days  of  William  sending  his  approval,  Marlborough  received  warrants  to 
embark  aboard  the  main  fleet  at  Portsmouth  eight  regiments  of  foot  and  2000  marine  soldiers. 
This  reflected  the  fact  that  his  Instructions  effectively  put  him  in  charge  of  both  the  land  and 
sea  elements  of  the  force.  Command  of  the  fleet  was  then  under  a  triple  commission  of 
Killigrew,  Ashby  and  Haddock;  these  Admirals  were  not  ordered  to  obey  Marlborough 
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directly,  but  they  were  to  assist  him  in  attacking  Cork  and  Kinsale.  The  main  Instructions 
were  addressed  to  Marlborough  and  the  responsibility  for  directing  the  attack  rested  with 
him.  The  simplicity  of  the  Instructions  had  probably  facilitated  their  swift  formulation  which 
was  also  the  case  with  the  preparation  for  departure.  The  Admiralty  lost  no  time  in 
assembling  the  fleet  at  Spithead,  while  also  attending  to  the  procurement  of  provisions  and 
the  additional  requirements  of  having  soldiers  aboard  ship  such  as  bedding.  Although  Danby, 
as  part  of  his  constant  critique  on  the  operation,  complained  that  the  troops  had  not  been 
embarked  by  29  September,  on  the  following  day  the  task  was  completed.  Thereafter  the 
only  thing  preventing  the  departure  were  the  contrary  winds  that  kept  the  fleet  at  anchor  off 
Portsmouth  for  three  weeks.  Finally  on  17  September  the  expeditionary  force  weighed.  " 
Demonstrating  the  concern  for  his  men  which  in  later  years  would  cause  him  to  be 
affectionately  nicknamed  'Corporal  John"',  Marlborough  wrote  to  Nottingham  of  his  hopes 
that  the  voyage  would  be  short  as  many  of  his  troops  were  suffering  sickness  from  having 
been  embarked  at  anchor  for  three  weeks.  "  Fortunately,  it  only  took  four  days  for  the  fleet  to 
arrive  on  21  September  off  Crosshaven  near  the  inlet  to  Cork  Harbour.  Both  Crosshaven  and 
the  Passage  West  had  been  mooted  as  potential  landing  sites,  but  the  latter's  location 
opposite  Great  Island  in  Cork  Harbour  meant  a  shorter  march  of  only  some  seven  miles  in 
order  for  the  troops  to  come  up  to  the  town  of  Cork  and  this  factor  probably  caused  it  to  be 
favoured  by  Marlborough.  However,  the  numerous  passageways  of  the  Lee  as  it  discharged 
into  the  estuary  made  entry  into  Cork  Harbour  an  intricate  task,  and  the  fleet's  arrival  not 
only  coincided  with  the  end  of  a  flood  tide,  but  also  the  dropping  of  the  wind.  In  these 
conditions,  the  pilots  refused  to  guide  the  vessels  into  the  harbour  and  the  expeditionary  force 
had  to  ride  at  anchor  for  the  rest  of  the  day.  56 
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The  weather  and  tidal  conditions  on  22  September  proved  suitable  and  the  fleet  began 
to  make  its  way  into  Cork  harbour.  The  lead  ship,  the  Kent,  almost  immediately  encountered 
opposition  on  its  larboard  side  from  a  shore  battery  in  Prince  Rupert's  Tower.  "  Reports  of 
its  strength  vary  from  between  six  to  twenty  guns.  The  fleet  managed  to  silence  it  swiftly  by 
several  vessels  faing  a  broadside  as  they  sailed  by  in  line-ahead;  meanwhile,  a  small  boat  party 
was  landed  to  drive  the  gunners  off,  though  on  reaching  the  emplacement  they  found  it 
deserted  and  guns  had  only  to  be  spiked  for  the  battery  to  be  rendered  permanently  out  of 
commission.  By  early  afternoon  the  ships  had  come  safely  to  anchor  at  Passage  West  and  the 
landing  of  the  soldiers  by  the  ships'  boats  began  in  the  early  hours  of  the  following  day  and 
was  complete  by  late  afternoon.  Four  days  later,  once  all  the  stores  had  been  landed,  the 
main  fleet  -  as  ordered  -  returned  home,  leaving  a  small  squadron  commanded  by  the  Duke  of 
Grafton  to  work  with  the  expeditionary  force.  " 
The  reinforcements  which  the  King  had  promised  Marlborough  from  his  army  in 
Ireland  took  a  circuitous  route  to  Cork.  On  William's  departure  for  England,  a  Council  of 
War  at  the  Tipperary  camp  was  called  by  Count  Sohns  -  temporarily  in  command  -  to 
consider  how  best  to  implement  the  King's  order  which,  in  addition  to  the  emphasis  upon 
supporting  Marlborough's  expedition,  also  included  directions  that  the  Irish  territory 
currently  held  by  the  Williamite  forces  should  be  secured  for  the  winter.  Without  positive 
confirmation  of  Marlborough's  arrival  before  Cork,  the  Council  considered  that  it  had 
insufficient  troops  to  send  immediately  a  sizeable  detachment  to  the  Earl.  In  the  first  instance, 
therefore,  Major-General  Tettau  commanding  two  Danish  battalions  was  sent  in  the  direction 
of  Youghal.  but  with  orders  to  halt  along  the  line  of  the  River  Blackwater,  thus  providing 
cover  for  county  Waterford  where  the  Danish  winter  quarters  were  to  be  based.  Meanwhile, 
Major-General  Gravemoer  was  to  lead  sixteen  cavalry  squadrons  drawn  from  the  Danish, 
Dutch  and  Huguenot  forces  along  with  five  Dragoon  troops,  eastwards  along  the  Blackwater 
Duke  ofMarlborough  to  the  Accession  of  Queen  Anne  (London,  1894),  ii.  164-5.  Exceptionally,  Anon,  A 
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to  Mallow,  just  twenty  miles  north-west  of  Cork.  "'  Neither  detachment  contained  a 
prominent  English  soldier  and  Marlborough's  request  as  he  approached  the  southern  Irish 
coast  that  the  English  major-generals,  Kirke  and  Lanier,  command  the  reinforcements  was 
brushed  aside  by  Ginkel  who  had  now  succeeded  Sohns  as  commander.  Ginkel's  view  was 
that  detachments  of  Gravemoer  and  Tettau  previously  posted  on  the  Blackwater  were  to 
proceed  to  Cork,  while  more  than  3000  horse  and  foot  under  the  Danish  commander,  the 
Duke  of  Wurtemberg,  would  march  from  Cdhir  to  Marlborough's  assistance.  " 
Cork's  garrison  of  over  4000  men  commanded  by  Colonel  MacElligott  was  thus 
threatened  by  a  pincer  as  Williamite  forces  moved  in  to  besiege  the  town  from  its  heights  to 
the  north  and  south.  MacElligott  also  had  no  obvious  sources  of  relief  Jacobite  forces  had 
recently  suffered  reverses  north  and  south  of  Limerick  in  attacking  Birr  Castle,  county  Offaly, 
and  in  attempting  to  occupy  Kilmallock;  while  it  was  also  reported  that  a  move  into  county 
Cork  had  been  repulsed  by  Gravemoer's  cavalry  near  Mallow.  Berwick  did  however  begin  to 
advance  with  a  considerable  force  from  Limerick  towards  Cork  but  the  Marshall  only  got  as 
far  as  Kilmallock  before  he  generously  estimated  the  enemy  force  in  the  region  to  be  too  great 
for  his  8000  men,  and  this  probably  gave  rise  to  Jacobite  scepticism  about  the  feasibility  of 
holding  Cork  that  was  subsequently  attributed  to  Berwick.  "'  Certainly,  the  task  became  even 
more  unlikely  when  MacElligott's  out-guards  failed  to  offer  any  credible  resistance  to  the 
approaching  forces. 
On  landing  at  Passage  West,  Marlborough  had  sent  a  vanguard  under  Colonel  Hales 
towards  Cat  Fort,  on  a  hill  rising  90  feet  above  the  town  and  at  a  distance  of  400  yards  from 
the  walls.  This  building  was  a  small  outwork  to  the  larger  Fort  Elizabeth  which,  at  under  a 
hundred  yards  from  the  city  walls,  provided  the  principal  defence.  The  Jacobites  dispatched  a 
couple  of  Dragoon  troops  to  oppose  Hales,  and  Cramond  fondly  recalls  having  much  fun 
'popping  from  the  hedges'.  "  The  Dragoons  quickly  beat  a  retreat  when  Hales  brought  a 
59  CSPD,  1690-1691,  pp.  111-12,118-19:  'M6moire  pour  mon  cousin  le  Comte  deSolmes',  2  Sept.  1690; 
Resolution  taken  by  Count  de  Solms  ...  as  to  what  had  best  be  done  for  the  King's  service,  according  to  his 
instructions  and  orders,  12  Sept.  1690;  The  Danish  Force  in  Ireland  1690-1691,  eds  K.  Danaher  &  LG. 
Simms  (Dublin,  1962),  nos.  58,59,60,61,  pp.  76-8:  Wurtemberg  to  Harboe,  9,13  Sept,  1690;  Wurtemberg  to 
Christian  V,  12  Sept.  1690;  Munchgaar  to  Harboe,  18  Sept.  1690. 
60  The  Danish  Force  in  Ireland  1690-1691,  no.  62,  pp.  78-90:  Wurtemberg  to  Christian  V,  23  Sept.  1690; 
Journal  of  the  Very  Rev.  RowlandDavies,  LLD.  Dean  ofRoss,  ed.  R.  Caulfield  (London,  1856),  p.  148. 
61  Journal  of  the  Very  Rev.  Rowland  Davies,  pp.  148-9;  Berwick,  Memoirs,  ii.  78;  The  Life  ofJames  the 
Second,  p.  419. 
62  BL,  Add  MSS  29878,  p.  28:  W. Cramond's  Diary,  24  Sept.  1690;  J.  G.  Simms,  'Marlborough's  Siege  of 
Cork,  1690',  IS  ix  (1969-1970),  118. 50 
couple  of  field-pieces  to  bear  upon  them,  however.  Once  the  rest  of  Marlborough's  force  had 
come  up,  the  Jacobites  abandoned  Cat  Fort  overnight.  Meanwhile,  in  Cork's  northern 
suburbs,  Tettau  and  Gravemoer  had  similar  success  intimidating  the  enemy  from  their 
outposts  around  Shandon  Castle.  Fortunately  the  castle  was  spared  the  fires  lit  by  the 
Jacobites  as  they  fled  and  it  remained  intact  as  a  readymmade  battery  site.  The  final  event  on 
24  September  which  bolstered  the  Williamite  approach  to  Cork  was  Marlborough's  request 
that  Gravemoer  send  him  a  party  of  horse.  He  had  been  conscious  that  his  expeditionary 
force  lacked  a  mobile  screen  and,  in  particular,  security  on  the  south-westerly  flank;  once 
Gravemoer's  horse  had  crossed  the  Lee  some  three  miles  westwards  at  the  church  of  Carry 
Kippane,  Marlborough  could  then  devote  full  attention  to  disposing  his  siege  works.  " 
Shandon  Castle  and  Cat  Fort  to  the  north  and  south  of  the  city  respectively  were  the 
obvious  sites  for  the  siege  batteries  and  Marlborough  quickly  approved  their  construction. 
He  recognised  though  that  the  bombardment  from  Cat  Fort  would  be  masked  by  the  stoutly 
constructed  Elizabeth  Fort  and  thus  a  third  battery  was  established  at  Red  Abbey,  situated  to 
the  south-east  of  the  city,  which  would  direct  its  fire  wholly  against  the  eastern  section  of  the 
walls.  The  undulating  nature  of  the  ground  meant  that  the  labour-intensive  task  of  digging 
trenches  for  cover  was  not  necessary,  leaving  time  for  other  batteries  to  be  erected  at  Mitre 
Inn  and  at  the  Friar's  Garden  near  Gallow  Green,  both  within  600  yards  of  Elizabeth  Fort. 
This  decisiveness  in  siege  operations  was  the  product  of  the  command  discretion  afforded 
Marlborough  by  his  Instructions,  with  his  authority  galvanising  the  soldiers  and  sailors  to 
work  effectively  together  in  bringing  up  the  materials  from  Passage  West  and  in  constructing 
the  batteries.  '  The  efficiency  of  combined  operational  endeavour  fostered  by  the  command 
structure  was,  however,  threatened  on  26  September  when  Wurtemberg  arrived  with  his 
troops  and  claimed  precedence  in  command  due  to  his  royal  lineage.  Naturally  Marlborough 
was  reluctant  to  accede  to  the  German's  demands  -  particularly  as  his  reputation  was  that  of 
an  indifferent  soldier  -  and  a  row  threatened.  But  to  prevent  the  siege's  progress  being 
undermined  a  compromise  was  reached  whereby  command  would  pass  between  the  two 
generals  on  alternate  days.  Marlborough's  forbearance  and  flattery  of  Wurtemberg  in 
choosing  his  name  as  the  password  for  the  Duke's  non-command  days  has  been  greatly 
63  BL,  Add  MSS  29878,  p.  28:  W.  Cramond's  Diary,  24  Sept.  1690;  Journal  of  ihe  Very  Rev.  Rowland 
Davies,  pp.  148-51;  Simms,  'Marlborough's  Siege  of  Cork,  1690',  p.  118. 51 
commended.  "'  The  somewhat  juvenile  form  of  the  compromise  perhaps  undermines  its 
credibility  as  a  serious  solution  but  Wurtemberg's  recognition  of  his  limitations  by  repeatedly 
deferring  to  Marlborough  meant  that  the  potential  threat  to  the  command  structure  for  the 
combined  operation  never  materialised. 
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Fig  2:  The  Capture  ol'Cork. 
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The  final  manoeuvre  which  captured  Cork  reinforced  the  combined  army  and  navy 
foundation  of  the  operation.  66  By  27  September,  with  another  battery  of  heavy  ordnance 
constructed  on  the  river  bank  by  the  Red  Cow  Inn  and  firing  directly  on  the  eastern  wall,  it 
seemed  that  the  siege  guns  had  caused  sufficient  damage  to  force  MacElligott  to  negotiate. 
On  requesting  that  envoys  be  sent  to  discuss  terms,  he  allowed  Bishop  Wetenhall  to  shepherd 
out  over  a  thousand  Protestants.  This  gesture  of  goodwill  proved  however  merely  a  ruse. 
Notwithstanding  the  opportunity  to  exploit  a  difference  between  Wurtemberg  and 
Marlborough  over  concessions  to  the  garrison  (the  latter  being  determined  to  offer  none), 
MacElligott  held  the  envoys  until  the  tide  had  risen  and  then  rejected  negotiations.  According 
to  the  Danish  Lieutenant-Colonel,  Munchgaar,  the  arrival  of  the  flood  tide  postponed  a 
planned  advance  that  he  and  Sir David  Collier  were  to  undertake  on  to  islands  near  the  city 
walls.  Cramond,  instead,  refers  to  a  three  battalion  strong  assault  from  the  south  that  had 
been  ordered  for  daybreak  on  28  September  but  which  was  countermanded  at  dawn.  Both 
these  advances  would  have  lacked  the  breach  in  the  walls  upon  which  the  successful  capture 
of  a  besieged  town  was  invariably  contingent.  It  may  well  be  that  the  attack  which  Cramond 
mentions  was  abandoned  for  this  reason  and  not  because  of  the  confusion  attending 
MacElligott's  apparent  desire  to  capitulate.  Nevertheless,  if  so,  the  timing  was  marginal,  for 
a  breach  was  effected  during  the  morning  of  28  September  in  the  eastern  section  of  the  wall. 
The  plan  reputedly  formed  for  Munchgaar's  aborted  advance  was  now  significantly  expanded 
to  encompass  a  joint  advance  on  the  town  from  the  north  and  south  and,  with  the  Lee  to  be 
crossed,  the  attack  was  perforce  timed  against  the  tides.  The  morning's  flood  tide  was  used 
to  bring  up-river  to  the  north-east  of  the  city  the  bomb  vessel  Salamander  and  a  sloop  which 
were  to  provide  extra  fire  support.  This  was  likely  to  be  essential,  as  the  marshland  around 
the  city  walls  would  make  the  going  heavy  for  the  soldiers.  Unbeknownst  to  the  allies, 
however,  there  was  a  difference  in  the  tidal  range  between  the  Lee's  north  and  south  channels 
66  The  ensuing  account  of  the  capture  of  Cork  is  based  on  the  following  primary  sources  and  secondary 
authorities:  BL,  Add  MSS  29878,  pp.  26-5:  W.  Cramond's  Diary,  27-9  Sept.  1690;  The  Danish  Force  in 
Ireland  1690-1691,  no.  65,  Appendix  IV,  pp.  834,151-2:  Munchgaar  to  Harboe,  29  Sept.  1690;  Transl.  of 
Authentische  Nachrichten  -  'The  Capture  of  Cork,  16901;  Journal  ofthe  Very  Rev.  RowlandDavies,  pp.  15  1- 
6;  A  Full  and  True  Relation  of  the  Taking  of  Cork;  A  Jacobite  Narrative,  p.  119;  W. Griflyth,  Fillare 
Hibernicum  (London,  1690),  p.  27;  Cox,  'Marlborough  in  Ireland',  pp.  289-90;  Simms,  'Marlborough's 
Siege  of  Cork',  PP.  120-  1;  Wolseley,  The  Life  ofJohn  Churchill,  ii.  187-99;  Atkinson,  Marlborough  and  the 
Rise  of  the  British  Army,  p.  116.  The  four  naval  captains  (in  addition  to  the  Duke  of  Grafton)  directly 
involved  in  the  assault  were  Cornwall,  Leighton,  Fairborne  and  Neville.  See  Griffyth,  Villare  Hibernicum,  p. 
27. 53 
and  this  caused  the  start  of  the  operation  to  mistime  inasmuch  as  Wurtemberg's  force  was 
able  to  cross  the  river  with  ease  well  in  advance  of  the  English.  More  importantly,  it  also 
meant  that  Marlborough's  column  led  by  Lord  Colchester  with  Trelawny's  grenadiers  in  the 
van  had  to  wade  through  water  that  was  often  at  chest  height.  Nonetheless,  the  grenadiers 
ably  fulfilled  this  specialised  forward  assault  role  that  had  become  their  central  function  since 
67  their  introduction  in  1678.  Under  heavy  fire,  they  fought  a  passage  through  to  allow  the 
regiments  of  Marlborough,  his  brother  and  Collier,  along  with  detachments  from  two  other 
regiments  of  the  expeditionary  force,  to  join  Wurtemberg's  troops  on  the  East  Marsh. 
Shelter  and  a  chance  to  re-group  was  provided  by  the  bank  of  the  counterscarp  which  was 
also  partially  covered  by  a  house  standing  in  the  lee  of  the  city  walls.  However,  before 
sanctuary  could  be  reached,  the  Duke  of  Grafton  -  while  reconnoitring  the  marsh  for  a  gun 
emplacement  site  -  fell  to  a  bullet  in  the  shoulder.  His  subsequent  death  caused  him  to  be 
much  praised  as  a  volunteer  in  the  offensive  across  the  river;  but  he  was  only  one  of  a  number 
in  this  category  which  -  significantly  given  the  operation's  amphibious  context  -  comprised  at 
least  four  naval  captains  in  addition  to  Grafton. 
Repeating  his  performance  of  the  previous  day,  Governor  MacElligott  indicated  a 
desire  to  surrender  within  two  hours  of  the  assault  commencing,  only  to  set  his  face  against 
the  prospect  when  the  terms  were  offered.  On  this  occasion,  the  two  naval  vessels  in  the  Lee, 
along  with  the  previously  established  siege  batteries,  were  maintaining  a  preponderant  fire 
which  widened  the  breach,  thus  providing  the  troops  in  the  East  Marsh  with  a  healthy  chance 
of  success  in  the  assault.  Consequently,  MacElfigott  quickly  changed  his  mind  and  agreed  to 
surrender,  regardless  of  the  proposed  terms.  These  conditions  proved  strict:  the  Elizabeth 
Fort  was  to  be  rendered  inside  the  hour  followed  by  the  town  in  the  morning,  when  the 
garrison  would  be  taken  prisoner.  This  latter  provision  yielded  many  senior  Jacobite 
commanders,  including  the  Earl  of  Clancarty  who  was  also  one  of  the  country's  largest  land 
owners.  Well  might  d'Albeville's  account  of  Cork's  capture  imply  that  the  sacrifice  in 
attempting  to  retain  it  had  been  too  great.  "' 
67  C.  T.  Atkinson,  'Grenadier  Companies  in  the  British  Anny',  JSAHR  x  (1931),  225. 
68  RMC,  FinCh  MSS,  ii.  470-7:  d'Albeville  to  James  11,  [27  Oct.  -]6  Nov.  1690. 54 
The  capitulation  proceeded  without  incident  and  this  released  Marlborough  to  pursue 
the  operation's  second  objective:  Kinsale.  "  Situated  some  seventeen  miles  due  south  of 
Cork  at  the  mouth  of  the  River  Bandon,  Kinsale's  harbour  was  considered  the  better 
anchorage,  although  much  more  poorly  defended.  The  town  was  not  walled,  and  its 
defensive  strength  derived  solely  from  two  forts:  the  Old  Fort  sat  on  an  eminence  which 
ballooned  out  into  the  riverjust  east  of  the  town;  while  the  larger  and  more  heavily  gunned 
New  (or  Charles)  Fort  had  been  built  recently  to  modern  principles  on  the  other  river  bank  to 
the  north.  On  29  September,  an  advance  party  of  nearly  500  horse  and  dragoons  commanded 
by  Brigadier  Villiers  and  Colonel  Neuenhuse  was  dispatched.  As  they  reached  Kinsale's 
environs,  a  trumpeter  was  sent  with  terms  to  the  septuagenarian  Jacobite  Governor,  Colonel 
Fdward  Scott,  who  answered  in  defiance  and  led  his  garrison  and  the  town's  inhabitants  to 
occupy  the  two  forts.  The  Villiers-Neuenhuse  detachment  then  could  only  occupy  the  town 
and  extinguish  the  fires  begun  by  the  Jacobites.  Although  summons  were  sent  to  the  two 
forts,  their  respective  commanders,  Scott  and  O'Sullivan-More,  imitated  Michelburne  at 
Londonderry  by  unfurling  a  bloody  flag  in  answer. 
KINSALE.  October  1690 
Scale 
Fig  3:  Kinsale,  October  1690. 
"'  The  ensuing  account  of  the  capture  of  Kinsale  is based  on  the  following  primary  sources  and  secondary 
authorities:  BL,  Add  MSS  29878,  pp.  24-2:  W.  Cramond's  Diary,  29  Sept,  -15  Oct.  1690,  -  Griffyth,  1711are 
Hibernicum,  pp.  27-8;  The  Danish  1"orce  in  Irelantl  1690-1691,  nos.  67-8,  pp.  85-9:  Munchgaar  to  Harboe,  15 
Oct.  1690;  Wurtemberg  to  Christian  V,  17  Oct.  1690;.  1  Jacobite  Narrative,  pp.  120-1;  Cox,  'Marlborough  in 55 
Villiers  believed  that  with  modest  reinforcements  -  up  to  three  foot  regiments  and 
cannon  -  the  Old  Fort  would  be  vulnerable;  and  although  Marlborough  sent  these  from  Cork 
immediately  on  receiving  Villiers's  request,  they  failed  to  arrive  any  earlier  than  the  main 
expeditionary  force  which  entered  the  town  on  2  October.  Both  Marlborough  and 
Wurtemberg  agreed  with  Villiers's  assessment  of  the  Old  Fort  and  this  was  also  underlined  by 
some  deserters  who  claimed  its  garrison  to  be  barely  200  men  strong.  Accordingly,  a  plan 
was  formed  whereby  Major-General  Tettau  would  lead  a  mixed  force  of  grenadiers  and 
Fitzpatrick's  fusiliers  across  the  river  to  the  promontory  on  which  the  Old  Fort  stood.  With 
quite  remarkable  success  in  several  appropriated  river  boats,  this  transfer  of  800  men  was 
completed  noiselessly  at  low  water  during  the  night  of  2/3  October.  In  order  to  maintain 
surprise,  the  troops  landed  to  the  south  of  the  fort  and  Tettau  then  disposed  them  into  two 
groups:  one  to  make  a  feint  attack  on  the  weakest  part  of  the  fort,  and  the  other  more 
substantial  group  to  assault  the  stronger  bastions.  This  part  of  the  plan  worked  well,  but  the 
garrison  was  about  double  the  strength  anticipated;  and  Tettau  might  have  struggled  if  several 
barrels  of  powder  had  not  exploded,  killing  many  of  those  inside  the  fort  and  causing  the  rest 
to  attempt  escape.  Frustratingly  for  Marlborough,  this  audacious  capture  of  the  Old  Fort  did 
not  cause  Scott  to  surrender  the  New  Fort,  as  had  been  hoped. 
Preparations  to  invest  the  New  Fort  were  pushed  forward,  though  effective  progress 
was  hampered  until  II  October  when  the  artillery  train  eventually  arrived  from  Cork.  Once 
these  cannon  began  to  play  constantly  upon  the  walls,  a  breach  was  opened  and  on  15 
October  Governor  Scott  beat  a  parley.  In  a  reversal  of  previous  attitudes,  Marlborough  was 
now  willing  to  offer  terms  which  would  allow  the  garrison  to  march  out  with  the  full  honours 
of  war,  where  instead  Wurtemberg  wished  them  taken  prisoner.  Marlborough  was  merely 
being  pragmatic:  with  the  weather  worsening,  and  news  filtering  through  of  Sarsfield  roaming 
the  region  with  a  cavalry  force,  he  reasoned  that  it  would  be  better  to  secure  Kinsale  -  even  if 
this  required  that  the  garrison  go  free  -  than  risk  Scott  refusing  the  terms  and  prolonging  the 
siege.  Ultimately,  Marlborough  prevailed  over  Wurtemberg  and  the  garrison  marched  out  on 
17  October. 
Ireland',  pp.  292-3;  J.  Jordan,  'The  Siege  of  Kinsale,  1690:  The  Danish  Report',  AC  xv  (1954-1955),  58-64; 
Wolseley,  The  Life  ofJohn  Churchill,  ii.  204-15;  Atkinson,  Marlborough,  pp.  118-19. 56 
The  capture  of  both  Cork  and  Kinsale  had  considerably  exacerbated  the  'death 
wound'  that  Lapthorne  claimed  Jacobite  Ireland  had  received  at  Londonderry.  "'  Another  land 
campaign  in  the  following  year,  with  victory  at  Aughrim  (12  July)  and  a  successful  second 
siege  of  Limerick  in  the  autumn,  would  admittedly  be  required  before  the  Jacobites  were 
stilled.  But  Marlborough's  operation  to  the  Munster  coast  was  undoubtedly  the  necessary 
pivot  in  the  second  stage  of  the  Irish  war,  just  as  the  relief  of  Londonderry  had  been  in  the 
fwst.  A  significant  foothold  in  the  south  had  been  secured  which  provided  William  with  both 
naval  and  military  strategic  benefits.  The  Jacobites'  principal  sea-based  communication  with 
France  had  been  blocked  off  and,  notwithstanding  any  residual  French  sea  command  gained 
from  victory  at  the  battle  of  Beachy  Head,  future  supply  convoys  would  be  forced  due  west 
on  to  Ireland's  Atlantic  seaboard  and  into  the  ports  of  Galway  and  Limerick.  Militarily,  the 
Jacobites'  defence  of  the  line  of  the  Shannon  -  effectively  their  strategic  touchstone  since  the 
late  summer  of  1690  -  could  now  be  threatened  simultaneously  on  two  fronts  from  the  north 
and  south.  Even  Patrick  Sarsfield's  irrepressible  military  energy  would  find  this  a  debilitating 
challenge.  Twice  in  the  Irish  theatre,  amphibious  warfare  had  precipitated  the  military 
conditions  which  propelled  the  Williamite  cause  to  victory. 
70  See  pp.  434. 57 
Section  11:  Combined  Operations  and  the  Colonial  Theatre  During 
the  Nine  Years  War,  1688-1697. 
111:  The  Overseas  Emnire  as  a  Theatre  of  War. 
John  Evelyn's  remark  with  regard  to  the  Nine  Years  War  that  Flanders  was  where  'the 
greate  stress  of  the  quarrell  lies"  reflected  the  view  that  the  war  was  essentially  a  Grand 
Alliance  of  European  states  ranged  against  the  principal  European  continental  power  - 
France.  '  More  significantly,  Evelyn's  view  also  accorded  with  the  Whiggish  argument  that 
William  III  should  be  considered  a  good  'European'  because  his  descent  on  England  in 
November  1688  was  wholly  motivated  by  his  continental  ambitions  to  join  England  to  the 
European  alliance  against  France.  ' 
As  has  been  previously  outlined  William's  conduct  immediately  following  the 
'Glorious  Revolution'  did  little  to  diminish  this  interpretation.  The  resistance  in  Ireland  was 
considered  a  grave  inconvenience  which  would  hinder  the  deployment  of  English  resources 
on  the  continent;  and  William's  haste  to  free  up  troops  and  war  supplies  was  omnipresent  in 
his  attitude  to  the  war  in  that  theatre.  His  frustration  with  Schomberg's  apparent  operational 
tardiness  which  forced  him  to  delay  his  European  command  in  order  to  take  personal  charge 
of  the  1690  campaign  in  Ireland,  whilst  also  sanctioning  periodic  peace  initiatives,  spoke  of 
this  urgency.  William  was  even  moved  to  reduce  the  Irish  Establishment  by  three  cavalry 
regiments  and  four  infantry  battalions  before  the  commencement  of  what  proved  to  be  the 
final  campaign  in  1691.  By  then,  of  course,  he  had  assumed  command  of  the  Alliance's 
4 
armies  in  Holland. 
This  European  focus  has  had  a  dual  distorting  effect  upon  the  historiography  of  the 
war.  Firstly,  it  reinforced  the  existing  trends  in  orthodox  histories.  These  concentrated  on 
the  elemental  aspects  of  warfare  such  as  the  bloody  set-piece  battle  which  characteristically 
neglected  warfare  outside  of  the  European  theatre.  Even  if  treated  by  such  works,  the  extra- 
European  conflict  was  usually  either  portrayed  as  of  little  concern  to  the  monarch  in  terms  of 
1  The  Diary  ofJohn  Evelyn,  ed.  E.  S.  de  Beer  (Oxford,  1955),  v.  186. 
2  The  Grand  Alliance  was  formed  when  England,  the  United  Provinces,  and  Savoyjoined  the  pre-existing 
League  of  Augsburg  which  dated  from  1686  and  comprised  the  Empire,  Spain,  and  several  German  Princes. 
'  Macaulay,  7he  History  ofEngland,  iii.  1326-7;  Sir  Charles  Firth,  A  Commentary  on  Macaulay's  History  of 
England  (London,  193  8),  p.  34  1. 
4  Childs,  'The  Williamite  war,  1689-169  1',  pp.  195-6,209;  Simms,  'Williamite  Peace  Tactics.  1690-1691'. 
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anny  deployment,  or  it  was  hijacked  by  the  navalists  as  an  aspect  of  naval  strategy., 
Secondly,  as  a  reaction  to  the  above,  the  histories  of  empire  which  detail  the  Anglo-French 
conflict  in  the  colonies  consider  the  war  a  predominately  maritime  contest  best  waged  by 
Mahan's  'command  of  the  sea'  principle.  "  Ultimately,  neither  strand  of  history  provides  a 
clear  understanding  of  the  structure  and  function  of  overseas  warfare. 
Such  an  understanding  is  further  removed  because  both  distortions  represent  two 
differing  uncritical  assumptions  about  England's  world  role.  Firstly,  that  England  was  a 
minor  provincial  power,  predominately  disengaged  and  insular  in  attitude  towards  European 
diplomacy  where  commercial  activity  was  not  impeded.  It  followed,  therefore,  that  the 
military,  naval  and  diplomatic  consequences  of  the  'Glorious  Revolution'  were  primarily 
European  in  focus.  The  second  distortion  assumes  that  with  respect  to  her  colonial 
settlements,  the  real  interest  taken,  and  the  actual  control  exercised,  by  England  was  minimal. 
To  question  both  is  not  an  attempt  to  deny  that  William  positioned  England  in  the  centre  of 
the  European  states  system;  nor  does  it  imply  an  unrealistic  breadth  of  imperial  control. 
Rather  it  serves  to  highlight  that  England  was  a  global  power  that  was  necessarily  obliged  to 
achieve  a  level  of  colonial  integration  in  pursuance  of  the  war  and  that  this  is  a  more  precise 
context  in  which  to  investigate  the  nature  of  warfare. 
Perhaps  ironically,  on  his  appointment  as  Secretary  of  State  in  May  1695,  a  briefing 
paper  partly  informed  Sir  William  Trumbull  of  this  context.  Its  synopsis  on  the  history  of 
acquisition  throughout  the  seventeenth  century  demonstrated  that  England's  extra-European 
territory  and  colonial  settlement  ranged  from  the  most  northerly  areas  around  Hudson  Bay 
and  the  fishing  banks  of  Newfoundland,  down  through  the  north  eastern  coast  of  mainland 
North  America  where  the  principal  settlements  of  New  England  (comprising  the  provinces  of 
Massachusetts  Bay,  New  Plymouth,  New  Hampshire,  Connecticut,  and  Rhode  Island)  along 
with  New  York,  Pennsylvania,  New  Jersey,  Delaware  and  Maryland  were  situated,  to  the 
most  southerly  colonies  of  Virginia  and  Carolina.  In  the  Caribbean,  England's  principal 
colony  was  Jamaica,  though  the  Leeward  Islands,  Barbados,  the  Bahamas  and  the  Bermudas 
5  B.  P.  Lenman,  'Colonial  Wars  and  Imperial  Instability,  1688-1793',  in  P.  J.  Marshall  (ed.  ),  The  Oxford 
History  of  the  British  Empire  ii.  7he  Eighteenth  Century  (Oxford,  1998),  pp.  151-4.  The  army-centric  view 
with  the  set  piece  battle  as  the  main  focus  is  predictably  provided  by  Fortescue,  A  History  of  the  British  Army, 
i.  333-93.  Good  examples  of  the  navalists'  agenda  are,  N.  H.  Moses,  'The  British  Navy  in  the  Caribbean, 
1689-1697',  MM  52  (1966),  13-40,  and  Clowes,  7he  Royal  Navy,  ii.  418-534. 59 
were  also  important  English  acquisitions!  These  territories  became  the  foundation  of 
Britain's  'Old  Empire'  which  endured  till  the  loss  of  the  thirteen  mainland  American  colonies 
as  a  result  of  the  American  Revolutionary  War,  1775-1783. 
While  accurate  in  its  bald  historical  facts,  the  paper  remained  a  partial  exposition  of 
the  war's  context  because  it  failed  to  address  the  contemporary  issue  of  colonial  integration  in 
the  war  effort.  Its  analysis  of  the  colonies  as  part  of  the  English  polity  categorised  them 
under  one  of  two  forms  of  government:  the  King's  Commission  or  Proprietorial  control.  ' 
This  was  too  simplistic  a  picture  for  it  failed  to  cover  the  subtleties  in  the  governmental 
structure  of  individual  colonies  which  evolved  against  a  backdrop  of  increasing  friction 
between  the  colonists  and  the  English  Court  and  Parliament  over  the  extent  and  source  of 
imperial  control!  More  significantly,  the  paper  also  failed  to  relate  England's  continuing 
offensive  and  defensive  wartime  attempts  to  extend  both  her  geostrategic  reach  and  safeguard 
her  mercantilist  economy  within  these  extra-European  regions.  This  omission  is  all  the  more 
surprising  given  that  by  1695,  four  operations  combining  ships  and  land  forces  had  already 
been  sent  overseas  in  pursuance  of  these  ends  and  another  one  was  to  follow  before  Trumbull 
resigned  the  Secretaryship  on  I  December  1697. 
In  an  attempt  to  correct  the  historiographical  distortions,  this  section  will,  therefore, 
consider  a  set  of  five  expeditionary  operations  undertaken  during  the  Nine  Years  War  which 
encompassed  the  extent  of  empire  from  Newfoundland  to  the  islands  in  the  Caribbean  Sea.  It 
should  be  recognised  that  the  history  of  the  war  in  the  colonies  yields  many  more  examples  of 
such  operations.  On  the  North  American  mainland,  the  future  Governor  of  Massachusetts,  Sir 
William  Phips,  undertook  two  expeditions  in  1690:  first  against  Port  Royal,  Acadia  and  then 
the  grander  attack  against  Quebec.  Moreover,  as  the  war  there  settled  into  a  predominant 
6  See  for  example,  G.  S.  Graham,  Empire  of  the  North  Atlantic:  The  Maritime  Strugglefor  North  America 
(Canada,  1950);  D.  E.  Leach,  Armsfor  Empire:  A  Military  History  ofthe  British  Colonies  in  North  America 
1607-1763  (New  York,  1973). 
7  BL,  Add.  MSS  72572,  fos.  140-9:  'A  Short  Account  of  the  English  Plantations  in  America,  Brought  by  Mr 
Povey  2  May  1695'. 
8  ibid. 
9  See  for  example,  M.  J.  Braddick,  'The  English  Government,  War,  Trade,  and  Settlement,  1625-1688',  in  N. 
Canny  (ed.  ),  7he  Oxford  History  ofthe  British  Empire  i.  The  First  Century  ofEmpire  (Oxford,  1998),  pp. 
286-308;  I.  K.  Steele,  'The  Anointed,  the  Appointed,  and  the  Elected:  Governance  of  the  British  Empire, 
1689-1784',  in  Marshall  (ed.  ),  The  OxfordHisjory  ofthe  British  Empire,  ii.  105-27;  I.  K.  Steele,  'The  British 
Parliament  and  the  Atlantic  Colonies  to  1760:  New  Approaches  to  Enduring  Questions',  in  P.  Lawson  (ed.  ), 
parliament  and  the  Atlantic  Empire  (Edinburgh,  1995);  M.  Watson,  'The  British  West  Indian  Legislatures  in 
the  17th  and  18th  Centuries:  An  Historiographical  Introduction',  in  Lawson  (ed.  ),  Parliament  and  the 
Atlantic  Empire,  pp.  89-98. 60 
pattern  of  frontier  skirmish,  small  scale  riverine  expeditions  such  as  the  assaults  in  1692  and 
1696  upon  the  Acadian  fort  at  the  confluence  of  the  rivers  St  John  and  Naswaack,  became 
common.  In  the  Caribbean,  Sir  Timothy  Thornhill,  a  Barbadian  planter,  and  Captain 
Heweston,  at  the  behest  of  the  Leeward  Islands'  Governor,  Christopher  Codrington, 
completed  a  series  of  modestly  successful  raids  upon  Mariegalante,  St  Bartholomew  and  St 
Martin's  in  late  1689  and  the  early  1690s;  while  the  Royal  African  Company  operated  against 
the  French  territories  on  the  West  African  coast  throughout  1692-1693.  However,  this  study 
will  not  consider  these  examples  because  although  the  Imperial  Parent  often  knew  what  was 
planned,  none  of  these  operations  were  originally  dispatched  from  England.  Moreover,  the 
men  and  materials  involved  were  usually  provided  locally  by  the  colonial  authorities,  or  in  the 
case  of  the  vessels  used  against  the  West  African  coast,  privately  owned  by  the  Royal  African 
Company.  Only  on  one  occasion  -  the  1696  expedition  against  Fort  Naswaack  -  was  a  Royal 
Naval  warship,  the  Arundell,  deployed,  but  it  had  not  been  sent  out  from  England  for  this 
purpose.  10  The  common  thread  which  ties  all  these  expeditions  to  one  side  is  England's 
wholly  passive  role  in  their  preparation  and  execution.  The  definition  of  a  combined 
operation  aimed  at  here  first  seeks  an  exposition  of  the  administrative  role  undertaken  by 
England  and,  without  wishing  to  concentrate  solely  upon  substantive  bureaucratic  outcomes 
as  manifest  in  the  provision  of  resources,  their  total  absence  renders  it  both  unbalanced  and 
10  PRO,  CO  5/855,  fos.  605-12:  'A  Journal  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Late  Expedition  to  Port  Royal';  CSPC, 
1689-1692,  nos.  914,1417,  pp.  275-6,415:  Journal  of  the  proceedings  of  the  late  expedition  under  Sir 
William  Phips,  knight,  to  Port  Royal,  30  May  1690;  Sir  William  Phips's  account  of  his  expeditions  against 
Acadia  and  Quebec,  [21  Apr.  ]  1692;  Two  Narratives  of  the  Expedition  Against  Quehec,  A.  D.  1690,  ed.  S.  A. 
Green  (Cambridge,  1902);  T.  Savage,  An  Account  ofthe  Late  Action  of  the  New Englanders  (London,  169  1); 
J.  Walley,  'Mr  Walley's  Journal  in  the  Expedition  Against  Canada  in  1692  [sic]',  in  T.  Hutchinson,  The 
History  of  the  Colony  and  Province  ofMassachusetts-Bay  (2  edn,  London,  1760),  Appendix  no.  xxi,  pp.  554- 
65;  C.  Mather,  Pietas  in  Patriam:  The  Life  offfis  Excellency  Sir  William  Phips  (London,  1697);  NYCD,  iv. 
193-6:  Journal  of  Major  General  Winthrop's  march  from  Albany  to  Wood  Creek,  n.  d.;  E.  W.  Baker  &  J.  G. 
Reid,  The  New England  Knight:  Sir  William  Phips,  1651-1696  (Toronto,  1998),  pp.  86-109;  T.  Church,  The 
Entertaining  History  ofKing  Philip's  War  (  2nd  edn,  Boston,  1716),  pp.  90-157;  PXX  de  Charlevoix, 
History  and  General  Description  ofNew  France,  transi.  &  ed.  J.  G.  Shea  (London,  1902),  iv.  27-8;  ibid.,  v. 
29-33;  CSPC,  1696-1697,  nos.  257,403,  pp.  142,218:  Stoughton  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  24 
Sept.  1696;  Minutes  of  General  Assembly  of  Massachusetts,  IS  Nov.  1696;  'Journal  of  What  has  Happened  in 
Acadia  From  Oct.  13th,  1691  to  Oct.  25,1692%  'Account  of  the  Siege  of  Fort  Natchouak  by  the  English  of 
Boston,  and  of  Their  Retreat  by  Villebon,  Oct.  22,1696',  in  Acadia  at  the  End  of  the  Seventeenth  Century, 
ed.  J.  C.  Webster  (New  Brunswick,  1934),  pp.  40,89-94;  T.  Spencer,  A  True  and  Faithful  Relation  of  the 
Proceedings  of  the  Forces 
.. 
In  Their  E%pedition  Against  the  French  in  the  Carihby  Islands  in  the  West-Indies 
(London,  1691),  pp.  1-8;  CSPC,  1689-1692,  nos.  444,779,789,789.1,  pp.  146-7,221-2,225-3  1:  Codrington 
to  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  19  Sept.  1689;  Stede  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  3  Mar.  1690; 
Codrington  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  I  Mar.  1690;  Account  of  the  action  at  St  Martin's  under 
Captain  Hewetson,  n.  d.;  V.  T.  Harlow,  Christopher  Codrington,  1668-1710  (London,  reprint  1998),  pp.  17-19; 
Molyneaux,  Conjunct  Expeditions,  Part  I  p.  102;  Colomb,  Naval  Warfare,  pp.  263-6. 61 
unproductive  to  consider  the  subsequent  relationship  of  these  operations  to  Grand  Strategy 
and  the  practice  of  warfare.  The  five  which  are  to  be  assessed  fulfil  this  immediate 
administrative  precept.  Thus,  with  respect  to  the  historical  understanding  of  English 
combined  operations  in  the  Nine  Years  War,  it  is  hoped  that  their  narration  will  yield  the 
justification  with  which  the  history  of  warfare  might  look  upon  them  as  combined  operations, 
and  also  outline  their  utility  within  Grand  Strategy. 
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ll.  ii:  Commodore  Lawrence  Wril!  ht's  Expedition  to  the  West  Indies,  March  1690- 
September  1691. 
Not  only  were  many  of  the  overseas  colonies  administratively  and  politically  disordered  by 
news  of  the  'Glorious  Revolution"',  on  the  outbreak  of  war  the  Caribbean  territories  had  to 
face  a  superior  French  strength  in  the  region  that  possessed  great  potential  to  strike 
effectively  at  the  islands  and  to  damage  trade.  These  circumstances  were  underlined  by  the 
subjects  of  the  westemmost  colony,  Jamaica,  expressing  their  feelings  of  vulnerability  by 
petitioning  the  crown  for  a  significant  defensive  seapower  commitment.  It  was  to  the  east, 
however,  where  the  French  made  some  notable  gains  through  the  spring  and  summer  of  1689. 
These  included  the  reduction  of  the  Dutch  island  of  St  Eustatius  in  April,  and,  two  months 
later,  the  eviction  of  the  English  from  the  shared  island  of  St  Kitts  after  a  destabilising 
rebellion  by  the  Irish  inhabitants.  This  rebellion  spread  throughout  the  Leewards  Islands 
causing  Anguilla  to  be  left  under  an  Irish  Governor  when  it  fell  to  the  French,  and  forced  the 
premature  retirement  of  the  Islands'  chief,  Sir  Nathaniel  Johnson,  who  although  a  staunch 
Protestant,  was  considered  compromised  by  his  publicly  declared  commitment  to  James.  " 
The  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations  (a  committee  of  the  Privy  Council  first  appointed 
in  1675  to  manage  the  expanding  empire)"  had  already  foretold  of  the  impending  demands  of 
war  in  the  Caribbean.  Within  a  fortnight  of  William's  circular  in  early  April  informing  the 
colonial  governors  of  his  intention  to  declare  war  on  France,  the  Lords  sent  to  the  King 
recommendations  on  the  prosecution  of  the  war  overseas.  As  a  result,  William  ordered 
consultation  with  the  Admiralty  on  the  dispatch  of  a  squadron  overseas  and  this  quickly 
produced  a  list  of  seven  hired  vessels  (to  be  fitted  as  men-of-war)  and  two  fireships  that  could 
form  a  squadron  for  the  West  Indies  along  with  the  navy's  fourth  rate,  Dunkirk.  Meanwhile, 
the  operational  conception  was  broadened  by  the  recommendation  that  Sir  James  Leslie's 
regiment  of  foot  should  be  embarked.  Although  by  the  end  of  May,  four  of  the  hired  vessels 
were  sufficiently  adapted  to  be  sent  to  Longreach  for  their  guns  and  victuals  and  Leslie's 
regiment  was  ready  to  be  embarked,  quite  unexpectedly  the  King  ordered  the  hired  vessels  to 
11  R.  S.  Dunn,  'The  Glorious  Revolution  and  America',  in  Canny  (ed.  ),  The  Oxford  History  of  the  British 
Empire,  i.  445-66. 
12  CSpC#  1689-1692,  nos.  88,90,143,  p.  43:  Johnson  to  ?,  25  Apr.  1689;  Journal  of  the  Lords  of  Trade  and 
Plantations,  26  Apr.  1689;  Johnson  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  24  May  1689;  Sir  Alan  Burns, 
Ifistory  of  the  British  West  Indies  (2nd  edn,  London,  1965),  p.  375;  Harlow,  Christopher  Codrington,  pp.  15- 
17. 
13  W.  T.  Root,  'The  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations',  AHR  xxiii  (1917-1918),  2041. 63 
be  discharged  and  their  places  taken  by  Royal  Navy  ships.  "  The  King  must  have  known  that 
this  action  would  delay  the  departure  of  his  combined  force  to  the  Caribbean,  not  just  because 
these  ships  would  have  to  be  prepared  anew,  but  more  simply  because  many  of  them  were 
then  part  of  the  fleet  under  the  recently  ennobled  Arthur  Herbert  (now  Earl  of  Torrington) 
which  had  just  lately  fought  the  inconclusive  engagement  against  the  French  off  Bantry  Bay, 
Ireland.  "  The  Lords  of  Trade  were  also  concerned  that  the  now  delayed  squadron  would 
meet  both  huff  icanes  and  a  strengthened  French  presence  in  the  Caribbean.  " 
William's  decision  was,  however,  not  impulsive,  and  not  just  because  of  his  Dutch 
stolidness.  As  already  surveyed,  a  credible  Jacobite  interest  was  then  emerging  in  both 
Scotland  and  Ireland  where,  significantly,  it  was  sponsored  by  the  French.  Although 
Dundee's  Scottish  rebellion  was  perhaps  more  romantic  than  substantial,  the  prospect  that  the 
two  centres  of  resistance  might  combine  to  organise  their  resources  kept  the  crown 
precariously  placed  upon  the  heads  of  William  and  Mary.  Moreover,  William  had  still  to  turn 
his  attention  to  the  war  on  the  continent  and  make  the  substantial  English  commitment 
implicit  in  his  acceptance  of  the  English  crown.  In  practice,  the  Grand  Strategy  required  to 
contain  and  combat  Louis  XIV  in  the  early  years  of  the  war  was  proving  to  be  critically  torn 
between  the  competing  demands  of  domestic,  European  and  overseas  theatres.  Thus,  faced 
also  with  a  impecunious  exchequer",  William  probably  accepted  Torrington's  advice  that  the 
hired  vessels  were  fit  only  for  coastal  cruising  and  that  they  should  be  replaced  by  the  navy's 
fourth-rates,  with  the  consideration  that  some  breathing  space  within  the  demands  of  strategic 
14  CSpC,  1689-1692,  nos.  69-70,76-7,79,94,102,106,111,113,125,130,146,  pp.  22-3,31-6,39-40,44: 
Circular  to  the  Governors  of  the  Colonies,  15  Apr.  1689;  Circular  to  the  same  effect,  15  Apr.  1689; 
Shrewsbury  to  Robinson,  19  Apr.  1689;  Shrewsbury  to  Howard  of  Effingham,  19  Apr.  1689;  Shrewsbury  to 
Baltimore,  19  Apr.  1689;  Shrewsbury  to  Johnson,  19  Apr.  1689;  Memorandum  of  Lords  of  Trade  and 
Plantations,  29  Apr.  1689;  Order  of  King  in  Council,  2  May  1689;  Journal  of  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations, 
4,6  May  1689;  Order  of  King  in  Council,  6  May  1689;  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations  to  the  Admiralty, 
16  May  1689;  Bowles  to  Blathwayt,  17  May  1689;  Blathwayt  to  the  Admiralty,  25  May  1689;  PRO,  ADM 
1/5247,  pp.  31-4:  Naval  Minute,  6  June  1689;  PRO,  ADM  3/1,  pp.  53-7,83:  Board  Minutes,  [4],  6,27  May 
1689;  PRO,  ADM  1/169,  pp.  52,55,75-6,93:  the  Admiralty  to  the  Navy  Board,  12,25  Apr.  1689;  the 
Admiralty  to  Shrewsbury,  15  Apr.  1689;  the  Admiralty  to  Beach,  24  Apr.  1689;  the  Admiralty  to  Schomberg, 
4,11  May  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/377,  pp.  123,126-7,138:  Bowles  to  Blathwayt,  20,28  May  1689;  Bowles  to 
Torrington,  22  May  1689;  Bowles  to  the  Navy  Board,  23  May  1689. 
15  R.  W.  Neeser,  'The  British  Naval  Operations  in  the  West  Indies,  1650-1700',  USNIP  40  (Nov.  -Dec.,  1914), 
1613;  P.  Le  Fevre,  'The  Battle  of  Bantry  Bay,  I  May  1689',  IS  xviii  (1990-1992),  1-17. 
16  CSpC,  1689-1692,  no.  150,  pp.  44-5:  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations  to  the  King,  29  May  1689. 
17  PRO,  ADM  2/169,  p.  382:  the  Admiralty  to  the  Navy  Board,  25  Oct.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/170,  pp.  36,89, 
113,1434,203:  the  Admiralty  to  the  Lords  of  Treasury,  9  Jan.,  8,20  Feb.,  17  Mar.,  29  Apr.  1690;  J. 
Ehrman,  The  Navy  in  the  War  of  William  171,1689-1697.  -  Its  State  andDirection  (Cambridge,  1953),  pp.  256- 
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policy  might  be  gained.  "  Whitehall,  nonetheless,  wished  to  keep  up  the  appearance  of 
momentum  and,  in  early  June,  the  Admiralty  sent  a  list  of  eight  naval  vessels,  accompanied  by 
the  rather  improbable  claim  that  they  would  be  ready  within  a  fortnight.  "  The  fourteen  days 
was  to  become  225  by  the  time  the  expeditionary  force  left  England  on  9  March  1690.  " 
The  delay  was  a  product  of  both  accident  and  design  resulting  from  the  administrative 
insufficiencies  and  bureaucratic  inertia  of  the  Admiralty,  'War  Office',  and  the  Lords  of 
Trade.  It  would  seem  that  the  Admiralty,  despite  the  views  of  its  head,  Torrington, 
continued  to  promote  a  number  of  the  hired  ships  rejected  by  the  King  and  which  had  been 
dispatched  on  convoy  duty  as  part  of  Rooke's  squadron  stationed  off  the  Irish  coast.  In 
August  some  of  these  vessels  were  sent  a  recall  order  to  Plymouth  (via  Hoylake  to  take 
aboard  a  detachment  of  the  expedition's  soldiers)  but,  after  their  arrival  at  the  south-west 
port,  confusion  on  the  squadron's  composition  reigned  through  the  autumn  as  the  Admiralty 
then  moved  to  implement  the  King's  discharge  order!  ' 
Meanwhile,  the  Navy  Board  turned  its  attention  to  the  detailed  and  time  consuming 
task  of  fitting  out  a  late  seventeenth  century  overseas  expedition.  The  squadron's  vessels 
would  have  to  be  sheathed,  manned,  provisioned  and  have  their  ordnance  weight  reduced 
before  the  army  battalion  with  its  separate  provisions  and  artillery  train  could  be  embarked. 
Other  pressing  tasks  to  be  attended  to  included  the  preparation  of  the  fireships  and  the 
auxiliary  vessels  required  to  carry  surplus  stores  and  provisions.  In  many  of  these  areas, 
much  of  the  Navy  Board's  work  was  duplicated  as  it  began  first  with  those  hired  ships  that 
had  returned  from  the  Irish  coast  only  to  have  to  begin  again  with  the  Royal  Naval  vessels 
once  they  had  been  appointed  by  the  Admiralty.  "  Moreover,  progress  in  any  one  of  these 
18  CSPD,  1689-1693,  p.  133:  Memorandum  of  the  proceedings  of  the  Committee  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  3 
June  1689. 
19  PRO,  ADM  3/1,  pp.  88-90:  Board  Minutes,  30  May  1689;  CSPC,  1689-1692,  no.  169,  p.  57:  List  of  ships 
presented  by  the  Lords  of  the  Admiralty  as  to  the  state  of  ships  destined  for  the  West  Indies,  3  June  1689. 
20  PRO,  ADM  51/582,  Part  ii,  unpaginated,  Mary,  9  Mar.  1690. 
21  PRO,  ADM  2/4,  pp.  169-72:  the  Admiralty  to  Rooke,  27  Aug.  1689;  the  Admiralty  to  Tollemache,  27  Aug. 
1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/169,  pp.  251,269,271,301-2,361,369,398-402:  the  Admiralty  to  the  Navy  Board,  7, 
27  Aug.,  28  Sept.,  14,18  Oct.,  9,14  Nov.  1689;  the  Admiralty  to  Schomberg,  27  Aug.  1689;  PRO,  ADM 
2/170,  p.  3:  the  Admiralty  to  the  Navy  Board,  18  Dec.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/378,  pp.  242,301,365:  Bowles  to 
Walton,  5  Sept.  1689;  Bowles  to  Addis,  28  Sept.  1689;  Bowles  to  Blathwayt,  23  Oct.  1689. 
22  PRO,  ADM  3/1,  pp.  92,102,147-9,153,155,163,182:  Board  Minutes,  3,10  June,  10,13,16,23  July,  6 
Aug.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/4,  p.  277:  the  Admiralty  to  Wright,  24  Sept.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/5,  p.  107:  the 
Admiralty  to  Wright,  4  Jan.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/169,  pp.  212,214,216-17,223,225-6,240-1,251,271-2, 
280,317,335,362,398,401-2,512:  the  Admiralty  to  the  Navy  Board,  6,8,13,16  July,  7,27  Aug.,  9  Oct.,  9, 
14,21  Nov.  1689;  the  Admiralty  to  Torrington,  10,29  July  1689;  the  Admiralty  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and 
Plantations,  7  Sept.,  15  Oct.  1689;  the  Admiralty  to  Schomberg,  7  Oct.,  14  Nov.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/170,  pp. 65 
tasks  could  easily  to  break  down  and,  on  this  occasion,  the  navy's  victualling  system  ground 
temporarily  to  a  halt  through  a  lack  of  both  cash  and  credit.  "  An  uncomfortably  bright  spot 
light  had  already  been  shone  on  this  service  during  the  debates  on  the  conduct  of  the  naval 
war  in  Parliament's  second  session,  as  a  consequence  of  which  a  committee  of  inquiry  had 
been  established.  Although  the  King  attempted  to  pre-empt  the  committee's  conclusions  by 
appointing  new  victualling  commissioners,  the  sense  of  despair  in  the  service  was  well 
represented  by  his  new  First  Commissioner,  the  London  merchant  Thomas  Papillon,  whose 
reluctant  agreement  to  take  on  the  job  was  almost  immediately  followed  by  his  constant 
entreaties  to  be  released  from  it.  Ultimately,  before  the  eight  months  victuals  ordered  for  both 
the  land  and  sea  forces  could  be  supplied,  the  Treasury  had  to  make  a  series  of  tactical  fiscal 
interventions  to  provide  a  short-term  boost  to  the  victualling  commissioners'  cash  flow  by 
prioritising  their  Exchequer  payments  and  by  forestalling  other  government  creditors.  "  As 
the  money  crisis  continued  into  the  winter,  the  Admiralty  was  also  grappling  with  the  chore  of 
finding  accommodation  and  procuring  freight  for  several  newly  appointed  colonial  governors 
that  were  to  take  passage  with  the  squadron.  " 
The  organisation  of  the  land  force  was  soon  equally  mired  in  confusion.  Promptly 
after  the  King's  order  to  discharge  the  hired  ships,  it  was  decided  not  to  employ  Leslie's 
regiment,  but  without  first  selecting  an  alternative.  In  late  June,  Lord  Roscommon  offered  his 
3,62,67,82:  the  Admiralty  to  the  Navy  Board,  18  Dec.  1689,25,29  Jan.,  6  Feb.  1690;  PRO,  ADM  2/378, 
pp.  28-30,146,220,262,317-18,413,419,528:  Bowles  to  Beach,  6  July  1689;  Bowles  to  Torrington,  6  July 
1689;  Bowles  to  the  Navy  Board,  7  Aug.,  11  Sept.,  4  Oct.  1689;  Bowles  to  Blathwayt,  27  Aug.  1689;  Bowles 
to  the  Officers  of  the  Ordnance,  8,9  Nov.,  10  Dec.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/379,  pp.  54,102,108,135,141,161, 
181,188,189,196,200-1,211,220,270:  [Bowles?  ]  to  Jespen,  27  Dec.  1689;  Bowles  to  the  Navy  Board,  10 
Jan.  1690;  Bowles  to  Wright,  II  Jan.  1690;  Sotherne  to  the  Officers  of  the  Ordnance,  16  Jan.  1689;  Sotherne 
to  Wright,  18,28,29  Jan.,  6,18  Feb.  1690;  Sotherne  to  Beach,  25,  [30?  ]  Jan.,  1,4  Feb.  1690;  Sotherne  to  the 
Navy  Board,  4  Feb.  1690;  PRO,  ADM  1/3560,  pp.  25,119:  the  Navy  Board  to  the  Admiralty,  3  Jan.  1690;  the 
Navy  Board  to  Bowles,  II  Jan.  1690;  PRO,  ADM  1/5247,  pp.  62-3:  Naval  Minute,  15  Aug.  1689  [first 
version];  PRO,  ADM  1/5249,  p.  38:  Naval  Minute,  15  Aug.  1689  [second  version]. 
23  PRO,  ADM  2/169,  pp.  382,528:  the  Admiralty  to  the  Navy  Board,  25  Oct.  1689;  the  Admiralty  to  the 
Lords  of  the  Treasury,  4  Dec.  1689;  CTB,  1689-1693  Li.  62:  Treasury  Minute  Book,  3  Nov.  1689. 
24  Ux.  282-3;  CTB,  1689-1692,  pp.  64-5:  Treasury  Minute  Book,  10,14  Nov.  1689;  CTP,  1557-1696,  pp. 
75,95:  Presentment  of  the  Commissioners  of  Excise,  8  Nov.  1689;  Representation  of  the  Commissioners  of 
Excise  and  Hearth  Money  to  the  Lords  of  the  Treasury,  24  Jan.  1690;  A.  F.  W.  Papillon,  Memoirs  of  Thomas 
Papillon,  ofLondon,  Merchant  (Reading,  1887),  pp.  353-74;  Ehrman,  The  Navy  in  the  War  of  William  III,  pp. 
309-16,331. 
25  PRO,  ADM  2/4,  pp.  420,440-1:  the  Admiralty  to  Wright,  7,14  Nov.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/5,  pp.  238-9:  the 
Admiralty  to  Wright,  2  Feb.  1690;  PRO,  ADM  2/169,  pp.  280,293,317,362,392,534:  the  Admiralty  to  the 
Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  7  Sept.,  15  Oct.  1689;  the  Admiralty  to  the  Navy  Board,  24  Sept.,  7  Oct.,  5 
Nov.,  13  Dec.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/378,  pp.  66,179,220,299,345,493:  Bowles  to  Molesworth,  17  July  1689; 
Bowles  to  Blathwayt,  14,27  Aug.,  17  Oct.,  29  Nov.  1689;  Bowles  to  Montague,  28  Sept.  1689;  PRO,  ADM 66 
services  as  colonel  but  bizarrely  felt  he  could  not  speak  for  his  regiment  and,  on  the  same  day, 
the  Lords  of  Trade  noted  the  appointment  of  Luttrell's  battalion.  In  less  than  a  month, 
however,  Secretaryý-at-War  Blathwayt  was  inquiring  of  John  Shales,  Commissary  General  of 
Provisions,  how  soon  the  Duke  of  Bolton's  regiment  of  foot  could  be  shipped  for  the  West 
Indies.  "  This  was  presumably  Bolton's  newly  raised  second  regiment  commanded  by 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Henry  Holt;  `  which  first  had  to  march  to  Liverpool,  and  then  be  brought 
down  by  sea  to  Plymouth.  "  Once  this  transfer  had  been  completed  (by  the  hired  ships  drawn 
from  Rooke's  squadron  on  their  return  to  England)  Bolton's  second  regiment  was  found  to 
be  under  strength.  With  the  majority  of  the  English  forces  committed  to  the  Irish  theatre,  a 
possible  source  of  recruits  was  not  obvious.  It  was,  thus,  decided  to  draft  around  210  men 
from  the  six  companies  of  Bolton's  other  regiment  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel 
Norton  that  had  ironically  recently  been  at  Plymouth  as  part  of  an  abortive  descent  force  for 
Ireland  under  Trelawny  but  were  now  garrisoned  at  Portsmouth.  As  their  relief  from  garrison 
duties  had  to  be  organised  and  recruits  found  to  make  good  that  draft,  additional  time  was 
required;  and  furthermore  this  detachment  was  to  board  from  Portsmouth  thereby  requiring 
the  squadron  commander  to  organise  two  separate  embarkations.  "'  All  the  while,  as  has  been 
mentioned,  the  French  were  making  gains  in  the  Caribbean  and,  given  that  both  the  squadron 
and  Leslie's  regiment  had  been  ready  to  go  in  May,  the  King  might  well  have  lamented  his 
decision  to  discharge  the  hired  ships.  A  breathing  space  in  strategy  was  meaning  strategic 
loss.  I 
2/379,  pp.  13,105,108,217,235:  Bowles  to  Inchiquin,  16,24  Dec.  1689;  Bowles  to  Blathwayt,  II  Jan.  1690; 
Bowles  to  Wright,  II  Jan.  1689;  Sotherne  to  Tollemache,  6  Feb.  1690;  Sotherne  to  Wright,  8  Feb.  1690. 
26  CSpC,  1689-1692,  nos.  201,25  1,  pp.  69,83:  Journal  of  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  20  June  1689; 
Blathwayt  to  Shales,  II  July  1689. 
271  consider  Childs  in  'Secondary  Operations  of  the  British  Army',  p.  84,  to  have  wrongly  identified  this 
force  as  the  'I"  battalion'  of  Bolton's  regiment. 
28  PRO,  WO  515,  pp.  199,225,243,249,251,254,257:  Order  to  the  Duke  of  Bolton,  [June/July  1689?  1,6 
Nov.  1689;  Order  to  Colonel  Trelawny,  26  Nov.,  2  Dec.  1689;  Order  to  the  Earl  of  Bath,  Governor  of 
Plymouth,  4  Sept.  1689;  Order  to  the  six  Companies  of  the  Duke  of  Bolton's  regiment  commanded  by 
Lieutenant-Colonel  Norton,  9  Dec.  1689;  Order  to  the  Duke  of  Bolton's  regiment  commanded  by  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Holt,  9,12  Dec.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/4,  pp.  169-70,171-2:  the  Admiralty  to  Rooke,  27  Aug.  1689;  the 
Admiralty  to  Tollemache,  27  Aug.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/378,  pp.  221,242:  Bowles  to  Lee,  27  Aug.  1689; 
Bowles  to  Walton,  5  Sept.  1689. 
29  PRO,  WO  4/1,  P.  149,15  1:  Blathwayt  to  the  Lieutenant-Govemor  of  Portsmouth,  28  Jan.  1690;  Blathwayt 
to  Nott,  18  Feb.  1690;  PRO,  WO  515,  pp.  254,263:  Order  to  the  six  Companies  of  the  Duke  of  Bolton's 
regiment  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Norton,  9  Dec.  1689;  Order  to  the  Duke  of  Bolton's  regiment 
commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Norton,  12  Jan.  1690;  PRO,  ADM,  2/379,  p.  156:  Sotherne  to  Blathwayt, 
22  Jan.  1690;  PRO,  ADM  51/582,  Part  ii,  unpaginated,  Mary,  19  Feb.,  6  Mar.,  1690. 67 
The  third  source  of  delay  proved  to  be  the  drafting  of  the  Instructions  for  the 
expedition.  Initially,  this  was  hindered  by  the  indecision  over  whom  to  appoint  as  the 
squadron  commander.  Nobody  was  suggested  for  the  post  until  June  when  Torrington 
recommended  and  secured  the  appointment  of  his  prot6g6,  Sir  Cloudesley  Shovell,  whose 
recently  conferred  knighthood  recognised  his  able  performance  at  Bantry  Bay.  "  As  it  became 
clear  however  that  the  French  were  still  able  to  succour  the  Irish  rebellion  and,  more 
importantly,  threaten  England's  sea  route  to  the  coast,  it  was  decided  that  Shovell's  talents 
were  required  in  the  Irish  sea.  "  The  Admiralty  next  favoured  the  equally  experienced  Captain 
Lawrence  Wright  whose  service  record,  like  Shovell's,  included  a  West  Indian  tour.  " 
Nonetheless,  far  from  expediting  the  squadron's  departure,  his  experience  brought 
preconceived  ideas  to  be  added  to  the  consultation  on  the  Instructions. 
The  Admiralty  had  requested  in  July  that  the  Lords  of  Trade  forward  draft 
Instructions  and  their  delay  till  October  before  even  considering  possible  articles  was  blamed 
upon  the  King.  To  speed  up  the  process,  the  Admiralty  rather  improbably  intimated  that 
Wright  was  ready  to  sail,  though  this  failed  to  persuade  the  key  bureaucratic  figure,  the 
King's  Secretary-at-War,  William  Blathwayt,  who  also  served  the  Lords  of  Trade  as  their 
secretary.  It  was  the  second  week  of  November  before  he  circulated  a  first  draft  and  then 
there  were  the  Admiralty's  various  amendments  and  alterations  to  be  contended.  Their 
formulation  had  been  complicated  by  Wright's  persistent  lobbying  that  he  be  provided  with  an 
independent  command  from  the  colonial  governors  which  would  allow  him  scope  to  direct 
both  the  naval  squadron  and  the  operations  once  in  the  West  Indies.  Securing  the  Admiralty 
Commission's  subsequent  agreement  to  any  alterations  was  convoluted  due  to  the 
requirement  that  it  comprehend  the  views  of  its  head,  Torrington.  His  frequent  absences 
30  PRO,  ADM  3/1,  pp.  105-7:  Board  Minutes,  II  June  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/169,  pp.  158-60:  Admiralty  to 
Torrington,  13  June  1689.  The  treatment  of  this  stage  of  Shovell's  career  in  the  most  recent  secondary 
literature  is  variable.  S.  Harris,  Sir  CloudesleyShovell:  StuartAdmiral  (London,  2001)  fails  to  mention  the 
appointment;  while  J.  B.  Hattendorf,  'Sir  George  Rooke  and  Sir  Cloudesley  Shovell,  c1650-1709  and  1650- 
1707'  in  P.  Lc  Fevre  &  R.  Harding  (eds),  Precursors  ofNelson:  BrifishUmirals  of  the  Eighteenth  Century 
(London,  2000),  p.  51  claims  that  Shovell  was  temporarily  assigned  to  the  West  Indian  squadron  commanded 
by  Wright.  My  evidence  indicates  that  Shovell  was  in  fact  appointed  to  the  sole  command  of  this  squadron 
and  that  Wright's  appointment  followed  the  decision  to  employ  Shovell  off  Ireland. 
3'  Le  Fevre,  'The  Battle  of  Bantry  Bay,  I  May  1689',  pp.  1-7;  Mulloy,  'The  French  Navy  and  the  Jacobite  War 
in  Ireland,  1689-91',  pp.  25-6;  Harris,  Sir Cloudesley  Shovell,  pp.  108-16;  Hattendorf,  'Sir  George  Rooke  and 
Sir  Cloudesley  Shovell',  p.  5  1. 
32  PRO,  ADM  3/1,  p.  136:  Board  Minutes,  I  July  1699;  PRO,  ADM  2/169,  pp.  216-17:  the  Admiralty  to 
Torrington,  10  July  1689;  Neeser,  'The  British  Naval  Operations  in  the  West  Indies',  p.  1613.  Shovell  had 68 
afloat  or  in  port  put  the  secretary,  Bowles,  into  a  quandary  as  to  how  the  Instructions  could 
ever  possibly  be  agreed  if  Torrington  did  not  come  up  to  London.  "  Accordingly,  it  was 
December  before  a  final  set  of  Instructions  was  issued,  only  for  it  to  be  augmented  -  though 
not  substantively  changed  -  through  January  by  the  formulation  of  additional  provisions.  " 
Bowles's  irony  was  thinly  veiled  when  he  subsequently  commended  the  Instructions  to 
Wright  for  having  been  'maturely  debated'.  " 
On  reading  his  Instructions,  Wright  was  doubtless  disappointed  because  his  principal 
request  for  independence  from  the  colonial  governors  had  not  been  granted.  Instead,  not  only 
had  Wright  iffunediately  on  his  arrival  in  the  region  to  consult  with  the  Barbadian  Governor 
and  Council  on  the  expeditionary  force's  defensive  and  offensive  dispositions,  but  also  after 
making  his  way  to  the  Leeward  Islands,  he  was  to  be  subordinate  to  their  governor, 
Christopher  Codrington.  Although  the  context  for  this  secondary  role  was  specifically  stated 
to  be  the  direction  of  the  land  forces,  and  a  Council  of  War  was  to  be  sovereign  in  all 
operational  decisions,  Wright's  authority  over  the  squadron  was  also  circumscribed.  Any  sea 
action  was  only  to  be  undertaken  after  consultation  with  the  relevant  governor  and  sanctioned 
by  the  Council  of  War;  while,  similarly,  approval  from  both  was  required  before  he  could 
dispatch  individual  ships.  If  either  thought  the  squadron's  presence  was  necessary  on  a 
particular  island  station  then  Wright  had  to  comply.  Such  provisions  will  be  seen  to  affect 
future  disputes  within  Whitehall  when  the  Instructions  for  other  overseas  operations  were 
being  drafted.  In  terms  of  targeting,  the  Instruction's  gave  the  colonial  interest  an  added 
command  advantage.  Wright's  only  option  was  the  freedom  to  attack  Martinique  en  route  to 
the  Leeward  Islands,  otherwise  the  Council  of  War  had  operational  discretion  on  targeting.  "' 
The  top  loading  of  this  Council  by  the  colonists,  including  its  presidency,  and  the  priority 
which  would  rightly  be  afforded  to  the  prevailing  regional  intelligence,  meant  that  Wright's 
opinions  as  the  newcomer  would  probably  carry  much  less  weight.  Wright  was  though 
actually  served  twice  in  the  West  Indies  during  his  early  career:  first  in  1663  with  Sir Christopher  Myngs  and 
again  five  years  later  under  Sir  John  Harman.  See  Harris,  Sir  Cloudesley  Shovell,  pp.  14-16,25-3  1. 
33  CSpC,  1689-1692,  nos.  263,519,527,552,584,617,  pp.  97,169,171,179,183,188:  the  Admiralty  to  the 
Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  17  July  1689;  Blathwayt  to  Bowles,  28  Oct.,  13,21  Nov.  1689;  Bowles  to 
Blathwayt,  5  Nov.,  3  Dec.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/378,  pp.  453-4,510,513-14:  Bowles  to  Torrington,  19  Nov. 
1689;  Bowles  to  Blathwayt,  3,5  Dec.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/378,  p.  413:  Bowles  to  Blathwayt,  12  Nov.  1689; 
PRO,  ADM  2/379,  pp.  Bowles  to  Wright,  21  Oct.  1689. 
34  PRO,  ADM  2/5,  pp.  77-82:  'Instructions  for  Capt.  Lawrence  Wright',  21  Dec.  1689;  PRO,  ADM  2/5,  pp. 
156-7:  'Supplementall  Instructions  to  Capt.  Wright  for  the  West  Indies',  18  Jan.  1690. 
35  PRO,  ADM  2/379,  p.  45:  Bowles  to  Wright,  24  Dec.  1689. 
36  PRO,  ADM  2/5,  pp.  77-82:  'Instructions  for  Capt.  Lawrence  Wright',  21  Dec.  1689. 69 
allowed  to  fly  a  'distinguishing  pendant'  which  identified  him  as  Commodore  and  C.  -in.  C  of 
the  naval  squadron  going  to  the  West  Indies.  " 
Wright's  squadron  of  some  thirteen  ships  with  Bolton's  regiment  aboard  and  sundry 
auxiliary  vessels  arrived  in  the  Caribbean  in  early  May  1690.  As  instructed,  Wright  had  made 
first  for  Barbados  (to  deliver  the  new  governor,  James  Kendall)  whence  after  consultation,  he 
was  to  head  for  the  Leeward  Islands.  Although  the  voyage  had  largely  passed  without 
incident,  it  was  ominous  that  sickness  was  already  prevalent  when  the  anchors  were  dropped 
in  Carlisle  Bay.  Wright  downplayed  the  extent  of  the  contagion,  but  both  Kendall  and 
Codrington  made  clear  that  it  was  sufficiently  extensive  to  detain  the  squadron  at  Barbados 
for  the  remainder  of  May  in  the  hope  that  the  men  would  recover.  Although  Codrington 
seemed  by  this  time  quite  resigned  to  delay,  he  failed  to  hide  his  bitter  disappointment  with 
the  quality  of  the  expeditionary  force  when  it  eventually  arrived  off  Antigua.  He  was 
particularly  dismayed  at  how  short  Bolton's  regiment  was  of  Establishment  strength,  and  at 
the  fewness  in  number  and  poor  quality  of  the  small  arms.  He  calculated  that  by  combining 
Holt's  troops  with  the  maximum  number  of  the  Leeward  Islands'  militia,  and  the  remnants  of 
the  Barbadian  regiment,  a  landing  force  of  only  2000  men  would  be  produced.  In  the  hope 
that  additional  troops  might  be  forthcoming  from  Jamaica  or  even  Barbados,  the  first  Council 
of  War  held  on  I  June  deferred  selecting  a  French  target.  Instead,  a  fortnight  was  to  pass 
during  which  the  fleet  watered  at  Montserrat  and  attempts  were  made  to  muster  as  many 
troops  as  possible.  These  included  some  200  seamen  which  Wright  agreed  to  commit  to  the 
land  force,  along  with  four  naval  captains  to  be  commissioned  as  their  officers,  who  became 
known  as  the  'Marine  Regiment'.  A  further  review  of  all  available  forces  held  on  Nevis  on  13 
June  produced,  according  to  Codrington,  an  increase  of  only  500  men  from  his  original 
calculation,  though  Sir  Timothy  Thornhill's  secretary  estimated  an  additional  1000. 
A  Council  convened  during  this  two  week  interval  had  determined  that  an  attempt  be 
made  on  St  Kitts.  Back  in  August  1689  the  French  had  evicted  the  English  from  their  half  of 
37  PRO,  ADM  2/5,  p.  223:  Warrant  empowering  Capt.  Lawrence  Wright  to  wear  a  Flag  at  the  Main 
Topmasthead,  6  Feb.  1690.  The  official  rank  of  Commodore  did  not  appear  in  the  Navy  Regulations  until 
1806.  Imported  from  Holland  in  1689,  it  was  used  intermittently  to  denote  a  Captain  dispatched  in  command 
of  a  squadron  for  overseas  service.  Wright's  rank  was  Captain  but  he  had  been  appointed  C.  -in-C.  of  the 
Squadron  in  the  West  Indies.  Throughout  the  eighteenth  century  the  term  Commodore  became  a  means  of 
allowing  a  Post-Captain  to  be  appointed  to  command  a  squadron  without  affecting  the  seniority  lists.  See 
Ehrman,  The  Navy  in  the  War  of  William  III,  pp.  455,  Appendix  X,  650;  Sir  R.  Massie  Blomfield,  'Naval 
Executive  Titles.  Commadore  or  Commodore?  ',  MM  iv  (1914),  73-7;  N.  A.  M.  Rodger,  The  Wooden  Wor/J  An 
Anatomy  of  the  Georgian  Navy  (London,  1988),  pp.  299-300. 70 
this  shared  island  and  it  was  thought  that  the  French  had  now  dug  in  a  strong  defensive  force. 
The  Antelope  and  the  Hampshire  spent  two  days  (15-17  June)  annoying  the  enemy  along  the 
island's  coastline,  while  a  plan  was  composed  to  surprise  the  French  by  landing  at  Frigate 
Bay,  situated  to  the  south.  To  this  end,  on  19  June  Wright  was  to  lead  a  decoy  squadron  of 
five  vessels  away  from  the  Bay,  while  the  Assistance,  the  Success  and  the  Guernsey  would 
shepherd  the  ships'  boats  loaded  with  some  600  soldiers  each  as  far  as  possible  towards  the 
shore.  Although  Wright  was  subsequently  critical  of  these  vessels  weighing  late  in  the  day 
due  to,  he  believed,  the  army's  slowness  embarking,  Codrington  was  more  affected  by  what 
he  saw  of  the  French  as  he  neared  the  landing  point.  Some  1000  French  troops  at  arms  were 
disposed  in  deep  trenches  close  to  Frigate  Bay.  Surprise  was  now  a  chimera;  and  as 
Codrington  considered  it  an  standard  rule  of  warfare  that  even  with  an  additional  1000 
bodies,  men  landing  from  boats  cannot  overcome  those  in  trenches  to  establish  a  bridgehead, 
the  attack  was  aborted. 
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Reconvening  the  following  day,  the  Council  now  sought  to  formulate  a  plan  which 
reclaimed  the  element  of  surprise.  It  now  resolved  to  attack  the  French  by  landing  two 
groups  of  troops:  one  force  of  around  500  colonial  soldiers  commanded  by  Sir  Timothy 
Thornhill  would  go  ashore  at  Friar  Bay,  a  half-mile  to  the  eastwards  of  Frigate  Bay,  ascend 
the  near  800  foot  interposing  hill  and  drop  down  on  the  rear  of  the  western  flank  of  the 
French  trenches;  and  as  Thornhill  was  making  this  attack,  a  second  force  comprised  of 
Bolton's  regiment  and  the  seamen  would  land  as  originally  planned.  The  Council  also 71 
wagered  that  the  French  would  believe  the  English  return  to  Frigate  Bay  a  feint  for  a  principal 
landing  to  the  leeward,  and,  so,  to  entrench  this  possible  misapprehension,  once  the  soldiers 
for  Frigate  Bay  had  been  sent  on  their  way,  the  squadron  having  been  rejoined  by  the 
detachment  at  Friar  Bay  would  set  sail  to  leeward. 
The  execution  of  the  plan  was  a  complete  success.  "  Thornhill  encountered  little 
resistance  on  landing  or  during  his  arduous  march  over  what  is  still  known  today  as  'Sir 
Timothy's  Hill'.  Swiftly  dealing  with  the  derisory  number  of  French  scouts,  his  colonial  force 
was  able  to  descend  the  western  slope  and  punch  a  hole  through  the  French  trenches  which 
had  been  weakened  (as  the  English  surmised)  by  the  withdrawal  of  men  to  deal  with  an 
expected  attack  to  the  leeward.  This  changed  the  situation  visa  vis  the  seaborne  assault. 
When  the  rest  of  the  troops  completed  a  successful  landing  at  Frigate  Bay,  thus  tightening  the 
other  arm  of  the  English  pincer,  the  French  fled  from  their  trenches  towards  the  island's 
principal  town,  Basseterre.  A  bridgehead  had  been  established;  but  if  the  island  was  to  be 
completely  conquered  then  further  co-operation  between  the  army  and  navy  would  be 
required.  This  was,  in  fact,  what  occurred  over  the  course  of  the  next  month  as  the  centres  of 
French  resistance  upon  the  island  were  progressively  eliminated. 
Drawing  his  landed  troops  up  into  two  lines  -  one  taking  the  high  mountainous  route 
and  the  other  the  road  at  sea  level  -  Codrington  pursued  the  enemy  towards  Basseterre. 
About  a  mile  from  Frigate  Bay  both  were  engaged  in  a  fire  fight  as  the  French  had  rallied 
during  their  initial  retreat.  The  line  of  troops  on  the  lower  route  met  particularly  stout 
resistance  and  the  Antiguans,  who  comprised  the  majority  of  this  force,  lost  a 
disproportionate  amount  of  men.  The  French  were  eventually  beaten  back  and  sufficiently 
disordered  to  abandon  the  possibility  of  establishing  the  town  and  fort  of  Basseterre  as  a 
centre  of  defence.  As  Wright,  whose  task  had  been  to  take  the  squadron  down  to  the  coast 
parallel  to  the  town  with  a  view  to  bombarding  it  into  submission,  approached  the  roadstead, 
the  French  struck  their  colours,  fired  many  of  the  town's  building  and  fled  into  the  mountains. 
38  The  ensuing  account  of  the  operation  on  St  Kitts  is  based  on  the  following  primary  sources:  CSPC,  1689- 
1692,  nos.  927,968,977,1004,1034.1,11,1044.111,  pp.  278-9,288-9,291-4,313-14,303-5:  Codrington  to 
the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  4  June  1690;  Kendall  to  Shrewsbury,  26  June  1690,  Codrington  to  the 
Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  4  July,  3  Aug.  1690;  Wright  to  Kendall,  24  June,  26  July  1690;  Inventory  of 72 
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It  was  not  the  intention  of  the  French  Governor,  Guiteau,  to  remain  long  in  the 
highlands,  and  with  a  force  of  some  300  regular  troops  and  planters  he  travelled  north  west  to 
Charles  (or  the  English)  Fort  on  Sandy  Point  to  stage  his  defence  of  the  island.  Guiteau's 
abandonment  of  the  other  inhabitants  engendered  a  sense  ofbetrayal  that  diluted  any 
resistance  to  Fnglish  troops  on  their  march  upon  the  fort,  while  the  fleet  sailed  round  to  a 
rendezvous  at  Pheype's  Bay.  Overlooking  Charles  Fort  from  the  east,  Brimstone  Hill 
provided  an  excellent  vantage  point  for  reconnaissance;  and  from  its  heights  Codrington 
immediately  appreciated  that  he  was  t1aced  with  undertaking  a  standard  siege.  Although 
Wright  was  now  some  distance  off  the  coast  in  the  Old  Road  having  flailed  to  make  the 
rendezvous  due  to  bad  anchorage  at  Pheype's  Bay,  word  still  reached  him  on  27  June  that 
Codrington  wished  a  consultation.  A  meeting  that  day  between  the  two  men  reached 
agreement  on  the  positioning  of  naval  ordnance  on  the  north-east  slopes  of'  Brimstone  II  ill; 
and,  more  significantly,  demonstrated  their  harmonious  relations  in  that  they  had  both  t'elt  able 
to  dispense  with  a  Council  of  War.  Within  two  days  Wright  had  landed  the  two  chase  guns 
from  the  Mag's  forecastle,  and  the  sailors  then  serving  with  the  land  force  were  subsequently 
commended  by  Codrington  for  their  efforts  in  bringing  this  ordnance  up  the  hill  on  specially 
built  sledges.  With  the  hill  batteries  ready  to  begin  their  fire,  on  I  July  Wright  led  seven  ofhis 
the  arms  etc.  taken  at  Charles  Fort,  St  Christophers,  PRO,  ADM  5  1/582,  Parts  i-ii,  unpaginated,  Afaty,  9 73 
squadron  in  a  double  pass  of  the  fort,  throwing  from  half-range  an  upper-tier  broadside  on 
each  occasion.  This  did  not,  however,  seem  to  quell  the  enemy's  fire  from  the  fort  and  the 
naval  captains  concluded  that  the  situation  of  the  well-walled  fort  on  a  rock  that  was  almost 
as  high  as  the  walls  caused  it  to  be  immune  from  a  sea-based  bombardment.  A  preponderant 
land  battery  was  considered  the  only  way  forward  and  a  further  nine  twelve  pounders  were 
landed  from  the  squadron  to  form  a  shore  level  gun  emplacement.  Previously,  on  30  June, 
Codrington  had  opened  his  half-moon  trenches  and,  as  the  parallel  lines  inched  forward,  he 
sent  parties  out  to  sweep  the  mountainous  environs  in  an  attempt  to  flush  out  any  enemy 
operating  in  his  rear.  Although  this  tactic  culminated  in  a  full  island  traverse  by  800  troops 
headed  by  Codrington,  the  enemy's  dispersal,  allowed  the  majority  of  them  to  evade  the 
English  military  broom. 
Given  that  his  attempt  to  secure  his  siege  force  had  largely  failed,  Codrington  required 
that  swifter  progress  be  made  in  forcing  the  fortress  to  surrender.  There  was,  nonetheless, 
little  cause  for  anxiety.  Over  the  course  of  nine  days  from  2  to  12  July,  the  heavy  ordnance 
began  to  take  its  toll  as  the  trenches  moved  within  pistol  shot  of  the  fort  gates.  At  each  stage 
sailors  from  the  squadron  -  and  not  only  those  initially  organised  as  the  'Marine  Regiment'  - 
were  prominent  in  moving  the  siege  forwards.  On  12  July  Guiteau  beat  a  parley,  seeking  a 
cease-fire  of  between  48  to  72  hours  and  Codrington  quickly  consented,  though  he 
remorselessly  continued  the  works  by  extending  his  front  trench  to  link  up  with  the  one  the 
enemy  had  dug  outwards  for  access  and  mounted  more  guns.  Within  48  hours  of  the  cease- 
fire,  Guiteau  agreed  to  a  surrender  and  on  16  July  the  garrison  marched  out  with  only  their 
baggage,  leaving  behind  some  29  cannon  and  over  200  small  arms. 
Buoyed  by  this  successful  action,  Codrington  persuaded  the  Council  to  dispatch 
Thornhill  with  a  force  of  350  men  comprised  of  troops  from  Thornhill's  colonial  regiment  and 
Bolton's  regiment  to  reclaim  St  Eustatius  for  the  Dutch.  Wright  ordered  the  Guernsey  with 
some  hired  sloops  to  transport  and  land  Thornhill's  force,  while  the  rest  of  the  squadron 
sailed  to  Pheype's  Bay  to  embark  the  sailors  of  the  'Marine  Regiment'.  Thereafter,  the 
squadron  was  to  bear  for  St  Eustatius  to  support  the  land  force.  The  landing  was  unopposed 
and  Thornhill's  force  made  good  progress  through  the  interior  of  the  island  to  come  up 
against  the  fort  on  the  south  side  where  a  French  garrison  of  80  men  had  concentrated  their 
Mar.  -16  July  1690;  Spencer,  A  True  andFaithful  Relation  of  the  Proceedings  ofthe  Forces,  pp.  7-11. 74 
defences.  Allied  unity  was  not  advanced,  though,  by  the  circumstance  that  former  Dutch 
governor,  Captain  Schorer,  had  landed  three  days  earlier  from  Saba  with  a  meagre  force  of  60 
soldiers  which,  Codrington  acidly  remarked,  managed  only  to  round  up  the  island's  livestock. 
As  at  St  Kitts,  the  English  had  to  lay  siege  to  the  fort,  and  the  squadron  again 
provided  the  mainstay  of  the  ordnance  for  the  batteries.  On  this  occasion,  the  fort  was  more 
susceptible  to  bombardment  from  the  sea  and  over  the  two  days  -  21  and  22  July  -  Wright 
sent  various  ships  in  close  to  ensure  a  reasonably  constant  fire.  The  naval  commander  was 
also  instrumental  in  maintaining  a  regular  supply  of  stores  to  the  trenches  until  the  French 
surrendered  on  25  July.  It  was  an  outcome  that  greatly  pleased  Wright  who,  after  inspecting 
the  fort,  wrote  of  its  natural  and  erected  defences  as  being  too  great  to  have  been  overcome 
by  assault.  "  He  would  also  have  been  pleased  with  the  successful  completion  of  this  second 
combined  operation  just  as  the  height  of  the  huff  icane  season  was  giving  notice  of  a  cessation 
in  operational  activity.  Moreover,  an  increasing  sickness  amongst  the  troops  was  hindering, 
in  the  short-term  at  least,  any  further  action.  Considering  these  factors,  a  Council  of  War 
decided  at  the  end  of  July  that  the  remnants  of  Bolton's  and  the  Barbadian  regiments  would 
remain  at  St  Kitts  while  the  colonial  militia  could  return  home.  Wright  was  to  depart  for 
Barbados  and  weather  the  worst  of  the  season  by  cruising  off  that  station.  40 
London's  orders  were  that  Wright  return  with  the  squadron  on  the  depletion  of  his 
provisions  towards  the  end  of  the  summer.  However,  both  Kendall  and  Codrington  -  albeit 
for  different  reasons  -  were  keen  that  the  squadron  continue  in  the  Caribbean.  Kendall's 
concerns  were  defensive,  fearing  that  Wright's  departure  would  coincide  with  the  anticipated 
French  squadron's  arrival  in  the  region,  thus  leaving  the  English  colonies  vulnerable  to  attack. 
Codrington,  however,  had  a  more  aggressive  vision,  focused  upon  the  wholesale  capture  of 
the  Caribbean  sugar  trade  through  deploying  the  squadron  to  press  home  attacks  against  the 
other  French  islands  and,  in  particular,  Martinique  and  Guadeloupe.  As  Kendall  was  not 
embroiled  in  the  campaign  to  retake  St  Kitts,  the  Barbadian  Governor  was  the  first  to  begin 
lobbying  the  Court  as  early  as  June  and  his  promptness  bore  fruit  when  agreement  was 
reached  that  the  squadron  would  remain  till  the  turn  of  the  year,  while  provision  ships  would 
39  CSPC,  1689-1692,  nos.  1004,1034.1,  pp,  303-5,313-14:  Codrington  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations, 
3  Aug.  1690;  Wright  to  Kendall,  26  July  1690;  PRO,  ADM  51/582,  Part  ii,  unpaginated,  Mary,  17-26  July 
1690;  Spencer,  A  True  andFaithfid  Relation  of  the  Proceedings  of  the  Forces,  pp.  11-12. 75 
be  dispatched  with  supplies  and  around  400  recruits  for  Bolton's  regiment.  Furthen-nore, 
when  he  was  eventually  to  depart,  Wright  was  to  appoint  a  frigate  each  to  the  island  stations 
of  Barbados,  Jamaica  and  the  Leeward  Islands,  showing  an  increased  English  commitment  to 
the  West  Indies. 
These  decisions  taken  in  October  clearly  responded  more  to  Kendall's  defensive 
concerns  than  Codrington's  enthusiasm  to  take  steps  to  expel  the  French.  Indeed,  the 
Leeward  Islands'  Governor  was  most  upset  when  he  received  notification  in  December  that 
Wright  was  only  to  stay  until  January,  particularly  as  an  operation  against  Guadeloupe  in 
October  had  been  shelved  due  to  the  refusal  of  the  militia  troops  to  participate  until  there  was 
a  full  and  fair  division  of  the  current  stocks  of  plunder.  Nonetheless,  the  slowness  of  early 
modem  military  communications  meant  that  Codrington  was  then  unaware  that  in  November 
the  Court  had  decided  that  Wright  would  remain  in  the  West  Indies  indefimitely.  ' 
By  the  time  notification  of  the  squadron's  indefinite  continuance  reached  the 
Caribbean,  reports  had  come  through  that  a  considerable  French  squadron  had  dropped 
anchor  at  Martinique.  Wright  was  cruising  off  Barbados  when  this  news  reached  him  and, 
although  it  proved  difficult  to  clarify  the  exact  number  of  French  ships,  with  estimates  of  the 
number  of  men-of-war  varying  between  fourteen  and  two,  it  was  clear  that  the  navy's  ability 
to  participate  in  a  combined  operation  had  been  compromised.  Regional  sea  command  was 
now  threatened,  and  as  a  result  the  squadron  would  either  have  to  assert  its  supremacy  or 
look  two  ways  when  undertaking  operations.  Without  waiting  for  confirmation  of  the  size  of 
the  French  squadron,  Wright's  initial  reaction  was  to  augment  his  own  force  by  hiring  six 
merchantmen  whose  provisioning  would  be  at  the  colonies'  expense.  The  naval  captains 
readily  agreed  with  this  course  of  action  but  -  probably  due  to  the  cost  -  the  colonial  officials 
were  more  sceptical  and,  when  the  number  of  French  ships  was  reported  to  be  considerably 
less  then  fourteen,  Kendall  argued  for  the  discharge  of  some  of  the  merchantmcn.  Although 
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3  Aug.  1690;  Wright  to  Kendall,  26  July  1690;  PRO,  ADM  51/582,  Part  ii,  unpaginated,  Mary,  31  July  1690; 
PRO,  ADM  2/5,  pp.  77-82:  'Instructions  for  Capt.  Lawrence  Wright',  21  Dec.  1689. 
41  CSpC,  1689-1692,  nos.  968,1158-9,1207,1242,1319,  pp.  288-9,338,351-2,369-70,388-9:  Kendall  to 
Shrewsbury,  26  June  1690;  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations  to  Kendall,  I  Nov  1690;  Minutes  of  the 
Council  of  Barbados,  3  Nov.  1690;  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations  to  Codrington,  24  Nov.  1690; 
Codrington  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  16  Dec.  1690,15  Feb.  169  1;  PRO,  ADM  1/5247,  fos.  134- 
5,145:  Naval  Minute,  18  Sept.,  30  Oct.  1690;  PRO,  ADM  2/6,  fos.  393-4,488,494,507-9,513:  'Instructions 
for  Capt.  Lawrence  Wright',  I  Oct.  1690;  the  Admiralty  to  Wright,  17,21  Nov.  1690;  the  Admiralty  to 
Tollemache,  18,20  Nov.  1690,  PRO,  ADM  2/380,  f  531:  Sotherne  to  Wright,  17  Nov.  1690. 76 
the  naval  Council  undoubtedly  complied  with  the  Instructions  by  consulting  with  the 
Barbadian  Governor,  its  rejection  of  his  advice  transgressed  the  spirit  of  the  expedition;  and 
this  was  the  first  milestone  on  the  road  to  increasingly  fractious  relations  between  Wright  and 
the  colonial  authorities.  "' 
In  early  February,  Wright  revealed  his  determination  to  mount  further  operations  with 
Codrington  by  sailing  for  the  Leeward  Islands  without  first  neutralising  the  French  naval 
threat  as  Kendall  had  suggested.  "  To  be  fair  to  Wright,  he  did  ply  off  Martinique  for  a 
couple  of  days  on  his  voyage  north  to  seek  clarification  on  the  actual  strength  of  the  French 
fleet;  and  on  16  February  he  received  the  lowest  estimate  of  only  two  French  men-of-war 
from  the  crew  of  a  sloop  that  the  Bristol  captured  under  Martinique's  shore.  As  this  hardly 
represented  a  credible  threat  to  his  sea  command,  Wright  did  not  want  to  waste  time  or 
resources  blocking  up  Martinique  to  entice  the  French  out  for  an  engagement.  Nonetheless, 
the  Commodore  also  learned  that  Ducasse  was  on  his  way  to  the  region  with  a  considerably 
larger  French  squadron.  This  should,  perhaps,  have  instilled  a  sense  of  urgency  in  the 
forthcoming  amphibious  operations. 
A  Council  of  War  held  ashore  at  St  Kitts  on  19  February  resolved  to  attack 
Guadeloupe,  and  that  the  preparations  for  this  were  immediately  to  proceed  apace.  Wright's 
log  recorded  much  activity  by  the  squadron  moving  amongst  the  Leeward  Islands  embarking 
soldiers  and  stores  but  there  was  no  explanation  why  a  month  hence  the  expeditionary  force 
had  still  to  sail  for  Guadeloupe  or  why  on  20  March  the  Council  changed  the  target  of  attack 
to  Mariegalante.  However,  unusually  for  a  Captain's  log,  Wright  provides  a  fairly 
personalised  commentary  alongside  the  factual  notes.  He  described  disputes  such  as  that  over 
the  discharge  of  the  hired  ships  and  punctuated  the  record  with  sarcastic  remarks  on 
Codrington's  alleged  pretensions  to  greatness  in  military  command.  In  doing  so,  he  charted 
the  deterioration  of  his  relationship  with  the  Governor  and  implied  that  the  delay  was  due  to 
Codrington's  procrastination.  Of  course,  the  Leeward  Islands'  Council  was  forthcoming  with 
an  alternative  interpretation  which  portrayed  Wright  as  a  dilettante,  who  possessed 
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insufficient  resolve  to  attack  the  French  and  who  wasted  time  cruising  amongst  the  islands. 
The  evidence  is  ultimately  inconclusive  but  what  is  clear  is  that  when  the  squadron  left  for 
Mariegalante  on  21  March,  the  relationship  between  the  land  and  sea  forces  and,  more 
specifically,  between  Codrington  and  Wright  had  deteriorated. 
Notwithstanding,  the  operation  against  Mariegalante  was  a  success.  On  28  March 
Bolton's  regiment  plus  over  200  sailors  were  landed  under  the  command  of  Major  Nott  and 
marched  without  opposition  to  the  town  where  a  fort  of  four  guns  was  found  to  be  deserted. 
The  enemy  had,  in  fact,  fled  to  the  woods  upon  the  English  landing,  and  Nott's  main  task 
was,  as  Hutcheson  described  it,  'hunting-work'.  The  Major  was,  nonetheless,  deprived  of  his 
seamen  after  Wright  took  a  boat  down  to  shore  to  assess  the  extent  of  Nott's  task  and 
decided  that  the  squadron  might  be  more  profitably  employed  reconnoitring  Guadeloupe. 
When  the  Commodore  returned  to  Mariegalante  on  6  April,  Codrington  had  arrived  to  send  a 
summons  to  the  French  Governor,  Auger,  which  he  answered  the  day  after  Nott  captured 
Lieutenant  d'Avoux  and  30  of  his  men.  This  number,  added  to  the  50  already  killed  out  of  a 
total  of  240,  obviously  caused  Auger  to  believe  that  he  had  not  sufficient  numbers  to  defend 
French  control  of  the  island;  but  implicitly  it  also  reflected  the  insignificance  of  Mariegalante 
within  the  region.  Ironically,  this  view  was  underlined  by  the  English  who  after  sending  the 
French  prisoners  away,  brought  off  all  their  troops  on  13  April  having  resolved  to  leave  the 
island  without  a  garrison  as  they  set  out  for  the  strategically  more  important  island  of 
Guadeloupe. 
This  resolution  had  been  taken  at  a  Council  held  on  10  April  -a  fractious  meeting  at 
which  Codrington  had  tried  to  persuade  the  assembled  participants  that  Martinique  should  be 
attacked  first.  He  argued  that  this  more  southerly  French  island  held  the  key  to  the  rest  of 
their  possessions  in  the  West  Indies  and  that,  militarily,  a  logical  progression  could  be  made 
from  it  to  Guadeloupe.  Since  Barbados  had  agreed  only  to  commit  troops  to  the  reduction  of 
Martinique,  Codrington  contended  that  the  landing  force  could  make  an  initial  attack  while 
awaiting  the  arrival  of  this  contingent.  This  would  secure  the  majority  of  the  island  save  for 
the  fort  where  it  was  expected  the  French  Governor  would  retreat  in  strength.  Once  the 
Barbadians  had  arrived  they  could  invest  the  enemy  stronghold  thereby  freeing  the  landing 
force  to  press  north  to  Guadeloupe  which  Codrington  expected  to  offer  less  resistance  even 
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though  intelligence  reports  indicated  that  defensive  preparations  were  being  completed  in 
expectation  of  an  attack.  It  remains  unclear  why  the  Council  was  not  persuaded  by 
Codrington's  plausible  arguments,  especially  since  the  Governor  held  the  Chair  in  the 
presence  of  many  other  soldiers.  While  the  naval  captains  may  have  been  resolved  for 
Guadeloupe  on  going  into  the  meeting,  the  majority  verdict  against  Codrington  implies  that 
some  land  men  voted  against  him.  Perhaps  there  were  fears  that,  regardless  of  the  eventual 
support  from  Barbados,  the  landing  force  would  incur  loss  at  the  initial  attack  on  Martinique 
causing  there  to  be  a  reduction  in  the  1100  troops  then  available  for  deployment  on 
Guadeloupe;  or  perhaps  the  Council  as  a  whole  simply  could  not  accept  Codrington's 
assessment  about  the  comparative  degrees  of  resistance  expected  at  either  island. 
When  the  fleet  arrived  off  Guadeloupe  on  19  April  and  bore  down  towards  the  shore 
in  front  of  the  main  town,  Basse-Terre,  Wright  noted  the  scale  of  the  French  defensive 
disposition:  deep  trenches  faced  with  armed  men  and  a  couple  of  troops  of  horse  positioned 
above.  This  was  in  addition  to  Fort  Maudlin  and  other  gun  emplacements,  all  of  which 
managed  to  badly  gall  the  squadron  that  afternoon  when  it  got  caught  in  a  calm  at  half-cable 
lengths  distance.  Some  thirty  men  were  lost  in  this  exchange  which  lasted  just  over  an  hour 
before  a  slight  wind  blew  up  to  allow  the  vessels  to  disengage.  This  stout  French  opposition 
caused  a  rethink  of  the  landing  site  when  the  fleet  aff  ived  at  the  intended  spot  -  Anse  La 
Barque  Bay  -  on  21  April  only  to  spy  the  enemy  hastening  there  too.  Codrington  proposed 
landing  at  another  bay  to  the  windward,  sensibly  arguing  that  the  extra  two  leagues  march 
was  worth  the  security  of  wading  ashore  from  the  boats  largely  unmolested.  This  point  was 
subsequently  underscored  when,  after  a  successful  landing  had  been  effected,  considerable 
French  breastworks  positioned  at  Anse  la  Barque  were  seen  for  the  first  time. 
Major  Nott  and  Lord  Archibald  Hamilton  led  English  troops  landed  first  to  relative 
safety  on  a  nearby  hill-top;  included  in  this  force  was  the  re-formed  'Marine  Regiment'  of 
around  400  sailors  drawn  from  the  squadron.  Soon  after,  the  march  upon  Basse-Terre  began 
and  it  was  not  without  incident.  For  the  English,  the  major  difficulty  was  the  immediate 
topography  which  compressed  the  reach  of  their  force  and  provided  the  French  with  many 
robust  natural  features  to  use  as  cover.  Indeed,  the  ascent  to  the  enemy's  position  some  two 
and  a-half  miles  distant  on  the  opposite  side  of  a  steep  gully  was  difficult;  the  path,  wide 
enough  for  only  three  troops  abreast,  ran  through  a  thick  wood  that  thinned  on  the  left  flank 
as  the  crest  was  reached.  It  took  a  well  executed  flanking  manoeuvre  by  Lord  Hamilton 79 
round  the  less  dense  left  of  this  wood  before  the  French  were  forced  from  their  position. 
Such  problems  were  virtually  replicated  three  miles  forward  where  the  French  had  rallied  on  a 
hill-top  across  the  Habitants  river.  Again  a  wood  interposed  and  the  most  suitable  approach 
could  accommodate  only  two  soldiers  abreast.  Codrington  initially  aimed  to  beat  a  path 
through  the  woods  and  he  committed  around  450  men  to  this  task;  but,  as  they  got  bogged 
down  in  a  fire-fight,  he  was  forced  to  seek  a  passage  some  distance  up-river  before  the 
French  could  be  forced  once  more  onto  the  retreat.  After  sunset  on  22  April,  Codrington 
with  an  advanced  detachment  of  500  men  did  arrive  in  the  deserted  town  of  La  Bayliffthree 
miles  from  Basse-Terre;  but  it  had  not  been  without  cost. 
On  the  following  morning,  as  the  rest  of  the  army came  up,  Captain  Blackiston  was 
sent  forward  to  reconnoitre  Basse-Terre.  Since  the  landing,  the  squadron  had  been  redundant 
as  it  followed  the  course  of  the  army  along  the  shore,  but  the  land  sources  imply  that  its 
idleness  caused  the  fleet  to  provide  an  inaccurate  report  that  Blakiston  was  engaged  at  the 
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town,  though  Wright's  log  contains  no  record  of  this.  Nonetheless,  on  this  pretext, 
Codrington  moved  quickly  to  support  Captain  Blackiston  to  find  that  he  had  in  fact  entered  a 
deserted  town  and  that  those  French  who  had  stayed  were  in  the  town's  old  fortified  castle 
connected  within  a  furlong  to  a  'cavalier'  or  fortified  raised  outpost.  Hutchesons's  report 
makes  clear  that  the  strength  of  these  fortifications  derived  both  from  their  natural  aspects 
and  the  quality  of  their  construction  but  on  24  April  the  Council  agreed  that  siege  works 
should  be  begun. 
Wright  organised  his  squadron  to  land  the  requisite  amount  of  ordnance  and  store  for 
the  siege  batteries,  while  drafting  a  proposal  that  the  squadron  ply  to  the  windward  and  bear 
down  in  line  to  batter  the  castle  and  the  'cavalier'.  Codrington  and  the  land  officers  agreed  to 
Wright's  plans  but  despite  three  attempts,  the  weather  and,  in  particular,  the  strength  of  the 
current  prevented  any  seaborne  bombardment.  Hence  by  I  May,  Wright  was  back  at  anchor 
off  Bailiff  landing  additional  ordnance  and  stores  as  Codrington  moved  his  gun  batteries  ever 
closer  to  the  forts  in  expectation  of  effecting  the  necessary  breach  as  a  preliminary  to  an 
assault.  At  that  point  the  principal  source  of  worry  was  that  the  French  might  send 
reinforcements  from  Martinique  and,  in  an  attempt  to  neutralise  this  threat  by  increasing  the 
size  of  their  own  force,  the  Council  sent  Hutcheson  to  Barbados  to  negotiate  an  additional 
supply  of  men.  However,  within  three  days  of  his  departure  Hutcheson's  task  looked 
increasingly  irrelevant  as  word  came  through  to  Wright  that  Ducasse  had  already  arrived  at 
Martinique,  albeit  with  only  two  men-of-war. 
This  news  did  not  initially  impact  upon  the  English  operation  and  the  siege  batteries 
continued  their  near  constant  bombardment,  causing  several  smaller  breaches  to  open  up,  and, 
on  II  May,  the  razing  of  the  fort's  house.  Two  days  later  however  Wright  was  informed  that 
eleven  substantial  French  sail  had  been  spotted  coming  from  Martinique.  He  immediately 
concluded  that  Ducasse  was  leading  a  relief  expedition  and  sent  to  Codrington  with  an 
account  of  these  circumstances  and  a  request  that  all  the  sailors  currently  on  shore  be  sent 
back  aboard.  The  Commodore's  instinct  was  to  leave  Guadeloupe  and  sail  towards  Ducasse. 
His  log  does,  however,  play  down  such  intentions  and  notes  that  at  the  Council  of  naval 
captains  convened  the  following  day  it  was  resolved  merely  to  ask  Codrington  if  the  squadron 
should  sail,  thus  leaving  the  army  ashore;  and  the  minute  of  this  Council  supports  this  version 
of  events.  Codrington,  nonetheless,  believed  that  Wright  was  threatening  to  withdraw  sea- 
based  support  without  which  his  army  faced  being  cut  off.  Codrington  subsequently  wrote  of 81 
trying  to  forge  a  compromise  by  suggesting  to  Wright  that  five  of  the  hired  merchantmen 
remain  on  station  while  the  land  force  made  a  final  push  to  capture  the  forts.  According  to 
Codrington  -  Wright  makes  no  mention  of  this  proposal  in  his  log  -  the  Commodore's 
response  was  intemperate  and  focused  on  preserving  the  squadron  at  all  costs. 
The  army  was  re-embarked  during  the  night  of  14  May,  thus  signalling  the  end  of  the 
combined  operations  undertaken  by  Wright  and  Codrington.  The  squadron  set  off  to  engage 
Ducasse  but,  either  through  accident  or  design,  the  Frenchman  managed  to  outrun  Wright. 
Thereafter,  on  returning  to  Barbados,  the  relationships  between  Wright  and  the  colonial 
authorities  progressively  worsened  throughout  the  rest  of  the  summer  to  such  an  extent  that 
Codrington  and  others  sought  to  engineer  Wright's  disgrace  on  his  return  to  England.  By  the 
time  Wright  left  the  Caribbean  in  the  early  autumn  due  to  sickness  and  a  recall  order,  a 
warrant  been  issued  for  his  arrest.  The  court  martial,  which  did  not  occur  for  another  two 
years,  acquitted  him  of  all  charges  relating  to  his  conduct  when  in  the  Caribbean.  In  the 
summer  of  1691  this  was  for  the  future  as  the  important  questions  about  the  failure  of 
William's  strategy  and  the  combined  operations  in  the  Caribbean  began  to  be  asked  at  Court. 
111ii:  Captain  Ralph  Wrenn's  Expedition  to  the  West  Indies,  Januarv-April  1692. 
The  short  three  month  duration  of  this  expedition,  combined  with  the  fact  that  Captain  Wrenn 
failed  to  make  any  offensive  troop  landings  before  he  succumbed  to  yellow  fever  in  early 
April,  questions  its  separate  inclusion  in  a  study  of  combined  operations.  This  though  can  be 
immediately  answered  by  the  administrative  and  strategic  reality  of  an  expedition  which  was 
dispatched  in  the  six  months  following  the  ignominious  circumstances  surrounding  the 
indecision  over  Wright's  recall  and  his  subsequent  arrest  for  high  treason.  " 
Superficial  enquiry  might  lead  one  to  pre-date  the  operation's  origins  to  a 
memorandum  circulated  in  June  1691  in  which  the  author  (subsequently  identified  as 
Blathwayt)  laid  out  a  plan  for  a  strengthened  West  Indian  squadron  to  make  a  series  of 
44  I1MC,  Finch  MSS,  iii.  168:  Nottingham  to  Sydney,  21  July  1691,  states  that  Wright  was  to  be  ordered  home 
and  yet,  PRO,  ADM  316,  pp.  126-7:  Board  Minutes,  7  Aug.  169  1,  contains  fresh  orders  to  Wright  regarding 
the  provisioning  of  his  squadron  in  the  West  Indies.  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  iii.  198:  Nottingham  to  the 
Commissioners  of  the  Admiralty,  10  Aug.  1691,  indicates  that  it  was  not  until  10  Aug.  that  the  Admiralty 
were  requested  to  remove  Wright  and  issue  a  warrant  for  his  arrest.  Neeser,  'The  British  Naval  Operations  in 
the  West  Indies,  1650-1700',  p.  1624  n.  38,  claimed  that  an  order  countermanding  the  recall  was  received  in 
the  West  Indies.  By  autumn,  in  the  event  of  the  Admiralty  having  failed  to  issue  the  warrant,  the  Lords  of 
Trade  in  CSPC,  1689-1692,  no.  1775,  p.  545:  Journal  of  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  21  Sept.  1691, 
made  clear  their  intention  to  do  so. 82 
destructive  descents  on  the  French  territories  in  conjunction  with  the  Duke  of  Bolton's 
Second  Regiment  of  Foot  (previously  taken  out  by  Wright)  and  a  further  two  infantry 
battalions.  "  However,  this  was  little  different  from  what  Wright  had  been  dispatched  to 
undertake,  and  Blathwayt's  plan  came  to  provide  the  wellspring  and  general  direction  of  all 
expeditions  sent  to  the  Caribbean  during  the  war.  The  more  immediate  origins  of  Wrenn's 
squadron  are  to  be  found  in  the  failure  of  the  last  Wright-Codrington  attempt  against 
Guadeloupe.  On  that  occasion  the  joint  service  equilibrium  whereby  maritime  preponderance 
succoured  the  land  campaign  had  been  upset  by  the  arrival  of  some  eleven  French  sail  in  a 
neighbouring  bay.  The  basic  point  that  (regional)  sea  command  was  essential  before  any 
other  attacks  (land  or  sea)  could  be  sustained  had  been  well  made.  "'  It  followed  that  a 
prerequisite  of  such  command  was  a  preponderant  sailing  force  and  the  small  squadron  that 
Captain  Arthur  commanded  after  Wright's  departure  was  evidently  insufficient.  Moreover,  it 
was  desperately  short  of  provisions,  both  of  victuals  and  war  stores.  These  circumstances  led 
West  Indian  interests  to  express  their  vulnerabilities.  The  colonial  governors  wrote  home  of 
their  fears  of  imminent  French  territorial  attacks  and  such  misgivings  were  underscored  by  an 
autumn  report  that  France  was  preparing  to  send  to  the  region  a  squadron  of  fourteen  sail.  "' 
Meanwhile,  critical  mercantile  opinion  on  custom  duties;  the  three  quarters  native  crew 
threshold;  and  the  continuing  damage  inflicted  upon  trade,  all  festered  throughout  the  summer 
and  culminated  in  a  series  of  petitions  and  bills  when  Parliament  opened  in  the  autumn.  "  In 
the  summer  of  169  1,  therefore,  William's  war  strategy  seemed  to  lack  a  coherent  imperial 
defence  component  and,  in  the  Caribbean,  England  was  offensively  and  defensively  impotent. 
These  were  not  circumstances  he  could  afford  to  ignore;  nor  did  he  want  to.  On  19  August 
169  1,  a  month  before  Wright  touched  Kinsale  on  his  return,  the  Admiralty  summoned  Captain 
Sir  Francis  Wheler"  to  attend  'haveing  occasion  to  employ  him'.  " 
45  CSpC,  1689-1692,  no.  1560,  pp.  467-8:  Proposals  for  destroying  the  French  Plantations  in  America, 
[June?  ]  1691. 
46  W.  T.  Morgan,  'The  British  West  Indies  During  King  William's  War  (1689-97)',  JMIIii  (1930),  390; 
Colomb,  Naval  Warfare,  pp.  255-7. 
47  CSpD,  1690-1691,  p.  525:  Proceedings  upon  the  petition  of  the  Commissioner  for  the  Leeward  and 
Caribees  Islands,  19  Sept.  1691. 
48  Morgan,  'The  British  West  Indies',  pp.  389-9  1;  L.  F.  Stock,  Proceedings  and  Debates  ofthe  British 
Parliaments  Respecting  North  America,  iL  1689-1692  (Washington  D.  C.,  1927),  pp.  46-7,50-9. 
49  Also  frequently  spelt  Wheeler,  though  I  have  adopted  the  spelling  given  in  the  Dictionary  ofNational 
Biography  (London,  1909),  xx.  1355. 
50  PRO,  ADM  3/6,  p.  144:  Board  Minutes,  19  Aug.  169  1. 83 
Wheler  was  to  be  asked  to  command  the  prospective  West  Indian  squadron  and 
throughout  the  following  weeks  he  and  the  Board  were  engaged  in  negotiations  over  the 
extent  and  the  nature  of  this  command.  Using  Captain  Wright's  Instructions  as  a  model,  both 
parties  moved  to  the  drafting  of  a  new  set.  Initially  no  points  of  contention  arose  and,  indeed, 
the  Admiralty  proposed  and  secured  agreement  for  the  appointment  from  the  Queen's 
Cabinet  Council.  "  Moreover,  the  colonial  governors  were  certainly  led  to  believe  that  it  was 
to  be  Sir  Francis  who  was  soon  to  arrive  with  a  squadron.  "  However,  just  two  months  after 
negotiations  had  first  begun,  the  Admiralty  signed  Instructions  for  a  Captain  Ralph  Wrenn, 
and  not  Wheler,  to  command  the  West  Indian  squadron.  " 
This  alteration  was  a  product  of  the  breakdown  in  negotiations  between  Wheler  and 
the  Admiralty.  There  had  been  a  failure  to  reach  agreement  on  the  balance  of  authority 
between  the  naval  commander  and  the  colonial  governor,  who,  in  the  absence  of  an  appointed 
General  Officer,  would  command  the  land  forces.  Wheler's  request  at  the  end  of  August  for 
a  clearer  explanation  on  this  point  ran  up  against  Governor  Codrington's  correspondence  on 
the  perceived  imbalance  in  command  which  he  considered  had  bedevilled  combined 
operations  with  Wright.  As  part  of  a  remedy,  he  had  suggested  that  the  governor  should  have 
sole  authority  over  the  naval  squadron  and  this  had  recently  been  piloted  by  ranking  the 
current  naval  commander  in  the  West  Indies  subordinate  to  the  Barbadian  Governor.  "'  The 
union  of  military  and  naval  command  in  the  hands  of  a  colonial  official  was  unlikely  to  appeal 
to  a  sailor  of  Wheler's  experience;  and,  certainly,  in  the  following  year,  a  memorandum  he 
drafted  on  the  West  Indian  squadron  explicitly  argued  that  the  naval  command  should  be 
totally  independent  of  the  colonial  governors.  " 
The  firial  Instructions  issued  to  Wrenn  indicated  that  the  Admiralty  required  a  more 
submissive  junior  captain  to  lead  the  squadron.  The  provisions  on  command  expressed  in 
Articles  Seven  to  Eleven  -  albeit  subtly  drafted  -  showed  Codrington  to  have  succeeded  in 
51  PRO,  ADM  3/6,  p.  161:  Board  Minutes,  31  Aug.  1691;  PRO,  ADM  2/171,  pp.  399-400:  the  Admiralty  to 
Nottingham,  31  Aug.  169  1;  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  iii.  405-6:  Minutes  of  the  Committee,  or  Cabinet  Council, 
appointed  to  advise  the  Queen  during  the  King's  absences  from  England,  21  Aug.  1691. 
52  CSpCp  1689-1692,  no.  1993,  pp.  587:  Codrington  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  II  Jan.  1692. 
53  PRO,  ADM  3/6,  p.  24  1:  Board  Minutes,  30  Oct.  169  1. 
54  PRO,  ADM  3/6,  p.  202:  Board  Minutes,  2  Oct.  169  1;  PRO,  ADM  2/17  1,  pp.  399-400:  the  Admiralty  to 
Nottingham,  31  Aug.  1691;  CSPC,  1689-1692,  nos.  1617  1688,  pp.  490-1,520:  Codrington  to  the  Lords  of 
Trade  and  Plantations,  3  July  169  1;  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations  to  Kendall,  6  Aug.  169  1. 
55  PRO,  SP  42/1,  fos.  397-406:  'Proposalls  Humbly  Offered  by  Sir  Francis  Wheeler  Upon  His  Being  Thought 
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retaining  the  colonial  influence.  Admittedly  he  was  not  given  sole  command  of  the  fleet  as  he 
had  argued  for,  nor  could  he  ignore  the  resolutions  of  a  Council  of  War  at  which  Wrenn  and 
his  three  eldest  Captains  had  standing,  but  overall,  the  greater  discretion  in  command  went  to 
the  governor.  Similar  to  Wright's  Instructions,  Codrington,  and  the  Leeward  Islands' 
Council  of  War,  could  advise  on  the  proceedings  of  the  squadron  at  sea;  while  Wrenn  was 
also  prohibited  from  detaching  any  of  his  squadron  without  first  informing  the  Barbadian  and 
Leeward  Islands'  authorities.  Moreover,  having  done  so,  the  naval  commander  had  to  ensure 
that  such  land  men  were  satisfied  that  the  King's  service  did  not  positively  need  the  ships  to 
remain  on  the  island  station.  56 
This  wrangling  between  the  colonial  and  naval  interests  did  not  hinder  the  material 
preparations  of  the  squadron  and  these  indicated  that  the  naval  force  was  to  combine  with  a 
contingent  of  soldiers  and,  thus,  possess  an  amphibious  capability.  That  this  was  to  be 
modest  was  obvious  from  the  size  of  force  to  be  embarked  in  asmuch  that  it  did  not  warrant  a 
general  commanding  officer,  nor  even  a  commissioned  regimental  officer.  On  its  dispatch 
from  England,  twenty  non-commissioned  officers  provided  the  higher  ranks  of  military 
command  for  the  400  soldiers  which  had  been  drafted  from  Bolton's  Regiment  billeted  at 
Portsmouth  as  recruits  for  his  second  infantry  battalion  previously  raised  for  service  in  the 
West  Indies.  "  Since  1690  it  had  been  mainly  quartered  in  the  Leeward  Islands  and,  due  to 
sickness  and  combat  casualties,  was  now  desperately  short  of  establishment  strength  not  to 
mention  clothes  and  provisions. 
The  squadron's  modest  amphibious  capability  was  further  underscored  by  the 
relatively  small  size  of  its  naval  component.  As  Captain  of  the  Norwich,  Wrenn  was  only  to 
take  under  his  command  from  England  two  fourth  rates  -  the  Diamond  and  the  Mordaunt  - 
which  were  to  convoy  fourteen  merchant  ships  hired  as  freight  for  the  soldiers,  provisions  and 
ordnance.  Only  on  arrival  in  the  Caribbean  would  the  squadron  be  enlarged  through  the 
addition  of  the  six warships  that  Wright  had  been  persuaded  to  leave  on  station.  " 
Significantly,  the  Admiralty  denied  Wrenn  the  additional  authority  of  flying  a  Flag  at  his  ship's 
56  PRO,  ADM  2/8,  pp.  330-4:  'Instructions  for  Capt.  Ralph  Wrenn,  29  Oct.  1691. 
57  PRO,  ADM  3/6,  p.  169:  Board  Minutes,  4  Sept.  1691;  PRO,  ADM  2/8,  p.  215:  the  Admiralty  to  the 
Commissioners  for  Transportation,  4  Sept.  169  1;  PRO,  WO  516,  p.  23  1:  Order  to  the  Duke  of  Bolton,  31  Oct. 
1691;  PRO,  WO  25/3138,  p.  139:  Warrant  for  the  Earl  of  Ranelagh,  19  Nov.  1691. 
58  PRO,  ADM  2/8,  pp.  330-4:  'Instructions  for  Capt.  Ralph  Wrenn',  29  Oct.  1691;  CSPC,  1689-1692,  no. 
1617,  p.  485:  Codrington  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  3  July  1691.  In  the  event  only  five  warships 85 
topmasthead,  which  would  have  conferred  upon  him  unofficial  rank  of  Commodore.  "'  This 
small  number  of  warships  and  few  soldiers  has  led  Wrenn's  force  to  be  described  as 
'lamentably  inadequate'.  "  Quantitatively,  this  was  quite  correct,  especially  if  one  of  the 
reasons  for  the  squadron's  departure  was  to  reclaim  command  of  the  sea.  However,  such 
condemnation  misses  the  point  that  Wrenn's  expeditionary  force  was  modest  by  design 
because  its  combined  operational  deployment  was  to  be  as  the  junior  partner  with  the  colonial 
authorities.  The  Admiralty  may  have  underestimated  the  capability  required  to  command  the 
Caribbean  sea  and  eject  the  French  from  their  territories,  but  with  respect  to  Wrenn's 
squadron,  its  material  resource  was  commensurate  with  the  objectives  and  structure  of 
command  set  down  in  the  Instructions. 
Despite  its  small  size,  the  fitting  out  of  Wrenn's  squadron  was  not  spared  delay.  The 
blame,  however,  did  not  entirely  lie  with  the  Admiralty.  Indeed,  as  has  been  seen,  the 
negotiations  over  the  Instructions  continued  throughout  September  and  October  as  the  Navy 
Board  worked  to  bring  the  squadron  together.  The  delays  originated  with  the  merchant  ships 
which  had  been  hired  to  carry  the  majority  of  the  soldiers  (the  three  warships  were  only  to 
carry  50  soldiers  each)"  plus  the  ordnance  and  victuals.  There  occurred  grave  problems  in 
getting  the  relevant  freight  -  in  particular  the  victuals  -  aboard  and  for  the  ships  then  to  slip 
down  the  River  Thames  to  the  Downs  before  starting  for  St  Helens  where  the  soldiers  were 
to  be  embarked.  "  More  delay  could  then  be  expected  there  for  the  War  Office  had  been  slow 
to  issue  the  correct  order  for  the  draught.  "'  Circumstances  were  further  complicated  by  the 
fact  that  in  early  August  preparations  had  been  begun  to  send  out  some  merchantmen  with 
four  months  victuals  and  stores  for  the  warships  already  on  station.  The  fourth  rates  the 
Diamond  and  the  Norwich  were  to  act  as  convoy  and  they  had  a  projected  departure  date  of 
joined  Wrenn  because  the  Jersey  surrendered  to  the  French  after  a  short  action  on  18  December  1691.  See 
Moses,  'The  British  Navy  in  the  Caribbean,  1689-1697',  pp.  26-7. 
59  PRO,  ADM  2/381,  p.  397:  Sotherne  to  Wrenn,  7  Nov.  1691;  PRO,  ADM  2/8,  pp.  380-1:  Order  to  Capt. 
Wrenn,  7  Nov.  169  1;  PRO,  ADM  3/3,  pp.  20,35:  Board  Minutes,  28  Jan.,  6  Feb.  1690. 
6"  Neeser,  'The  British  Naval  Operations  in  the  West  Indies',  p.  1615. 
61  PRO,  ADM  2/171,  pp.  425-6:  the  Admiralty  to  the  Navy  Board,  17  Sept.  1691. 
62  PRO,  ADM  2/38  1,  p.  339:  Sotherne  to  Blathwayt,  12  Oct.  1691. 
63  The  initial  order  -  PRO,  WO  516,  p.  223:  Order  to  Col.  John  Gibson,  7  Oct.  1691  -  was  cancelled,  but  then 
reissued  on  24  October  -  PRO,  WO  516,  p.  230.  This  was  superseded  when  it  was  decided  that  the  total  400 
soldiers  were  to  be  solely  drafted  from  Bolton's  First  Regiment  of  Foot  instead  of  100  coming  from  Viscount 
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15  September.  "  With  both  these  warships  appointed  to  the  proposed  West  Indian  squadron 
it  seems  likely  that  this  convoy  never  departed  and,  instead,  that  the  Navy  Board  had  to 
integrate  its  freight  with  that  being  sent  out  in  the  fourteen  merchantmen  of  Wrenn's 
squadron.  To  the  Admiralty's  credit  they  recognised  the  potential  for  delay  and  stressed  to 
the  Navy  Board  the  need  for  its  strict  oversight.  "  It  was,  nonetheless,  to  little  avail.  In  early 
October,  the  Admiralty  Secretary,  Sotherne,  demanded  to  know  of  the  victuallers  why  the 
loading  of  the  merchant  vessels  was  in  a  state  of  'backwardness'.  "  Wrenn  was  to  provide 
regular  lists  of  those  vessels  that  appeared  at  the  Downs,  though  his  first  return  of  mid- 
October  which  mentioned  only  Henry  Stupple's  England  Frigate,  contradicted  the  Downs's 
commander's  list  that  also  cited  the  Edward  &  Elizabeth.  Confusion  and,  doubtless,  delay 
resulted.  Certainly  no  time  was  gained  and,  by  the  end  of  the  month,  there  were  more  than  a 
few  merchant  vessels  who  had  still  not  passed  down  the  Thames.  With  the  mass  of  soldiers 
still  to  be  embarked,  it  was  2  December  before  Wrenn  received  his  orders  to  sail.  " 
The  fate  of  Wrenn,  his  squadron  and  the  prospective  combined  operations  with  the 
colonial  authorities  in  the  Caribbean  can  in  outline  be  understood  from  the  Court's 
consideration  of  his  widow's  petition  for  relief  The  Admiralty  had  referred  her  pleadings 
upwards  because  its  rules  prohibited  relief  to  the  dependants  of  those  not  slain  in  an  actual  sea 
fight  and  it  considered  that  Wrenn,  who  had  died  from  the  sickness  prevalent  in  the  West 
Indies,  was  due  some  form  of  recognition.  The  Admiralty's  supporting  report  highlighted 
Wrenn's  many  years  as  a  naval  commander  and  also  his  actions  in  defending  his  convoy  when 
it  was  attacked  on  22  February  1692  by  a  much  larger  French  force  commanded  by  Comte  de 
Blenac,  as  Wrenn  made  his  way  from  Barbados  to  Antigua.  "' 
That  this  was  the  only  incident  related  from  Wrenn's  last  period  of  service  was  highly 
significant  for  it  explains  the  failure  of  the  combined  operations  directed  by  Article  Seven  of 
Wrenn's  Instructions.  As  demonstrated  by  Wright's  experiences,  regional  sea  superiority  was 
a  significant  requirement  for  the  execution  of  combined  operations.  On  his  arrival  at 
Barbados  during  the  second  week  of  January  1692,  both  Wrenn  and  Governor  Kendall  were 
64  PRO,  ADM  316,  pp.  120,136,147:  Board  Minutes,  3,14,21  Aug.  1691;  PRO,  ADM  2/171,  pp.  362-3:  the 
Admiralty  to  the  Navy  Board,  4  Aug.  169  1. 
65  PRO,  ADM  2/171,  p.  446:  the  Admiralty  to  the  Navy  Board,  30  Sept.  1691. 
66  PRO,  ADM  2/38  1,  p.  322:  Sotheme  to  the  Commissioners  for  Victualling,  9  Oct.  169  1. 
67  PRO,  ADM  2/38  1,  pp.  3549  383,450:  Sotherne  to  Wrenn,  17,20  Oct.,  2  Dec.  169  1;  Sotherne  to  Blathwayt, 
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hopeful  of  gaining  this  sea  command  for  intelligence  had  indicated  that  the  eighteen-strong 
French  squadron  was  divided  between  a  station  off  Barbados  and  an  anchorage  at  Martinique. 
Wrenn,  having  augmented  his  own  squadron  with  some  merchantmen,  sailed  on  30  January 
with  the  objective  of  engaging  the  French  ships  off  Barbados.  The  French,  however,  checked 
his  efforts  by  sailing  north  and  effecting  a  concentration  of  their  force,  leaving  Wrenn  little 
option  but  to  return  to  Carlisle  Bay.  " 
In  the  following  weeks,  despite  the  lurking  presence  of  the  French  fleet,  the  Barbadian 
Council  was  keen  that  Wrenn  should  not  default  on  providing  security  for  the  merchants 
operating  between  the  islands,  nor  on  the  delivery  of  the  recruits,  provisions  and  ordnance  for 
Bolton's  regiment  quartered  on  the  Leeward  Islands.  Therefore,  on  18  February,  having 
taken  full  advantage  of  the  enhanced  authority  afforded  them  by  Wrenn's  Instruction,  the 
island's  Council  of  War  dispatched  the  Captain  to  convoy  the  merchantmen  bound  for 
Antigua  and  Jamaica.  Although  the  Council  had  enjoined  that  Wrenn  steer  clear  of  the 
French  squadron  until  the  merchants  were  safe  and  he  had  been  joined  by  three  warships  from 
the  Leeward  Islands,  this  took  no  account  of  Blenac  actively  seeking  an  engagement.  This 
was  what  occurred  on  the  morning  of  22  February  as  Wrenn  passed  by  La  Ddsirade  near 
Guadeloupe.  The  French  took  advantage  of  a  favourable  gale  to  forrn  a  line  of  sixteen  sail 
and  attack  Wrenn,  who  was  thus  forced  to  fight  a  defensive  action  for  four  hours  until  noon 
when  the  convoy  was  in  the  clear.  Thereafter,  despite  the  preponderant  French  force,  Wrenn 
managed  to  bring  his  squadron  of  seven  sail  back  to  Barbados  on  25  February  without  loss. 
The  lack  of  battle  damage  could  not,  however,  hide  the  strategic  consequences  that  Wrenn 
had  not  only  failed  to  gain  command  of  the  sea  but  had  been  chased  from  it.  Moreover, 
tactically,  it  was  obvious  that  the  small  size  of  his  squadron  would  prohibit  further  actions  of 
either  a  naval  or  amphibious  character.  This  was  confirmed  by  the  landing  of  the  recruits  - 
increasingly  ravaged  by  sickness  -  at  Barbados.  " 
Wrenn's  death  soon  after  returning  to  Barbados  meant  that  he  was  not  given  the 
opportunity  to  seek  a  resolution  of  his  squadron's  strategic  and  tactical  problems.  Nor 
indeed,  did  his  successor,  Captain  Butler,  whose  leadership  was  confined  to  implementing  the 
61  PRO,  ADM  2/10,  p.  306:  'Report  on  a  Reference  of  Council  upon  the  Petition  of  the  Widdow  of  Captain 
Wrenn  for  Relief,  IS  July  1693;  PRO,  ADM  1/4080,  f.  155:  Court  Minute,  28  July  1692. 
69  CSpC,  1689-1692,  nos.  2024,2025,  p.  59  1:  Minutes  of  the  Council  of  War  at  Barbados,  23,25  Jan.  1692; 
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Admiralty's  order  to  return  in  the  spring  after  disposing  certain  warships  for  the  guard  and 
service  of  the  islands.  At  the  same  time,  Governor  Kendall  wrote  home  of  the  relative 
weakness  of  the  French  force  in  the  region  which  was  such  that  he  believed  the  English  were 
better  placed  to  harin  it  than  might  have  been  thought.  This  implied  that  Wrenn's  later 
conduct,  his  death  and  then  Butler's  concentration  on  returning  home  were  all  missed 
opportunities.  "  Such  criticism  did  not  adversely  impact  Mrs  Wrenn's  case  and  she  was 
awarded  a  pension  of  f.  100  per  annurn7';  but  more  importantly  for  the  war  policy  it 
encouraged  the  organisation  of  a  third  expeditionary  operation  to  the  West  Indies. 
H.  iv:  Rear  Admiral  Sir  Francis  Wheler's  Expedition  to  the  West  Indies  and  North 
America,  January-September  1693. 
Although  the  first  six  months  of  1692  brought  European  naval  success  through  Admiral 
Russell's  triumph  at  the  battle  of  La  Hogue  and  then  planning  for  an  combined  operation 
upon  the  northern  French  coast,  Secretaries  Blathwayt  and  Nottingham  devoted  much  of  the 
second  half  of  the  year  organising  a  third  combined  army  and  naval  force  for  the  Caribbean. 
The  English  Court  was  optimistic  as  it  considered  there  to  be  a  'fair  prospect"'  of  inflicting 
some  damage  upon  the  French  in  the  region,  while  Nottingham  even  reckoned  the  advantage 
to  be  gained  'so  great  and  so  probable'.  '  These  views  both  rcflected  Kendall's  assessment  of 
inherent  French  weakness  in  the  Caribbean,  and  coincided  with  the  colonial  Governors-) 
continual  solicitation  for  a  further  despatch  of  warships  and  troops  to  bolster  regional 
security.  "  But  perhaps  most  importantly,  no-one  involved  in  formulating  war  policy  could 
ignore  the  need  to  make  good  the  patchy  success  of  the  Wright-Codrington  ventures  in  1691 
and  the  lack  of  progress  by  Wrenn.  This  was  especially  true  for  politicians  like  Nottingham 
who  were  sceptical  of  William's  continental  campaigning  and  instead  favoured  a  more 
exclusively  maritime  strategy.  This  strategic  conception  had  been  pithily  articulated  by  Sir 
Thomas  Clarges  during  the  debate  on  supply  for  1692,  through  his  claim  that  the  natural  way 
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Governor  Kendall  to  Blathwayt,  20  Apr.  1692. 89 
for  an  island  was  to  wage  war  by  sea,  and  that  if  America  could  be  reclaimed  and  sea 
superiority  maintained,  then  the  French  could  overrun  continental  Europe  without  impunity 
for  England.  " 
The  operational  continuities  with  1690-1691  are,  however,  initially  difficult  to  detect 
due  to  misleading  accounts  of  the  expedition's  vague  provenance.  "  It  is  necessary  to  work 
many  months  back  from  the  flurry  of  preparatory  activity  in  the  autumn  of  1692  to  March 
when  the  Admiralty  decided  to  send  a  squadron  to  the  West  Indies  under  Captain  George 
Meese.  This  proposal  admittedly  fell  into  abeyance  and  Meese  was  soon  employed  in  the 
Channel.  "  Notwithstanding,  by  the  beginning  of  April,  Secretary  Nottingham  indicated  that 
Blathwayt  had  already  grasped  the  initiative  with  respect  to  the  West  Indies  when  he 
encouraged  the  Secretary-at-War  to  press  on  with  the  project  he  had  fon-ned  for  the  region. 
Governor  Kendall's  claims  in  early  March  that  the  Barbadians,  were  eagerly  awaiting  Wheler's 
arrival  could  conceivably  be  used  to  push  the  date  of  origin  back  even  further.  "  However,  it 
seems  likely  that  these  expectations  were  continuing  hopes  founded  upon  the  preparations  for 
a  squadron  in  the  second  half  of  1691  that  Wheler  was  initially  designated  to  command  -  the 
truncated  version  of  which  Wrenn  commanded  -  and  not  early  knowledge  of  a  new  design. 
Despite  further  references  between  the  two  Secretaries  throughout  the  spring,  progress 
proved  slow  as  overseas  endeavour  remained  strategically  subordinate  to  the  quest  for 
military  and  naval  success  in  Europe.  " 
Progress  on  land  remained  elusive,  with  William  bogged  down  in  a  'war-as-process" 
in  Flanders.  Command  of  the  sea  had  been  secured  at  La  Hogue  in  the  early  summer, 
however;  and  Blathwayt  was  hopeftil  of  gaining  the  King's  attention  for  his  colonial  project. 
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squadron  under  Meese  as  a  precursor  to  Wheler's. 
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In  this  he  was  aided  by  the  diminishing  prospect  that  a  combined  operation  would  be 
executed  against  the  Normandy  coast.  "  By  the  end  of  June,  not  only  did  William  agree  to  the 
dispatch  of  a  squadron  of  eleven  sail  with  one  regiment,  and  300  recruits  for  Bolton's 
battalion  already  quartered  on  Barbados,  to  the  Caribbean  by  I  August  but  he  also  allocated 
an  additional  infantry  regiment;  ordered  all  infantry  Captains  to  increase  their  companies  by 
between  five  and  ten  men;  and  appointed  Captain  Sir  Francis  Wheler  C.  -in-C.  " 
The  operation  was  clearly  Blathwayt's  progeny  and  his  1691  proposals  once  again 
provided  the  outfine.  "  Still,  the  extent  of  the  Secretary-at-War's  originality  in  design  and 
control  should  not  be  exaggerated.  The  detail  in  the  appointment  of  the  land  and  sea 
commanders,  including  the  drafting  of  the  Instructions,  and  the  material  preparations 
provided  many  opportunities  for  Whitehall  and  others  to  exert  influence.  It  was  thus  that  the 
King's  appointment  of  Sir  Francis  WheIer  as  C.  -in.  -C.  was  highly  significant.  As  mentioned, 
Wheler  had,  in  1691,  been  mooted  to  command  a  West  Indian  squadron  with  troops  aboard, 
and  both  the  King  and  Blathwayt  would  have  known  of  his  stalled  negotiations  with  the 
Admiralty  regarding  this  appointment.  "  Yet  remarkably  neither  initially  stipulated  the 
parameters  of  his  commission,  nor  those  of  the  Instructions  save  only  that  Wheler  was  to 
have  a  'superior'  command  at  sea  and  land.  "  This  provided  Wheler  and  the  Admiralty  with 
an  opportunity  to  influence  both  by  continuing  their  discussions  left  off  in  October  169  1. 
By  late  July  1692,  Wheler  had  been  invited  to  London  for  a  conference  on  the 
expedition.  The  agenda  was  to  be  two  papers  that  Sir  Francis  had  earlier  submitted  to 
Whitehall  which  considered  separately  the  sea  and  land  commands.  "  Three  Articles  in  each 
document  dealt  with  the  command  structure  and  indicated  that  Wheler  favoured  a  unitary  and 
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autocratic  form.  "  In  the  first  paper,  Article  Two  expressed  the  nub  by  stipulating  that  the  sea 
command  be  totally  independent  of  the  colonial  governors.  Article  Thirteen  underscored  this 
with  the  practical  condition  that  the  naval  commodore  have  the  freedom  to  deploy  his 
squadron  without  reference  to  another  authority  in  theatre.  The  third  noteworthy  Article  (the 
Fifth)  aimed  at  bolstering  the  naval  commander's  role  by  nominally  commissioning  him  a 
Lieutenant-Colonel  (or  second-in-command)  if  he  should  go  ashore  with  the  troops.  " 
Significantly,  Wheler's  paper  did  not  mention  a  Council  of  War  as  an  arbiter  of  command 
decisions.  The  whole  thrust  was  that  the  number  of  decision-takers  should  be  kept  to  a 
minimum. 
The  second  paper,  focusing  on  the  land  command,  continued  in  a  similar  manner. 
Although  the  proposal  that  the  naval  commander  be  nominally  commissioned  a  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  when  on  shore  clearly  represented  an  attempt  to  interpose  him  within  the  army's 
hierarchy,  it  was  not  a  prelude  to  reducing  the  senior  soldier's  authority  and  an  argument  for 
an  increase  in  the  scope  of  the  Colonel's  command  was  made.  While  it  was  accepted  that  the 
island  forces  would  have  a  pre-existing  command  structure  based  upon  the  Governor,  Articles 
One  and  Four  made  it  clear  that  the  land  commander  sent  from  England  should  have  full 
authority  over  the  colonial  militia  and  territorially  raised  regiments.  Furthermore,  Article 
Three  aimed  at  undermining  this  recognition  of  a  pre-existing  colonial  command  structure  by 
proposing  that  all  the  islands'  forces  should  combine  to  form  one  brigade  under  a  single 
general  officer.  "  The  underlying  logic  that  this  would  serve  to  break  down  the  islands' 
regimental  loyalties  and  habits  of  command,  leaving  just  one  individual  for  the  commander  of 
the  land  forces  to  treat  with,  was  another  example  of  Wheler's  desire  to  concentrate 
command. 
Whitehall's  response  can  be  inferred  from  certain  scribbled  marginal  comments.  Of 
the  six  Articles  considered,  Articles  Two  and  Five  of  the  first  paper  received  a  scribbled 
Touching  the  Land  Forces  that  are  to  Goe  to  the  West  Indys',  18  July  1692;  Wheler  to  Albemarle,  30  July 
1692;  BL,  Add  MSS  37991,  fos.  132-3:  Nottingham  to  Blathwayt,  26  July  1692. 
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autocrat  would  seek  to  exercise  close  control  when  the  circumstances  required  it  and  it  seems  that  Wheler 
aimed  to  structure  the  command  to  allow  himself  such  autocratic  discretion. 
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'agreed'  as  did  Article  Four  of  the  second  paper.  The  margins  of  Articles  One  and  Three  of 
the  latter  document  and  Article  Thirteen  of  the  former  remained  blank.  "  This  pattern  could 
suggest  that  Whitehall  agreed  that  the  Service  commanders  be  mainly  responsible  for 
operational  direction,  but  that  there  was  also  a  willingness  to  recognise  the  essential 
component  role  of  the  colonial  governors.  Certainly,  Nottingham  reflected  gubernatorial 
interests  when  he  argued  that  Wheler  should  not  be  a  supreme  commander  and  that,  outside 
the  theatre  of  combat,  the  governors  should  remain  in  charge  of  their  island's  troops.  This 
was  a  theme  that  the  Secretary  returned  to  after  Blathwayt  had  floated  the  idea  of  a  military 
appointment  superior  to  the  governors  and  the  Committee  of  Council  wished  it  represented 
that  they  did  not  approve  of  a  general  army  officer's  commission  which  placed  the  colonial 
officials  in  a  subordinate  position.  " 
Eventually,  the  King  and  Blathwayt  settled  upon  a  command  structure  quite  different 
from  that  implied  by  Wheler's  appointment  as  C.  -in-C.  Firstly,  Wheler's  command  was  to  be 
divided  with  Colonel  John  Foulkes,  whose  career  had  included  the  command  of  Monmouth's 
White  Regiment  at  Sedgemoor  (1685),  and  who  was  to  be  C.  -in-C-.  of  all  the  land  forces, 
including  the  colonial  troops,  when  on  board  ship  and  in  action;  and,  secondly,  in  line  with  the 
previous  two  expeditions,  a  Council  of  War  was  detailed  as  the  sovereign  command 
authority.  This  transfer  of  individual  authority  to  a  Council  was  underlined  by  its  composition 
which  included  all  land  and  sea  officers;  the  governors;  and  even  the  colonial  militia  officers 
when  in  combat  or  discussing  island  defence.  "  It  has  been  argued  that  the  resolution  of  the 
expedition's  command  structure  was  a  ruinous  fudge  by  Blathwayt  acting  as  an  imperial 
centralist,  whereby  a  military  commander  had  been  interposed  within  the  previously  volatile 
relationship  between  the  squadron  commander  and  the  colonial  governors.  "'  Not  only  does 
the  progress  of  the  expedition  bear  this  argument  out,  it  is  also  underscored  by  the 
prescriptive  nature  of  the  Admiral's  Instructions.  Although  the  final  version  of  Wheler's 
Instructions  were  very  general  in  their  objectives,  combining  standard  naval  duties  such  as 
securing  island  trade  with  a  weak  amphibious  provision  to  annoy  the  French  by  land  or  sea  as 
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opportunity  arose,  the  King  issued  him  with  a  set  of  detailed  Additional  Instructions.  These 
picked  up  on  draft  proposals  that  had  been  made  in  September  which  directed  Wheler  to 
destroy  Martinique  by  'frequent  descents'  and  crucially  outlined  a  second  phase.  It  was 
stipulated  that  Wheler's  squadron  plus  Foulkes's  and  Goodwyn's  regiments  must  leave  the 
Caribbean  by  the  end  of  May  and  proceed  to  North  America  to  combine  with  the  New 
England  provinces  in  an  amphibious  attempt  to  seize  Canada.  Thereafter,  before  returning  to 
England  at  the  end  of  September  he  was  specifically  directed  to  Newfoundland  to  destroy  the 
French  settlements  and  fisheries  there.  95  Both  targets  were  prevailing,  though  not 
predominant,  strategic  concerns  of  the  Court  since  the  failure  of  Sir  William  Phips's  attempt 
to  conquer  Canada  in  1690  and  Commodore  Holman's  ineffective  bombardment  and  raiding 
in  1692  of  the  southern  Newfoundland  coast. 
The  nine-month  interval  before  Wheler  weighed  anchor  with  his  squadron  of  one 
warship  and  II  frigates,  sundry  support  vessels  and  some  1500  soldiers  reflected  not  only  the 
length  of  negotiations  to  resolve  the  expedition's  command  structure  but  also  the  preparation 
of  the  ships  and  the  organisation  of  the  land  force  for  embarkation.  Aside  from  procuring 
some  50  tons  of  freight  for  the  household  goods  of  Jamaica's  new  Lieutenant-Governor,  Sir 
William  Beeston,  who  was  to  go  out  with  the  squadron,  no  specific  issue  seemed  to  hinder 
the  Navy  Board's  preparations.  It  was  just  that  the  extent  of  their  duties  from  ensuring  that 
the  ships  were  sheathed  and  provisioned  for  eight  months,  to  the  appointment  of  the 
squadrons'  standing  naval  officers,  caused  the  bureaucratic  wheel  to  grind  slowly.  Moreover, 
they  were  reliant  on  the  speedy  dispatch  of  orders  by  others  such  as  Admiral  Russell  who  had 
been  requested  to  send  in  four  ships  that  had  been  with  his  fleet.  Delays  seemed  inevitable, 
and  when  these  occurred  they  set  back  other  tasks  which  had  been  completed  on  schedule. 
This  was  particularly  true  of  certain  victuals  which  quickly  went  bad  and  had  to  be  replaced  if 
stowed  for  too  long  before  departure.  ' 
The  assembly  of  the  two  regiments  and  the  recruits  for  Bolton's  second  battalion 
proved  difficult,  particularly  in  the  final  few  weeks  before  the  squadron's  departure.  Again 
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Indies,  20  Sept.  1692. 
96  PRO,  ADM  2/172  pp.  316,350,356,361,389-90,390,392,413,418,423,431:  the  Admiralty  to  the  Navy 
Board,  23  July,  II  Aug.,  3,5,14,21,24  Sept.  1692;  the  Admiralty  to  Nottingham,  17  Aug.,  3  Sept.  1692;  the 
Admiralty  to  Russell,  20  Aug.  1692. 94 
the  structure  of  command  was  at  the  centre  of  the  contested  issues.  The  first  problem 
concerned  the  vacant  colonelcy  of  Hale's  Regiment  of  Foot  as  the  eponymous  colonel  had 
not  been  reappointed  after  suffering  the  King's  disfavour  and  reputedly  that  of  the  other 
officers  in  his  regiment.  Godfrey  Lloyd  was  hopeful  of  being  appointed  but  Nottingham 
managed  to  cause  much  rancour  by  manocuvring  Robert  Goodwyn  into  the  post  with  Lloyd 
being  barely  consoled  with  the  command  of  Bolton's  second  battalion  in  the  West  Indies. 
Resentment  deepened  when  Nottingham's  judgement  was  called  into  question  by  Goodwyn's 
unwillingness  to  go  on  the  expedition,  though  Lloyd's  efforts  to  get  Blathwayt  to  intervene 
proved  fruitless.  "  More  significantly,  this  lack  of  enthusiasm  to  serve  in  the  Caribbean  was 
also  displayed  by  Foulkes  who,  even  after  being  appointed  C.  -in-C.  of  the  land  forces,  aimed 
to  command  his  regiment  in  Flanders  instead.  When  his  request  was  turned  down,  he  then 
began  grumbling  about  his  lack  of  authority  as  C.  -in-C.  These  circumstances  were  made 
worse  by  the  intervention  of  the  Lieutenant-Govemor  of  Portsmouth,  Colonel  John  Gibson, 
who  had  been  requested  by  Blathwayt:  to  help  with  the  troops'  regulation  and  organisation  as 
they  assembled  on  the  Isle  of  Wight  and  around  Portsmouth.  This  he  did,  but  the  Governor's 
conduct  was  motivated  by  a  desire  to  replace  Foulkes.  The  King  eventually  stalled  Gibson's 
malignant  efforts  but  not  before  he  had  undermined  Foulkes  and  caused  him  to  believe  that 
there  was  a  whispering  campaign  against  him  at  Court.  " 
Possibly  the  most  damaging  aspect  of  Gibson's  intriguing  was  its  basis  in  truth.  He 
accurately  represented  the  poor  condition  of  Foulkes's  regiment  which  required  both  recruits 
and  a  stop  placed  upon  deserters  at  its  quarters  on  the  Isle  of  Wight.  This  was  reportedly  in 
contrast  to  Goodwyn's  regiment  which  was  praised  as  were  also  the  recruits  for  Lloyd's  new 
command.  To  be  fair  to  Foulkes,  he  fully  recognised  the  problems  with  his  regiment  but 
hardly  endeared  himself  to  his  men  by  requesting  that  a  detachment  of  Dragoons  be  sent  from 
Portsmouth  to  keep  discipline.  This  ran  contrary  to  English  military  tradition. 
Unsurprisingly,  Gibson  had  little  trouble  representing  Foulkes's  idea  as  improper,  further 
undermining  the  C.  -in-C.  's  authority,  though  Wheler  had  echoed  Foulkes's  suggestion. 
Through  to  December,  Foulkes  continued  to  struggle  to  bring  his  regiment  up  to  near 
97  NMM,  SOU/14,  unt:  Nottingham  to  'Sir'  [Blathwayt],  3,12,15  Aug.  1692;  [Blathwayt]  to  Nottingham,  I 
Sept.  1692;  BL,  Add.  MSS  9727,  fos.  52-3:  Lloyd  to  'Sir'  [Blathwayt?  ],  29  Sept.  1692;  PRO,  SP  44/166,  pp. 
292,295:  Commission  for  Robert  Goodwyn  Esq.,  26  Sept.  1692;  Commission  for  Godfrey  Lloyd  Esq.,  24 
Sept.  1692. 
98  BL,  Add.  MSS  9727,  fos.  74-5,88-9.105-6:  Gibson  to  Blathwayt,  3,8,18  Dec.  1692. 95 
establishment  strength,  and  also  to  keep  the  officers  with  their  men,  as  many  found  the 
attraction  of  London  with  the  possibility  of  gaining  an  exemption  from  the  expedition  too 
tempting.  Four  days  before  Christmas,  Foulkes  and  Wheler  completed  the  embarkation  of 
soldiers,  though  the  Colonel  was  still  seeking  deserters.  Contrary  winds  then  prevented  the 
squadron  from  weighing  until  the  latter  half  of  the  first  week  in  January  1693.  " 
The  squadron  arrived  off  Barbados  at  the  end  of  February  1693  after  a  largely 
uneventful  voyage.  "'  Following  a  prudent  enquiry  into  the  health  of  the  island,  Wheler 
dropped  anchor  in  Carlisle  Bay  and  disembarked  the  troops.  The  Barbados  Assembly  had 
already  passed  an  act  to  provide  the  soldiers  with  free  quarters  and  colonial  enthusiasm  for 
Wheler's  arrival  was  also  evident  in  the  efforts  of  Governors  Kendall  and  Codrington  to 
maintain  the  integrity  of  around  1000  victualled  militia  which  they  had  each  previously  been 
directed  to  raise.  Despite  an  outbreak  of  sickness,  Kendall  had  managed  to  retain  some  800 
troops  and  had  organised  them  into  two  regiments  commanded  by  Colonels  Butler  and 
Salter.  "'  Codrington  encountered  difficulties  after  the  arrival  of  the  squadron,  when  the 
Antiguan  contingent  proved  reluctant  to  serve  under  an  alternative  commander  to  their 
Governor.  Codrington  was  forced  to  join  the  expedition  as  a  volunteer  commander  without 
Wheler  or  Foulkes  being  informed.  "'  This  was  an  ominous  development  for  the  operational 
command  inasmuch  as  in  a  Council  of  War  with  upwards  of  26  members,  there  was  liable  to 
be  many  opinions,  and  Codrington  with  his  equivocal  status  was  likely  to  prove 
contentious.  "' 
99  BL,  Add.  MSS  9727,  fos.  70-1,76-7,78-9,92-3,101-2,103-4,107-8,109-10:  Foulkes  to  'Sir'  [Blathwayt], 
22  Sept.,  3,10,16,21  Dec.  1692;  Gibson  to  'Sir'  [Blathwayt],  5,21  Dec.  1692;  Thomson  to  'Sir' 
[Blathwayt],  14  Dec.  1692. 
100  It  is  difficult  to  determine  the  exact  date  of  arrival.  Wheler  stated  that  he  arrived  on  the  I  March  and  the 
King  was certainly  informed  of  this  date.  See  CSPC,  1693-1696,  no.  170,  p.  41:  Wheler  to  Nottingham,  6 
Mar.  1693;  NMM,  SOU/14,  unf.:  Nottingham  to  Blathwayt,  28  Apr.  1693;  [Blathwayt]  to'My  Lord' 
[Nottingham],  3  May  1693.  However,  oddly,  CSPC,  1693-1696,  no.  113,  p.  3  1:  Minutes  of  the  Council  of 
Barbados,  21  Feb.  1696,  records  the  Council  as  having  been  informed  by  Governor  Kendall  of  Wheler's 
arrival  but  Kendall's  own  correspondence  -  CSPC,  1693-1696,  no.  164,  pp.  39-40:  Kendall  to  Nottingham,  4 
Mar.  1696  -  indicates  that  Sir  Francis  arrived  on  the  28  February. 
'01  CSPC,  1689-1692,  no.  2599,  pp.  732-3:  Kendall  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  3  Jan.  1692; 
CSPC,  1693-1696,  nos.  170,171,  pp.  41-3:  Wheler  to  Nottingham,  6  Mar.  1693;  Foulkes  to  Nottingham,  6 
Mar.  1693. 
102  CSpC,  1693-1696,  no.  336,  pp.  100-1:  Codrington  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  10  May  1693. 
103  Harlow,  Christopher  Codrington,  p.  11.  Harlow  argued  that  the  senior  Codrington's  main  weakness  was  a 
tendency  to  'high-handedness'  which  sometimes  manifest  itself  as  'down-right  tyranny'.  This  temperament, 
combined  with  a  self-confidence  born  of  having  participated  in  the  combined  operations  of  1690-1691,  boded 
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The  Additional  Instructions's  direction  that  the  squadron  leave  the  Caribbean  for  the 
eastern  American  seaboard  by  the  end  of  May  put  time  at  a  premium,  and  the  first  Council  of 
War  to  consider  how  best  to  descend  upon  Martinique  was  held  on  2  March.  The  logistical 
task  ofjoining  the  two  groups'  land  forces  at  Barbados  and  the  Leeward  Islands  was  perforce 
the  first  issue  to  be  resolved.  The  Council's  minute  implied  that  there  was  an  early  suggestion 
for  the  squadron  to  sail  to  Antigua,  collect  Codrington's  force  and  then  proceed  to 
Martinique.  This  would  certainly  have  been  advantageous  in  terms  of  integrating  the  two 
bodies  of  troops  while  also  reducing  the  vulnerability  of  two  convoys  sailing  independently 
but  drawing  on  the  same  escort  force.  However,  Wheler  represented  the  difficulties  involved 
in  beating  leeward  to  Antigua  and  raised  grave  concerns  about  sickness  setting  in  the  longer 
the  troops  were  at  sea.  Therefore,  the  Council  resolved  that  Codrington's  force  would  be 
met  leeward  of  Martinique  at  the  Cul  de  Sac  Marin,  one  and  half  miles  from  the  island's 
shore.  The  Chester  and  the  Mermaid  were  sent  to  convoy  the  Leeward  Islands'  troops  and  a 
sloop  was  to  reconnoitre  Martinique's  coast.  "' 
Altemative  suggestions  cast  these  proceedings  and  the  point  of  rendezvous  in  an  odd 
fight.  Kendall's  contribution  had  emphasised  that,  while  the  French  inhabitants  were 
supposed  to  be  few  in  number,  they  were  busily  fbrtifýýing  all  potential  landing  sites.  By 
proceeding  to  Martinique  in  two  different  convoys,  the  English  were  risking  one  group 
arriving  before  the  other,  thus,  advertising  the  expedition's  approach  and  stalling  any 
momentum  that  might  have  been  built  up  for  an  immediate  descent.  Instead,  time  would  be 
lost  in  full  view  of  the  enemy  as  the  Council  convened  for  deliberations  on  the  choice  of  a 
landing  site.  Codrington  had  written  to  propose  Mariegalante  as  an  alternative  rendezvous, 
but  this  was  rejected  by  the  Council  on  16  March  on  the  grounds  that  the  fleet  would  struggle 
to  weather  Dominica  and  that  the  water  was  poor  at  Mariegalante.  Yet,  when  the  initial 
decision  had  been  taken  to  meet  at  the  Cul  de  Sac  Marin  there  had  been  no  discussion  about 
the  need  to  water,  nor  indeed  would  it  have  been  possible  there.  "' 
104  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  no.  982,  pp.  510-11:  the  King  to  Wheler:  Further  Additional  Instructions,  27  Nov. 
1692;  CSPC,  1693-1696,  nos.  48,170,170.1,  pp.  13,41-3:  King  to  Phips,  2  Feb.  1693;  Wheler  to 
Nottingham,  6  Mar.  1693;  the  Council  of  War  to  Codrington,  2  Mar.  1693.  The  covering  letter  -  no.  170,  pp. 
41-2  -  refers  to  the  same  Council  of  War  as  occurring  on  8  March.  However,  this  seems  a  misprint  for  the 
manuscript  source  of  this  letter  -  PRO,  CO  28/37,  fos.  18  1-2  -  clearly  dates  the  Council  as  occuff  ing  on  the  2 
March  1693. 
105  CSPC,  1693-1696,  nos.  170,194,  pp.  41-2,54-5:  Wheler  to  Nottingham,  6  Mar.  1693;  Minutes  of  the 
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The  main  squadron  under  Wheler  sailed  from  Barbados  on  30  March  and  arrived  at 
the  rendezvous  on  I  April,  a  full  three  days  before  Codrington's  convoy  even  left  the 
Leeward  Islands.  To  their  credit  Wheler  and  Foulkes  did  not  prove  idle  for,  accompanied  by 
Codrington's  son,  Christopher  -  on  temporary  release  from  his  Fellowship  at  All  Souls, 
Oxford  -  they  took  a  sloop  to  reconnoitre  possible  landing  sites  and  by  nightfall  on  2  April, 
Foulkes  had  securely  disembarked  all  the  troops.  This  initial  landing  presaged  a  series  of 
raids  over  three  days  in  which  Foulkes,  Lloyd,  Wheler  and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Lillingston  all 
commanded  parties  attacking  French  plantations  and  sugar  works,  forcing  the  inhabitants  to 
flee  into  the  woods.  The  only  English  loss  was  a  party  of  around  seven  soldiers  and  their  boat 
crew  who  had  been  commanded  ashore  by  a  Lieutenant  without  orders  and  had  blundered 
into  a  French  ambuscade.  "  These  raids  were,  at  best,  an  irrelevance,  for  the  operation  could 
make  no  progress  against  the  main  centres  of  French  defence  -  Forts  Royal  and  St  Pierre  - 
without  the  extra  men  from  the  Leeward  Islands;  and  in  reality  they  probably  bolstered  French 
intelligence. 
On  9  April,  Codrington  arrived  at  the  Cul  de  Sac  Marin  with  the  Leeward  Islands' 
troops  and  a  detachment  of  about  600  soldiers  from  Lloyd's  regiment.  However,  three  days 
passed  before  a  Council  of  War  was  held  aboard  Wheler's  flagship  to  determine  how  the 
operation  should  proceed  and  then  the  substantive  question  was  deferred  until  the  fleet  had 
gone  about  to  view  Fort  Royal.  Two  days  later,  the  Council  decided  to  adjourn  again  until 
the  other  island  fort  had  been  reconnoitred.  In  the  event  a  full  week  from  Codrington's 
arrival  was  to  pass  before  the  operation  gained  any  direction  with  the  resolution  on  15  April 
to  attack  Fort  St  Pierre.  Both  the  natural  aspect  and  design  of  Fort  Royal  had  caused  it  to  be 
considered  a  'difficult  work""  by  a  majority  in  the  Council,  though  it  is  noteworthy  that  of 
the  six  dissenting  voices  five  were  officers  from  the  colonies.  Perhaps  they  possessed  local 
insight  that  Fort  St  Pierre  would  prove  as  tricky.  "' 
106  HMC,  PortlandMSS,  iii.  517-18:  A  Journal  kept  by  Sir  Francis  Wheler,  Knight,  rear  Admiral  and 
Commander  in  Chief  of  all  Their  Majesties  ships  and  vessels  in  the  West  Indies,  [hereafter  'Wheler's 
Journal']  30  Mar.  -6  Apr.  1693;  CSPC,  1693-1696,  no.  334,  p.  99:  Kendall  to  Nottingham,  9  May  1693. 
107  HMC,  PortlandMSS,  iii.  525:  Council  of  War  Minutes,  15  Apr.  1693. 
108  HMC,  Portland  MSS,  iii.  518-19,525:  'Wheler's  Journal',  9-15  Apr.  1693;  Council  of  War  Minutes,  15 
Apr.  1693;  CSPC,  1693-1696,  nos.  276,334,336,  pp.  86,99,100-1:  Minutes  of  the  Council  of  War,  15  Apr. 
1693;  Kendall  to  Nottingham,  9  May  1693;  Codrington  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  10  May  1693. 98 
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On  17  April,  through  an  adroit,  though  admittedly  opportunistic,  use  of  calms  and 
sudden  gales,  Wheler  managed  to  create  a  diversionary  impression  that  the  disembarkation 
was  to  be  the  southern  end  of  the  bay  in  front  of  St  Pierre,  thus  allowing  a  safe  landing  of  an 
initial  1000  troops  commanded  by  Colonel  Holt  on  the  basin's  north-west  side.  The  rest  of 
the  soldiers  swiftly  followed  without  any  loss  of  life.  Holt's  advance  troops,  whose 
momentum  had  carried  them  some  distance  inland,  quickly  found  themselves  on  the  retreat  as 
they  came  up  against  large  enemy  parties  marching  down  from  the  town.  It  required  timely 
succour  by  Foulkes,  commanding  a  large  second  tranche  of  landed  soldiers,  to  stall  this 
reverse  and  cause  the  opposing  forces  to  take  up  posts  on  each  side  of  a  large  gully.  A  brisk 
fire  fight  continued  throughout  the  afternoon  and  when  the  Antiguans'  outflanking 
manoeuvre  along  the  seashore  ended  bloodily,  Foulkes  realised  that  he  would  require  naval 
assistance  in  order  to  force  the  enemy  position.  It  was  determined,  therefore,  that  on  the 
following  day  several  frigates  would  lie  close  in  by  the  shore  so  that  Foulkes  could  attack  the 
enemy  across  the  gully  under  the  cover  of  the  naval  ordnance.  However,  dawn  on  18  April 
revealed  that  enemy  had  retired  towards  the  town  and  fort,  thus  rendering  the  joint  naval  and 
military  attack  unnecessary.  "' 
'09  HMC,  Portland  MSS,  iii.  519-2  1:  'Wheler's  Journal',  17-18  Apr.  1693. 99 
Reconnaissance  from  a  hill  top  quickly  established  that  the  enemy  had  given  up  a 
strong  defensive  position  on  one  side  of  a  gully  for  an  even  stronger  position,  entrenched 
inside  the  town's  fort.  It  was,  though,  well  within  cannon  shot  and  two  of  the  train's  field 
pieces  were  landed  and  dragged  up  the  hill  to  begin  playing  upon  the  enemy.  Meanwhile 
Foulkes  organised  his  troops  for  the  following  day  when  he  was  to  lead  a  party  of  400  men 
followed  by  an  additional  600  against  the  enemy's  less  fortified  rear.  However,  on  20  April, 
this  force  was  worsted  en  route  and  forced  to  beat  a  retreat,  the  potential  effects  of  which 
were  only  ameliorated  -  according  to  Wheler  -  by  Foulkes's  leadership.  Meanwhile,  the 
French  took  advantage  of  the  weakened  English  front  to  sally  forth,  killing  and  wounding 
several  of  the  English  out-guards.  Despite  a  four-fold  increase  in  the  strength  of  his  battery, 
Foulkes  requested  that  the  naval  officers  attend  a  Council  of  War  ashore.  At  this  he  proposed 
withdrawal  on  the  grounds  that  there  was  no  prospect  of  his  increasingly  weak  troops 
dislodging  the  enemy  from  the  town  and  fort.  A  heated  debate  ensued  and  the  Council  was 
adjourned  till  the  following  morning  when  its  members  were  to  submit  in  writing  their  opinion 
on  the  question  whether  the  army  should  besiege  St  Pierre  or  draw  off.  Wheler  claimed  that 
written  opinions  were  needed  partly  for  reasons  of  secrecy  and  partly  so  that  the  King  and 
nation  could  be  fully  informed  of  events.  "'  This  latter  reason  anticipated  a  political  stonn 
back  home  on  the  proceedings  of  the  expedition,  and  Wheler,  having  already  expressed  his 
opposition  to  withdrawal,  clearly  viewed  a  written  record  as  a  necessary  from  of  political  and 
professional  insurance.  "' 
By  a  majority,  the  Council,  which  reconvened  on  the  morning  of  21  April,  agreed  to 
withdraw  from  Martinique  and  then  consider  future  action.  "'  Well  might  Kendall  write 
subsequently  that  the  Barbadians  were  put  into  a  'great  consternation'  by  this  sequence  of 
events.  "'  Ostensibly  it  appeared  that  the  English  had  decided  to  walk  away  from  a  forward 
position  of  strength  which  at  least  merited  the  opening  of  trenches  for  a  standard  siege 
operation.  Moreover,  with  the  French  concentrated  in  St  Pierre,  Foulkes  would  not  have  had 
to  contend  with  the  distraction  of  a  relief  army.  The  appreciation  of  these  circumstances 
produced  three  basic  positions  within  the  Council.  At  the  extremes  were  the  traditional 
110  HMC,  PortlandMSS,  iii.  521-2,526:  'Wheler's  Journal'  18-20  Apr.  1693;  Council  of  War  Minutes,  20 
Apr.  1693. 
"I  RMC,  PortlandMSS,  iii.  516:  Wheler  to  4  June  1693. 
112  HMC,  PortlandMSS,  iii.  522:  'Wheler's  Journal',  21  Apr.  1693;  CSPC,  1693-1696,  no.  281,  pp.  97-8: 
Minutes  of  the  Council  of  War  in  the  West  Indies,  20  [sic]  Apr.  1693. 100 
thoroughgoing  attack  and  full-scale  retreat  options;  whilst  the  pivot  was  represented  by  an 
argument  to  attack  and  destroy  as  much  as  possible  around  St  Pierre  before  beating  a  retreat. 
Only  Lieutenant-Colonel  Colt  and  Wheler  advocated  a  full-scale  siege.  Colt  believed  that  a 
significant  advance  had  already  been  achieved,  thus  ameliorating  any  risks.  Wheler 
considered  that  the  conjunction  of  field  guns  and  mortars  with  the  bombardment  by  the  fleet 
should  prove  sufficient.  Neither  had  any  hope  of  attracting  support  for  their  position  because 
the  middle  option  reflected  similar  arguments,  and  ultimately  reached  the  same  answer  as 
those  who  wished  to  leave  immediately.  Selecting  Colonel  Goodwyn  and  Major  Abrahall  as 
examples  of  these  options,  it  is  recorded  that  they  both  pointed  to  the  800  men  lost  since  the 
landing  and  the  large  contingent  of  Irish  troops  who  were  considered  untrustworthy  when 
near  their  co-religionists  as  dictating  retreat.  The  only  difference  between  these  two  soldiers 
was  that  Goodwyn  wanted  an  immediate  departure,  whereas  Abrahall  saw  merit  in  causing  as 
much  devastation  as  possible  before  re-embarkation.  "'  This  made  clear  that  the  division 
between  those  demanding  instant  retreat  and  those  wishing  to  conduct  alternative  attacks  in 
the  environs  was,  at  root,  only  a  question  of  timing.  Hence,  twenty-four  were  in  favour  of 
withdrawal  and  only  two  in  favour  of  continuing  the  operation,  giving  rise  to  the  dismay  of 
the  Barbadians. 
The  re-embarkation  had  taken  place  in  the  early  hours  of  22  April  and,  thus,  the 
soldiers  were  somewhat  haphazardly  billeted,  causing  the  squadron  to  head  first  for  Dominica 
in  order  to  reorganise  the  troops  and  to  take  on  water.  It  was  25  April  before  the  Council 
convened  to  consider  what  further  action  might  be  taken  and,  specifically,  whether 
Guadeloupe  should  be  attacked.  With  positive  orders  to  repair  to  North  America  by  the  end 
of  May,  Wheler  was  keenly  aware  that  the  prospects  of  any  combined  operational  success  in 
the  Caribbean  were  diminishing  daily  and  he  argued  vigorously  for  an  immediate  attack.  Both 
Foulkes  and  Codrington  were  as  aggressive  as  Wheler,  but  the  land  men  considered  it 
necessary  for  the  troops  and  vessels  to  remain  for  at  least  six  weeks  to  carry  off  the  French 
inhabitants  and  bring  on  new  settlers.  "'  These  circumstances  both  revealed  the  limitation  of 
seapower  ashore  and  the  dissociation  between  the  services's  requirements  when  operational 
co-operation  is  telescoped  by  time.  Although  the  Foulkes-Codrington  contingent  was 
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realistic,  the  warships  could  not  afford  the  sea  time  in  the  Caribbean.  Any  continuance  would 
eventually  have  required  a  transgression  of  the  King's  orders.  The  Council  thus  resolved 
against  attacking  Guadeloupe  and  formally  signalled  the  end  of  all  operations  in  the  Caribbean 
under  the  aegis  of  Wheler's  squadron  by  ordering  that  the  island  troops  be  returned.  '  ` 
This  cessation  in  operations  was  more  naturally  confirned  by  an  increasing  sickness 
within  the  squadron  and  the  English  regiments.  Apparently  caught  from  the  merchant  ships  in 
Barbados  and  made  worse  by  the  spring  rains  at  Martinique,  the  distemper  reached  such  a 
peak  in  May  that  Wheler  was  reported  to  have  lost  half  his  sailors  and  most  of  his  officers.  "' 
This  was  no  exaggeration.  Of  the  twelve  naval  captains  who  had  sailed  from  England,  up  to 
seven  had  died,  whilst  the  lower  decks  had  been  decimated  by  the  loss  of  around  700  men.  "' 
Such  a  high  number  of  deaths  amongst  the  seamen  undermined  the  squadron's  sailing 
effectiveness;  and,  although  the  marine  soldiers  along  with  some  regular  troops  could,  and 
frequently  did,  stand  in  for  the  able-seamen,  they  were  usually  poor  replacements.  The 
circumstances  for  Wheler's  voyage  to  America  were,  therefore,  not  propitious,  and  the 
prospects  seemed  to  worsen  en  route  when  Foulkes  died  of  the  sickness  that  had,  in  Wheler's 
opinion,  already  'severely  smarted""  the  two  regiments  aboard. 
These  vicissitudes  were,  however,  largely  irrelevant  for  unbeknownst  to  Wheler  as  he 
prepared  to  depart  the  Caribbean  on  18  May,  the  second  phase  of  his  expedition  to  join  the 
New  England  provinces  in  an  combined  army-navy  attack  upon  Canada  and  then  against  the 
French  settlements  on  the  southern  Newfoundland  coast  had  already  been  undermined  by  the 
delay  and  miscarriage  of  the  orders  directing  the  colonial  preparation.  Letters  to  the 
Governors  of  Massachusetts  and  New  York  explaining  Wheler's  Additional  Instructions  had 
been  drafted  as  early  as  February  1693.  However,  they  seemed  to  have  been  delayed  by  a 
comedy  of  errors,  in  which  the  civil  messenger  objected  to  his  schedule;  Nottingham  objected 
to  the  Whiggism  of  the  military  messenger;  the  Virginian  fleet  remained  wind  bound;  and  the 
Admiralty  disdained  to  appoint  a  warship  as  courier.  Perhaps  unsurprisingly,  the  denouement 
was  that  when  the  packet  boat  with  the  orders  aboard  actually  managed  to  leave  England,  it 
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was  captured  by  the  French.  Consequently,  when  Wheler  arrived  at  Boston  in  June  the 
Massachusetts  Governor,  Sir William  Phips,  claimed  ignorance  of  the  projected  enterprise 
and,  indeed,  he  subsequently  alleged  that  Blathwayt's  letter  on  the  topic  only  arrived  at  the 
end  of  July.  "' 
The  New  York  Council's  consideration  of  the  cost  of  naval  stores  with  its  resolution 
of  May  to  inforin  Wheler  of  the  scarcity  of  flour  and  biscuit,  and  Governor  Fletcher's  remark 
on  the  widespread  surprise  at  the  failure  to  attack  Canada,  might  suggest  that  Phips  was  being 
economical  in  acknowledging  what  he  knew  of  the  proposed  operation  even  given  the  delay 
in  his  official  orders.  "'  However,  due  to  his  experience  as  commander  of  a  combined 
operation  against  Quebec  in  1690,  and  his  subsequent  lobbying  of  the  Court  for  the  resources 
to  make  a  second  attempt,  Phips  was  the  most  influential  colonial  voice  on  such  matters 
especially  as  Quebec  was  again  the  target  which,  if  successfully  taken,  would  presage  an 
riverine  assault  on  Montreal.  "'  The  Massachusetts  Governor  was,  thus,  able  to  halt  the 
operation  against  Canada  when  he  informed  Wheler  that  the  provinces  would  have  required  at 
least  four  months  prior  notification  to  raise  some  2000  troops  which  would  have  been 
necessary  to  join  a  similar  number  sent  out  from  England  -  4000  men  being,  in  Phips's 
opinion,  the  minimum  number  required  to  mount  a  credible  assault.  Moreover,  in  response  to 
Wheler's  urging  that  an  operation  be  undertaken  even  if  not  against  Quebec,  the  Governor 
argued  that  the  time  of  year  was  too  advanced  to  make  any  descents,  and  that  there  was  no 
viable  alternative  target  to  Quebec  below  the  ile  d'Orleans  in  the  St  Lawrence  River.  The 
only  suggestion  Phips  made  was  that  Wheler  might  attack  some  French  merchantmen  which 
were  known  to  be  harbouring  at  Plaisance,  (or  Placentia),  the  principal  French  settlement  on 
Newfoundland.  "' 
The  Additional  Instructions  already  directed  Sir  Francis  to  this  jointly  occupied  island 
off  the  North  American  coast  on  the  conclusion  of  the  operation  against  Canada.  In  the  event 
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of  the  latter's  abandonment,  Wheler  began  early  preparations  for  a  descent  on  Newfoundland. 
However,  once  again  it  was  Phips  who  undermined  the  viability  of  the  operation  by  his 
unwillingness  to  make  any  material  contribution.  Hiding  behind  the  Charter's  provisions 
which  prohibited  the  dispatch  of  militia  without  the  consent  of  the  colony's  recently  dismissed 
Assembly,  Phips  denied  Wheler  the  400  troops  he  had  requested  as  reinforcements  for  the 
remaining  650  from  Foulkes's  and  Goodwyn's  regimentS.  124  Without  these  men,  Wheler's 
sickly  squadron  was  to  find  the  French  at  Placentia  with  their  two  new  forts  and  forty  guns 
too  strong  to  combat.  On  arrival  off  the  island,  a  Council  of  War  rejected  the  proposals  for  a 
landing  under  the  cover  of  the  ships'  guns,  and  Wheler's  only  success  before  setting  course 
for  England  on  22  September  was  the  destruction  of  the  fishing  station  on  the  small  he  de  St 
Pierre  which  lay  to  the  south-west.  12'  This  was  a  product  of  co-operation  between  the 
squadron's  frigates  and  a  small  party  of  soldiers  commanded  by  Major  Rabisner,  and  it 
represented  the  sole  combined  operational  success  of  the  expedition's  second  phase. 
The  remnants  of  Wheler's  squadron  reached  Spithead  by  mid-October  and  was  put 
into  quarantine.  ""  It  had  contributed  little  to  what  was  in  any  case  a  bleak  year  for  the  allies 
during  which  both  the  maritime  and  continental  strategies  had  suffered  reverses  with  the 
capture  of  the  Smyrna  convoy  and  the  military  defeats  at  Ncerwinden  (19  July)  and  Marsaglia 
(25  September).  "'  That  the  commanders  of  the  expedition  suffered  no  professional  censure 
can  be  explained  by  the  reasons  subsequently  given  by  Codrington  for  the  failure  at 
Martinique.  Firstly,  the  timing  was  poor;  the  squadron  arrived  just  before  the  start  of  the 
rains  in  May,  making  sickness  inevitable  while  hampering  land  operations,  and  the  positive 
orders  to  leave  by  the  end  of  May  left  only  two  months  for  what  was,  in  Codrington's 
judgement,  a  four  month  operation.  Secondly,  the  constant  delay  through  the  autumn  and 
winter  of  1692  had  allowed  the  French  time  to  fortify.  Thirdly,  the  number  of  troops  was 
insufficient;  Codrington  considered  an  additional  two  regiments  necessary.  "'  Significantly,  all 
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three  could  equally  account  for  the  squadron's  inertia  when  it  reached  North  America.  Each 
of  the  three  criticisms  could  be  attributed  to  the  expedition's  initial  design  and  preparation 
and,  in  particular,  the  restrictions  placed  upon  the  commanders.  At  the  watershed  Council 
held  after  the  withdrawal  from  Martinique,  the  Additional  Instructions's  tight  time  sequencing 
and  the  lack  of  discretion  in  command  for  individual  commanders  meant  that  Wheler's  only 
option  was  to  leave  the  Caribbean  despite  the  senior  commanders  agreeing  in  principal  that  a 
combined  operation  could,  and  should,  be  mounted  against  Guadeloupe.  Similarly,  if  an 
administrative  opera  bouffe  had  not  been  played  out  over  the  dispatch  of  the  orders  to  New 
England,  or  indeed  (assuming  Phips  knew  more  of  the  operation  than  he  admitted),  if 
Wheler's  command  had  been  sufficiently  robust  to  pressurise  Phips  into  providing  the 
recruits,  then  the  planned  operations  against  Canada  and  Newfoundland  could  have  gone 
ahead.  The  Court's  optimism  for  regional  superiority  based  on  imperial  aggrandisement 
remained  unfulfilled  because  the  amphibious  means  fixed  upon  had  been  poorly  designed  and 
prepared. 
H.  v:  Commodore  Robert  Wilmot's  and  Colonel  Luke  Lillingston's  Expedition  to 
Hispaniola,  Januarv-Sel2tember  1695. 
The  genesis  of  this  operation  was  both  retaliatory  and  defensive  in  form  as  the  focus  of  the 
war  in  the  Caribbean  shifted  westwards.  In  the  summer  of  1693,  the  Governor  of  Martinique 
had  proposed  the  capture  of  Jamaica  in  order  to  alleviate  what  he  considered  was  the 
vulnerability  of  the  French  dispersed  among  too  many  islands.  Jamaica  was  also  viewed  as  a 
suitable  place  to  absorb  some  2000  French  whose  plantations  had  been  ruined  by  previous 
English  raids  or  invasions.  "'  Although  the  Lieutenant-Governor  of  Jamaica,  Sir  William 
Beeston,  was  not  aware  of  the  French  Governor's  proposal,  he  knew  that  French  privateering 
raids  from  French  Hispaniola  against  the  island  had  increased  significantly.  At  the  end  of  May 
1694,  the  merchant  sailor,  Captain  Elliot,  on  his  escape  from  French  custody  had  warned 
Beeston  of  an  imminent  French  invasion  as  the  Governor  of  Hispaniola,  Ducasse,  had 
gathered  a  force  of  twenty  ships  and  3000  men.  The  devastation  wrought  by  the  French  in 
the  six weeks  following  their  dual  landings  at  Cow  Bay  and  at  the  eastern  Morant  Bay  on  17 
June  1694  was,  perhaps,  not  surprising  given  the  island's  vulnerability  after  a  massive 
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earthquake  in  June  1692,  the  damage  from  which  Beeston  had  only  started  to  make  good 
following  his  return  to  Jamaica  in  1693.  "'  Nonetheless,  the  economic  consequences  and 
humiliation  of  having  fifty  sugar-works  destroyed  and  some  1300  slaves  stolen,  plus 
Beeston's  warning  during  the  period  of  French  occupation  that  all  would  be  lost  if  a  relief 
force  was  not  sent,  forced  Jamaica's  defence  and  the  issue  of  a  retaliatory  action  up  the 
Court's  war  agenda.  131 
Of  course,  the  war  in  the  West  Indies  had  not  been  ignored  since  Wheler's  departure 
in  May  1693.  The  colonial  governors  had  constantly  requested  extra  warships  and  troops  to 
attack,  and  defend,  against  the  French  regional  presence.  London  only  managed  temporarily 
to  shelve  all  requests  by  claiming  that  any  future  force  would  have  to  await  Wheler's  return 
from  America.  It  was  however  eight  months  before  four  warships  were  dispatched  in  June 
1694  as  convoy  for  the  merchants  headed  for  Barbados.  Further  pleas  from  the  Leeward 
Islands'  Commissioners,  considered  in  November,  caused  a  fifth  rate  to  be  appointed  but  by 
July  of  the  following  year  it  was  still  at  Plymouth.  "'  Consequently,  some  historians  have 
traced  the  origins  of  the  Wilmot-Lillingston  operation  to  these  requests,  when  in  fact  it  was 
not  until  the  French  attack  upon  Jamaica  in  the  late  summer  of  1694  that  the  idea  of  sending 
another  expeditionary  force  -  as  opposed  to  warships  transporting  recruits  -  to  the  region  was 
seriously  canvassed.  "' 
The  Lords  of  Trade's  initial  response  to  Beeston's  early  correspondence  on  the 
French  invasion  was  to  recommend  the  dispatch  of  enough  soldiers  and  ships  to  relieve  the 
island  and  mount  punitive  strikes  against  the  French.  This  latter  proposal  was  specifically 
aimed  at  protecting  English  trade  and  preventing  the  French  mounting  a  similar  operation 
130  CSpC,  1693-1696,  nos.  211,212,1236,1236.1,  pp.  62-3,325-33:  Petition  of  merchants  and  planters 
concerned  with  Jamaica  to  the  King,  23  Mar.  1693;  Considerations  offered  as  to  the  state  of  Jamaica,  [23 
Mar.  ]  1693;  Beeston  to  Shrewsbury,  18  Aug.  1694;  Sir  William  Beeston,  'Narrative  of  the  French  Invasion', 
in  G.  W. Bridges,  The  Annals  ofJamaica  (London,  1828),  i.  312-22;  de  la  Roncifte,  Histoire  de  la  Alarine 
Franqaise,  vi.  250-1;  L.  Gregg,  'The  Port  Royal  Earthquake',  HT  1  (2000),  28-34. 
131  CSpC,  1693-1696,  nos.  1109,1121,1194,1228,  pp.  299-300,305,318-19,324:  Beeston  to  Trcnchard,  23 
June  1694;  Beeston  to  Trenchard,  2  July  1694;  Beeston  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  7  Aug.  1694; 
Journal  of  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  16  Aug.  1694;  Bridges,  Annals  ofJamaica,  i.  323. 
132  CSpC,  1693-1696,  nos.  437,494.1.,  539,627,870,1564.1,1679,  pp.  123-4,140,155,183-4,247,410, 
432:  Codrington  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  3  July  1693;  Memorial  of  the  Commissioners  for  the 
Leeward  Islands  to  the  Queen,  n.  d.;  Journal  of  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  7  Sept.  1693;  Codrington  to 
the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  17  Oct.  1693;  Order  of  the  King  in  Council,  8  Feb.  1694;  Memorial  of  the 
Commissioners  for  the  Leeward  Islands  to  the  King,  n.  d.;  Bridgeman  to  Blathwayt,  13  Feb.  1695;  Moses, 
The  British  Navy  and  The  Caribbean,  1689-1697',  pp.  30-1. 106 
elsewhere  in  the  Caribbean.  ""  Although  the  French  withdrawal  from  Jamaica  on  18  July 
rendered  its  immediate  relief  unnecessary,  London  did  not  know  of  this  until  October  and, 
besides,  the  whole  project  gained  currency  in  Whitehall  as  result  of  the  King's  personal 
intervention.  Blathwayt  represented  William's  awareness  of  the  strategic  importance  of 
Jamaica  as  the  centre  for  the  Spanish  trade  and  as  a  bulwark  against  French  occupation  of 
neighbouring  islands.  Indeed,  William's  principal  fear  was  that  the  loss  of  Jamaica  would 
trigger  a  regional  domino  effect,  resulting  in  the  French  capturing  the  Spanish  half  of 
Hispaniola  and  Cuba,  and  providing  them  with  footholds  in  the  coastal  towns  from  Trinidad 
to  St  Augustine  (on  the  east  coast  of  Florida).  As  he  had  done  for  the  Wheler-Foulkes 
expedition,  the  King  augmented  the  expeditionary  land  force  by  directing  that  two 
establishment  strength  battalions  be  sent;  while  he  also  attended  to  the  diplomatic  context 
through  his  envoy  at  Madrid,  Alexander  Stanhope,  whose  orders  were  to  gain  the  Spanish 
Court's  material  help  in  driving  the  French  from  Hispaniola.  "' 
It  was  perhaps  fortunate  that  delay  in  late  seventeenth  century  diplomacy  matched  that 
of  English  administration.  Immediately  upon  receipt  of  his  instructions  in  October  (OS), 
Stanhope  had  sent  a  memorial  to  the  Secretario  del  Despacho  Universal,  Don  Alonso 
Camcro,  outlining  the  purpose  of  the  operation  and  London's  request  that  orders  be  sent  by 
Carlos  11  to  his  colonial  governors  directing  their  assistance.  Despite  following  this  up  with 
constant  calls  upon  Spanish  Ministers,  Stanhope  was  told  that  colonial  affairs  could  not  be 
ordered  until  the  Council  of  the  Indies's  President,  the  Duke  of  Montalto,  recovered  from 
illness  and,  thus,  it  was  towards  the  end  of  November  (OS)  before  a  positive  response  was 
forthcoming.  Even  then,  Stanhope  was  left  lamenting  the  Spanish  Court's  reluctance  to 
ensure  that  their  governors  received  the  orders  by  bearing  the  cost  of  sending  out  copies  by 
various  routes.  Such  circumstances  might  suggest  that  the  Spaniards  were  unenthusiastic 
about  the  projected  enterprise,  yet  Mancera  wrote  of  its  centrality  to  the  Alliance's  'common 
cause';  and  experience  consoled  Stanhope  that  the  delay  was  the  product  of  Spain's 
133  Childs,  'Secondary  Operations  of  the  British  Army',  p.  9  1,  posits  a  clear  connection  between  the  earlier 
colonial  requests  and  the  Wilmot-Lillingtson  expedition.  Morgan,  'The  British  West  Indies,  1689-1697',  pp. 
399-401,  is  more  oblique  but  no  less  confiising  by  initially  implying  the  link  only  to  step  back  from  it  later. 
134  PRO,  ADM  7/693,  pp.  10-11:  'Att  the  Committee  of  Plantations  att  the  Councill  Chamber  Whitehall',  16, 
20  Aug.  1694;  CSPC,  1693-1696,  no.  1189,  p.  317:  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Planatations  to  Beeston,  3  Aug. 
1694. 
135  CSpC,  1693-1696,  nos,  1195,1277,  pp.  319,341-2:  Beeston  to  Trenchard,  7  Aug.  1694  [Endorsed:  'R.  29 
Oct.  1694];  Blathwayt  to  Trenchard,  2  Sept.  1694;  HMC,  Buccleuch  Montague  MSS,  ii.  1  120-1:  Blathwayt  to 
[Shrewsbury],  [23  Aug.  -]2  Sept.  1694;  PRO,  SP  94/73,  f.  3  10:  Stanhope  to  'My  Lord',  3  Oct.  1694. 107 
consistently  phlegmatic  approach  to  affairs  of  state.  "'  Although  frustrating,  lethargy  did  not 
prevented  Spain's  commitment  and  this  was  finally  offered  in  December. 
A  report  on  the  forwardness  of  the  expedition's  arrangements  received  by  the  King  in 
December  did  represent  a  delay  from  what  had  been  the  expected  departure  of  October,  its 
conclusion  that  only  orders  for  embarkation  were  outstanding  obscured  the  omnipresent 
confusion  amongst  the  organising  bodies  during  the  previous  three  months.  "'  The 
considerable  correspondence  on  the  preparations"'  suggests  that  the  disorganisation  was  not 
a  product  of  bureaucratic  inertia  but,  instead,  arose  from  the  urgency  with  which  the 
Departments  would  set  to  work  preparing  an  aspect  of  the  expedition  without  its  Parameters 
being  clearly  decided  upon.  The  organisation  of  the  land  force  was  particularly  afflicted  in 
this  respect  both  in  terms  of  its  size  and  the  appointed  regiments.  Such  were  the  problems 
that  there  occurred  a  fundamental  change  in  the  prescription  of  the  force  laid  down  by 
William  in  September. 
Northcote's  and  Farrington's  regiments  were  initially  selected  by  the  King,  but  the 
latter  was  reluctant  to  go  and  Shrewsbury  thought  that  Northcote  would  be  so  to. 
Meanwhile,  other  officers  offered  themselves  and  their  regiments,  including  Luke  Lillingston 
whose  regiment  along  with  Northcote's  was  eventually  chosen.  This  was  Shrewsbury's 
preferred  choice,  supported  by  the  Transport  Commissioners  who  favoured  the  administrative 
advantages  in  terms  of  the  supply  of  transports,  victualling  and  a  pre-embarkation  muster 
offered  by  both  these  two  regiments  being  in  the  environs  of  Plymouth.  '"  Notwithstanding 
this  decision,  which  on  paper  would  have  totalled  around  1380  officers  and  men"',  various 
estimates  of  the  force  were  invoked.  On  3  September,  the  Transport  Commissioners  were 
charged  with  finding  transportation  for  2000  men  but  within  three  days,  this  was  reduced  by 
136  PRO,  SP  94/73,  fos.  310-12,314-16:  Stanhope  to  'My  Lord',  3,17  Oct.,  21  Nov.  1694,  and  enclosure, 
Mancera.  to  Stanhope,  I  Dec.  1694  [NS];  Spain  Under  Charles  the  Second,  Or,  Extractsfrom  the 
Correspondence  of  The  Hon.  Alexander  Stanhope,  British  Minister  at  Madrid  1690-1699,  ed.  Lord  Mahon 
(2nd  edn,  London,  1844),  p.  62:  Stanhope  to  Halifax,  31  May  1694. 
137  CSPC,  1693-1696,  nos.  1279,1572,  pp.  342,413:  Minute  of  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations; 
Memorandum  of  the  state  of  the  preparations  for  Jamaica,  laid  before  the  King  in  Council,  2  Dec.  1694. 
138  Neeser,  'The  British  Naval  Operation  in  the  West  Indies',  p.  1624  n.  49. 
"9  RMC,  Buccleuch  Montague  MSS,  ii.  L  121,126-7,13  1:  Blathwayt  to  [Shrewsbury],  [23  Aug.  -]2  Sept.,  10- 
20  Sept.  1694;  Shrewsbury  to  Blathwayt,  31  Aug.,  4  Sept.  1694;  CSPC,  1693-1696,  no.  1332,  pp.  357-8:  the 
Commissioners  for  Transport  to  Povey,  22  Sept.  1694. 
140  The  paper  figure  for  an  infantry  battalion  during  William's  reign  was  reckoned  to  be  650  men  and  42 
commissioned  officers  but  Blathwayt's  working  assumption  was  said  to  be  lower  at  600  men,  excluding 
commissioned  officers.  See,  'Lord  Cutts's  Letters,  1695',  ed.  J.  Childs  Camden  Miscellany  XXX,  Camden  4th 
Series  39  (London,  1990),  p.  381  n.  3. 108 
300.  Meanwhile,  the  Victualling  Commissioners  were  working  to  a  figure  provided  by  the 
Committee  of  Council  which  was  a  hundred  less  again  and,  by  December,  a  third  figure  of 
1400  was  settled  upon  much  to  the  Transportation  Commissioners'  chagrin  as  they  had  just 
provided  for  1841  men.  Moreover,  ironically,  prior  to  the  King's  decision,  estimates  had  also 
been  prepared  for  the  most  economical  regimental  organisation  of  a  maximum  of  1200 
soldiers.  Matters  were  complicated  further  when  it  was  proposed  to  send  with  the 
expeditionary  force  an  Independent  Company  for  service  in  Jamaica,  and  also  a  newly  raised 
regiment  for  Barbados.  It  was  not  until  the  second  week  of  December  that  the  correct  total 
of  1200  men  -  implicit  in  the  King's  decision  in  September  for  two  battalions  -  was  first 
adopted  wholesale  by  all  those  preparing  the  expeditionary  force.  "' 
This  initial  confusion  over  regiments  and  the  overall  size  of  the  force  presaged  a 
significant  change  in  their  organisation.  Throughout  the  autumn  both  Lillingston  and 
Northcote  had  presented  memorials  on  the  state  of  their  regiments  which  noted  principally 
their  arrears  of  pay  and  shortage  of  men.  "'  This  likely  contributed  to  the  decision  taken 
before  Christmas  1694  to  send  instead  a  detachment  of  1200  men.  `  At  the  beginning  of 
January,  Brigadier  Lord  Cutts  was  sent  on  an  regimental  inspection  tour  starting  at  Plymouth 
and  working  east  to  Portsmouth,  during  which  he  was  to  form  this  detachment  by  breaking 
Lillingston's  regiment  and  retaining  its  core  of  600  men,  while  simultaneously  adding  to  this 
141  CSpC,  1693-1696,  nos.  1245,1262-4,1280-1,1283,1295,1299,1302,1349,1393,1405,1526,1557, 
1574,1598,  pp.  335,338-9,342-6,364,374,376,404,409,414,417-18:  Povey  to  Clerk,  21  Aug.  1694; 
Estimate  of  the  annual  charge,  28  Aug.  1694;  Similar  Estimate,  28  Aug.  1694;  Memorandum  as  to  the  above 
Estimates,  28  Aug.  1694;  Povey  to  the  Commissioners  for  Transportation,  the  Victuallers  of  the  Navy, 
Secretary  at  War,  3  Sept.  1694;  the  Victuallers  of  the  Navy  to  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations;  Order  of  the 
Queen  in  Council,  8  Sept.  1694;  Extract  from  a  letter  from  the  Navy  Board  forwarding  the  following  extract 
from  the  Victualling  Commissioners,  10  Sept.  1694;  Journal  of  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  26  Sept. 
1694;  Povey  to  Guy,  9  Oct.  1694;  Povcy  to  Bridgeman,  10  Oct.  1694;  the  Agents  for  Barbados  to  the  Lords  of 
Trade  and  Plantations,  26  Nov.  1694;  Minute  of  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  26  Nov.  1694;  Memorial 
of  the  Commissioners  for  Transportation  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  3  Dec.  1694;  Journal  of  the 
Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  14  Dec.  1694. 
142  CSpC,  1693-1696,  nos.  1360,1381,1439,1453,1471,  pp.  366,370,384,387,391:  Memorial  of  Colonel 
Lillingston  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  28  Sept.,  8  Oct.  1694;  Povey  to  Guy,  20  Oct.  1694;  Journal 
of  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  24  Oct.  1694;  Memorial  of  Colonel  William  Northcott  to  the  Privy 
Council,  [I  Nov.  ]  1694;  CTP,  155617-1696,  pp.  357,390,398,412:  Representation  of  Col.  Luke  Lillingston 
to  the  King,  [About  4  Apr.  ]  1694;  Memorial  of  Col.  Lillingston  to  the  Lords  of  the  Treasury,  [About  Sept.  ], 
[About  31  Oct.  ]  1694;  Representation  of  Col.  Luke  Lillingston,  [1694]. 
"I  CSPC,  1693-1696,  no.  1598,  pp.  417-18:  Journal  of  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations  refers  to  1200  men 
being  sent,  while  CTP,  155617-1696,  p.  410:  Letter  from  Mr.  William  Blathwayt,  to  Henry  Guy,  Esq., 
secretary  to  the  Treasury,  21  Dec.  1694,  states  that  only  Lillingston's  regiment  was  to  go.  These  documents 
combined  with  other  evidence  which  indicates  that  the  detachment  of  1200  men  was  to  be  listed  as  a  new 
regiment  for  Lillingston  allows  the  decision  to  drop  Lillingston's  late  regiment  and  Northcote's  regiment  to 
be  dated  to  before  Christmas. 109 
number  200  strong  drafts  from  each  of  Northcote's,  Faffington's  and  Colt's  regiments. 
Although  above  Establishment  strength  this  detachment  was  to  be  listed  as  one  regiment,  and 
Cutts  was  to  supervise  its  embarkation  on  board  twelve  transports  for  the  voyage  to  the 
Caribbean.  The  process  was  not  without  incident,  for  despite  noting  the  quality  of  the  new 
regiment  -  attributed  to  the  rump  of  Lillingston's  former  battalion  -  Cutts  had  to  quell 
mutinous  troops  aboard  four  ships  through  negotiation  and  drawing  a  temporary  guard  of  100 
men  from  Plymouth  Garrison.  "' 
As  with  the  organisation  of  Wrenn's  expedition,  the  naval  squadron  suffered  delay  due 
to  problems  securing  the  auxiliary  vessels.  Time  was  lost  haggling  over  the  cost  of  freight 
and  then  the  question  of  demurrage  arose.  The  delay  only  lengthened  when  the  Admiralty 
proved  dilatory  both  in  providing  a  convoy  to  bring  these  vessels  from  the  Downs  to 
Plymouth  and  in  securing  their  crews'  protections  from  the  press.  Consequently,  it  was  21 
December  before  the  transports  headed  west  along  the  Channel.  "'  To  cap  everything  as  time 
pressed,  when  the  main  squadron  weighed  from  Spithcad  on  15  January  to  link  up  with  the 
transports  at  Plymouth,  the  weather  drove  them  beyond  to  Falmouth.  The  Commodore, 
Captain  Robert  Wilmot,  then  had  to  travel  overland  to  notify  Cutts  and  organise  a 
conjunction  of  the  squadron  and  the  transports  for  22  January  by  which  time  the  troops 
would  have  been  embarked  for  a  week.  "' 
144  'Lord  Cutts's  Letters,  1695',  nos.  1-5,  pp.  381-5:  Cutts  to  Blathwayt,  13,15,18,20  Jan.  1695;  L. 
Lillingston,  Reflections  on  Mr  Burchett's  Memoirs  Or,  Remarks  on  His  Account  of  Captain  Wilmot's 
Fxpedition  to  the  West  Indies  (London,  1704),  p.  22-3,  CSPD,  1695,  pp.  305-6:  Newsletter  addressed:  "For 
the  Right  Honourable  the  Earl  of  Derwentwater,  Newcastle-upon-Tyne",  19  Jan.  1695. 
145  CSpCp  1693-1696,  nos.  1239,1244,1259,1261,1280,1301,1313,1332,1345,1347-8,1352,1361,1407, 
1435,1440,1449,1527,1533,1553,1555,1572-4,1577-9,1582,1584,1613,  pp.  334-5,338,342,345, 
353,357,363-4,366,376,3834,396,404-5,408-9,413-16,419:  the  Commissioners  for  the  Navy  to  Povey, 
20  Aug.  1694;  Povey  to  the  Commissioners  for  Transportation,  21  Aug.,  3,6,26  Sept.  1694;  the 
Commissioners  for  Transportation  to  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  27  Aug.,  10  Sept.,  3  Dec.  1694; 
Journal  of  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  28  Aug.,  20  Oct.,  3.  Dec.  1694;  Povey  to  Lowndes,  12  Sept.  1694; 
the  Commissioners  for  Transportation  to  Povey,  22,29  Sept.  1694;  Memorandum  for  John  Povey,  26  Sept. 
1694;  Povey  to  the  King's  Physicians,  26  Sept.  1694;  Order  of  the  Queen  in  Council,  27  Sept.  1694; 
Bridgem  an  to  Povey,  II  Oct.  1694;  Povey  to  Guy,  20  Oct.  1694;  Minutes  of  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations, 
24  Oct.  1694;  Povey  to  the  Apothecary  General,  12  Nov.  1694;  Blathwayt  to  the  Apothecaries'  Company  at 
the  Savoy,  20  Nov.  1694;  Blathwayt  to  the  Commissioners  for  Transportation,  20  Nov.,  5  Dec.  1694; 
Blathwayt  to  Guy,  26  Nov.  1694;  the  Commissioners  for  Transportation  to  Blathwayt,  26  Nov.,  8  Dec.  1694; 
Memorandum  of  the  state  of  the  preparations  for  Jamaica,  laid  before  the  King  in  Council,  2  Dec.  1694; 
Blathwayt  to  Bridgeman,  3,21  Dec.  1694;  Bridgernan  to  Blathwayt,  4  Dec.  1694;  Masters  of  the  transport 
ships  to  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  4  Dec.  1694;  CTP,  155617-1696,  pp.  410:  Letter  from  Mr.  William 
Blathwayt,  to  Henry  Guy,  Esq.,  secretary  to  the  Treasury,  21  Dec.  1694. 
146  PRO,  ADM  51/4322,  Part  vi,  unpaginated,  Ruhy,  15-23  Jan.  1694;  'Lord  Cutts's  Letters,  1695',  nos.  4,6, 
pp.  384-6:  Cutts  to  Blathwayt,  20,22  Jan.  1694. 110 
Wilmot  probably  made  the  journey  to  Plymouth  instead  of  sending  a  messenger 
because  of  his  additional  responsibilities  as  C.  -in-C.  Lillingston  had  been  hopeful  for  this 
appointment  and,  moreover,  had  effectively  claimed  it  from  September.  Nonetheless,  when 
the  Lords  of  Trade  asked  the  King  to  decide  between  the  military  or  naval  commander  for  the 
appointment,  Lillingston's  recent  experience  of  an  amphibious  campaign  on  Martinique  in 
1693  was  ignored,  and  the  Beachy  Head  veteran  was  Preferred.  For  Wilmot,  this  was  the 
pinnacle  of  a  professional  recovery  begun  three  years  previously  following  his  acquittal  by  the 
Devonshire  assizes  for  killing  Marine  Ensign  Roydon  in  a  duel  at  Torbay,  despite  his 
undoubted  guilt.  The  appointment,  though,  was  hazardous.  Notwithstanding  the  trenchant 
support  by  the  then  commanding  Admirals  who  claimed  that  Wilmot  had  been  unreasonably 
provoked,  the  action  had  surely  betrayed  a  temperament  ill-suited  to  the  stress  of  provocation 
that  was  likely  to  be  encountered  on  an  expedition  to  the  Caribbean.  ""  This  point  is 
underscored  by  the  King,  who  took  the  unusual  step  of  granting  Wilmot  and  Liflingston  a 
joint  audience  to  impress  the  need  for  harmonious  conduct.  To  facilitate  this  he  provided 
instructions  for  the  division  of  spoils  which  revealed  his  hope  that  his  senior  army  and  naval 
officers  should,  when  necessary,  think  of  themselves  as  the  equivalent  rank  in  the  other 
service.  The  King's  principal  purpose  was  to  point  out  where  clashes  between  commanders 
had  damaged  previous  expeditions  and,  then,  to  exhort  Wilmot  and  Lillingston  to  'a  mutual 
exact  concurrence  of  kindness'.  "' 
This  reliance  on  personality  to  produce  success  might  be  viewed  as  a  compensation 
for  the  lack  of  clarity  of  the  Instructions.  Although  these  confirmed  the  expedition's  principal 
objectives  as  attacking  French  Hispaniola,  a  Council  of  War  -  again  the  sovereign  command 
authority  -  could  first  determine  on  alternatives.  The  sealed  Instructions  given  to  Wilmot 
prior  to  departure  clumsily  attempted  to  accommodate  gubernatorial  interests  while 
maintaining  any  operational  momentum  built  up  before  the  squadron  touched  an  English 
117  CSpC,  1693-1696,  nos.  1360,1602,1614,  pp.  366,418-19:  Memorial  of  Colonel  Luke  Lillingston  to  the 
Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  28  Sept.  1694;  Minutes  of  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  16  Dec.  1694; 
Journal  of  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  21  Dec.  1694;  PRO,  ADM  3/9,  unpaginated:  Board  Minutes,  27 
July,  4,13,  Sept.  1693,5  Mar.  1694;  PRO,  ADM  2/173,  pp.  363,379:  the  Admiralty  to  Attorney  General,  4 
July  1693;  the  Admiralty  to  Admirals  of  the  Fleet  15  July  1693;  PRO,  ADM  7/694,  pp.  130-1,194-90:  the 
Admirals  to  'Rt.  Honble.  ',  30  June,  17  Aug.  1693;  L.  Edye,  The  Historical  Records  ofthe  Royal  Marines 
(London,  1893),  p.  387.1  am  grateful  to  Dr  P.  Le  Fevre  for  putting  me  on  the  trail  of  the  references  to  this 
incident  in  PRO,  ADM  7/694. 
148  Lillingston,  Reflections  on  Mr  Burchett's  Memoirs,  p.  6;  J.  Burchett,  Memoirs  of  Transactions  at  Sea 
During  the  War  with  France  Beginning  in  1688  and  Ending  in  1697  (London,  1703),  pp.  310-15:  'The 
Distribution  of  the  Prizes  and  Booty  That  Should  be  Taken  in  the  West  Indies'. III 
colony.  Its  Articles  were  more  similar  to  Wrenn's  than  Wheler's.  The  colonial  governor  was 
to  be  President  of  the  Councils  which  met  on  the  island,  and  his  militia  officers  had 
membership  when  local  defence  was  on  the  agenda;  more  significantly,  the  Governor  and  the 
Island  Council  had  the  right  of  veto  on  the  dispatch  of  warships  from  the  squadron. 
Furthermore,  Lillingston's  and  Beeston's  separate  Instructions  emphasised  the  latter's 
superiority  in  command.  However,  in  terms  of  the  Hispaniolan  objectives,  none  of  these 
provisions  need  be  adhered  to  because  the  squadron  was  directed  in  the  first  instance  to  the 
Spanish  half  of  the  island.  If,  at  the  principal  Spanish  settlement  of  St  Domingo,  the 
Governor  was  ready  to  proceed  against  the  French,  then  the  squadron  need  not  go  to  Jamaica 
till  the  operation  was  complete.  "'  Beeston  was  unaware  of  this  provision  and,  thus,  that  his 
influence  could  be  limited  to  objectives  decided  upon  later.  "'  Whitehall  had  diffused  the 
sources  of  unitary  conu-nand  but  in  doing  so,  a  smokescreen  had  been  drawn  over  the  extent 
of  colonial  influence. 
It  is ironic  that  the  expedition  in  which  the  King  personally  intervened  to  prevent 
disorder  amongst  his  senior  commanders  produced  inter-service  bitterness  of  such  a 
magnitude  that  the  operation's  weaknesses  must  be  whofly  attributed  to  it.  This  division  was 
reflected  in  contemporary  accounts  and  histories  which  sided  with  either  Wilmot  or 
Lillingston,  leaving  Beeston  largely  an  irrelevance.  The  Admiralty  Secretary,  Josiah  Burchett, 
put  the  naval  case  plainly  in  his  history,  which  ignored  almost  completely  the  contribution  of 
the  land  commander  and  was  also  peppered  with  waspish  comments  on  the  soldiers' 
contribution  to  the  expedition.  "'  Pubfished  in  1703,  this  text  provoked  Lillingston  to  reply  in 
which  he  accused  Burchett  of  being  'indifferently  qualified'  as  a  historian  and  for  uncritically 
149  BL,  Add  MSS  32694,  fos.  137-40:  Extract  of  Instructions  for  Capt.  Wilmot,  1695;  Lillingston,  Rej7ections 
on  Mr  Burchell's  Memoirs,  pp.  9-12:  'Instructions  for  Our  Trusty  and  Welbeloved  Luke  Lillingston  Esq.  '  23 
Dec.  1694;  Burchett,  Memoirs  of  Transactions  at  Sea,  pp.  306-9:  'Contents  of  the  Said  General  Instructions'; 
CSPC,  1693-1696,  nos.  1618-20,  p.  420:  Instructions  to  Sir  William  Beeston  relating  to  the  Jamaica  Forces, 
23  Dec.  1694;  Instructions  to  Colonel  Luke  Lillingston,  23  Dec.  1694;  Instructions  to  Captain  Robert  Wilmot, 
commanding  the  squadron  for  Jamaica,  23  Dec.  1694. 
130  CSPC,  1693-1696,  nos.  2022,2022.11-V,  pp.  566-9:  Sir  William  Beeston's  narrative  of  what  passed  while 
the  fleet  was  at  Hispaniola,  22  Aug.  1695;  Instructions  from  Sir  William  Beeston  to  Colonel  Beckford,  21 
Feb.  1694/5;  Beeston  to  President  of  St  Domingo,  21  Feb.  1694/5;  Beeston  to  Lillingston,  21  Feb.  1694/5; 
Beeston  to  Wilmot,  21  Feb.  1694/5.  These  documents  show  Beeston  to  think  naively  it  was  his  idea  to  attack 
Hispaniola  first  before  the  squadron  came  to  Jamaica,  and  that  the  commanders  would  have  to  be  encouraged 
to  do  so. 
151  Burchett,  Memoirs  of  Transactions  at  Sea,  pp.  305-21.  A  good  example  of  Burchett's  querulousness  is  to 
be  found  on  p.  319,  when  he  remarks  on  the  slowness  in  mounting  guns  ashore  'by  those  whose  proper 
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accepting  'a  most  scandalous  false  account'.  "'  Burchett  continued  the  controversy  by 
responding  in  detail  to  Lillingston  within  the  year,  and  this  text,  though  ignored  in  G.  F. 
James's  assessment  of  Burchett's  historiography"',  contained  in  full  many  of  the  primary 
documents  drawn  on  for  his  previous  publication.  "'  Other  contemporary  accounts  are  works 
of  thinly  veiled  bias:  Commissary  Murrey's  Journal  is  unabashed  in  its  support  of  Wilmot, 
while  there  is  a  sense  that  the  Captain  of  the  Ruby  sought  to  twist  the  usually  neutral 
Captain's  Log.  "'  Lillingston,  though,  did  attract  some  supporters,  notably  the  army  scholar, 
J.  W.  Fortescue,  whose  preface  to  the  CSPC,  1693-1696,  incautiously  adopts  the  Colonel's 
perspective,  quoting  extensively  from  his  pamphlet  and  heavily  censoring  Wilmot's  conduct. 
This  excess  of  self-justification  provokes  sympathy  with  Beeston's  lament  that  the  complaints 
from  all  sides  were  'beyond  my  power  to  reconcile';  ""  but,  however  biased  these  sources, 
they  do  provide  the  expedition's  narrative  and,  in  disagreeing  so  vehemently,  show  the  King 
to  have  been  unwise  to  rely  on  personal  restraint  to  produce  success. 
The  clash  of  characters  was  immediately  evident  on  the  outward  voyage.  En  route 
first  to  Madeira"',  Lillingston  believed  that  Wilmot  opened  their  sealed  Instructions  before 
the  stipulated  400  latitude,  and  then  expressed  his  dissatisfaction  with  their  contents.  There 
also  occurred  a  dispute  over  the  admission  of  Captain-Lieutenant  Warner  to  the  Council  of 
War  during  which  Lillingston  considered  Wilmot  to  show  insufficient  deference  to  an  army 
custom  and  to  have  done  so  in  a  manner  contrary  to  the  spirit  of  accommodation  invoked  by 
William.  After  anchoring  at  Madeira  on  12  February,  their  relationship  encountered  further 
strains.  Wilmot  allegedly  proposed  to  Lillingston  that  they  ignore  their  Instructions  and  seek 
opportunities  for  personal  wealth,  a  theme  Lillingston  believed  he  had  previously  hinted  at 
during  the  voyage.  Then,  when  a  storm  blew  up  dispersing  the  fleet  over  two  days  (15-17 
February),  Lillingston  and  other  regimental  officers  were  nearly  stranded  on  the  island.  The 
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Colonel,  however,  did  not  consider  nature  as  the  sole  reason  for  his  prolonged  stay  on  the 
beach  and  accused  Wilmot  of  complicity  in  preventing  his  rescue.  Murrey,  though,  recorded 
that  the  Commodore  had  sent  his  boat  for  the  land  commander  and,  moreover,  the  Ruby's  log 
and  other  Captains'  journals  confirm  both  the  violence  of  the  storm  and  the  necessity  for 
Wilmot  to  weigh  almost  immediately  in  order  to  preserve  the  squadron.  With  reference  to 
Lillingston's  allegations  during  the  first  part  of  the  voyage,  Burchett  undermines  their 
credibility  by  stressing  their  origins  in  situations  where  only  the  Colonel  and  the  Commodore 
were  present.  "'  Whoever  was  to  blame,  the  important  point  is  that  before  the  squadron 
reached  Spanish  Hispaniola,  the  two  commanders  were  squabbling  furiously,  the  Commodore 
was  reported  as  wishing  to  ignore  his  Instructions;  and  the  fleet  had  been  dispersed. 
Notwithstanding  further  disputes  as  to  whether  Wilmot  had  issued  clear  rendezvous 
instructions  in  event  of  dispersal,  and  as  to  his  advertisement  of  the  squadron's  presence, 
reassembly  occurred  at  St  Kitts  by  25  March.  Three  days  later,  despite  an  ominous  increase 
in  sickness  amongst  the  crews  and  soldiers,  the  squadron  weighed  for  Spanish  Hispaniola 
bound  first  for  its  eastern  island  of  Saona  where  the  Swan,  which  had  previously  been  sent  to 
make  contact  with  the  Governor  at  St  Domingo,  was  to  be  met.  Along  with  Colonel 
Beckford  who  had  been  sent  from  Jamaica  by  Beeston  in  the  Hampshire,  the  Swan's  Captain 
gave  word  that  the  Spanish  were  ready  to  proceed  with  the  operation  if  Wilmot  came  first  to 
St  Domingo.  In  order  to  shield  the  transports  from  the  arduous  beat  to  windward,  Wilmot 
sent  them  north  to  Samana  Bay  convoyed  by  the  Reserve,  the  Ruby,  the  Winchester  and  the 
Firebrand  fireship,  while  the  rest  including  the  Hampshire  went  to  the  Governor,  Don 
Ignatio  Peris  Caro.  "' 
Wilmot  believed  the  English  to  be  initially  well  received  at  St  Domingo  with  the 
Spanish  showing  considerable  enthusiasm  for  the  projected  venture.  However,  as  the  days 
passed,  in  what  Murrey  euphemistically  termed  'many  conferences  and  papers"60,  in  an 
158  Lillingston,  Reflections  on  Mr  Burchell's  Memoirs,  pp.  24-35;  Burchett,  Mr  Burchell's  Justification  offfis 
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Whittell,  24  July  1695;  Wilmot  to  Admiralty,  26  July  1695;  'Murrey's'Joumal',  [31  July]  1695. 
160  CSpC,  1693-1696,  no.  1938,  p.  552:  'Murrey's  Journal',  [31  July]  1695. 114 
attempt  to  agree  the  parameters  of  the  Anglo-Spanish  co-operation,  Wilmot  lost  patience 
with  what  he  regarded  as  Spanish  procrastination.  Not  surprisingly,  Lillingston  argued  that 
the  negotiations  took  up  to  twelve  days  because  Wilmot  first  tried  to  dominate  the  Spaniards 
and  then  refused  to  respect  their  wish  to  treat  only  with  the  land  commander.  The  agreement 
eventually  arrived  at  was  wide  ranging,  including  articles  to  regulate  conduct  in  conquered 
French  plantations.  More  importantly,  it  determined  upon  the  windward  most  French 
settlement,  Cap  Franqois,  as  the  first  target  and  a  disposition  of  force  comprising  between 
1500  to  1700  Spanish  marching  overland,  while  the  English  sailed  around  to  Manchaneel  Bay 
where  a  rendezvous  would  occur.  Even  though  the  English  squadron  left  St  Domingo  on  15 
April  to  link  up  with  the  vessels  at  SamanA  Bay,  it  was  4  May  before  the  fleet  -  save  for  three 
frigates  and  a  bomb  vessel  which  had  been  sent  to  blockade  the  French  ships  at  Cap  Franýois 
-  anchored  off  Monte  Christo  near  Manchaneel  Bay.  Lillingston  blamed  the  delay  on  the 
Commodore  wasting  time  at  Samand  but  this  proved  irrelevant  as  the  Spaniards  had  also  been 
held  up  and  their  General,  who  had  specifically  pressed  on  ahead,  only  arrived  two  days 
later.  "' 
Fig  9:  Hispaniola. 
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With  Wilmot  unwell,  Lillingston  and  the  Spanish  officer  agreed  that  Bayaha  would  be 
the  specific  point  of  rendezvous  for  the  troops.  On  9  May  the  squadron  anchored  in  the 
Manchaneel  Bay  having  been  joined  by  the  promised  three  warships  of  Spain's  Barlovento 
Fleet  which  Murrey  considered  barely  mediocre.  Over  the  following  three  days  the  Colonel 
made  frequent  trips  ashore  in  expectation  of  meeting  the  Spanish;  and,  when  on  12  May  this 
was  fulfilled,  it  was  agreed  at  a  Council  that  his  brother,  the  Regimental  Major,  would  land 
with  some  150  English  troops  (including  50  Grenadiers)  and  100  Spanish  from  the 
Barlovento  to  join  the  overland  march.  The  remaining  fit  men  of  Lillingston's  regiment  were 
landed  with  him  at  the  Bay  of  Potansees,  some  three  to  five  leagues  from  Cap  Frangois  where 
the  squadron  proceeded  to  lie  byjust  out  of  gunshot  of  the  French  fort.  Lillingston 
subsequently  grumbled  that  his  detachment  might  have  been  spared  the  march  by  the  ships' 
boats  rowing  one  and  a-half  leagues  further.  It  had  been  planned  that  once  the  soldiers 
marched  up  to  the  south-cast  side  of  the  town,  the  squadron  would  broadside  the  fort  while  a 
detachment  of  landed  seamen  were  to  attack  its  rear.  This,  however,  did  not  account  for  the 
French  unexpectedly  abandoning  and  blowing  up  the  fort  on  19  May  as  the  sailors  scoured 
the  coast  for  a  suitable  landing  site  and  the  army,  still  some  distance  off,  struggled  across 
country. 
All  participants  agreed  that  the  sailors  were  the  first  into  the  town,  but  their  conduct 
there  became  a  source  of  competing  assertions.  The  Commodore  considered  his  men  to  have 
gallantly  defused  the  booby-trapped  houses  until  all  the  troops  arrived  by  21  May  when  he 
reported  that  the  Colonel  pulled  down  the  Jack  Flag  to  replace  it  with  Spain's  colours; 
Lillingston  believed  the  sailors'  entry  to  have  been  premature  and  their  time  spent  in  taking 
off  all  the  spoil;  Beckford  wrote  of  soldiers  assaulting  sailors  in  their  quest  for  loot;  while 
Murrey  accused  the  Spaniards  of  the  plunder.  The  first  combined  operation  against 
Hispaniola  had  ended  successfully  though  its  methods  had  exacerbated  pre-existing  tensions, 
leaving  the  army-navy  force  divided  and  squabbling.  Ironically,  by  retreat,  the  French  had 
damaged  the  English  more  than  if  they  than  if  they  had  stood  and  fought.  "" 
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The  French  had  pulled  back  westerly  towards  Port  de  Paix  which  perforce  had  to  be 
attacked  next.  Communication  between  Lillingston  and  Wilmot  was  now  only  through 
intermediaries  and  agreement  on  the  disposition  of  force  for  this  second  phase  proved 
contentious.  Wilmot  believed  that  the  army  and  navy  would  be  arranged  as  before  and  he 
was  confounded  when  Lillingston  failed  to  re-cmbark  the  English  troops  and  instead  took 
them  to  join  the  Spanish  camp  for  the  overland  march.  Lillingston's  version  was  that  he 
informed  Wilmot  of  his  intentions  -a  point  corroborated  by  Murrey  who  acted  as  messenger  - 
and  condemned  the  Commodore  for  failing  to  leave  behind  some  transports  for  care  of  the 
increasingly  numerous  sick  soldiers.  Whatever  the  motivation,  the  decision  for  all  the  troops 
to  march  to  Port  de  Paix  was  ill-informed.  Distances  were  miscalculated  and  the  arduous 
nature  of  the  terrain  caused  the  army  to  take  sixteen  days  where  four  had  been  estimated. 
Moreover,  tempestuous  weather  added  to  the  diminishing  morale  and  health  of  the  land  force. 
The  delayed  arrival  of  the  troops  at  Port  de  Paix  gave  rise  to  recriminations  over  the 
squadron's  actions  in  the  interim.  Having  left  Cap  Frangois  on  31  May,  the  squadron 
anchored  some  five  leagues  eastwards  of  Port  de  Paix  on  6  June,  and  the  Commodore  sent 
raiding  parties  ashore  to  burn  all  French  plantations  up  to  the  Port  and  also,  according  to 
Wilmot,  establish  a  line  of  communication  with  Lillingston.  Murrcy  and  Beckford  implicitly 
commended  this  action  as  a  necessary  preparatory  step  to  flush  out  the  French  inhabitants. 
Lillingston,  although  not  condemnatory,  cast  doubt  on  the  resoluteness  of  Wilmot's  raids,  and 
argued,  in  particular,  that  the  flight  of  the  French  from  the  principal  and  well  defended 
plantation  four  leagues  from  the  Port,  was  due  to  the  threat  that  the  soldiers  were  about  to 
cut  it  off.  "' 
By  15  June  both  land  and  sea  forces  were  before  Port  de  Paix  and  a  summons  was 
sent.  Its  immediate  rejection  meant  that  batteries  had  to  be  constructed  in  the  hope  of 
effecting  a  breach  in  what,  all  agreed,  was  a  stoutly  built  and  naturally  defended  fort. 
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However,  disputes  followed  over  the  location  of  the  Council  of  War  and  Wilmot  was  said  to 
have  withdrawn  his  participation  from  those  held  ashore  unless  Lillingston  was  willing  to 
accept  his  repeated  offer  to  focus  on  accumulating  personal  wealth.  Lillingston  believed  his 
rejection  of  this  offer  contributed  to  Wilmot  delaying  the  landing  of  the  necessary  ordnance 
and,  eventually  after  ten  days,  putting  ashore  at  a  most  incommodious  site  the  wrong  quantity 
and  type.  This  allegation  gained  credence  from  the  numerous  letters  that  Lillingston  wrote  to 
Murrey  on  the  topic.  Burchett  argued  that  the  soldiers  had  proved  dilatory  in  erecting  those 
guns  initially  landed  and  that  for  this  reason  and  others  -  principally  the  sailors'  reluctance  to 
serve  under  Lillingston  ashore  -  Wilmot  sailed  by  Port  de  Paix  and  from  23  June  landed  a 
detachment  of  up  to  700  sailors  with  ordnance  to  erect  batteries  at  differing  levels  on  the  hill 
overlooking  the  fort  from  the  west.  Perhaps  predictably,  Lillingston  derided  both  the  position 
and  engineering  of  the  navy's  batteries;  and  both  services  promoted  the  relative  efficacy  of 
their  continual  fire.  Certainly  the  cumulative  effect  had  an  impact  for,  at  the  beginning  of 
July,  news  was  brought  to  Wilmot  that  the  enemy  intended  to  abandon  the  fort.  On  the  night 
of  3-4  July  the  French  attempted  a  breakout:  a  party  of  around  500  headed  towards  Wilmot's 
forces  and  he  sent  forward  150  men  to  meet  them.  A  sharp  fire-fight  then  occurred,  resulting 
in  many  casualties.  Eventually  the  English  seemed  to  gain  the  upper  hand  and  the  enemy  fled 
into  the  woods,  where  the  majority  were  rounded  up  later  by  the  Spanish.  Prior  to  this 
Lillingston's  battery  had  managed  to  effect  a  breach  and  he  was  preparing  to  launch  an 
assault.  On  hearing  the  exchanges  to  the  west  he  sent  his  Major  with  some  men  to  investigate 
and  the  subsequent  report  led  Lillingston  to  conclude  that  his  soldiers'  cfforts  had  in  fact 
forced  the  French  out  and  that  the  sailors  had  been  lucky  that  the  French  wished  only  to  break 
though  and  beat  a  path  to  the  woods.  This  view  was  predicated  upon  the  assumption  that  the 
garrison  sallied  westwards  upon  a  reckoning  that  Wilmot's  force  would  offer  the  least 
resistance.  As  at  Cap  Franýois,  the  individual  services  tried  to  claim  the  success  of  this 
combined  operation  on  Hispaniola  as  their  own.  '" 
164  Lillingston,  Reflections  on  Mr  Burchelt's  Memoirs,  pp.  68-86,88,90-7,99-101,103-16;  Burchett, 
Memoirs  of  Transactions  at  Sea,  pp.  317-20;  Burchett,  Mr  Burchelt's  Justification  offfis  Naval  Memoirs,  pp. 
52-4;  CSPC,  1693-1696,  nos.  1946,1973,1980.1,1983,2022.  XI-XII,  pp.  536-8,545,548-9,554-6,570: 
Narrative  of  Colonel  Peter  Beckford;  Copies  of  a  series  of  letters  on  the  Hispaniola  expedition  from  Charles 
Whittell,  24  July  1695;  Wilmot  to  Admiralty,  26  July  1695;  'Murreys'  Journal',  [31  July]  1695;  Wilmot  to 
Beeston,  10  July  1695;  Lillingston  to  Beeston,  10  July  1695;  Burchett,  Mr  Burchett's  Justification  offlis 
Naval  Memoirs,  pp.  12248:  'Relating  to  the  Proceedings  at  Port  de  Paix:  Capt.  Butler  of  the  Winchester, 
Capt  Soul  of  the  FirehrandFireship;  Capt  Moses  of  the  Experiment;  Lt  Hickman,  Third  of  the  Dunkirk;  Lt 
Jarman,  Second  of  the  Dunkirk;  Lt  Stiles  of  the  Swan;  Lt  Farquaharson  of  the  Reserve;  Lt  Turner  of  the 118 
Petit  Goavc  and  Lcogane  now  remained  as  potential  targets;  the  former  had  been 
cited  in  the  original  Instructions  and  both  had  been  agreed  upon  with  the  Spaniards  at  St 
Domingo.  However,  the  pattern  of  destructive  inter-service  relationships  continued  with 
similar  disputes  on  the  taking  off  of  spoil  at  Port  de  Paix  and  on  the  viability  of  future 
operations  on  Hispaniola.  The  Spanish  General,  Don  Juan  del  Barranio,  and  Wilmot  had  a 
heated  exchange  over  the  provision  of  naval  help  to  destroy  the  Port  de  Paix  fort  and  over  the 
Spaniards'  agreement  to  continue  south  to  Petit  Goave,  which  Wilmot  held  out  as  a 
prerequisite  condition  for  providing  more  assistance.  The  Spanish  were  not  forthcoming  and, 
although  the  fort  was  ultimately  razed,  Wilmot  considered  the  Spanish  attitude,  combined 
with  Lillingston's  refusal  to  commit  the  English  troops  due  to  their  increasing  sickness,  to 
signal  the  suspension  of  operations.  "'  Interestingly,  Stanhope  makes  no  mention  of  this 
dispute  in  his  official  correspondence  through  to  1696,  despite  Barranio's  intention  to  brief 
66  Madrid.  Alternatively,  the  Spanish  Court  may  have  deliberately  omitted  to  mention  ft., 
Nonetheless,  the  soldiers'  refusal  to  continue  was  certainly  the  most  important  factor  in 
causing  the  projected  attacks  against  Petit  Goave  and  Leogane  to  be  set  aside. 
The  squadron  left  Hispaniola  for  Jamaica  on  17  July,  and  arrived  within  the  week. 
Within  two  months  the  suspension  of  operations  became  a  cancellation  as  Wilmot  sailed  for 
England.  With  the  two  main  actions  against  French  Hispaniola  having  been  already 
undertaken,  Beeston  was  in  a  poor  position  to  generate  further  operations;  and,  as  he  tried  to 
make  sense  of  the  inter-service  squabbling,  he  became  drawn  into  it.  There  were  other 
contributory  factors  such  as  the  sickness  which  was  now  affecting  the  warship  Captains  and 
had  already  considerably  diminished  the  effectiveness  of  Lillingston's  regiment.  Indeed,  an 
abstract  of  its  Establishment  after  the  squadron's  departure,  put  it  at  over  1000  men  under- 
strength.  Moreover,  Jamaica  did  not  have  the  resources  to  make  good  the  expeditionary 
force's  deficiencies  which  were  thrown  into  sharp  focus  by  the  news  that  Ducasse  had  dug-in 
Ruby';  Lillingston,  Reflections  on  Mr  Burchell's  Memoirs,  pp.  83-6,89-95,101-3:  Lillingston  to  Murrey,  22, 
25,26,27  June  1695;  'At  a  Council  of  War'  23  June  1693%  Lillingston  to  Wilmot,  28  June  1695;  'At  a 
Council  of  War'  25  June  1695. 
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from  Charles  Whittell,  24  July  1695;  Wilmot  to  Admiralty,  26  July  1695;  'Murreys'  Journal',  [31  July]  1695; 
Lillingston  to  Normanby,  22  Aug.  1695;  Translation  of  a  letter  from  the  Spanish  Lieutenant-General  and  five 
of  his  officers  to  Colonel  Lillingston,  18  July  1695;  Lillingston  to  Beeston,  10  July  1695;  Beeston  to  Wilmot, 
19  July  1695. 
166  Lillingston,  Reflections  on  MrBurcheit's  Memoirs,  p.  125.  The  relevant  volumes  up  to  1702  (including  the 
Supplementary  Volume)  in  PRO,  SP  94  State  Papers  Foreign,  Spain,  have  been  examined. 119 
at  Leogane  with  some  2000  men.  Nonetheless,  Beeston  implied  that  it  was  the  ongoing 
personal  disputes  which  ensured  that  the  expeditionary  force  could  not  be  galvanised  to 
further  action,  and  in  early  September,  with  the  season  too  far  advanced  for  the  squadron  to 
go  to  Newfoundland  as  was  stipulated  by  the  Instructions,  Wilmot  prepared  to  leave  for 
England.  On  3  September  the  remnants  of  the  squadron  sailed  from  Jamaica.  Three  frigates, 
fewer  than  had  been  ordered,  were  left  behind:  two  as  a  permanent  guard  and  one  to  convoy 
the  merchants  at  a  later  date.  Lillingston's  regiment  was  left  in  the  Caribbean  but  the  Colonel 
and  some  other  officers  took  passage  home.  "' 
For  the  religious  amongst  those  soldiers  left  on  Jamaica,  Wilmot's  subsequent  death 
during  the  return  voyage  was  likely  considered  a  providential  judgement  on  both  the  success 
and  failure  of  the  expedition.  "'  For  the  sailors,  it  robbed  the  navy  of  an  immediate  advocate 
for  its  role  in  the  expedition.  The  excursions  to  Cap  Franqois  and  Port  de  Paix  had  barely 
reaped  any  tactical  advantage,  still  less  fulfilled  any  geostrategic  objective;  but  in  evicting  the 
French  albeit  temporarily  from  northern  Hispaniola,  the  Wilmot-Lillingston  expedition  had 
succoured  Jamaican  defence  and  avenged  the  French  operation  of  June  1694.  These  were 
primarily  the  reasons  for  which  it  was  dispatched  and,  alone  amongst  the  combined 
operations  sent  to  the  Caribbean  during  the  war,  it  had  fulfilled  them.  Due  to  the  ceaseless 
inter-service  conflict,  the  claim  that  this  achievement  was  the  product  of  genuine  combined 
operational  endeavour  as  opposed  to  individual  service  effort  remains  unproven. 
JIM:  Commodore  John  Norris's  and  Colonel  John  Gisbon's  Expedition  to 
Newfoundland,  April-October  1697. 
In  the  imperial  context  of  the  late  seventeenth  century,  Newfoundland  was  regarded  as  a 
territory  whose  possession  did  not  necessarily  require  substantial  military  or  fiscal 
commitment.  "  Lying  off  the  North  American  coast  bounded  by  the  Atlantic  reaches  to  the 
north-east  and  the  south,  with  the  Gulf  of  St  Lawrence  and  the  Straits  of  Belle  Isle  to  the 
167  CSpC,  1693-1696,  nos.  1971,1973,1980.1,1983,2026,2026.1,2123,  pp.  543-5,549,556,573-5,612: 
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Whittell,  24  July  1695;  Wilmot  to  the  Admiralty,  26  July  1695;  'Murreys'  Journal',  [31  July]  1695;  Beeston  to 
Trenchard,  24  Aug.  1695;  Copy  of  a  Minute  of  a  Council  of  War  held  at  St  Jago  de  la  Vega  in  Jamaica,  29 
July  1695;  Abstract  of  the  strength  of  Colonel  Lillingston's  Regiment  of  Foot  at  Jamaica  in  October,  1695; 
PRO,  ADM  51/4322,  Part  vi,  unpaginated,  Ruby,  17-23  July  1695;  Lillingston,  Reflections  on  Mr  Burchell's 
Memoirs,  pp.  137-9. 
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west,  the  early  history  of  England's  involvement  with  this  island  bears  testimony  to  the  above 
point.  Although  discovered  by  the  Englishman  Cabot  in  the  late  fifteenth  century, 
Newfoundland  did  not  immediately  become  a  principal  area  of  official  settlement  for  England 
and  this  dovetailed  with  the  initial  European  interest  which  has  been  characterised  as 
'commercial  and  non-political"",  whereby  fishing  the  huge  cod  banks  remained  largely  a 
private  venture.  Even  when  this  became  untenable  as  the  competition  over  the  fisheries  gave 
rise  to  territorial  disputes,  English  colonisation  on  the  island  remained  small  scale  with  the 
total  resident  population  only  increasing  by  thirteen  per  cent  over  eighteen  years  from  1680.1"1 
Paradoxically,  the  inhabitants  had  been  consistent  in  their  enthusiasm  for  an  official 
settlement  but  had,  in  turn,  been  firmly  opposed  by  the  influential  West  Country  mercantile 
interest  who  feared  that  it  would  lead  to  the  loss  of  their  fishing  monopoly.  Historically,  the 
Government  had  heeded  the  merchants'  views  and,  while  accepting  a  minimum  level  of 
settlement,  no  effort  was  made  to  commit  human  or  material  resource  for  the  island's 
defence.  Heavy  fortifications  and  large  garrisons  were  considered  unnecessary  on  the  basis 
that  the  command  of  the  Atlantic  from  the  Channel,  combined  with  the  annual  summer 
warship  convoy,  and  the  severe  winters  would  provide  sufficient  protection.  "'  In  marked 
contrast,  the  French  had  officially  settled  over  200  miles  of  territory  along  Newfoundland's 
southern  shore  since  the  founding  of  Placentia  in  1665.  Moreover,  Louis  XIV  had  begun 
fortifying  these  settlements  in  the  late  1680s,  thus  making  clear  his  wish  that  France  was  to 
have  a  strong  base  from  which  to  contest  the  overall  territorial  control  of  the  island.  "' 
In  1689,  England's  Declaration  of  War  recognised  Louis's  attitude  by  specifically 
mentioning  French  depredations  upon  Newfoundland.  ""  Furthermore,  it  quickly  became  clear 
that  England's  indifference  to  the  island's  defence  was  not  a  sufficiently  robust  attitude  for 
wartime.  In  May,  the  King  had  accepted  the  Lords  of  Trade's  recommendations  on  the 
169  G.  S.  Graham,  'Britain's  Defence  of  Newfoundland:  A  Survey,  From  the  Discovery  to  the  Present  Day', 
CHR  23  (1944),  260. 
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173  HarveyA  Short  History  offew/bundland,  pp.  62-3;  Hatton  &  Harvey,  Newfoundlang  pp.  38-9;  Graham, 
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conduct  of  the  war  in  the  colonies  which  included  the  harassment  of  French  settlements  on 
Newfoundland  and  the  fortification  of  the  principal  English  settlement  at  St  John's.  "' 
However,  it  was  1692  before  the  Ministry  made  attempts  to  give  their  approach  teeth  through 
Commodore  William's  bombardment  of  Placentia  and  coastal  incendiary  raids,  and  in  the 
following  year  (as  has  been  narrated  above)  directing  Wheler  to  attack  the  island  after  his 
operations  against  Canada.  Nonetheless,  both  fell  short  of  expectations  and  their  failure 
further  emboldened  the  French  who  then  developed  an  aggressive  policy  to  strike  at  the 
English  placements  on  the  island. 
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Fig.  10:  Newloundland. 
In  August  1694,  an  attack  by  two  French  men-of-war  on  Ferryland  was  only  checked 
by  the  ell'orts  ol'William  I  lolman,  commander  of  the  sole  English  warship  on  station,  who,  in 
"'  (SP(',  1689-1692,  no.  94,  p.  32:  Journ  aI  of  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  P  Ian  tat  ions.  26  Apr.  1689: 
573-4:  Order  in  Council  on  the  State  of  the  Plantations,  &c,  2  May  1689. 122 
conjunction  with  the  inhabitants,  erected  some  fortifications  and  gun  emplacements.  116  French 
assaults  commenced  again  in  early  1696  when  Admiral  Nesmond  anchored  his  ships  in  the 
harbour  in  order  to  attack  St  John's.  '"  The  attempt  was  foiled,  but  the  French  redoubled 
their  efforts  in  the  autumn  when  d'Iberville  and  the  French  Governor  of  Placentia,  Brouillan, 
commenced  a  series  of  amphibious  raids  on  the  island.  Between  September  1696  and  April 
1697,  d'Iberville  and  Brouillan  effectively  captured  the  whole  of  Newfoundland  for  France, 
though  the  settlement  at  Bonavista  and  the  Island  of  Carbonear  held  out.  The  ultimate 
ignominy  was  served  by  the  capture  and  destruction  of  St  John's,  thus  making  a  mockery  of 
England's  defence  policy  for  the  island.  "" 
It  required  only  the  first  wide-ranging  raid  by  Brouillan  between  September  and 
October  1696  which  encompassed  Ferryland  and  the  Bay  of  Bulls  before  the  West  Country 
merchants  were  petitioning  the  King  for  retaliatory  action.  Inertia  would  mean  the  collapse  of 
their  fishing  trade  and  the  forfeiture  of  an  excellent  training  ground  for  seamen,  and  the  early 
representations  from  the  Bideford  and  Barnstaple  merchants  were  soon  followed  by  others  at 
the  turn  of  the  year,  particularly  after  the  attack  on  St  John's  in  November  1696  became 
common  knowledge.  The  merchants  requested  an  appropriate  number  of  ships  and  land 
forces  in  order  to  reclaim  the  areas  of  Newfoundland  lost  to  the  French;  strengthened 
convoys,  and  an  increased  number  of  capital  ships  on  station  would  then  support  this  action. 
Ironically,  some  merchants  were  now  even  clamouring  for  the  defensive  fortifications  that 
they  had  hitherto  opposed  because  they  had  considered  it  a  military  adjunct  of  an  official 
government  settlement;  there  was  even  a  willingness  to  countenance  a  permanent  garrison  of 
up  to  three  companies  of  soldiers.  "'  This  mercantile  pressure  was  of  great  importance  in 
176  CSpC,  1693-1696,  no.  2059,  pp.  592-3:  Journal  of  the  Lords  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  18  Sept.  1695; 
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fi  g  British  Army',  p.  95,  dates  it  as  occurring  in  1694  as  do  Hatton  &  Harvey,  New  oundlan  p.  39.  The  latter 
may,  however,  be  a  printing  error  for  they  also  write  that  the  attack  took  place  four  years  after  1692.  Both 
Harvey,  A  Short  History  ofNewfoundland,  p.  63,  and  A.  F.  Williams,  Father  Baudoin's  War.  DIberville's 
Campaigns  in  Acadia  and  Newfound7and  1696,1697,  (Newfoundland,  1987),  p.  28,  date  it  1696.  Ifone 
accepts  that  a  printing  error  has  occurred  in  Hatton's  &  Harvey's  text  then  the  consensus  would  seem  to  fall 
upon  1696. 
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convincing  the  Court  that  an  operation  was  required  and  yet  oddly  it  has  been  overlooked  in 
recent  scholarship.  "'  The  petitioners  were  certainly  pushing  at  an  open  door  likely  unlocked 
by  Sir  Robert  Robinson's  advice  in  1695  which  had  recommended  a  more  aggressive  policy 
against  the  French  on  Newfoundland.  Moreover,  the  deported  inhabitants  of  the  island 
underscored  mercantile  representations  by  also  petitioning  the  Court  for  a  land  and  sea 
expedition  to  reclaim  their  settlements.  "'  Despite  this  momentum,  it  was  not  immediately 
clear  that  the  Court  would  agree  to  an  operation  that  had  Newfoundland  as  its  sole 
destination,  and  the  deliberations  initially  got  caught  up  in  the  ongoing  preparations  for  the 
despatch  of  a  squadron  to  the  West  Indies.  The  strategic  and  tactical  functions  reflected  by 
that  command's  composition  was  initially  to  form  the  yardstick  by  which  a  viable  independent 
expedition  to  Newfoundland  was  to  be  decided. 
A  West  Indian  squadron  had  been  proposed  in  late  1696  in  response  to  intelligence 
that  despite  Chfiteaurenauk's  squadron  being  beaten  back  by  bad  weather,  the  French  still 
intended  to  send  a  considerable  force  to  the  Caribbean.  "'  From  November  through  to  the 
spring  of  1697  intelligence  returns  reported  that  the  French  were  now  fitting  out  a  fleet  at 
Brest  under  Pointis.  This  was  thought  to  be  designed  for  the  Caribbean  with  soldiers  aboard 
to  attack  the  Spanish  King's  possessions  there,  and  attempt  the  capture  of  the  returning 
Spanish  Flota.  To  deal  with  these  threats,  and  the  fear  that  Jamaica  might  be  attacked,  the 
dispatch  of  a  West  Indian  squadron  became  an  imperative.  '"  Concurrently,  an  idea  was 
floated  in  Whitehall  to  draft  an  Additional  Instruction  for  this  squadron,  directing  it  to  repair 
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1697  and  enclosures,  untitled;  untitled;  extract  of  the  Journal  of  the  Council  of  Trade,  n.  d.;  extract  of  Sir 
William  Beeston's  letter,  19  June  1696;  extract  of  another,  4,5  July  1696;  PRO,  ADM  1/4084,  fos  1245, 
1247.  Shrewsbury  to  the  Admiralty,  28  Mar.  1697,  and  enclosure,  untitled;  PRO,  ADM  1/4085,  fos  443,451- 
5.  Vernon  to  Bridgeman,  17  June  1697,  and  enclosure,  'Instructions  to  be  Observd  by  Our  Trusty  and 
Welbeloved  John  Nevill  Esq.  ' 124 
to  Newfoundland  on  its  voyage  home.  The  details  as  to  its  actions  when  off  the  island  were 
to  follow  at  a  later  date.  ""  The  previous  mercantile  and  inhabitants'  insistence  that  both  a 
land  and  sea  force  would  be  required  to  regain  the  settlements  on  Newfoundland  makes  it 
reasonable  to  suggest  that  this  squadron  would  have  had  to  have  had  some  troops  aboard. 
The  intended  West  Indian  squadron  was  to  be  formed  from  two  separate  groups  of  warships. 
One  detachment  of  five  warships  and  two  fireships  commanded  in  the  Mediterranean  by  Vice 
Admiral  John  Neville  had  been  ordered  in  December  1696  to  proceed  into  the  Caribbean. 
Neville's  orders  were  strictly  naval  in  character:  to  locate  both  Pointis  and  the  Spanish  Flota 
with  the  intent  to  destroy  the  former  and  secure  the  latter.  No  extant  evidence  suggests  that 
he  had  any  troops  on  board  other  than  the  likely  draft  of  marine  soldiers  and,  unless  these 
troops  were  to  be  relied  upon,  Neville  thus  required  land  reinforcements  to  undertake  any 
combined  land  and  sea  operations.  "'  Initially  this  seemed  possible  for  the  other  group  of 
ships  forming  the  squadron  had  been  delayed  in  leaving  England  and  could  therefore  have  had 
troops  embarked  aboard.  However,  as  the  sheer  extent  of  this  delay  became  clear,  it  most 
likely  caused  the  idea  to  be  shelved.  Undoubtedly  it  weighed  heavily  with  the  Court  that  the 
Board  of  Trade  and  the  Admiralty  had  traded  allegations  as  to  whom  was  responsible  for 
failing  to  communicate  this  squadron's  design  and  purpose  while  the  French  raids  continued 
unabated.  Despite  an  attempt  to  hasten  the  squadron's  preparations,  William  quickly  rejected 
the  idea  of  an  Additional  Instruction  and,  instead,  chose  to  send  to  Newfoundland  a  self- 
contained  squadron  with  land  forces  aboard.  In  order  to  inject  a  sense  of  urgency  into  the 
preparations,  William  informed  all  the  petitioners  of  his  decision  by  30  January.  "' 
The  King's  determination  made  an  impression  upon  the  various  boards,  departments 
and  officials  who  were  to  put  the  operation  together  as  they  demonstrated  an  early  awareness 
into  the  necessity  of  their  interdependence.  The  Board  of  Trade  acted  as  a  bureaucratic  pivot, 
liaising  effectively  with  the  Admiralty,  Secretary  of  State  Trumbull,  and  the  Ordnance  Board. 
From  the  outset  the  net  for  help  was  cast  wide  in  an  attempt  by  Whitehall  to  spread  the 
134  PRO,  ADM  1/4084,  fos.  893-4,995-6:  Trumbull  to  the  Admiralty,  29  Jan.  1697,  and  enclosure,  the 
Council  of  Trade  to  Trumbull,  28  Jan.  1697. 
lss  PRO,  ADM  1/4085,  fos  443,451-5:  Vernon  to  Bridgeman,  17  June  1697,  and  enclosure,  'Instructions  to 
be  Observ'd  by  Our  Trusty  and  Welbeloved  John  Nevill  Esq.  ';  NUL,  PwA  972,  unf  :  The  naval  journal  of 
Vice-Admiral  John  Neville,  Dec.  1696-July  1697. 
lg6  PRO,  ADM  1/4084,  fos.  853-6,893-4,995-6:  Trumbull  to  the  Admiralty,  16,29  Jan.  1697,  and  enclosure, 
the  Council  of  Trade  to  Trumbull,  28  Jan.  1697;  NUL,  PwA  974,  unf:  Neville  to  Portland,  29  Apr.  1697; 
CSPC,  1696-1697,  no.  648,  p.  337:  Popple  to  the  Mayors  of  Bristol,  Exeter,  Bideford,  Barnstaple,  Plymouth, 
Weymouth,  Dartmouth,  Poole  and  Fowey,  30  Jan.  1697. 125 
administrative  burden.  As  sundry  merchants  were  asked  to  estimate  for  the  sea  and  land 
provisions,  the  North  American  provinces  were  requested  to  send  men  and  equipment, 
though  it  remains  unclear  whether  the  colonies  responded  to  this  appeal.  "'  Throughout,  the 
bureaucratic  oil  was  the  redoubtable  Blathwayt.  His  letters  make  clear  William's  personal 
commitment,  evidenced  by  his  attention  to  the  operation's  administrative  minutiae.  A  notable 
example  was  the  King's  recognition  of  the  vulnerability  of  the  soldiers'  health  when  aboard 
ship.  He  directed  that  the  surgeons  should  care  for  both  seamen  and  soldiers  and,  to  prevent 
this  order  miscarrying  due  to  friction  between  the  Admiralty  and  War  Office  over  funding, 
William  shrewdly  determined  that  on  the  return  of  the  ships  each  surgeon  be  reimbursed  two 
shillings  and  six-pence  per  soldier  from  the  army  contingencies.  Blathwayt's  correspondence 
also  crucially  kept  the  pressure  upon  the  Admiralty  with  repeated  requests  for  the  King  to  be 
provided  with  reports  on  the  forwardness  of  the  preparations.  "' 
The  culmination  of  all  this  bureaucratic  activity  was  a  detailed  memorandum  on 
progress  sent  by  Blathwayt:  on  29  March  to  the  Admiralty  which  demonstrated  that,  overall, 
the  arrangements  were  at  a  relatively  advanced  stage.  "'  Within  three  weeks,  on  17  April,  a 
squadron  of  eleven  ships"O  commanded  by  Commodore  John  Norris"',  with  between  700  and 
137  CSPC 
0  1696-1697,  nos.  647,685,686,852,  pp.  337,351,411:  the  Council  of  Trade  and  Plantations  to 
Trumbull,  29  Jan.,  5  Feb.  1697;  the  Commissioners  of  Transportation  to  the  Council  of  Trade  and  Plantations, 
5  Feb.  1697;  the  Council  of  Trade  and  Plantations  to  Stoughton,  24  Mar.  1697;  CSPD,  1697,  p.  62:  the  King 
to  [the  Governor  of  the  Province  of  Massachusetts  Bay],  18  Mar.  1697. 
182  PRO,  ADM  1/4084,  fos.  1097-1100,1221-4,1229-32:  Blathwayt  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Admiralty,  9  Mar. 
1697;  Blathwayt  to  the  Admiralty,  23  Mar.  1697;  Blathwayt  to  'Sir'  [Burchett?  ],  25  Mar.  1697. 
"19  PRO,  ADM  1/4084,  fos.  1269,1271-4:  Blathwayt  to  the  Admiralty,  29  Mar.  1697,  and  enclosure,  'The 
Dispatch  of  the  Preparations  for  the  Expedition  to  Newfoundland  Consists  as  Followeth'. 
'9*  Tberc  is  some  doubt  as  to  the  exact  composition  of  the  squadron.  Both  PRO,  ADM  8/5,  unf:  'Ships 
Bound  to  Newfoundland',  23  Mar.  1697,  and  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS,  NS,  iii.  327:  'Instructions  for  Capt. 
John  Norris',  11  Apr.  1697,  cite  an  additional  fourth  rate,  the  Portland,  and  the  Etna  fireship  as  part  of  the 
squadron.  CSPC,  1696-1697,  no.  906,  p.  440:  Distribution  of  the  Land  Forces  in  the  Fleet  Bound  to 
Newfoundland,  also  states  that  the  squadron  comprised  thirteen  ships.  The  Admiralty's  disposition  list  for  the 
squadron  after  its  departure,  PRO,  ADM  8/5,  unE:  'A  List  of  His  Majesty's  Ships  and  Vessels  Now  in  Sea 
pay',  4  May  1697,  omits  these  two  vessels;  and  yet,  a  disposition  list  two  months  hence,  PRO,  ADM  8/5, 
unf.:  'The  Present  Disposal  of  all  His  Majesty's  Ships  &  Vessels  in  Sea  Pay',  I  June  1697,  includes  them 
again  and  lists  a  further  two  fourth  rates  -  the  Bonadventure  and  the  Crown.  In  their  Journals  -  PRO,  ADM 
51/592,  Part  vii,  unpaginated,  Monck:  'A  Journal  of  My  Proceedings  with  his  Majesty's  Ships  on  the 
Newfoundland  Expedition'  [hereafter  'Norris's  Journal'],  and  BL,  Stowe  463,  p.  5  (reverse  pagination): 
Journals  of  M.  Richards,  1696-7,1700  -  Norris  and  Richards  record  that  on  27  June,  Captain  Littleton  in  the 
Portland  aff  ived  with  the  Fortune  fireship,  the  Unity  transport  vessel  and  the  Oxenden  and  the  Katherine 
storeships,  while  two  further  storeships,  the  Union  and  the  Benjamin,  had  failed  on  that  occasion  to  get  about 
Cape  Francis.  This  second  fireship  was  different  to  the  one  cited  in  Norris's  Instructions  and  the  disposition 
listofthe23Mar.  Norris's  journal  -PRO,  ADM  51/592,  Part  vii,  unpaginated,  Monck:  'Noff  is's  Journal'- 
notes  the  aff  ival  with  convoys  of  the  Bonadventure  (a  hired  man-of-war  from  Lisbon)  and  the  Crown  over  the 
two  days,  11-12  July.  Another  estimation  of  eight  frigates,  two  fireships,  two  bomb  vessels  and  some 
storeships  was  given  in  Life  of  Captain  Stephen  Martin,  1666-1740,  p.  27.  The  frequent  citation  of  other 126 
900  troops  from  Colonel  John  Gibson's  infantry  battalion"'  and  60  Ordnance  Office 
personnel""  captained  by  Michael  Richards  (youngest  brother  of  the  notable  family  trio  of 
gunners  and  military  engineers)""  aboard,  left  Spithead.  A  preparatory  time  of  less  than  three 
months  meant  that  the  despatch  of  this  expedition  had  been  less  beset  by  delay  than  the  others 
sent  overseas  throughout  the  war. 
. 
Nonetheless,  the  administrative  speed  belied  a  lack  of  smoothness  in  respect  of  three 
issues.  The  least  important  glitch  concerned  Richards's  appointment  as  the  expedition's  Chief 
Engineer  and  Principal  Ordnance  Officer.  His  Journal  related  the  farcical  story  of  how  he 
came  to  this  command.  Despite  initially  requesting  the  appointment,  a  bout  of  illness  at  the 
end  of  February  when  the  list  of  appointed  ordnance  personnel  was  published,  and  then  the 
uncertainty  as  to  whether  Colonel  Romer  was  to  attend  as  the  engineer  with  Gibson 
commanding  the  train,  caused  much  muddle.  Ultimately,  without  an  official  letter  of 
appointment  or  Instructions  from  the  Ordnance  Board,  Richards  embarked  onboard  the 
flagship  Monck  at  Portsmouth  on  17  April  with  only  the  wishes  of  the  Master-General  of  the 
Ordnance  and  a  'gentleman's  understanding'  with  Gibson  to  explain  his  presence.  "' 
A  second  administrative  ruffle  was  the  debate  as  to  whether  the  squadron  was  to 
proceed  as  one  or as  two  detachments  with  different  sailing  times.  Initially  the  officials  - 
particularly  the  victuallers  -  favoured  the  latter  option  for  it  would  allow  the  minimum  of 
provisions  to  be  sent  with  the  fwst  sailing,  thus  providing  more  time  to  procure  all  the 
larger  estimates  by  historians  is  possibly  a  product  of  a  lack  of  awareness  about  the  debate  as  to  whether  the 
squadron  would  depart  as  one  unit  or  as  two  and  the  subsequent  circumstances  of  its  departure. 
19'  See  Chapter  1,  Section  ll.  ii,  p.  69  n.  37. 
192  Tbc  primary  and  secondary  sources  disagree  as  to  the  exact  number  of  soldiers  embarked.  NorrisIsjoumal 
-  PRO,  ADM  51/592,  Part  vii,  unpaginated,  Monck:  'Norris's  Journal',  14  Apr.  1697  -  records  his  receipt  of  a 
letter  from  Gibson  stating  that  the  regiment  to  be  embarked  comprised  896  men.  Blathwayt's  communication 
with  the  Admiralty  -  PRO,  ADM  1/4084,  fos.  1113-16:  Blathwayt  to  Burchett,  9  Mar.  1697  -  states  that  930 
troops  were  to  go  to  Newfoundland,  though  he  did  also  indicate  in  that  letter  that  bedding  for  900  would  be 
sufficient,  thus  anticipating  the  actual  number  of  troops  to  be  nearer  this  lower  figure  for  bedding.  CPSC, 
1696-1697,  p.  440:  Distribution  of  the  land  Forces  in  the  Fleet  Bound  for  Newfoundland,  put  the  total  number 
of  troops  lower  at  760.  As  for  the  secondary  sources,  Aldridge,  'Sir  John  Norris  1660?  -l  749',  p.  132  puts  the 
number  at  750;  Childs,  'Secondary  Operations  of  the  British  Army'  claims  there  were  50  less;  and  R. 
Chartrand,  'Early  British  Regulars  in  Canada,  1697-1717',  JSAHR  lxxvi  (1998),  1,  declares  an  additional  ten. 
I  have  not  found  an  exact  embarkation  return  for  this  squadron. 
193  PRO,  ADM  1/4084,  f  1269:  Blathwayt  to  the  Admiralty,  29  Mar.  1697. 
194  For  biographical  and  military  service  details  on  Jacob,  John  and  Michael  Richards  see  H.  T.  Dickinson, 
67be  Richards  Brothers:  Exponents  of  the  Military  Arts  of  Vauban',  JSAHR  x1vi  (1968),  76-86,  and  F.  J. 
Herbert,  'The  Richards  Brothers',  IS  xii  (1975-1976),  200-11.  An  element  of  caution  is  required  when 
reading  both  for  they  contain  certain  chronological  inaccuracies  with  respect  to  Michael  Richards's  service  in 
Newfoundland. 
195  BL,  Stowe  463,  pp.  1-3  (first  pagination):  Journals  of  M.  Richards,  Sept.  1696-17  Apr.  1697. 127 
necessary  foodstuffs.  However,  this  ran  contrary  to  the  King's  wishes  that  the  squadron  sail 
as  a  whole.  At  the  end  of  March,  the  Board  of  Trade  intervened  on  the  victualler's  behalf  by 
pointing  out  that  they  had  been  working  under  the  assumption  that  the  squadron  would  be 
divided  and  that  further  orders  would  be  required  if  the  ships  were  to  be  provisioned  to  sail  as 
a  whole.  The  Board's  warning  had  no  effect.  Within  the  following  fortnight,  the  Transport 
Commissioners  had  informed  Blathwayt  that  the  transports,  having  suffered  delays  in 
victualling,  could  only  sail  immediately  without  the  whole  quantities.  "'  The  administrative 
process  had  seemed  to  frustrate  monarchical  design;  but  ultimately  it  was  not  to  prevail.  All 
the  ships  save  one  left  on  17  April,  the  remaining  vessel,  the  Portland,  followed  later  with  five 
storeships,  thus  acting  more  as  a  convoy  than  forming  a  second  detachment. 
The  third  difficulty  faced  by  the  officials  concerned  the  drafting  of  Norris's 
Instructions.  Encompassing  not  only  the  strategic  purpose  of  the  operation  but  also  the 
balance  of  command  between  the  land  and  sea  officers,  it  was  by  far  the  most  important  issue 
addressed.  Blathwayt  sent  a  draft  of  the  Instructions  plus  some  'Heads'  for  discussion  to  the 
Admiralty  on  15  March.  In  terms  of  implementing  the  strategic  intent  to  recover 
Newfoundland,  the  amphibious  quality  of  the  expedition  suggested  by  the  King's  decision  of 
30  January  was  diluted.  Instead  of  a  single  combined  operation  directed  to  take  and  hold  one 
sector  of  Newfoundland  from  whence  full  control  might  be  achieved  through  envelopment, 
vaguely  targeted  assaults  against  various  parts  of  the  island  were  now  promoted.  The 
potentially  advantageous  tactical  position  conferred  upon  a  single  landing  by  the  maritime 
command  securing  the  flanks  and  the  line  of  retreat  had  been  sacrificed  in  favour  of  sporadic 
landings  determined  upon  by  the  land  commander  and  approved  by  a  Council  of  War.  "' 
Admittedly,  the  Instructions  did  specifically  direct  Norris  to  Placentia  and  the  French 
strongholds  along  the  southern  coast  but  the  suggested  course  of  action  was  bound  by  the  a 
number  of  caveats  including  the  requirement  that  it  would  not  prejudice  service  elsewhere. 
The  combined  service  assaults  were  now  one  of  a  plethora  of  tasks  for  the  squadron  such  that 
when  the  final  set  of  Instructions  was  issued  on  II  April,  Noff  is's  responsibilities  ranged  from 
1"  PRO,  ADM  1/4084,  fos.  1269,1271-4,1413-16:  Blathwayt  to  the  Admiralty,  29  Mar.,  13  Apr.  1697,  and 
enclosure,  'The  Dispatch  of  the  Preparations  for  the  Expedition  to  Newfoundland  Consists  as  Followeth; 
PRO,  ADM  1/4084,  f  1305:  Trumbull  to  the  Admiralty,  31  Mar.  1697,  and  enclosure,  f.  1307:  Council  of 
Trade  to  Trumbull,  29  Mar.  1697. 
1"  PRO,  ADM  1/4084,  fos  1168,1269,1275-82,  unf.  Blathwayt  to  Secretaries  of  the  Admiralty,  15,29  Mar. 
1697,  and  enclosures,  'Instructions  for  Noff  is';  'Heads  of  Instructions  for  Captain  John  Norris;  'Heads  of 
Instructions  for  Captain  John  Norris'. 128 
the  immediate  necessity  of  securing  the  coastal  waters  to  the  despatch  of  convoys  to  various 
Mediterranean  ports.  While  some  of  the  tasks  were  a  standard  feature  for  any  squadron 
stationed  at  Newfoundland,  the  majority  were  thoroughgoing  naval  activities  that  evidently 
required  no  input  from  the  army.  "' 
The  Instruction's  prescriptions  on  command  did  though  fully  recognise  that  this  was 
to  be  combined  army  and  naval  venture.  The  standard  exhortation  that  the  success  of  the 
expedition  depended  upon  constant  good  relations  between  the  Service  commanders  was 
shored  up  by  an  attempt  to  provide  both  greater  clarity  on  their  specific  responsibilities  and 
enhanced  authority  in  these  areas.  The  commander  of  the  land  forces  was  detailed  as 
responsible  for  proposing  when,  and  where,  his  battalion  was  to  land  for  an  assault;  while  he 
also  had  full  command  of  any  detachment  of  seamen  put  ashore  as  assistance.  However,  in 
deference  to  the  expertise  of  the  senior  naval  officer,  that  detachment  could  only  be 
authorised  if  the  Commodore  considered  it  consistent  with  the  sea-going  demands  of  the 
squadron.  And,  as  has  already  been  noted,  Norris  was  in  sole  command  of  naval  activities 
such  as  the  provision  of  convoys  to  the  Mediterranean.  ""'  Interestingly,  in  this  form,  these 
provisions  were  not  in  the  original  draught  though  the  enhanced  discretion  for  the  land 
commander  had  formed  one  of  the  separate  'Heads  of  Instructions'.  "'  In  so  far  as  the  above 
emphasised  that  this  was  a  combined  venture  in  a  negative  manner  by  delineating 
responsibilities  peculiar  to  each  Service,  their  conjunction  was  positively  reinforced  by  a 
combined  Council  of  War  being  the  sovereign  authority  of  command.  In  the  usual  manner, 
the  presidency  of  the  Council  would  depend  on  whether  it  convened  ashore  or  afloat,  though 
notably  when  ashore,  Gibson  was  not  bound  to  invite  the  naval  officers  unless  he  specifically 
wanted  their  advice.  "'  This  latter  provision  might  be  thought  to  provide  a  functional 
advantage  for  Gibson  but  such  an  interpretation  overlooks  the  potentially  superior  structural 
advantage  afforded  to  Norris  by  the  presidency  of  the  combined  Council  being  determined  by 
the  location  of  its  assembly.  This  made  it  more  likely  that  Gibson  would  have  to  seek 
sanction  for  his  proposals  on  the  landings  under  a  naval  Presidency.  These  circumstances 
might  have  been  thought  to  credit  Norris  with  supreme  command.  However,  as  the  events  of 
HMC,  House  ofLords  MSSNS,  iii.  327-30:  Instructions  for  Capt.  John  Norris,  II  Apr.  1697. 
JIMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  iii.  327-30:  instructions  for  Capt.  John  Norris,  II  Apr.  1697. 
200  PRO,  ADM  1/4084,  f  1168,  unf.:  Blathwayt  to  the  Admiralty,  15  Mar.  1697,  and  enclosures,  'Instructions 
for  Norr  is';  'Heads  of  instructions  for  Captain  John  Norr  is'. 
20'  1  IMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  iii.  327-30:  Instructions  for  Capt.  John  Norris,  II  Apr.  1697. 129 
the  expedition  were  to  show  the  Instructions  conferred  neither  a  structural  nor  a  functional 
advantage  to  either  service  but  instead  confirmed  their  essential  association  in  command. 
It  was  29  March  before  the  squadron  cleared  Lands  End,  having  spent  twelve  days 
since  leaving  Spithead  working  down  the  Channel  collecting  such  merchantmen  as  required 
convoy  to  Newfoundland.  However,  once  out  in  the  Atlantic  good  progress  was  made  with 
only  the  last  part  of  the  sailing  bedevilled  by  a  fog  of  such  thickness  that  the  ships  had  to  use 
all  their  guns,  bells  and  drums  to  ward  against  collision.  "  By  7  June,  Newfoundland  was  in 
sight  and  Norris  called  a  combined  Council  of  land  and  sea  officers  to  determine  proceedings. 
Colonel  Gibson  claimed  that  he  argued  for  a  landing  of  150  men  to  attack  Kitty  Vitty,  a  place 
near  St  John's,  while  the  rest  of  the  troops  would  be  transported  in  light  vessels  for  an  assault 
upon  the  harbour.  The  Council  ignored  this  by  resolving  to  gain  intelligence  on  the  current 
state  of  affairs  at  St  John's  and,  in  particular,  where  it  would  be  possible  to  effect  a  landing  in 
the  face  of  French  opposition.  Thus,  Captains  Cleasby  (naval)  and  Petit  (ordnance)  were  sent 
out  in  two  ship's  boats  only  to  return  quickly  with  the  news  that  contrary  to  expectations,  the 
French  had  quitted  St  John's  some  time  ago.  There  remained  a  few  English  inhabitants  along 
with  some  merchantmen  who,  having  been  separated  from  the  convoy  in  the  recent  fog,  had 
groped  their  way  through  to  St  John's  harbour.  By  late  afternoon,  Norris's  squadron  had 
joined  them.  "' 
The  French  departure  from  St  John's  was  a  surprise  which  rendered  void  the  expected 
fight  for  reoccupation  and  ameliorated  the  need  to  immediately  place  it  in  a  defensive  posture; 
but  also  there  was  now  an  opportunity  to  undertake  the  combined  assaults  against  French 
settlements  elsewhere.  However,  within  two  days  of  their  arrival,  the  English  decided  to  land 
all  the  troops  at  St  John's  with  the  necessary  provisions  left  in  the  Suffolk  hag-boat  so  that 
they  could  begin  surveying  the  ground  for  the  erection  of  the  batteries  and  buildings.  This 
would  also  allow  Noff  is  to  take  the  squadron  to  sea  for  twelve  days,  though  the  two  bomb 
vessels  were  left  behind  as  harbour  defence.  These  proceedings  were  not  entirely  without 
sense  for,  if  a  garrison  was  to  be  established,  then  it  would  require  accommodation  and  St 
John's  was  also  poorly  fortified.  Moreover,  with  the  provisions  stowed  on  board  the  men-of 
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war  having  been  kept  to  a  minimum,  Norris  was  keen  to  secure  the  supply  ships  coming  from 
England  and  a  convoy  expected  from  the  Mediterranean.  ""'  This  early  decision  to  divide  the 
immediate  activities  of  the  army  and  navy  was  to  prove  crucial  for  the  future  viability  of  the 
combined  assaults.  In  fact,  they  never  came  to  be  discussed  as  a  series  of  events  on  the  land 
and  at  sea  entrenched  this  initial  disposition  of  force  as  the  only  one  capable  of  providing  both 
for  its  own  security  and  that  of  St  John's. 
The  first  stage  in  this  process  occurred  when  Norris  cut  short  his  cruise  after  only 
three  days  as  a  result  of  inteRigence  he  gained  from  the  crew  of  the  captured  French 
merchantman.  The  captains  agreed  at  Council  that  the  prisoners'  evidence  strongly  suggested 
that  a  French  squadron  of  three  70  to  80-gun  men-of-war  and  several  50s  were  headed  for 
Placentia;  while  letters  intercepted  aboard  from  Rochelle  referred  to  a  squadron  of  eleven 
men-of-war  bound  for  Newfoundland  that  were  to  link  up  with  others  from  Brest.  This 
information  should  not  have  been  surprising  for  it  was  entirely  consistent  with  the  reports  sent 
from  Europe  prior  to  the  expeditionary  force's  departure  on  17  April.  "'  Notwithstanding,  the 
Council  resolved  that  the  fleet  should  return  immediately  to  defend  St  John's.  "'  On  22  June, 
a  combined  Council  agreed  with  the  Captains'  analysis,  believing  that  St  John's  could  only  be 
protected  by  the  fleet  until  the  necessary  fortification  materials  arrived  in  the  supply  ships 
from  England.  Meanwhile,  to  strengthen  the  fleet's  position  in  the  harbour,  improvisation 
with  some  spare  topmasts  and  fascines  caused  a  boom  to  be  placed  across  the  harbour 
mouth.  "' 
The  French  squadron  had  not  appeared  by  27  June  when  Captain  Littleton  arrived 
with  the  storeships,  thus  allowing  Norris  to  set  out  cruising  again.  "'  Ominously,  the  arrival 
of  the  foodstuffs  did  not  seem  to  alleviate  the  general  shortage.  Gibson  emphasised  the  plight 
of  the  soldiers,  blaming  Norris  for  refusing  to  send  to  New  England  for  a  further  supply  and 
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prohibiting  the  land  forces  from  taking  the  merchantmens'  goods  until  2  August.  The 
Colonel  also  drew  attention  to  the  prodigious  consumption  by  the  Masters  of  the  storeships  in 
serving  out  a  full  allowance  to  their  crews.  "  There  was,  doubtless,  some  truth  in  these 
points;  but  combined  they  provided  a  lop-sided  picture  of  the  range  of  the  shortage,  and  gave 
credence  to  the  rather  cursory  argument  that  the  shortage  was  a  product  of  divided 
command.  "'  The  accounts  provided  by  Norris  and  Richards  make  clear  that  the  deprivation 
was  common  to  soldier  and  sailor,  with  both  on  half-allowance  of  bread  and  short-allowance 
of  all  other  provisions  save  for  oatmeal  and  flour;  and  that  the  three  principal  officers  worked 
together  to  procure  all  the  available  bread  whether  it  be  with  the  island's  inhabitants  or  hidden 
in  the  storeships.  "'  Rather  than  conflict  between  the  services  causing  the  scarcity,  it  seems 
probable  that  errors  had  occurred  in  the  victualling  as  it  was  completed  against  an  uncertain 
backdrop  as  to  whether  the  squadron  was  to  proceed  as  one  or  two  groups  of  ships. 
This  prospective  shortage  of  provisions  did  not  prevent  the  Council  from  allocating  21 
sea  days  for  the  squadron's  second  cruise  which  was  to  conclude  with  an  assessment  of  the 
former  English  ports  to  the  south  of  St  John's.  But  again,  Norris  steered  the  squadron  back 
to  St  John's  in  little  over  a  third  of  that  time  as  a  result  of  confirmation  from  two  captured 
prizes  that  the  arrival  of  a  French  squadron  was  indeed  imminent.  The  Masters  of  both  the 
Union  and  the  Bellicuer,  claimed  to  have  sailed  from  Rochelle  on  5  May  under  the  convoy  of 
Nesmond's  squadron  of  eleven  men-of-war  which  had  set  course  for  Newfoundland.  They 
believed  that  Placentia  was  the  place  of  rendezvous  in  the  event  of  separation  and  from  there 
it  was  thought  that  Nesmond  would  target  Boston.  The  English  naval  captains  were  too 
fearful  of  the  French  squadron's  reputed  strength  to  risk  Nesmond  being  solely  interested  in 
the  New  England  town  by  remaining  at  sea  and  thus  leave  St  John's  without  defence.  "' 
Naval  perception  of  French  strength  in  the  region  was  further  enhanced  by  the 
assessments  of  over  a  hundred  English  prisoners  who  were  returned  from  Placentia  in  early 
July.  Norris  was  particularly  alarmed  by  the  testimony  of  one  Richard  Wakeling,  Master  of 
the  Speedwell  ketch.  He  provided  a  dispiriting  account  of  the  extent  of  the  French 
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fortification  and  ordnance  at  Placentia,  including  their  36  gun  Fort  Placens  with  a  further  six 
guns,  and  two  mortars  positioned  on  the  hill-top  and  banks  overlooking  the  settlement.  in 
terms  of  human  resources,  Wakeling  estimated  that  there  were  near  2000  soldiers,  sailors  and 
inhabitants.  Finally,  the  Master  reported  observing  a  considerable  amount  of  recent  French 
naval  activity  at  Placentia  which  included  around  30  merchantmen  in  the  harbour  and  four 
French  men-of-war  cruising  between  Newfoundland  and  Hudson  Bay.  "'  The  cumulative 
effect  of  this  intelligence  about  current  and  potential  French  regional  strength,  worked  against 
the  launching  of  any  combined  assaults.  The  initial  decision  taken  on  arrival  regarding  the 
disposition  of  the  force  which  had  indirectly  prioritised  the  defence  of  St  John's  and  its 
environs  was  increasingly  confirmed  by  events  as  the  most  prudent  option. 
This  trend  was  reinforced  by  Colonel  Gibson,  who,  although  possessing  the  authority 
for  proposing  the  assaults,  seemed  not  in  the  least  interested  in  their  potentiality.  Richards 
provided  a  vivid  account  of  the  Colonel  immersing  himself  in  the  building  work,  much  to  the 
Chief  Engineer's  chagrin  for  he  considered  Gibson  to  be  transgressing  upon  his  area  of 
responsibility.  The  fortification  of  St  John's  was  actually  the  only  occasion  throughout  the 
whole  expedition  when  Gibson  suggested  that  the  sea  and  land  forces  should  work  together. 
On  14  July,  Norris  and  his  captains  considered  Gibson's  request  for  400  seamen  to  fetch  the 
palisades  and  they  agreed  to  a  daily  provision  of  100  men  contingent  upon  restrictions  on 
Gibson's  command  over  them.  Although  the  Colonel's  ultimate  shore  authority  was 
rccognised,  the  captains  wanted  to  ensure  that  naval  officers  would  be  the  sailors'  immediate 
commanders  on  shore,  and  further  that  they  be  given  duties  near  the  harbour  mouth.  "" 
Gibson  rejected  the  offer  outright,  and  approached  Richards  to  complain  of  the  difficulties 
between  the  land  and  sea  forces.  Interestingly,  acquitting  Norris  of  responsibility  for  the  state 
of  relations,  Gibson  blamed  'turbulent  spirits'  amongst  the  Captains  and  asked  if  Richards 
could  mediate.  "'  Although  clearly  not  sympathetic  to  Gibson,  Richards  waited  upon  Norris 
who  had  in  the  interim  received  a  conciliatory  letter  from  the  Colonel.  An  agreement  was 
reached  for  the  immediate  provision  of  100  sailors  to  palisade  and  for  a  further  60  to  be 
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employed  in  breaking  up  old  ships  and  harbour  rock.  ""  The  tension  between  the  land  and  sea 
forces  over  the  employment  of  seamen  ashore  had  been  resolved  but  only  temporarily. 
Meanwhile,  combined  operational  action  seemed  increasingly  unlikely  as  there  was  no 
change  in  the  intelligence  assessments  regarding  French  strength.  In  the  evening  of  the  23 
July,  Pointis,  having  outrun  Neville  north  of  Cuba,  stood  some  five  French  warship  into 
Conception  Bay.  A  Council  of  War  held  in  the  afternoon  of  24  July  confirmed  a  decision 
taken  by  the  same  Council  in  the  morning  for  the  expeditionary  force  to  remain  in  St  John's 
harbour  for  the  common  security  of  the  island's  settlements,  the  squadron,  and  the  troops.  It 
also  decided  to  embark  the  soldiers,  and  call  for  all  neighbouring  inhabitants  to  man  the 
incomplete  gun  batteries  along  with  the  naval  ordnance  that  had  been  set  ashore.  "'  This  was 
based  upon  the  flawed  premise  that  the  five  ships  spotted  were  part  of  a  much  larger  fleet 
under  Nesmond  which  intelligence  returns  before  leaving  England,  and  naval  reconnaissance 
since,  had  indicated  was  headed  for  Newfoundland.  "'  In  fact,  Nesmond  did  not  arrive  for 
another  month  and,  as  a  result  of  the  Council's  decision,  Pointis's  squadron  with  its  valuable 
cargo  was  ultimately  able  to  make  a  second  escape.  ""  In  the  Chair  at  the  afternoon  Council 
on  24  July,  Norris  argued  that  the  fleet  should  leave  the  harbour  and  attempt  to  engage  the 
French  vessels  at  Conception  Bay.  "'  However  the  mutual  dependence  of  the  combined  army- 
navy  action  -  as  framed  by  the  Instructions  -  was  demonstrated  by  Norris's  inability  to 
persuade  a  third  of  the  navy  officers  who  joined  the  soldiers  to  vote  against  egress.  These 
captains  even  rejected  the  Commodore's  persuasive  argument  that  if  the  French  warships  in 
Conception  Bay  were  in  communication  with  any  others  within  five  leagues,  then  they  would 
have  already  been  spotted  from  Cape  Francis  or  Baccalieu.  In  other  words,  as  this  was  not 
the  case,  the  expected  larger  French  fleet  under  Nesmond  was  likely  to  be  too  far  away  to  be 
of  immediate  assistance  to  those  at  anchor  in  Conception  Bay  and,  thus,  the  opportunity  to 
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engage  them  should  be  grasped.  "  Captain  Martin  of  the  Blast  bomb  vessel  subsequently 
claimed  that  all  the  sea  officers  had  wished  to  engage  Pointis;  but  laying  aside  his  incorrect 
arithmetic,  Martin  missed  the  material  point.  "  This  was  that  despite  his  presidency  of  the 
Council,  Norris  could  not  overcome  the  combined  dynamic  of  sailors  and  soldiers  who  had 
decided  that  they  did  not  want  the  fleet  to  leave  the  harbour. 
Even  as  it  became  clear  over  the  course  of  the  following  days  that  it  was  only 
Pointis's  squadron  in  the  bay,  the  Council  held  firm  to  its  view  when  it  re-convened  to 
consider  the  matter  on  25  and  27  July.  "'  On  the  latter  occasion  Norris  had  had  hopes  that  the 
pre-existing  resolution  would  be  amended  because  he  claimed  that  prior  to  the  Council 
Gibson  had  indicated  a  wholesale  change  in  his  opinion.  That  no  alteration  occurred,  Norris 
credited  to  Gibson's  behaviour  in  Council.  The  Commodore  recorded  that,  although  Gibson 
voted  for  the  fleet's  egress,  he  wished  it  minuted  that  he  considered  this  action  contrary  to  the 
benefit  of  the  whole  service.  "'  Neither  Gibson  nor  Richards  referred  to  the  former's  change 
of  vote.  Gibson  stressed  his  constant  opposition  to  the  departure  of  the  fleet  on  the  basis  of 
what  be  considered  was  the  continuing  uncertainty  as  to  whether  Nesmond  remained 
unsighted  off  the  coast.  Certainly,  it  does  seem  odd  that  Gibson  would  show  his  hand  for  a 
proposal  which  he  expressively  stated  was  contrary  to  the  King's  service.  "  Yet,  Gibson 
undermined  the  veracity  of  his  own  record  by  claiming  to  remember  that  only  three  sea 
captains  voted  with  the  Commodore  for  the  fleet's  departure  on  24  July  when  the  extant 
minutes  of  the  Council  showed  seven  supporting  Norris.  ""  However,  regardless  as  to  which 
record  was  correct,  Gibson  was  lending  his  qualified  support  to  what  was  primarily  a  naval 
task  -  securing  the  coastal  waters.  The  question  of  a  combined  action  upon  Newfoundland 
had  still  to  be  raised  and  Gibson  continued  to  show  no  inclination  to  do  so  when,  at  the  end 
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of  the  month,  he  requested  that  the  Council  agree  to  the  troops  being  landed  at  St  John's 
again  to  continue  their  works  ashore.  " 
Norris's  own  view  on  the  egress  of  the  fleet  in  such  circumstances  altered  nearly  one 
month  hence  when,  on  18  August,  Nesmond  with  a  squadron  of  fifteen  warships  did  in  fact 
appear  off  St  John's  harbour.  This  time  Norris  gave  no  thought  to  seeking  an  engagement 
and,  instead,  drew  his  squadron  up  line-astern  in  a  half-moon  with  the  broadside  of  each 
covering  the  boom  that  lay  across  the  harbour  mouth.  He  also  sent  an  express  north  to 
inform  the  inhabited  coastal  areas  of  the  enemy's  appearance.  Meanwhile,  with  no  tine  to 
embark,  Gibson  disposed  his  troops  to  man  the  still  partially  completed  South  and  North 
batteries,  while  Richards  ensured  that  each  emplacement  and  the  soldiers  had  sufficient 
ammunition.  "'  Norr  is  and  Gibson  recorded  that  Nesmond  spent  a  day  plying  up  and  down 
outside  the  harbour,  though  they  disagreed  on  how  many  of  the  squadron  subsequently  stood 
into  the  harbour  mouth.  Gibson  believed  that  the  French  commander  despatched  only  a  50 
and  a  bomb  vessel  which  were  chased  away  with  a  bomb  thrown  from  either  the  Comet  or 
Blast 
. 
22'  Norris  considered  that  the  whole  squadron  stood  in  about  noon,  though  a  cross 
wind  forced  the  vessels  to  head  off  and  be  brought  to.  Furthermore,  he  cited  the  weather  as 
proving  the  undoing  of  the  French  when  it  thickened  throughout  the  afternoon  and  into  the 
following  day  with  a  south-easterly  gale  veering  to  the  east  and  north-east,  thus,  forcing  the 
squadron  to  stand  out  to  sea.  230  Gibson  argued,  however,  that  it  was  the  strong  defensive 
posture  provided  by  the  conjunction  of  the  land  and  sea  forces  in  the  harbour  area  which  had 
forestalled  the  French  and  he  was  later  supported  by  the  Lords  Justices  who  minuted  their 
intent  to  discount  the  news  that  Nesmond  had  forced  the  harbour  due  to  the  conjunction  of 
numerous  soldiers  and  vessels  within  its  haven.  Of  course,  their  Lordships  had  no 
meteorological  information.  231 
The  English  suffered  a  further  fright  on  23  August  when  twelve  sail  were  spotted 
some  seven  leagues  out.  Again,  the  fleet  remained  in  the  harbour  and  assumed  a  similar 
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defensive  posture.  Though,  on  this  occasion,  Norris  noted  that  his  disposition  attracted  the 
criticism  of  Gibson  who  believed  that  the  squadron's  fire  might  prejudice  his  soldiers  at  the 
batteries.  Not  surprisingly,  Norris  considered  his  squadron  well  ordered  to  defend  the 
harbour  with  the  ships'  guns  clear  of  the  batteries  as  a  result  of  the  broadsides  being  brought 
up  with  stream  cables  at  the  vessels'  stems  along  with  other  springs  ahead  and  astern.  The 
Commodore,  thus,  refused  to  alter  the  line  and  dismissed  Gibson's  intervention  as  typically 
impolite  behaviour.  This  scare  lasted  for  24  hours  after  which  the  ships  could  no  longer  be 
sighted;  and  then  both  commanders  returned  to  the  building  works  with  a  detachment  of 
sailors  put  ashore  again  to  help  the  completion  of  the  new  fort's  covered  way.  "' 
The  first  three  months  at  Newfoundland  show  Norris  and  Gibson  to  be  merely 
reacting  to  events  driven  by  the  intelligence  provision  which  emphasised  French  strength. 
Certainly,  neither  had  mentioned  the  possibility  of  undertaking  the  combined  assaults  against 
Placentia  and  the  surrounding  areas.  Indeed,  their  initial  decision  not  to  work  as  a  combined 
unit  but  concentrate  on  individual  service  responsibilities  -  fortification  and  naval  cruises  -  had 
become  entrenched.  This  trend  continued  through  the  first  few  weeks  of  September  as 
relations  between  all  officers  became  increasingly  fractious.  Norr  is  and  Gibson  revisited  their 
quarrel  over  the  command  of  the  seamen  ashore;  Richards  and  Gibson  involved  themselves  in 
demarcation  disputes;  and  a  Council  which  convened  to  decide  where  the  French  prisoners 
should  be  returned  occasioned  a  grubby  dispute  between  Colonel  Gibson  and  Lieutenant- 
Colonel  Dove  during  which  Gibson  effectively  challenged  the  younger  man  to  a  duel.  ", 
Meanwhile,  as  the  winter  season  approached,  there  was  a  constant  awareness  that  the 
provisions  were  further  dwindling;  and  Norris,  not  knowing  that  a  peace  treaty  had  been 
signed  four  days  previously,  called  a  Council  on  17  September  to  settle  affairs  for  sailing 
home. 
The  squadron  did  not  actually  leave  Newfoundland  until  8  October.  "'  The 
intervening  weeks  had  been  taken  up  with  Gibson  settling  the  extent  of  garrison  that  was  to 
be  left  and  completing  as  much  of  the  fortification  work  as  possible.  The  importance  of 
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ensuring  the  defence  of  the  areas  of  English  settlement  was  confirmed  by  Gibson's  initial 
desire  to  remain  himself  in  command  of  the  whole  regiment  as  garrison.  Even  when  a  lack  of 
provisions  combined  with  the  Council's  refusal  to  leave  the  Suffolk  hag-boat  as  lodging  for 
the  regiment  in  the  absence  of  a  completed  barracks  reputedly  forced  Gibson  to  alter  his 
plans,  over  a  quarter  of  the  troops  brought  out  were  still  to  be  left  under  the  command  of  the 
Regimental  Major,  Thomas  Handysde.  With  ten  subordinate  officers  including  three 
company  Captains,  and  an  artillery  train  of  36  personal  commanded  by  Captain  Petit,  it  was 
not  an  insignificant  force  for  the  defence  of  a  relatively  small  sector  of  the  island.  "'  Although 
the  provision  of  a  garrison  had  been  ordered,  the  fact  that  this  inherently  defensive  task  was 
to  be  undertaken  solely  by  the  army,  thus  representing  another  enterprise  successfully 
completed  by  an  individual  service,  stood  as  final  testimony  to  the  lack  of  combined 
operational  endeavour  throughout  the  course  of  the  expedition.  Indeed,  it  would  be  easy  to 
characterise  the  operation  as  one  whereby  the  navy  simply  acted  as  a  taxi  to  an  army  garrison 
and  providing  return  travel  for  the  remainder  of  the  troops. 
The  ink  on  the  peace  treaty  concluded  at  Rijswijk  had  been  dry  for  nearly  two  months 
when  the  returning  squadron  came  to  anchor  in  the  Downs  on  3  November.  "  Under  the 
terms  of  the  Treaty,  the  colonial  status  of  Newfoundland  was  to  revert  to  the  pre-war 
circumstances:  essentially  a  shared  island  with  distinctive  areas  of  French  and  English 
settlement.  "'  Thus,  even  if  Norris  and  Gibson  had  attempted  any  combined  action  against  the 
French  and  expelled  them  from  Newfoundland  the  peace  would  have  overturned  such 
success.  However,  this  prospect  did  not  have  to  be  contemplated  because  the  English 
practice  of  warfare  during  this  expedition  had  been  wholly  moulded  by  events.  It  was  not  on 
this  occasion,  as  some  have  concluded  I",  that  the  army  and  navy  were  despatched  without 
any  operational  or administrative  principles  with  respect  to  the  war  in  the  colonies;  rather  it 
was  that  both  failed  to  adhere  to  those  provided  when  in-theatre.  The  early  decision  that  the 
army  and  the  navy  were  essentially  to  remain  at  St  John's  was  allowed  to  be  entrenched  by 
intelligence  reports  of  a  considerable  French  presence  on  the  island  and  the  appearance  at 
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different  times  off  the  eastern  Newfoundland  coast  of  two  French  squadrons.  Fortification 
and  the  immediate  defence  of  St  John's,  including  its  environs,  then  quickly  became  the 
objective  of  the  whole  operation. 
Ultimately  these  proceedings  had  a  reductive  effect  upon  subsequent  Government 
policy  towards  Newfoundland.  Despite  the  subsequent  furore  over  Captain  Charles 
Desborow's  petition  against  the  verdict  of  a  court  martial  that  'broke'  him  whilst  serving  with 
Norris's  squadron  at  Newfoundland,  which  occasioned  the  politically  motivated  suspension  of 
Norris  for  allegedly  having  been  more  concerned  with  protecting  prizes  than  pursuing 
Pointis,  239the  Ministry  was  most  concerned  with  the  extent  and  efficacy  of  St  John's  defences 
in  the  immediate  years  following  the  squadron's  return.  At  the  end  of  January  1700,  Michael 
Richards  was  called  to  a  meeting  at  the  Board  of  Ordnance  to  provide  an  account  of  the 
fortifications  at  St  John's  which  resulted  in  him  being  sent  out  there  again  in  April  as  Chief 
Engineer.  He  was  to  help  the  much  reduced  garrison  of  one  Independent  Company  effect 
improvements  to  the  nine  gun  South  and  five  gun  North  batteries;  strengthen  the  ordnance  at 
Fort  William  and  the  One  Clock  Stage;  and  begin  building  anew.  2"  Although  admittedly  at 
peace  with  France,  this  policy  betrayed  a  return  to  the  Government's  limited  ambition  for 
Newfoundland  as  a  source  of  cod  and  a  training  ground  for  seamen  albeit  one  that  was  to  be 
better  defended.  Certainly  there  was  no  discussion  or  planning  as  to  how  England  might  hold 
the  whole  island  as  a  strategic  gateway  to  the  'New  World'.  Such  was  the  legacy  of  a  failed 
wartime  combined  operation  that  had  in  its  planning  and  preparation  sought  conquest. 
21" 
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Section  III:  Combined  Operations  and  the  European  Theatre  During 
the  Nine  Years  War,  1688-1697. 
TIM:  Combined  Operations  as  'Descents'  in  Eur"e. 
In  1691  Edward  Littleton's  pamphlet  recommended  that  King  William  undertake  a  'descent' 
(simply  a  seabome  landing  of  men  on  enemy  territory)  upon  the  French  coast.  It  concluded 
with  the  claim  that  the  responsibility  of  a  skilful  general  was  'not  to  dance  after  the  Enemy, 
but  to  make  the  Enemy  dance  after  Him",  and  it  followed  that  to  undertake  a  combined  army 
and  navy  operation  to  land  soldiers  on  the  French  coast  would  cause  Louis  XIV  to  begin  the 
jig.  Littleton's  metaphor  neatly  encapsulated  the  principal  strategic  motive  of  descents  in 
early  modem  warfare:  the  establishment  of  a  second  front  in  the  enemy's  territory,  which 
would  force  him  to  draw  off  resources  from  the  main  theatre  of  operations.  It  also  hinted  at 
more  immediate  tactical  objectives  such  as  the  destruction  of  a  harbour,  which  might  be 
completed  as  part  of  the  wider  strategic  venture  or  form  the  sole  object  of  the  operation,  but 
which  would  equally  prompt  an  enemy  response.  Overall,  despite  the  author's  rather  naive 
enthusiasm,  the  pamphlet  outlined  a  positive  case  for  this  type  of  combined  army  and  navy 
operation  upon  the  French  coasts.  ' 
Although  Littleton  was  not  alone  amongst  his  contemporaries  in  making  the  military 
case  for  descents,  '  modem  commentators  have  remained  largely  sceptical  of  the  arguments. 
The  foremost  military  authority  of  the  late  seventeenth  century,  Professor  John  Childs,  rejects 
the  strategic  and  military  worth  of  combined  operations  undertaken  as  descents  upon  the 
French  coast  during  the  Nine  Years  War.  "  He  condemns  them  as  'political  operations  of  war, 
which  were  'poorly  conceived  and  ill  prepared'.  '  On  both  counts,  Professor  Childs  has  much 
evidence  to  draw  upon.  The  political  dialectic  between  the  Whigs,  who  favoured  a 
continental  army-centric  strategy,  and  the  Tories,  whose  interest  was  for  a  more  exclusively 
maritime  or  'blue-water'  strategy  that  promoted  the  navy  in  command  of  the  sea  while 
protecting  and  expanding  overseas  trade,  did  largely  foster  the  European  descents  during  the 
war.  By  combining  army  and  navy  resources  to  meet  specific  tactical  or  strategic  objectives, 
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they  were  considered  structurally  and  functionally  suited  to  fulfil  certain  aspects  of  both  Whig 
and  Tory  strategies.  At  a  more  basic  Political  level,  Danby  wrote  of  the  propagandistic 
benefits  of  effecting  a  landing  directly  on  enemy  territory.  "  On  the  second  charge  of  poor' 
planning  and  preparation,  a  history  of  failure  can  be  found  in  the  abandoned  attempts  against 
the  Normandy  coast  and  Brest  in  1692  and  1693  respectively,  in  the  bloody  repulse  at  Brest 
in  1694;  and  in  the  lack  of  action  by  Russell's  Mediterranean  fleet  which  had  soldiers 
embarked  aboard  during  1695.  '  Nonetheless,  Professor  Childs's  condemnation  of  descents 
does  in  the  first  instance  require  a  rather  improbable  rejection  of  the  -  admittedly  now  banal  - 
Clausewitzian  consensus  about  warfare  being  sui  generis  a  pofitical  instrument.  "  And,  more 
importantly,  it  assumes  that  London  considered  the  descents  to  form  a  separate  and  coherent 
strategy.  Clearly  within  such  a  context  the  operational  failures  were  truly  lamentable;  but, 
considered  from  a  different  standpoint,  the  extent  and  nature  of  these  miscarriages  becomes 
explicable. 
An  alternative  approach  would  be  to  consider  these  combined  operations  as  just  one 
element  of  the  Court's  war  policy:  a  product  not  purely  of  political  compromise  but  as  a 
combined  army  and  naval  means  to  implement  the  separate  mil-itary  and  naval  strategies.  This 
context  admits  an  element  of  credibility  in  the  argument  that  descents  might  help  alter  the 
military  balance  in  the  land  theatre,  though  not  sufficiently  to  comprise  a  single  war-winning 
strategy.  It  also  implies  that  William  appreciated  this  point  with  a  greater  degree  of 
enthusiasm  than  is  usually  accorded  to  him,  and  that  along  with  senior  courtiers  and 
commanders,  he  sought  to  organise  a  series  of  descents  as  one  aspect  of  his  continental 
strategy.  Equally,  with  reference  to  the  wider  naval  strategy,  this  interpretative  framework 
adopts  descents  as  just  one  agency  for  its  implementation.  Although  command  of  the  Narrow 
Seas  had  been  achieved  at  La  Hogue  (1692),  the  French  navy  had  not  been  destroyed  and  the 
two  principal  squadrons  operating  out  of  Brest/Rochefort  in  the  north  and  Toulon  in  the 
south  could  still  combine  to  form  a  considerable  battlefleet.  There  was  much  to  recommend 
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destroying  these  vessels  as  they  lay  in  port  to  guarantee  sea  command;  and,  aside  from 
seaborne  bombardment,  a  combined  army  and  navy  descent  offered  a  means  to  do  so.  This 
approach  was  only  underlined  when,  from  1694,  the  French  naval  strategy  evolved  to 
promote  guerre  de  course  above  guerre  descadre  '  and  the  coastal  ports  now  served  as 
havens  for  the  privateers  preying  on  English  trade  and  the  naval  warships  that  afforded  them 
escort.  In  attempting  either  to  prevent  the  conjunction  of  the  French  squadrons  or  to  combat 
the  French  guerre  de  course,  the  descents  planned  against  the  northern  French  coasts  might 
also  be  considered  to  have  fulfilled  a  dual  function  by  facilitating  William's  ambition  to 
establish  England  as  the  principal  Mediterranean  seapower.  As  part  of  this  ambition,  descents 
were  considered  as  an  instrument  for  destroying  shipping  in  the  southern  as  well  as  the 
northern  ports.  More  importantly,  when  in  1695  after  the  main  fleet  had  wintered  in  the 
Mediterranean  for  the  first  time,  descents  were  perceived  as  a  means  of  intervening  in  the  war 
on  the  Iberian  peninsula,  and,  in  particular,  at  Catalonia,  where  the  Duc  de  Noailles's  army 
had  made  significant  gains  against  the  Spanish  and  was  threatening  the  region's  principal 
town  -  Barcelona.  " 
This  section  will  therefore  consider  the  historical  evolution  of  the  alternative  context 
in  which  to  assess  the  descents  undertaken  by  England  in  Europe  during  the  Nine  Years  War. 
Necessarily  such  an  approach  will  require  an  explication  of  the  planning  and  preparation  - 
even  if  operations  were  abandoned  -  which  should  throw  some  light  upon  their  administrative 
control  and,  thus,  help  establish  the  credentials  of  descents  as  amphibious  warfare.  The 
corollary  of  this  bureaucratic  focus  will  be  an  indication  of  the  level  of  political  support  for, 
and  perception  about,  these  combined  operations.  If,  as  conjectured  above,  it  is  possible  to 
describe  descents  as  handmaidens  of  the  separate  continental  and  maritime  strategies  and  not 
as  an  independent  war-winning  strategy,  then  Childs's  interpretation  of  such  operations 
would  seem  to  be  open  to  question. 
111ji:  The  Planned  Descents  on  the  Northern  French  Coastline,  1691-1693. 
Symcox,  The  Crisis  ofFrench  Sea  Power  1688-1697,  pp.  3-4,6-8,169-77. 
'*  Corbett,  England  in  the  Mediterranean,  ii.  420-65;  Gradish,  'The  Establishment  of  British  Seapower  in  the 
Mediterranean',  pp.  1-9;  Ehrman,  'William  III  and  the  Emergence  of  a  Mediterranean  Naval  Policy',  pp.  268- 
92;  Childs,  'Secondary  Operations  of  the  British  Army',  pp.  74-80. 142 
The  claim  that  the  planned  descents  of  the  early  1690s  resulted  only  from  the  King  providing 
'greluctant  lip  service  to  the  idea"'  sits  oddly  beside  William's  expressed  interest  in  such 
projects  even  before  Ireland  was  conquered.  In  February  1691,  the  Allied  Conference  held  at 
The  Hague,  discussed  proposals  for  a  descent  into  France;  and,  although  William  was  then 
sceptical  about  the  plan's  practicalities,  within  four  months  he  ordered  that  preparations  be 
begun.  This  change  of  mind  was  partly  because  Secretary  Nottingham  kept  the  proposal  on 
the  executive  Council's  agenda,  despite  Sydney's  representations  of  the  King's  initial 
reluctance;  but,  more  importantly,  Ginkel's  successful  start  to  the  1691  Irish  campaign  at 
Galway  and  Aughrim,  raised  the  prospect  that  troops  might  soon  be  spared  for  service 
elsewhere.  Rather  than  ship  them  immediately  to  Flanders,  the  King  was  willing  to  deploy 
them  in  a  descent. 
Despite  William's  order  and  Nottingham's  claim  that  the  Council  was  working  on  the 
project,  no  detailed  planning  was  undertaken  and  only  Danby  in  consultation  with  Leinster 
and  other  French  Huguenots  put  forward  any  firm  proposals.  Their  ideas  for  descents  on  the 
River  Gironde  or  on  the  Non-nandy  coast  accorded  with  the  arguments  that  Littleton  put 
forward  in  his  pamphlet  regarding  the  military  benefits  which  could  accrue  from  such  an 
attack;  but,  as  the  summer  lengthened,  preparations  had  still  not  begun.  By  August,  Sydney's 
representations  that  the  King  was  lukewarm  about  the  idea  due  to  the  lateness  of  the  season 
and  his  desire  for  a  naval  action,  were  gaining  credit.  William's  reputed  coolness  was 
probably  a  consequence  of  the  military  momentum  in  Ireland  stalling  once  again  in  front  of 
Limerick's  walls,  ensuring  that  there  would  be  no  earlier  release  of  soldiers  from  that  theatre; 
and,  as  the  siege  dragged  through  to  the  autumn,  it  was  indeed  becoming  too  late  in  the 
season.  All  residual  hope  that  the  project  might  be  advanced  was  extinguished  in  early 
October  when  Nottingham  told  Ginkel  to  expect  that  on  the  conclusion  of  the  peace  treaty  in 
Ireland  many  of  the  soldiers  would  be  transferred  to  Flanders.  " 
Nonetheless,  in  early  spring  of  the  following  year,  the  idea  of  a  descent  on  the 
northern  French  coast  was  firmly  back  on  the  war  policy  agenda.  A  memorandum  sent  by 
11  Childs,  The  British  Army  of  William  III,  p.  217. 
12  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  iii.  17-18,98-9,128-9,140-1,165,182-4,188,191,202-3,28l,  397,402:  Nottingham 
to  the  Urd  President  [Carmarthen],  17  Feb.  1691;  Nottingham  to  Portland,  5  June  1691;  Nottingham  to 
Sydney,  26  June,  31  July  1691;  Sydney  to  Nottingham,  6,20  July,  3  Aug.  1691;  Nottingham  to  Ginkel,  28 
July,  6  Oct.  1691;  Nottingham  to  Russell,  29  July  1691;  Russell  to  [Nottingham],  II  Aug.  1691;  Minutes  of 
the  Committee,  or  Cabinet  Council,  appointed  to  advise  the  Queen  during  the  King's  absences  from  England, 143 
Nottingham  to  Blathwayt  on  3  March,  noted  that  a  descent  would  take  place  towards  the  end 
of  May  and  that  some  20  English  and  Dutch  infantry  battalions  along  with  a  couple  of  English 
regiments  of  horse  and  one  of  Dragoons  would  comprise  the  land  force.  Along  with  other 
details  on  the  transportation  arrangements  for  the  collection  of  these  troops  and  the  artillery 
train,  the  memorandum  revealed  that  the  King  had  spoken  only  to  the  prospective 
commanders  -  Admiral  Russell,  the  Duke  of  Leinster  and  the  Earl  of  Galway  -  about  the  plan. 
The  fact  that  the  King  had  kept  other  senior  courtiers  in  the  dark  probably  contributed  to  the 
proposal's  lack  of  political  support  when  it  was  presented  to  the  Cabinet  Council  advising 
Queen  Mary  following  William's  departure  to  the  European  continent  for  the  1692  campaign. 
Indeed,  Godolphin,  and  a  coterie  of  like-minded  colleagues,  managed  to  hold  up  the 
preparations  until  the  King  provided  further  evidence  of  his  intentions  in  the  matter. 
However,  even  when  this  was  received,  the  operation's  organisation  continued  to  suffer  delay 
when  in  mid-April  the  Council's  attention  was  diverted  to  preparing  the  nation's  defence 
against  an  imminent  French  invasion  on  behalf  of  the  exiled  King  James.  13 
The  death  of  Louis  XIV's  War  Minister,  Louvois,  in  1691  had  removed  from 
Versailles  the  principal  bulwark  against  French  policy  focusing  upon  a  Jacobite  restoration, 
and,  consequently,  the  French  King  was  persuaded  to  sponsor  another  attempt  by  James  to 
reclaim  his  kingdoms.  In  early  1692,  the  French  Channel  and  Mediterranean  fleets  -  save  for 
a  35-strong  squadron  which  was  to  winter  in  the  Mediterranean  -  had  been  combined  in  the 
Channel  under  the  Comte  de  Tourville,  while  a  sizeable  expeditionary  force  was  collected 
along  the  Normandy  coast.  However,  its  organisation  proved  slow  and  it  was  not  complete 
when  London  became  aware,  through  captured  papers,  of  the  French  plans.  To  preserve  the 
preparations  completed  to  date,  Tourville  was  positively  ordered  to  engage  the  Anglo-Dutch 
fleet  commanded  by  Russell  that  had  been  dispatched  from  England  to  intercept.  Under  the 
gaze  of  King  James  standing  on  the  cliffs  above,  the  two  fleets  clashed  off  Cape  La  Hogue  on 
19  May  and,  after  five  days  of  fighting,  Russell  had  not  only  defeated  Tourville  but  had  also 
23  June,  28  July  1691;  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  p.  x;  Browning,  Thomas  Osborne,  ii.  202-6:  Carmarthen  to  [the 
King],  IS  July,  28  Aug.  169  1. 
13  IfMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  no.  32,  p.  18-19:  Memorial  for  Mr.  Blathw[ayt],  3  Mar.  1692;  NMM,  SOU/I  3,  unf 
Nottingham  to  Blathwayt,  19,21  Apr.,  6,17,24  May  1692;  [Blathwayt]  to'My  Lord'  [Nottingham],  9,19,22 
May  1692  [NS];  IL  Horwitz,  Revolution  Poliliks:  The  Career  ofDaniel  Finch  Second  Earl  offollingham, 
1647-1730  (Cambridge,  1968),  p.  130. 144 
destroyed  much  of  the  inftastructure  for  the  invasion  force.  14  John  Ehrman  implies  that  the 
idea  of  a  descent  on  the  Normandy  coast  arose  from  the  subsequent  deliberations  as  to  how 
best  the  victory  at  La  Hogue  might  be  followed  up.  15  However,  as  has  been  shown,  the  idea 
in  general  had  been  current  ah-nost  since  the  start  of  the  war  and,  more  specifically,  a  proposal 
had  already  been  agreed  upon  for  1692.  Undoubtedly,  though,  Russell's  victory  provided  an 
impetus  to  the  preparations  begun  by  Nottingham  in  late  March. 
Prior  to  the  invasion  emergency,  it  was  Admiral  Russell  who  had  in  fact  proposed  a 
specific  target  for  the  descent  -  St  Malo.  Admittedly,  his  selection  was  based  on  the 
assumption  that  it  would  force  the  French  to  a  sea  engagement  but,  immediately  following  La 
Hogue,  he  remained  convinced  that  a  landing  should  still  be  effected  around  that  area  of  the 
Normandy  coast,  believing  that  it  would  most  effectively  capitalise  upon  the  current  French 
vulnerability.  Significantly,  however,  he  implied  that  for  this  opportunity  to  be  grasped  the 
descent  force  would  have  to  be  ready  forthwith.  16  As  Russell  was  returning  to  Spithead,  the 
Cabinet  Council  resolved  to  dispatch  three  of  its  members  -  Portland,  Rochester  and  Sydney 
-  along  with  Galway,  to  meet  with  the  Admiral  and  Leinster  at  Portsmouth  so  that  a  specific 
target  might  be  determined  upon.  From  the  -  albeit  limited  -  extant  evidence  of  the  meeting, 
it  would  seem  that  no  resolution  on  the  projected  descent's  objective  was  arrived  at  and  that, 
instead,  it  was  agreed  that  the  fleet  should  reconnoitre  the  coast  to  determine  the  current 
disposition  of  the  remaining  French  naval  forces.  Francis  Bickley  rightly  concludes  that  this 
decision  reflected  the  land  force's  current  lack  of  readiness.  17  Leinster's  efforts  in  this  respect 
had  been  frustrated  by  the  delays  in  bringing  troops  from  Ireland  and  by  the  measures  effected 
to  combat  the  invasion  threat;  while  a  general  lack  of  funding  had  also  undermined  his 
organisation.  Further  problems  threatened  in  June  moreover  when  the  Duke  faced  a  recall 
demand  by  William  for  those  horse  regiments  initially  detailed  to  be  transported  to  Flanders 
but  which  had  remained  behind  to  form  Part  of  the  descent  force.  It  was  only  as  a  result  of 
14  Ehrman,  The  Navy  in  the  War  of  William  III,  pp.  393-7;  Harding,  Seapower  andNaval  Warfare  1650-1830, 
pp.  154-5;  Churchill,  Marlborough,  i.  338-41. 
Ehrman,  The  Navy  in  the  War  of  William  III,  pp.  399-400. 
HMC,  FinchMSS,  iv,  nos.  255,287,349,361,  pp.  1334,152-3,183-4,189-90:  Russell  toNottingham,  9, 
13,25,27  May  1692. 
17  IIMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  nos.  350,357,367,  pp.  xxxi,  185,188,193-4:  Nottingham  to  Russell,  26  May  1692, 
Nottingham  to  Blathwayt,  27  May  1692;  Council  of  Flag  Officers,  30  May  1692;  Ehrman,  The  Navy  in  the 
Irar  of  William  III,  pp.  399-400. 145 
Nottingham's  entreaties  that  this  was  averted.  18  There  was  no  doubt  however  that  William 
was  becoming  annoyed  at  the  inertia  of  an  operation  that  he  had  initially  outlined  in  March 
and,  through  Blathwayt,  he  demanded  a  more  specific  explanation  as  to  what  was  currently 
proposed  'than  by  the  Generall  words  of  a  Descent'19 
Although  there  seemed  to  be  an  -  albeit  unexpressed  -  consensus  that  St  Malo  would 
be  the  target,  Nottingham  could  barely  reply  to  the  King  in  any  accurate  detail.  Moreover,  by 
July,  Russell  began  to  set  his  whole  face  against  the  enterprise.  Following  the  meeting  with 
the  three  members  of  the  Cabinet  Council  at  the  end  of  May,  the  Admiral  had  undertaken  a 
fiirther  reconnaissance  voyage  and  had  concluded  that  the  coastline  was  too  dangerous  for 
the  larger  rates  and  that,  in  general,  St  Malo  was  not  a  practicable  target  as  the  season 
progressed.  Given  the  time  and  political  currency  he  had  expended  in  trying  to  bring  the  plan 
to  fruition,  Nottingham  was  concerned  with  Russell's  increasing  intransigence.  He  therefore 
sought  to  regain  the  Admiral's  support  for  the  venture  but,  at  this  important  juncture,  the 
Secretary's  correspondence  did  not  prove  sufficiently  tactful.  By  suggesting  that  Russell 
would  not  want  to  leave  himself  open  to  the  charge  that  he  had  failed  to  do  everything 
possible  to  make  the  descent  plan  work,  it  seemed  to  the  Admiral  that  Nottingham  was  not 
only  criticising  his  actions  to  date  but  also  probably  preparing  the  political  ground  for  him  to 
be  blamed  for  any  subsequent  failure.  Accelerated  by  their  political  differences  -  Nottingham 
was  a  High  Church  Tory  and  Russell  a  Whig  -  relations  between  the  two  men  quickly 
deteriorated  to  the  detriment  of  the  descent  plan.  With  little  contribution  from  Leinster,  the 
debate  as  to  whether  the  descent  was  to  proceed  and,  if  so,  what  its  target  should  be 
continued  throughout  July  without  resolution.  20 
Towards  the  end  of  the  month,  Leinster  completed  the  embarkation  of  the  troops  and 
the  transports  weighed  to  fall  in  with  the  fleet  as  it  sailed  up  the  Channel  from  Torbay.  With 
both  component  parts  of  the  descent  force  now  together,  and  with  the  Queen  having 
specifically  recommended  to  Russell  that  the  operation  should  be  deployed  to  bum  St  Maio  in 
addition  to  considering  the  possibility  of  an  attack  on  Brest  given  that  intelligence  had  just 
indicated  that  a  number  of  French  vessels  had  proceeded  to  that  port,  Nottingham  might  have 
Is  Horwitz,  Revolution  Polifiks,  p.  13  1;  IIMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  nos.  433,  pp.  228-9:  Blathwayt  to  Nottingham, 
13/23  June  1692;  NMM,  SOU/13,  unf.:  Nottingham  to  'Sir'  [Blathwayt],  22  June  1692;  [Blathwayt]  to  'My 
Lord'  [Nottingham],  2  June,  7  July  1692  [NS]. 
'9  NMM,  SOU/I  3,  unE:  [Blathwayt]  to  'My  Lord'  [Nottingham],  7  July  1692  [NS]. 146 
anticipated  action.  However,  on  28  July,  ajoint  service  Council  of  War  aboard  the  Bredah 
concluded  that  it  was  not  practicable  to  attack  St  Maio  and,  further,  that  it  was  too  late  in  the 
year  to  make  any  attempt  against  Brest  or  Rochefort,  which  had  also  been  previously 
canvassed  as  a  target.  Russell's  influence  over  this  decision  was  evident  from  the  long  letter 
he  wrote  to  Nottingham  following  the  Council  in  which  he  justified  its  resolutions  in  some 
detail.  Moreover,  doubtless  guided  by  the  Admiral,  the  Council  was  not  minded  to  after  its 
decision  when  Russell  received  the  Queen's  recommendation  regarding  the  burning  of  St 
Maio.  Strictly,  the  Council  had  not  disobeyed  the  Queen  inasmuch  as  she  had  not  issued  a 
direct  order,  but  its  resolutions  were  clearly  clear  contrary  to  her  wishes  and,  perhaps  as  an 
attempt  to  soften  its  attitude,  the  Council  agreed  that  the  fleet  would  put  in  at  St  Helens 
where  it  could  be  kept  together,  ready  to  consider  any  commands  from  the  Queen.  In  an 
attempt  to  resolve  this  deadlock  between  the  wishes  of  the  Court  and  the  Ministry  on  one 
side,  and  those  of  the  descent  commanders  on  the  other,  Nottingham  and  the  available 
members  of  the  Cabinet  Council  -  Carmarthen,  Devonshire,  Dorset,  Rochester,  Sidney  and 
Comwaillis  -  travelled  to  Portsmouth  at  the  beginning  of  August  to  meet  with  Russell  and  the 
other  senior  commanders.  Nonetheless,  at  their  meeting  with  the  Council  of  War,  the 
politicians  were  not  able  to  Prevail  with  the  servicemen  to  undertake  an  attack  against  St 
Maio  or  indeed  anywhere  else  on  the  Normandy  or  Brittany  coasts.  21  As  Nottingham 
laconically  reported  to  Portland,  the  Cabinet  Council  members  returned  to  London  having 
6t  22 
succeeded  in  nothing  that  we  designed 
.  The  projected  descent  against  the  Normandy 
coast,  which  had  been  current  since  early  March,  was  now  finally  abandoned,  though  it  was 
to  comprise  a  celebrated  Parliamentary  contest  between  the  Whigs  and  the  Tories  (the 
supporters  of  Russell  and  Nottingham,  respectively)  when  the  session  opened  in  November.  23 
However,  for  the  immediate  future,  attention  was  focused  upon  an  alternative  joint  army-navy 
operation  that  the  King  had  proposed  just  before  the  Normandy  descent  was  given  up. 
20  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  nos.  505,550,  pp.  xxxv,  270-1,299:  Russell  to  Nottingham,  30  June  1692; 
Nottingham  to  Russell,  7  July  1692;  Horwitz,  Revolution  Poliliks,  pp.  131-2. 
21  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  nos.  622,635-7,639,643,649,655,664-5,  pp.  xxxv-xxxvi,  334,340-1,343-5,348- 
51,354,358-9:  Meese  to  [Nottingham],  22,26  July  1692;  Nottingham  to  Blathwayt,  26  July,  I  Aug.  1692; 
Nottingham  to  Russell,  26  July,  I  Aug.  1692;  The  Queen  to  Russell,  26  July  1692;  Leinster  to  Nottingham,  28 
July  1692,  and  enclosure,  (i)  Resolution  at  a  council  of  war;  Russell  to  Nottingham,  29,30  July  1692,  and 
enclosure,  (i)  Resolution  at  a  council  of  war,  30  July  1692;  NMM,  SOU/14,  unf.:  Nottingham  to  Blathwayt,  1, 
3  Aug.  1692 
22  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  no.  682,  p.  369:  Nottingham  to  Portland,  5  Aug.  1692. 
23  See  pp.  150-1  below. 147 
William's  target  was  one  of  France's  principal  harbours  for  privateers  and  the  most 
northerly  point  of  the  frontier  with  the  Spanish  Netherlands  -  Dunkirk;  but  on  this  occasion 
the  operation  was  not  to  be  a  seaborne  descent,  but  rather  two  separate  though  co-ordinated 
attacks  from  the  land  and  sea.  The  intended  troops  (save  for  some  200  Dragoons  and  the 
regiments  of  Foulkes  and  Hales,  the  latter  two  being  designed  for  an  overseas  expedition  to 
the  West  Indies)  were  currently  part  of  the  descent  force  with  the  fleet  at  St  Helens.  William 
planned  to  land  them  at  Ostend  or  Nieuport  whence  they  would  march  overland  with 
reinforcements  to  attack  the  town  of  Dunkirk.  Meanwhile,  the  fleet  which  had  transported 
them  would  undertake  a  seaborne  bombardment  against  its  port.  " 
Given  the  vacillation  over  the  planned  descents  for  the  northern  French  coast  the 
Dunkirk  operation  has  perhaps  with  some  justification  been  labelled  as  'face-saving'.  ', 
William  did  not  however  know  for  certain  when  he  designed  the  operation  that  the  descents 
against  St  Malo  or  Brest  had  been  aborted,  and,  in  fact,  he  made  the  Dunkirk  assault 
conditional  upon  a  final  decision  being  taken  to  abandon  operations.  Although  Blathwayt 
privately  infortned  Nottingham  that  the  King  anticipated  their  abandonment,  that  is  not  an 
argument  that  the  Dunkirk  project  possessed  no  merit  as  a  combined  army  and  navy  assault 
outside  the  context  of  operational  failure  elsewhere.  " 
William  had  previously  targeted  Dunkirk  in  January  as  a  first  strike  for  the  1692 
campaign  and  it  was  probably  only  the  fact  that  the  French  got  wind  of  the  design  which 
caused  it  to  be  shelved.  "  Now,  later  in  the  year,  William  was  returning  to  the  project  and 
hoped  to  make  effective  use  of  the  military  and  naval  resources  brought  together  for  the 
proposed  northern  coast  descents.  His  commitment  to  the  success  of  the  venture  -  as 
opposed  to  just  being  seen  to  being  doing  something  with  the  gathered  forces  -  is  illustrated 
21  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  nos.  646,680,  pp.  xxxvi-xxxvii,  345-6,368:  The  King  to  Nottingham,  [28  JulyJ7 
Aug.  1691  and  enclosure  (i)  Instructions  to  Col.  Henry  Withers,  Adjutant  General  of  Foot;  The  Queen  to 
Leinster,  5  Aug.  1692;  BL,  Add.  MSS  37991,  fos.  135,146-7,1624:  Nottingham  to  Blathwayt,  3  Aug.  1692; 
Blathwayt  to  Nottingham,  8,29  Aug.  1692. 
25  1  IMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  pp.  xxxvii. 
26  See  p.  147  n.  24  and  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  no.  689,  pp.  373-4:  Blathwayt  to  Nottingham,  8  Aug.  1692  and 
enclosure  (i)  'Memorandum:  for  the  Earl  of  Nottingham'. 
27  NUL,  PwA  1432,  unf:  'A  Project  made  in  the  Year  1692  to  blow  up  the  Forts  and  Castle  of  Dunkirk  and 
ruine  that  Harbour';  BL,  Add.  MSS  61337,  fos.  19-3  1:  'Memoire  touchant  le  Siege  de  D%  Fait  au  mois  de 
janvier,  1692%  Childs,  The  Nine  Years  War  and  the  British  Army  1688-1697,  pp.  178,2  10  n.  1;  Wolseley, 
The  Life  ofJohn  Churchill,  ii.  265-6;  Churchill,  Marlborough,  i.  333-4,333  n.  8.  Childs  obliquely,  and 
Wolseley  directly,  suggest  that  Marlborough  was  responsible  for  betraying  the  Dunkirk  project  to  the  French. 
Churchill,  however,  derides  Wolseley's  evidence  for  this  charge  but  in  the  process  makes  the  claim  that  the 
plan  was  not  formulated  until  August  -a  view  contrary  to  the  manuscript  source. 148 
by  the  blanket  of  secrecy  which  he  threw  over  details  of  the  operation.  Although  William's 
adjutant  -  Colonel  Withers  who  carried  the  details  about  the  project  to  Nottingham  -  had 
Instructions  which  allowed  for  the  service  commanders  to  be  briefed  in  full,  it  would  seem 
that  in  the  first  instance  this  did  not  occur.  Leinster  did  not  know  the  exact  target  until  he 
was  landed  at  Ostend;  and  London  -  aside  from  select  senior  ministers  -  assumed  that  with  the 
abandonment  of  the  proposed  descents,  the  troops  were  being  transported  to  the  Flanders 
theatre,  albeit  in  the  direction  of  Dunkirk.  28 
The  early  organisation  of  this  enterprise  contributed  to  the  belief  that  William  was 
only  transferring  troops.  Based  on  the  Instructions  Withers  had  delivered  to  Nottingham,  the 
Queen  ordered  Russell  to  detach  a  squadron  of  some  eight  men  of  war  from  his  fleet  at  St 
Helens  to  convoy  the  transport  ships  with  Leinster's  troops  on  board  and  the  auxiliary  store 
vessels  containing  the  large  descent  train  to  the  Downs  or  Margaret  Road  where  further 
orders  were  to  be  sent.  Russell  appointed  Shovell  to  command  this  detachment,  which 
included  Dutch  vessels;  and,  since  only  the  Dragoons  and  the  two  regiments  bound  for  the 
West  Indies  had  to  be  disembarked,  the  squadron  proceeded  quickly  up  the  Channel.  Once  at 
the  Downs,  the  Instructions  which  Shovell  and  Leinster  received  from  the  King  proved  only  a 
little  more  specific  by  informing  them  that  the  troops  and  war  stores  were  to  be  landed  at 
Ostend  or  Nieuport  by  22  or  23  August.  A  separate  Memorandum  attached  to  the  order 
anticipated  a  visit  to  the  squadron  by  Withers  to  infort'n  the  two  commanders  of  the  King's 
orders  but  it  remains  unclearjust  how  much  he  revealed.  At  the  Downs,  sickness  spread 
amongst  the  soldiers  and  in  a  tersely  worded  letter  to  Nottingham  regarding  the  management 
of  this  problem,  Leinster  condemned  the  fact  that  he  was  still  ignorant  about  how  his  troops 
were  to  be  deployed.  " 
The  outbreak  of  disease  proved  not  to  be  as  serious  as  Leinster  had  represented  and, 
although  some  men  were  put  ashore,  it  did  not  hinder  the  squadron's  passage  across  the 
Channel.  The  troops  were  in  fact  landed  at  Ostend  in  advance  of  the  prescribed  dates.  It  was 
2$  BL,  Add.  MSS  37991,  fos.  1614:  Blathwayt  to  Nottingham,  25  Aug.  1692;  NUL,  PwA  100  1  fos.  1-2: 
Carmarthen  to  Portland,  5  Aug.  1692;  The  Portledge  Papers,  pp.  144-5:  Lapthorne  to  Coffin,  6,13,18,20 
Aug.  1692. 
29  HMC,  FinchMSS,  iv,  nos.  679-80,690,704,726,741,  pp.  368,374,380,393-4,401:  The  Queen  to 
Russell,  5  Aug.  1692;  The  Queen  to  Leinster,  5  Aug.  1692;  Shovell  to  Nottingham,  8  Aug.  1692;  Blathwayt  to 
Nottingham,  14/24  Aug.  1692  and  enclosure  (i)  [The  King]  to  the  Commander  of  the  squadron  attending  the 
transport  ships  and  Memorandum;  Leinster  to  Nottingham,  10,17  Aug.  1691;  PRO,  ADM  7/692,  p.  53: 
Order  to  Sir  Cloudesely  Shovell,  6  Aug.  1692;  BL,  Add.  MSS  37991,  fos.  141-3:  Nottingham  to  Blathwayt,  12 
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then  that  orders  to  march  towards  Dunkirk  with  the  reinforcements  of  engineers  were  sent  to 
Leinster,  while  Portland  also  visited  him  at  Ostend  to  provide  further  explanation.  "  it  is 
difficult  to  know  exactly  when  Shovell  was  informed  of  the  details  that  he  was  to  lead  his 
squadron  against  Dunkirk's  port  as  one  element  of  a  combined  attack  on  that  town.  As  bomb 
vessels  were  initially  ordered  as  part  of  his  convoy  along  with  pilots  for  the  Flanders  coast, 
and  he  was  instructed  to  meet  with  Meester's  'Machine  Vessels'  if  possible,  "  Shovell  might 
have  guessed  more  about  the  operation  than  Leinster.  Or  perhaps  Withers  was  more  candid 
with  Shovell,  though  given  Leinster's  seniority  and  reputed  closeness  to  the  King  that  seems 
unlikely.  Shovell  probably  received  more  detailed  instructions  at  the  same  time  as  Lcinster 
given  that  he  then  wrote  briefly  to  Nottingham  about  the  squadron's  disposal  for  the  attack 
upon  which  Blathwayt  later  expanded.  This  correspondence  revealed  that  the  Dutch  Admiral 
Evertsen  would  lead  a  detachment  of  smaller  vessels  inshore  to  bombard  the  harbour  and 
explode  some  of  Meester's  'Machines',  while  Shovell  would  remain  outside  with  the  larger 
ships  to  combat  any  sea  based  opposition  or  relief" 
In  the  event,  neither  commander  acted  upon  his  orders.  A  week  after  Portland's 
meeting  with  Leinster  at  Ostend,  the  troops  were  only  encamped  just  eastwards  at  Veume 
whence  Leinster  marched  south  easterly  to  Dixmonde,  instead  of  pressing  forward  due  west 
to  attack  Dunkirk.  Shovell  for  his  part  struggled  offshore  with  poor  weather  which  prevented 
his  well  boats  from  tracking  the  army  as  it  marched.  This  was  a  necessary  task  to  ensure  a 
co-ordinated  assault  but  which  anyhow  would  have  become  impossible  when  Leinster  turned 
his  troops  towards  the  interior.  "  Blathwayt's  insouciance  in  reporting  home  Leinster's 
actions  by  claiming  that  he  was  preparing  winter  quarters  to  the  allies'  advantage  perhaps 
reflected  his  hitherto  low  expectations  of  the  enterprise,  but  it  obscures  the  reasons  why 
Dunkirk  was  no  longer  the  immediate  target.  Furthermore,  the  Secretary-at-War  failed  to 
30  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  nos.  742,767,788,  pp.  xxxvii,  402,411,421-2:  Atkinson  to  Nottingham,  17  Aug. 
1692;  Shovell  to  Nottingham,  22  Aug.  1692;  Portland  to  [Nottingham],  26  Aug.  [1692];  BL,  Add.  MSS 
3799  1,  f0s.  1614:  Blathwayt  to  Nottingham,  25,29  Aug.  1692. 
"'Machine  vessels'  were  small  ships  containing  explosive  'machines'  (which  Ehrman,  The  Navy  in  the  War 
of  William  III,  p.  573,  compares  to  modern  depth  charges)  with  a  firing  device  which  could  be  set  to  explode 
once  the  vessel  had  been  towed  inshore  and  ideally  placed  alongside  the  intended  target.  Meester  was  a  Dutch 
artillery  officer  at  the  forefront  of  the  vessel's  development  during  the  1690s,  though  his  Machines  were  utter 
&ilures  in  all  respects.  For  a  history  of  the  'Machine  Vessel'  both  before  and  after  Meester's  versions  see 
E.  W.  IL  Fyers,  'The  Story  of  Machine  Vessels'MMA  (1925),  50-90. 
32  f  IMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  no.  785,  p.  420:  Shovell  to  Nottingham,  26  Aug.  1692;  BL,  Add.  MSS  3799  1,  f0s. 
1624:  Blathwayt  to  Nottingham,  29  Aug.  1692. 150 
elaborate  when  the  orders  for  the  embarkation  of  Leinster's  troops  were  issued  in  mid- 
September  having  contended  that  the  occupation  of  Veume  and  Dixrnonde  was  all  that  the 
General  could  achieve.  Portland  and  Cambon,  after  visiting  Leinster  at  Ostend,  had  reported 
difficulties  with  the  proposed  attack,  though  no  specific  details  were  offered.  Thus,  aside 
from  the  increasing  lateness  of  the  season  and  the  bad  weather  hampering  the  co-ordination  of 
the  naval  and  military  attacks,  there  is  little  else  to  suggest  why  the  assault  on  Dunkirk  was 
dropped.  "'  Bickley's  positive  conclusion  that  unlike  the  earlier  planned  descents,  the  venture 
against  Dunkirk  had  at  least  been  begun,  misrepresents  the  nature  of  the  planned  combined 
operation.  "  As  previously  noted,  it  was  not  to  be  a  seabome  descent  but  a  co-ordinated 
attack  from  the  land  and  sea;  thus,  although  the  landing  of  the  troops  at  Ostend  was  a 
necessary  prerequisite  for  the  attack,  it  did  not  mark  its  beginning.  That  event  was  forestalled 
by  Shovell's  squadron  being  beaten  off  the  coast  and  more  importantly,  by  Leinster  marching 
to  Dixmonde.  The  combined  operation  against  Dunkirk  had  been  abandoned  just  like  the 
other  descents  against  the  northern  French  coast. 
It  might  be  reckoned  a  measure  of  William's  commitment  to  descents  as  part  of  his 
war  policy  that  despite  the  experiences  of  the  previous  year  his  speech  at  the  opening  of  the 
parliamentary  session  in  November  1692,  indicated  his  intent  to  mount  a  larger  descent  as 
part  of  the  forthcoming  campaign.  "'  Although  Parliament  first  began  picking  over  the  traces 
of  the  previous  summer's  failed  attempts  which  developed  to  become  a  celebrated  contest  in 
apportioning  blame  between  the  Tory  and  Whig  supporters  of  Nottingham  and  Russell,  " 
preparations  for  another  descent  were  begun  at  the  turn  of  the  year.  Neither  Russell  nor 
Nottingham  emerged  with  much  credit  from  the  Parliamentary  deliberations  but  it  was  the 
Admiral  whom  the  King  decided  to  replace  for  the  forthcoming  campaign  by  refusing  to 
accede  to  Russell's  threat  to  resign  if  he  had  to  receive  orders  from  Nottingham.  In  Russell's 
33  BL,  Add.  MSS  37991,  fos.  159-60,165-6:  Blathwayt  to  Nottingham,  1,8  Sept.  1692;  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv, 
no.  839,  p.  448:  Shovell  to  Nottingham,  7  Sept.  1692. 
34  BL,  Add.  MSS  37991,  fos.  159-60,164-6:  Blathwayt  to  Nottingham,  1,5,8  Sept.  1692;  HMC,  FinchUSS, 
iv,  nos.  847,855,  pp.  453-4,457-8:  Blathwayt  to  Nottingham,  12,15  Sept.  1692. 
35  HMC,  Finch  MSS,  iv,  p.  xxxviii. 
36  Cobbctt,  Parliamentary  Ifistory  of  England,  V.  707. 
31  The  Commons  debates  on  the  descents  and  the  naval  campaign  of  1692  can  be  followed  in  Grcy,  Debates  of 
the  liouse  of  Commons,  x.  243-8,252,263-79,291-6  and  in  7he  Parliamentary  Diary  ofNarcissus  Luttrell, 
1691-1693,  ed.  H.  Horwitz  (Oxford,  1972),  pp.  218-19,220-4,239-41,271-7,294-6,310,329-33.  The 
papers  submitted  during  these  debates  can  be  found  in  CJ  x.  714-23,749-5  9.  H.  Horwitz,  Parliament,  Policy 
and  Politics  in  the  Reign  of  William  III  (Manchester,  1977),  pp.  104-22,  is  a  detailed  secondary  account  of  the 
Parliamentary  proceedings. 151 
place,  a  triple  commission  of  Killigrew,  Delavall,  and  Shovell  was  appointed  to  command  the 
fleet  in  a  similar  manner  to  Killigrew,  Ashby,  and  Haddock  in  1690.  To  the  relief  of  Russell's 
defenders,  however,  Nottingham  did  suffer  a  reverse  in  March  when  the  King  completed 
some  ministerial  changes  to  the  Whigs'  advantage  in  an  attempt  to  build  a  majority  in 
Parliament.  Two  such  changes  were  to  move  Nottingham  to  the  Southern  Department,  and 
to  appoint  the  implacable  Whig,  Sir John  Trenchard,  to  the  second  secretaryship  of  state 
which  had  lain  vacant  since  Shrewsbury's  departure.  Although  it  had  been  Nottingham's 
suggestion  that  the  post  be  filled  to  ease  his  administrative  burdens,  Trenchard  would 
certainly  not  have  been  his  preferred  choice.  " 
In  addition  to  his  new  appointment  as  Secretary  for  the  Northern  Department, 
Trenchard  assumed  responsibility  for  naval  affairs  and  consequently  for  the  co-ordination  of 
the  preparations  for  the  descent.  Deliberations  by  the  Admiralty  and  Cabinet  Council  before 
and  after  the  King's  departure  for  the  continent  resolved  upon  Brest  as  the  target  for  1693. 
Specifically,  the  aim  was  to  destroy  the  French  fleet  commanded  by  Tourville  which  had 
congregated  in  the  port  after  La  Hogue,  and  thus  to  prevent  its  conjunction  with  d'Estrdes's 
squadron  based  at  Toulon.  The  exact  disposition  for  the  attack  was  to  be  left  to  a  Council  of 
War  called  by  the  Admirals  for  on  this  occasion  no  general  officer  was  appointed  to  command 
the  five  regiments  which  were  ordered  to  comprise  the  land  force.  "  Not  all  ministers 
supported  the  project  and  those  at  the  Treasury  in  particular  complained  about  what  they 
calculated  to  be  the  disproportionate  costs  to  the  prospective  benefits  of  the  enterprise.  " 
Despite  these  doubts,  Blathwayt  represented  that  William  was  sufficiently  relaxed  about  the 
estimated  f.  55  000  cost  of  the  expedition  to  apportion  a  further  E22  000;  while  the  secretary 
also  reported  that  the  King  believed  'something  considerable'  could  be  undertaken  at  Brest.  41 
The  destruction  of  the  enemy  fleet  in  the  port  was  contingent  upon  the  descent  being 
undertaken  early  in  the  season  before  the  French  put  to  sea.  Preparations  were  pushed 
forward  at  Portsmouth,  and  the  regiments  were  quickly  moved  to  camps  in  Sussex  and 
around  Winchester  in  Hampshire  where  supplies  were  more  plentiful  and  convenient  than  the 
38  Ehrman,  The  Navy  in  the  War  of  William  III,  pp.  409-13;  Horwitz,  Revolution  Politicks,  pp.  135-41; 
Horwitz,  Parliament,  Policy  and  Politics,  pp.  109,114-1  S. 
3'  BL,  Add.  MSS  37992,  fos.  26-7:  Blathwayt  to  Trenchard,  27  Apr.  1693;  PRO,  SP  44/205,  pp.  3,6,9: 
Trcnehard  to  the  Admirals  of  the  Fleet,  18,24  Apr.,  3  May  1693;  PRO,  ADM  7/694,  p.  41:  Order  to  the 
Admirals,  4  May  1693;  Browning,  Thomas  Osborne,  ii.  214-16:  Carmarthern  to  [the  King],  28  Apr.  1693. 
40  CSPD,  1693,  pp.  102-3:  [Godolphin]  to  the  King,  18  Apr.  1693. 
4113L,  Add.  MSS  37992,  fos.  26-7:  Blathwayt  to  Trenchard,  27  Apr.  1693. 152 
alternative  camp  at  Hounslow  Heath.  Moreover,  it  was  also  thought  that  the  congregation  of 
the  troops  at  those  places  was  sufficiently  close  to  Portsmouth  to  alarm  the  French  with  the 
prospect  of  an  imminent  embarkation  if  they  spied  the  soldiers'  movements.  Only  the 
confusion  over  the  amount  of  bedding  to  be  provided  by  the  Admiralty  for  the  soldiers  on 
board  the  fleet  and  a  debate  which  arose  over  the  authority  of  naval  Captains  to  discipline  the 
troops  when  on  board  caused  delay.  These  matters  were  however  in  the  process  of  being 
clarified  when  the  order  was  issued  at  the  beginning  of  May  for  the  Admirals  to  embark  the 
soldiers.  "' 
It  has  been  claimed  that  no  embarkation  took  place  and,  indeed,  that  the  descent  upon 
Brest  was  dropped  as  the  Admirals  were  ordered  in  late  May  to  provide  additional  escort  to 
the  outgoing  Smyrna  convoy  -  the  Levant  fleet  of  merchantmen  which  Vice-Admiral  Rooke 
in  command  of  a  squadron  of  fifteen  warships  had  been  ordered  to  escort  in  January  1691"1 
Delays  had  prevented  its  departure  and  on  hearing  in  May  that  Tourville  had  left  Brest  to  join 
d'Estr6es  to  attempt  an  ambush  of  the  convoy,  William  thought  it  prudent  that  Rooke  leave 
immediately.  The  Cabinet  Council  however  appreciated  that  a  quick  departure  was  unlikely 
and  suggested  instead  that  the  main  fleet  should  also  accompany  the  convoy.  "'  This  did  not 
mean  that  the  descent  had  been  abandoned,  though.  Blathwayt  had  previously  confided  to 
Nottingham  the  King's  desire  that  any  measures  taken  for  the  Mediterranean  trade  should  not 
hinder  the  project  of  the  descent  and  when  members  of  the  Cabinet  Council  went  to  consult 
with  the  Admirals  about  the  naval  campaign,  the  assault  upon  Brest  was  still  part  of  the 
agenda.  Upon  the  orders  to  accompany  Rooke  being  sent  to  the  Admirals,  two  regiments 
were  embarked  and  they  were  to  be  followed  by  a  further  two  with  the  fifth  (for  an  unknown 
reason)  left  ashore.  Moreover,  these  orders  only  required  the  Admirals  to  accompany  Rooke 
as  far  as  they  thought  appropriate.  This  left  them  with  both  the  discretion  and  opportunity  to 
undertake  the  attack  on  Brest,  although  the  intelligence  that  Tourville  had  left  the  harbour 
negated  the  original  objective.  "  This  intelligence  was  however  unconfirmed  (Tourville  did 
42  NMM,  SOU/14,  unf:  [Blathwayt]  to  Nottingham,  27  Apr.  1693;  PRO,  ADM  3/8,  unpaginated.  Board 
Minutes,  9,10,22,25  May  1693;  PRO,  ADM  7/694,  pp.  41,53-5,67-8,72-4,77-80,82,92-4:  Order  to  the 
Admirals,  4,10  May  1693;  the  Admiralty  to  the  Admirals,  10,23,24,30  May  1693;  the  Admirals  to'Rt 
Honble',  18,22,24  May  1693. 
43  Ehrman,  'William  III  and  the  Emergence  of  a  Mediterranean  Naval  Policy',  p.  270. 
44  Ehrman,  'William  III  and  the  Emergence  of  a  Mediterranean  Naval  Policy',  pp.  270-1;  Harris,  Sir 
Cloudesley  Shovell,  pp.  163  -4,166. 
45  BL,  Add.  MSS  37992,  fos.  6-8:  Blathwayt  to  Nottingham,  15  May  1693;  PRO,  SP  44/205,  pp.  14-15: 
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not  leave  Brest  until  the  end  of  May)"  and  on  their  departure  with  the  Smyrna  convoy,  the 
expectation  was  that  the  Admirals  would  seek  an  opportunity  to  assault  Brest. 
That  opportunity  did  nonetheless  fail  to  present  itself  throughout  the  summer.  After 
initially  deciding  that  the  main  fleet  would  accompany  Rooke's  squadron  thirty  leagues  past 
Ushant,  the  Admirals  decided  to  continue  on  for  a  fiirther  twenty.  This  reflected  their  lack  of 
intelligence  on  the  movements  of  the  French  fleet  and  much  of  the  early  part  of  the  summer 
was  spent  trying  to  guess  where  Tourville  and  d'Estrdes  might  be.  To  begin  with,  the 
Admirals  believed  that  the  Toulon  squadron  had  put  into  Brest,  though  it  was  not  until  Rooke 
had  departed  that  the  earlier  reconnaissance  of  Brest  harbour  was  followed  up.  This 
confirmed  that  it  was  empty  and  the  Admirals  then  turned  their  attentions  to  a  fruitless  search 
for  Tourville  in  the  immediate  vicinity.  In  the  event,  Tourville  had  sailed  south  to  join 
d'Estrdes  to  effect  the  ambush  of  the  Smyrna  convoy  which  they  achieved  in  Lagos  Bayjust 
round  from  Cape  Vincent  on  17  June.  " 
Although  it  was  towards  the  end  of  August  when  the  Council  of  War  officially 
abandoned  the  descent  on  Brest  due  to  the  lateness  of  the  season,  in  reality  it  was  the  earlier 
confirmation  that  its  harbour  was  empty  which  had  sounded  the  death  knell  of  the  descent. 
Unable  then  to  prevent  the  joining  of  the  French  squadrons,  the  descent  was  rendered 
functionally  irrelevant  as  an  aspect  of  the  naval  strategy.  This  was  confirmed  when  the 
additional  provisions  prepared  for  the  assault  were  apportioned  to  alternative  services  soon 
after  the  June  reconnaissance;  while  at  the  beginning  of  July,  the  field  officers  were  set  ashore 
and  the  artillery  train  and  the  auxiliary  transports  vessels  were  discharged.  "'  As  London  had 
become  increasingly  concerned  for  the  security  of  Rooke's  squadron,  the  main  fleet  was 
ordered  to  set  out  to  his  aid.  Lack  of  provisions  and  poor  weather  however  prevented  the 
Carmarthen  President  of  Our  Councill,  Our  Right  Trusty  and  Right  Welbeloved  Cousins  and  Councellors 
Thomas  Earl  of  Pembroke  Keeper  of  Our  Privy  Seal,  William  Earl  of  Devonshire  Steward  of  Our  Household, 
Charles  Earl  of  Dorset  Chamberlain  of  Our  Household,  Lawrence  Earl  of  Rochester  and  Our  Right  Trusty  and 
Welbeloved  Councellor  Sir  John  Trenchard  Kt  One  of  Our  Principall  Secretarys  of  State',  13  May  1693; 
Order  to  the  Admirals,  13  May  1693;  PRO,  ADM  7/694,  pp.  56-8,70-1:  The  Admirals  to  'Rt  Honble',  18 
May  1693;  Order  to  the  Admirals,  19  May  1693. 
SYMcox,  The  Crisis  ofFrench  Sea  Power,  p.  134. 
PRO,  ADM  7/694,  pp.  101-3:  The  Admirals  to  'Rt  Honble',  16  June  1693;  de  la  Ronci6re,  Ilisloire  de  la 
Afarine  Frangaise,  A.  139-48;  Ehrman,  'William  III  and  the  Emergence  of  a  Mediterranean  Naval  Policy', 
pp.  276-8;  Harris,  Sir  Cloudesley  Shovell,  pp.  167-9. 
48  PRO,  ADM  7/694,  pp.  184-90,203-4:  The  Admirals  to  'Rt  Honble',  17  Aug.  1693;  'At  a  Council  of  War', 
19  Aug.  1693;  PRO,  SP  44/205,  pp.  29-30,34,42  :  Trenchard  to  the  Victualling  Commissioners,  23  June 
1693;  Trenchard  to  the  Transport  Commissioners,  23  June,  21  July  1693;  Trcnchard  to  Clark,  4  July  1693; 
Trenchard  to  the  Principal  officers  of  the  Ordnance,  21  July  1693. 154 
fleet  from  sailing  before  word  came  through  of  the  ambush.  Thereafter,  it  continued  cruising 
in  the  Soundings  until  the  Admirals'  requests  that  the  ships  be  laid  up  for  the  winter  were 
granted  at  the  beginning  of  September.  Within  a  month  the  Admirals  were  given  leave  to 
come  up  to  London  to  face  the  gathering  political  storm  on  the  destruction  of  the  Smyrna 
convoy.  For  the  third  year  in  succession,  a  descent  had  been  prepared  as  a  significant  part  of 
the  King's  war  strategy  only  for  it  to  be  abandoned  as  other  circumstances  demanded  more 
immediate  attention.  This  type  of  combined  operation  would  nonetheless  be  back  on  the  war 
agenda  in  the  following  year;  and  it  would  then  actually  go  ahead. 
ITUH:  The  Descent  on  Brest,  8  June  1694.  and  the  Subseguent  Proposals  for 
Descents  on  the  Northern  French  Coastline. 
Two  years  on  from  the  publication  of  his  1691  pamphlet  proposing  a  descent  on  the  French 
coast,  Littleton  wrote  a  sequel.  "'  In  this  he  criticised  the  descent  projects  undertaken  over  the 
past  two  years  for  being  either  raids,  or  grandiose  invasion  ventures  aimed  to  capture  an 
enemy  stronghold.  The  first  he  considered  morally  reprehensible  and  the  second  false 
economy  in  terms  of  men  and  resources.  Littleton's  ideal  descent  would  instead  aspire  to 
scize  a  weak  point  on  the  enemy  coast,  fortify  it  and  then  maintain  a  small  garrison.  This 
would  cost  England  little  and,  with  the  majority  of  troops  re-embarked  to  attend  to  other 
descents,  several  footholds  could  be  created  along  the  enemy  coast,  thereby  critically 
stretching  their  resources.  In  terms  of  purpose,  the  emphasis  was  on  the  strategic  priority  of 
establishing  a  second  front  upon  enemy  territory  rather  than  on  capturing  an  enemy  town  or 
port  for  immediate  tactical  reasons.  It  is  unclear  whether  Littleton  would  have  approved  of 
William's  determination  to  assault  Brest  in  1694  in  order  to  prevent  the  French  squadron 
based  there  from  leaving  for  the  Mediterranean  and  joining  with  the  Toulon  squadron  to  raise 
the  prospect  that  the  combined  fleet  might  wreck  the  havoc  on  English  trade  it  had  the 
previous  year.  At  one  level  this  descent  would  be  the  tactical  capture  of  Brest  to  destroy  the 
harbour  and  the  ships  anchored  within.  At  another  level,  it  would  be  the  implementation  of 
William's  developing  ambitions  that  England  be  the  principal  power  in  the  Mediterranean.  As 
this  would  establish  intervention  on  another  front  (albeit  one  projected  from  the  sea),  the 
descent's  strategic  credentials  must  also  be  recognised. 
49E.  Littleton,  The  Descent  Upon  France  Considered;  In  a  Letter  to  a  Member  oftarliament  (London, 
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As  a  follow-on  from  the  failures  in  1693,  a  decision  in  principle  to  attack  Brest  in 
1694  was  taken  during  the  winter  of  1693-4  and  not,  as  Professor  Childs  contends,  in  the 
spring  of  1694.  A  rendezvous  was  &ed  for  the  fleet  at  the  Downs  at  the  beginning  of  March; 
however  it  was  mid-April  before  this  was  completed,  and  by  then  events  in  the  Mediterranean 
during  the  early  months  of  the  year  had  forced  a  rethink  of  the  plan.  "  At  the  end  of 
November  1693,  Rear-Admiral  Wheler,  recently  returned  from  his  fruitless  expedition  to  the 
West  Indies  and  North  America,  had  been  sent  to  the  Straits  with  a  squadron  to  convoy  trade 
and  provide  succour  to  the  Spanish  along  their  Mediterranean  coastline.  In  February 
Wheler's  squadron  was  caught  in  a  violent  storm  as  it  made  its  way  through  to  the  Middle 
Sea  and  the  Rear-Admiral  went  down  with  his  ship  along  with  five  other  vessels.  Although 
the  remainder  of  the  squadron  made  it  into  Gibraltar  Bay,  England  was  now  without  any 
effective  naval  presence  in  the  Mediterranean  either  to  pressurise  the  French  in  that  theatre  or 
-  and  more  importantly  in  the  City's  opinion  -  to  provide  protection  for  trade.  "  It  now 
seemed  imperative  that  the  French  fleets  should  not  combine  and  the  Instructions  issued  on 
24  April  to  the  re-appointed  Admiral  of  the  Fleet  and  newly  appointed  head  of  the  Admiralty 
commissioners,  Edward  Russell,  anticipated  that  he  might  have  to  chase  the  French  Brest 
fleet  south  to  prevent  such  a  juncture  if  it  had  quit  Brest  before  an  assault  could  be  mounted.  " 
The  political  fall-out  in  the  autumn  from  the  Smyrna  convoy  ddbdcle  had  claimed 
Nottingham  as  its  principal  victim  and  abused  the  two  obviously  Tory  admirals  of  the  joint 
command  -  Delavall  and  Killegrew  -  more  than  Shovell,  thus  marking  another  milestone  on 
William's  political  journey  away  from  mixed-ministries  to  his  mid-decade  reliance  upon  the 
Whigs.  Russell,  therefore,  largely  owed  his  appointments  not  just  to  the  failures  of  the  joint 
commanding  Admirals  but  to  the  increasing  political  ascendancy  of  the  Whigs  with  whom  he 
was  identified.  "  It  was  certainly  not  due  to  his  commitment  to  descents  about  which  he  had 
been  unenthusiastic  in  1692;  and  now,  on  receiving  his  Instructions  of  24  April,  he  began  to 
"PRO,  ADM  1/5248,  unpaginated:  Naval  Minutes,  29  Dec.  1693,11  Feb.  1694;  Ehrman,  'William  III  and 
the  Emergence  of  a  Mediterranean  Naval  Policy,,  pp.  280-1;  Childs,  The  British  Army  of  William  111,  p.  221. 
51  PRO,  SP  44/205,  pp.  87-9  1:  'Instruction  for  Sir  Francis  Wheler  Kt,  Admiral  and  Commander-in-Chief  of 
their  Majesties;  Ships  in  the  Mediterranean',  20  Nov.  1693;  N.  Luttrell,  A  Briefifistorical  Relation  ofState 
Afifairs  From  September  1678  to  April  1714  (Oxford,  1857),  iii.  195,225,287;  Ehrman,  The  Navy  in  the  War 
of  William  III,  pp.  503-5,5  10;  CorbetL  England  in  the  Mediterranean,  ii.  152. 
52  PRO,  SP  44/205,  pp.  109-10:  'Instructions  for  Our  Right  Trusty  and  Well-beloved  Councellor  Edward 
Russell  Esq.  ',  24  Apr.  1694. 
"  Horwitz,  Parliament,  Policy  and  Politics,  pp.  116-19,125;  Horwitz,  Revolution  Polificks,  pp.  143-9;  T. 
Merz,  The  junto  (Newcastic-Upon-Tync,  1907),  pp.  108-27. 156 
question  their  feasibility  in  correspondence  with  the  Duke  of  Shrewsbury,  who  in  March  had 
returned  to  the  Ministry  as  Secretary  for  the  Northern  Department.  "' 
Russell's  principal  criticism  that  chasing  the  French  fleet  southwards  could  not  be 
undertaken  in  conjunction  with  a  descent  on  Brest  was  based  on  a  misinterpretation  of  his 
orders.  As  part  of  William's  strategy,  the  priority  of  the  Instructions  of  24  April  was  to  stop 
the  Brest  fleet  from  entering  the  Mediterranean  to  combine  with  the  Toulon  fleet:  the  assault 
on  Brest  harbour  and  the  chase  were  merely  possible  options  to  that  end,  depending  upon  the 
current  intelligence  of  the  enemy's  whereabouts.  "  Russell's  error  was  understandable,  for  the 
idea  that  both  options  would  be  pursued  was  driven  by  the  administrative  preparations  of  the 
descent  which,  having  suffered  an  early  delay,  continued  independently  of  the  refinement  of 
the  Instructions  upon  fresh  intelligence  altering  the  operational  context. 
Although  late  and  with  many  of  the  seamen  unpaid,  Russell's  fleet  had  managed  to 
assemble  at  Spithead  by  the  end  of  April.  There  was  however  still  no  sign  of  the  auxiliary 
store  ships,  the  artillery  train,  nor  indeed  of  the  ten  infantry  battalions  which  were  to  comprise 
the  land  force  for  the  descent.  "'  The  senior  English  general,  Thomas  Tollemache,  "  had  been 
appointed  to  command  these  troops  in  mid-April,  but  it  was  the  beginning  of  May  before  they 
had  encamped  at  Portsdown  Hill  above  Portsmouth.  Nearly  a  fortnight  later  on  II  May, 
Tollemache  announced  that  they  were  ready  to  embark  but  by  then  Russell  had  taken  those 
ships  in  the  fleet  which  had  been  paid  upon  a  reconnaissance  mission,  and  this  confirmed  the 
departure  of  the  French  fleet  under  the  command  of  Chfiteaurenault  from  Brest  harbour  - 
presumably  bound  for  the  Mediterranean.  Russell  was  furious  that  the  descent  force  had  been 
delayed,  for  Brest  was  then  seen  to  be  weakly  defended  by  only  the  town's  militia  and  a 
couple  of  regular  infantry  companies.  The  Master-General  of  the  Ordnance  -  Lord  Sydney 
-"  Private  and  Original  Correspondence  of  Charles  Talbot,  Duke  of  Shrewsbury  [hereafter  Shrewsbury 
Correspondence],  ed.  W.  Coxe  (London,  1821),  p.  192:  Russell  to  Shrewsbury,  3  May  1694. 
55  Shrewsbury  Correspondence,  p.  192:  Russell  to  Shrewsbury,  3  May  1694;  PRO,  SP  44/205,  pp.  109-10: 
'instructions  for  Our  Right  Trusty  and  Well-beloved  Councellor  Edward  Russell  Esq.,  24  Apr.  1694. 
I  Af  I  gu  Shrewsbury  Correspondence,  pp.  192:  Russell  to  Shrewsbury,  3  May  1694;  HMC,  Bucc  euch  on  ae 
, 
XfSS,  H.  "  64:  Russell  to  Shrewsbury,  3  May  1694  (although  this  is  the  same  letter  as  the  one  above,  the  editors 
of  the  two  collections  have  printed  different  sections  of  it);  PRO,  SP  44/204,  p.  114:  Trenchard  to  Sydney,  2 
May  1694. 
"  Throughout  its  800  year  history,  the  Tollemache  family  name  has  been  spelt  in  a  variety  of  ways.  I  have 
adopted  the  spelling  recommended  by  the  family's  historian  as  the  version  with  the  greatest  claims  to 
universality,  although  I  recognise  that  in  the  late  seventeenth  century  this  was  probably  not  the  prevailing 
form.  See  E.  D.  1-1.  Tol  lernache,  The  Tollemaches  ofHelminghan;  and  Ham  (Ipswich,  1949),  p.  13. 157 
was  the  main  target  of  his  ire,  being  labelled  by  the  Admiral  a  'driveller'.  "  Again,  with  the 
preparations  for  the  descent  force  continuing  in  his  absence,  Russell  had  assumed  that  the 
descent  on  Brest  had  an  additional  objective  to  preventing  the  French  fleet's  departure. 
Shrewsbury's  correspondence  with  the  Admiral  showed  that  he  shared  this  assumption, 
although  significantly,  before  Russell's  return  from  his  reconnaissance,  the  Secretary  went 
beyond  the  April  Instructions  to  outline  a  possible  scenario  which  envisaged  both  an  attack  on 
Brest  and  the  fleet  sailing  south.  The  suggestion  was  that  if  the  French  fleet  had  left  the 
harbour,  then  Russell  would  lead  a  squadron  to  the  Mediterranean  in  pursuit,  but  that  the 
detachment  which  would  have  to  be  left  behind  to  guard  the  Narrow  Seas  could  undertake 
the  descent.  Upon  hearing  that  Brest  harbour  was  empty  the  King's  reaction  was  almost 
exactly  along  these  lines.  "'  The  descent  was  now  being  uncoupled  from  the  policy  of 
preventing  a  conjunction  of  the  two  French  squadrons.  It  stood  independently  as  an  assault 
to  destroy  Brest  harbour  and  any  ship  contained  within.  Admittedly,  the  possible  strategic 
benefits  which  might  accrue  both  in  the  Channel  and  the  Mediterranean  from  knocking  out 
France's  principal  northern  port  were  not  explained,  leaving  the  operation  vulnerable  to  the 
charge  that  it  was  purposeless.  " 
To  an  extent,  the  administrative  organisation  of  the  descent  force  had  already 
prepared  the  ground  for  a  refinement  of  the  orders  contingent  upon  the  new  independence  of 
the  operation.  During  May,  as  Trenchard  laboured  to  expedite  the  preparations,  a  warrant  for 
the  embarkation  of  the  troops  aboard  the  ships  left  by  Russell  at  Spithead  under  Shovell's 
command  directed  Tollemache  to  consult  with  the  Admiral  on  how  best  the  force  might  be 
used  for  'annoying  the  enemy'.  "  No  mention  was  made  of  the  descent's  previous  purpose  as 
one  option  for  preventing  the  egress  of  the  French  fleet,  though  equally  it  was  not  specifically 
stated  that  Brest  was  to  be  targeted  regardless.  That  clarification  only  came  some  weeks 
after  Russell  had  concluded  his  reconnaissance  when,  on  29  May,  Lord  Berkeley,  who  was  to 
command  the  Channel  squadron  that  was  now  to  be  detached  from  Russell's  main  fleet,  was 
given  a  squadron  list  along  with  a  set  of  Instructions:  these  clearly  directed  Berkeley 
53  NMM,  SOU/2,  fos.  211-14:  Trenchard  to  Blathwayt,  II  May  1694;  PRO,  SP  44/167,  p.  212:  Order  to 
Henry,  Viscount  Sydney  Master-General  of  Our  Ordnance,  28  Apr.  1694;  Shrewsbury  Correspondence,  pp. 
194-6:  Russell  to  Shrewsbury,  24  May/3  June  1694;  Memoirs  Relating  to  the  Lord  Torrington,  pp.  66-7. 
Shrewsbury  Correspondence,  pp.  1934:  Shrewsbury  to  Russell,  5,19  May  1694. 
A.  N.  Ryan,  'William  III  and  the  Brest  Fleet  in  the  Nine  Years  War',  in  Hatton  &  Bromley  (eds),  William  III 
and  Louis  XIV,  p.  64;  Childs,  The  British  Army  of  William  Iff,  p.  224. 
61  NMM,  SOU/2,  fos.  207-10:  Warrant  to  Lieutenant-General  Talmash,  II  May  1694. 158 
undertake  the  descent  upon  Brest,  though  a  Council  of  War  was  to  decide  the  actual  plan  of 
attack  " 
On  31  May,  after  Russell  had  brought  his  ships  up  from  Torbay  (where  he  had  put  in 
after  his  reconnaissance  mission)  to  Spithead  and  the  two  squadrons  had  weighed  to  sail 
down  the  Channel,  a  Council  was  convened  aboard  Russell's  flagship  the  Brilannia. 
Probably  because  the  only  access  to  Brest  and  its  harbour  was  through  a  tight  channel  called 
the  Goulet,  the  Council  decided  against  a  direct  attack  and  instead  resolved  to  land  the  troops 
at  Camaret  Bay  on  the  shore  line  of  the  Roscanvel  Peninsula.  This  was  the  southern  of  two 
bays  (Bertheaume  Bay  being  the  other  to  the  north  on  the  shore  of  the  Plateau  du  Uon) 
which  flanked  the  entrance  to  the  Goulet,  and,  if  the  peninsula  could  be  secured.  then 
batteries  might  be  established  not  only  to  bombard  Brest  but  also  to  provide  cover  fire  for  the 
fleet  as  it  proceeded  up  the  Goulet  to  conduct  its  own  bombardment  of  the  harbour.  "' 
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Fig  11:  The  Descent  on  Brest. 
62  NMM,  SOU/2,  fos.  272-4:  'Orders  to  the  Rt.  lion.  John,  Lord  Berkeley,  ',  29  May  1694. 
Marquess  of  Carmarthen,  A  Journal  qfihe  Brest  Expedition,  (London  1694),  pp.  6-8,  BL,  Fgerton  MSS  "'  I 
3359,  f.  5:  'A  Draught  of  Breste  and  the  Harbour',  Childs,  The  BrilishArmY  ot'llillian,  ///,  pp.  226-7. 159 
In  formulating  this  plan  the  Council  was  not  wholly  ignorant  about  the  potential 
opposition  which  might  be  encountered.  Intelligence  had  come  through  that  Louis  XIV  had 
dispatched  his  celebrated  engineer,  Vauban,  to  Brest  and  that  he  was  busily  improving  its 
defences  and  those  on  the  attendant  coastline;  while  there  had  also  been  reports  of  significant 
numbers  of  French  foot  and  horse  being  transferred  to  the  region.  Childs  points  to  a  series  of 
'Letters  from  Brest'  mentioned  in  the  London  Gazette  of  4  June  which  mention  specifically 
trenches  and  extensive  batteries,  and  upwards  of  9000  troops  in  the  area;  he  questions  why  - 
given  that  Tollemache  was  in  receipt  of  at  least  one  of  these  letters  before  sailing  -  the 
operation  was  not  called  off?  Only  recklessness  or  a  sense  of  confidence  that  the  force  was 
sufficient  to  combat  the  French  can  provide  the  answer.  64 
The  two  squadrons  had  sailed  together  for  just  less  than  a  week  when,  on  5  June,  they 
parted  upon  their  respective  missions.  "  Once  Berkeley  had  brought  his  Anglo-Dutch  fleet  of 
some  29  warships,  fireships,  bomb  and  machine  vessels  safely  round  the  ile  d'Ouessant,  he 
called  a  Council  of  War.  This  upheld  the  principal  resolutions  of  31  May  regarding  the 
landing  site  at  Camaret  Bay  and  the  subsequent  progress  of  the  fleet  through  the  Goulet,  but 
it  considerably  refined  the  landing  disposition.  The  Monck  and  the  Dutch  frigate,  the 
Damiaten,  were  to  engage  Vauban's  recently  built  redoubt  at  the  bay  as  the  troops  landed;  a 
naval  Lieutenant  was  to  command  each  landing  boat;  and  Major-General  Lord  Cutts  secured 
agreement  that  not  only  should  600  grenadiers  land  as  a  vanguard  but  that  50  of  them  should 
initially  be  put  ashore  to  assess  the  strength  of  the  enemy  entrenchments.  Lastly,  the  Council 
expressed  its  intent  to  land  that  evening  or  at  least  for  the  squadron  to  stand  as  far  into  the 
bay  as  circumstances  would  allow. 
64  PRO,  SP  44/205,  pp.  131-2:  Trenchard  to  Russell,  24  May  1694,  and  enclosure  'Extract  of  a  letter  from  Mr 
Wolscly',  16126  May  1694;  CSPD,  1694-1695,  p.  155:  Trenchard  to  Russell,  28  May  1694,  and  enclosure 
'Extract  of  a  letter  from  Paris',  28  May  1694  [NS];  CSPD,  1695,  p.  258:  Newsletter  addressed  to  the  Earl  of 
Derwentwater,  at  Newcastle-on-Tyne,  24  May  1694;  Tollemache  Family  Archives  716,  unf.:  'An  Account  of 
the  Proceedings  of  the  Brest  Expedition  in  Vindication  of  the  Aspertions  Thrown  Upon  His  Excellencie 
Lieutenant-General  Tolmach';  Childs,  The  British  Army  of  William  III,  p.  228;  London  Gazette,  No.  2983, 
11-14  June  1694. 
65  The  ensuing  account  of  the  descent  upon  Brest  is  based  on  the  following  primary  sources  and  secondary 
authorities:  Carmarthen,  A  Journal  ofthe  Brest  FExpedition,  pp.  9-34;  BL,  Add  MSS  61264,  fos.  9-12:  'Report 
of  Descent  on  Brest';  Tollemache,  77re  Tollemaches,  pp.  78-80:  'Volunteer  with  Lt.  -Gen.  Talmach  in  the 
Expedition  to  Brest,  Given  this  15th  June  1694%  Tollemache  Family  Archives  716  unf.:  'An  Account  of  the 
Proceedings  of  the  Brest  Expedition';  'The  Attempt  on  Brestý  1694',  in  The  Naval  Miscellany,  ii.  ed.  Sir  John 
Knox  Laughton  (London,  1910),  pp.  202-5;  HMC,  PortlandMSS,  viii.  41-2:  'Engagement  in  Camarett  Bay'; 
NMM,  SOU13,  fos.  35-7:  'My  Lords  Cutts  His  Account  of  the  Attempt  at  Brest',  9  June  1694;  PRO,  SP  42/3, 
fos.  522-5:  Berkeley  to  Trenchard,  9  June  1694;  A.  le  Moyne  de  ]a  Borderie,  Ifistoire  de  Bretagne  (Rennes, 
1972),  v.  565-7;  G.  Gustave-Toudouze,  Monsieur  de  Vauban  (Paris,  1954),  pp.  103-40. 160 
Several  auxiliary  vessels  and  even  some  ships  had  fallen  too  far  astern  for  any 
progress  to  be  made  on  the  night  of  6n  June  and  it  was  the  following  afternoon  before  the 
fleet  anchored  in  the  water  between  Camaret  and  Bertheaume  bays.  On  coming  to  this 
anchorage,  a  shortening  of  the  wind  had  forced  the  fleet  upon  a  double  tack,  thus  exposing  it 
to  fire  from  the  batteries  posted  at  both  bays  as  well  as  those  situated  at  the  Point  des  Minoux 
and  the  Point  des  Filletes  on  the  north  and  south  sides  of  the  Goulet.  Fortunately,  none  of 
this  ordnance  struck  home.  Curiously  though,  Tollemache  ignored  the  extent  of  this  fire 
when,  on  returning  from  a  reconnaissance  of  Camaret  Bay,  he  reported  that  there  were 
neither  batteries  nor  trenches  nearby  and  that  with  only  Camaret  fort  presenting  an  obstacle, 
he  predicted  that  the  landing  would  take  place  without  any  opposition.  Either  on  a  separate 
survey  mission  or  accompanying  Tollemache  (the  sources  are  not  clear  on  this  point)  the 
Marquess  of  Carmarthen  and  Cutts  came  to  a  different  conclusion  about  the  extent  of  the 
French  defensive  preparations.  Returning  to  the  flagship,  they  argued  vigorously  to  Berkeley 
that  additional  ships  be  sent  in  with  the  two  already  designated  to  bombard  the  fort  at 
Camaret  Bay,  so  that  fire  might  be  directed  against  any  enemy  troops,  which  they  believed 
would  mount  considerable  opposition  to  the  landing.  In  accordance  with  his  Instructions, 
Berkeley  referred  these  matters  to  the  Council  which  was  to  assemble  in  the  early  hours  of  the 
following  morning. 
Thick  fog  at  first  light  on  8  June  kept  the  signal  for  the  Council  unposted  for  some 
four  hours,  and  when  the  cloud  lessened,  allowing  the  Council  to  meet,  it  also  revealed 
several  squadrons  of  enemy  horse  on  the  hills  rising  behind  Camaret  Bay.  "  Clearly  the 
reconnaissance  of  Carmarthen  and  Cutts  had  been  more  keenly  observed  than  Tollemache's 
efforts.  More  importantly,  it  underscored  their  argument  for  an  increase  in  the  naval 
detachment  which  would  act  as  cover  for  the  landing.  Accordingly  the  Council  resolved  that 
an  additional  six  vessels  would  follow  the  Monck  and  the  Damiaten  into  the  bay;  and,  upon 
offering,  Carmarthen  was  given  the  task  of  positioning  these  latter  two  vessels  first  and  then 
returning  to  lead  in  the  remaining  six.  Meanwhile,  the  soldiers  had  been  embarking  in  the 
landing  boats  in  the  previously  agreed  descent  order  by  which  Venner's  regiment  would 
follow  the  grenadiers  on  to  the  beach  with  the  other  battalions  then  descending  in  reinforcing 
sequential  waves. 
66  The  sources  range  from  five  to  fourteen  squadrons  of  enemy  horse. 161 
In  the  event,  as  the  landing  boats  began  to  follow  Carmarthen's  detachment  into  the 
bay  this  order  was  lost  -  an  inexcusable  circumstance  given  that  there  was  a  naval  commander 
in  each  boat  and  that  the  cahn  weather  should  have  made  it  easier  to  manoeuvre  these  small 
oared  crafts.  Conversely,  the  tranquil  weather  conditions  made  Carmarthen's  task  much 
harder.  In  the  calm  both  the  Monck  and  the  Damiaten  had  to  be  towed  into  position  which 
was  not  only  a  laborious  and  fmely  balanced  manoeuvre  but  it  also  caused  a  gap  to  open  up 
between  them  and  the  other  ships,  now  numbering  only  five  as  the  Greenwich  had  failed  to 
join  the  detachment.  The  two  warships  were  exposed  to  a  considerable  bombardment  from 
the  west  side  of  Camaret  Bay  and  the  Point  des  Filletes  before  they  could  either  bring  their 
broadside  guns  to  bear  or  the  other  vessels  arrived  in  support.  Moreover,  Carmarthen 
quickly  appreciated  that  he  faced  a  greater  number  of  batteries  -  three  emplacements  with  a 
total  of  fourteen  guns  around  Camaret  Church  with  another  redoubt  of  up  to  six  guns  behind 
the  fort  -  than  even  his  reconnaissance  had  predicted,  and  that  to  combat  this  he  would  have 
to  alter  the  naval  detachment's  position  in  the  bay.  Forced  to  visit  each  ship  individually  to 
communicate  the  new  positions,  critical  time  was  lost  as  this  inshore  detachment  failed  to 
achieve  any  superiority  over  the  shore  defences  still  less  establish  an  effective  fire  support  for 
the  beach  landing. 
The  extent  of  the  enemy  preparations  to  oppose  the  assault  also  demoralised  the 
landing  party  as  it  approached  the  shore  line.  Tollemache's  aide,  Captain  Green,  understated 
matters  when  on  spying  three  batteries  to  the  right  and  two  to  left  of  the  beach,  in  addition  to 
its  three  trenches  containing  troops  and  another  battery,  and  the  150  musketeers  positioned  to 
provide  flanking  fire,  he  noted  that  the  men  were  'not  very  forward  to  land'.  "  It  was  not, 
however,  just  the  men  who  appeared  to  waver  as  small  arms  and  ordnance  fire  began  to  rain 
down  amongst  the  boats.  Belying  the  sobriquet  'Salamander'  which  he  was  subsequently  to 
gain  for  stolidity  under  fire,  Cutts  failed  to  organise  the  50  pre-vanguard  grenadiers. 
Consequently  Tollemache  was  forced  to  cry  out  to  the  Brigadier  to  effect  the  landing  and  in 
so  doing  questioned  Cutts's  commitment  to  his  orders,  although  in  fairness  to  Cutts,  he  had 
previously  argued  that  the  operation  should  be  abandoned  if  the  50  grenadiers  found  the 
enemy  entrenchments  heavily  defended  by  regular  troops  -a  fact  which  was  clearly  apparent 
without  any  troop  landings.  Nonetheless,  Cutts's  views  had  not  been  officially  adopted  by  the 
"  Tollemache,  The  Tollemaches,  p.  79:  'Volunteer  with  Lt.  -Gen.  Tahnach  in  the  Expedition  to  Brest,  Given 
this  15th  June  1694'. 162 
Council  of  War  and  crucially  his  vacillation  in  command  forced  Tollemache  to  land 
precipitously  with  only  five  other  officers"  and  nine  grenadiers.  "" 
Leading  up  from  the  beach,  about  thirty  ydrds  from  the  shore,  were  some  rocks  which 
provided  cover  for  Tollemache  and  his  colleagues  while  they  awaited  more  troops.  Although 
remaining  in  his  boat,  Cutts  had  now  began  to  organise  the  grenadiers  and  a  party  of  150 
were  landed.  Tollemache  along  with  the  other  officers  moved  from  the  cover  of  the  rocks  to 
lead  this  group  up  the  beach;  but,  lacking  numbers  and  without  adequate  covering  fire  from 
the  vessels  in  the  bay,  this  party  was  badly  galled  by  the  French  batteries.  La  Motte  and  many 
of  the  grenadiers  were  killed,  while  Tollemache  was  shot  in  the  thigh  (a  wound  he  was 
subsequently  to  die  from  when  it  became  gangrenous  back  in  England)  and  he  struggled  back 
to  the  shelter  of  the  rocks  again  with  Green  and  Montargier.  "  A  further  200  grenadiers  next 
made  it  on  to  the  shore  and  Tollemache,  despite  his  wound,  again  went  to  rally  them  for  an 
attack  up  the  beach.  Carmarthen's  naval  detachment  was  still  making  no  impact  upon  the 
French  batteries  whose  fire  along  with  some  French  marines,  killed  many  English  troops  and 
forced  the  rest  to  retreat  to  the  boats.  For  a  third  time,  Tollemache  was  back  under  the  rocks 
with  his  two  colleagues.  Just  then  Green  spied  a  considerable  party  of  French  horse  making 
its  way  down  to  the  beach  and,  fearing  a  rout,  he  was  able  to  persuade  a  reluctant  Tollemache 
that  the  descent  could  not  succeed.  Further  ignominy  was  still  to  attend  the  General  before 
he  could  leave  the  bay,  however.  The  ebb  tide  at  landing  had  stranded  many  of  the  boats  on 
the  beach  and,  with  desertions  amongst  the  crews,  refloating  was  proving  difficult.  After 
lifting  Tollemache  into  a  boat,  Green  faced  this  problem  and  had  to  bribe  the  crew  of 
63  The  officers  were  Colonel  de  la  Motte,  Lieutenant-Colonel  de  Montargier,  Captain  Green  and  an  Ensign 
accompanying  the  grenadiers. 
69  The  reader  should  be  warned  about  the  narrative  of  the  descent  in  Ment  Clark,  Goodwin  Wharton  (Great 
Britain,  1984),  pp.  289-93,  which  could  be  considered  misleading  on  several  counts.  Not  only  does  Clark 
seemingly  misunderstand  the  nature  and  function  of  the  grenadiers  by  claiming  on  p.  291  that  their  standard 
operational  form  was  'neat  rows'  which  undertook  'text-book  attacks'  (see  above  p.  53  for  a  different 
interpretation),  he  claims  that  Tollcmache  aborted  the  planned  grenadier  vanguard  on  nearing  the  shore,  and 
instead  chose  to  land  the  regular  infantry  under  his  leadership.  There  is  no  mention  of  the  General's 
exchange  of  words  with  Cutts  to  encourage  him  to  land  the  grenadiers;  rather  Clark  writes  on  p.  292  that 
Cutts  was  ordered  to  go  to  the  rear  of  the  boats  to  organise  the  reinforcements.  Another  questionable  claim  by 
Clark  is  the  statement  that  it  was  Carmarthen  who  -  after  returning  from  his  reconnaissance  -  committed  the 
additional  warships  to  his  detachment,  when  quite  clearly  only  the  Council  of  War  had  the  authority  to  take 
(as  it  did)  that  decision. 
"  Childs,  The  British  Army  of  William  III,  p.  234  states  that  Tollemache  received  his  wound  on  making  his 
final  retreat  from  the  rocks  to  the  shore.  I  have  instead  preferred  to  follow  the  Captain  Green's  account  - 
Tollemache,  ne  Tollemaches,  p.  79:  'Volunteer  with  Lt.  -Gen.  Talmach  in  the  Expedition  to  Brest,  Given  this 
15th  June  1694'  -  which  clearly  states  that  the  General  was  shot  in  the  thigh  when  he  went  to  lead  the  150 
grenadiers  which  had  landed. 163 
Berkeley's  long-boat  to  help  get  the  General  safely  off  the  shore.  The  spirit  of  combined 
army  and  navy  operational  endeavour  here  was  somewhat  defective. 
As  Tollcmachc's  boat  reached  the  relative  safety  of  the  flagship  whence  he  was 
quickly  transferred  with  a  surgeon  to  the  Dreadhought,  the  Earl  of  Macclesfield  and 
Carmarthen  were  left  to  withdraw  the  remaining  land  and  naval  forces.  Theirs  was  an 
unenviable  task.  Macclesfield,  although  not  on  the  beach,  had  to  bring  off  the  remaining 
grenadiers  as  the  French  party  of  horse  bore  down  and  also  turn  around  the  other  landing 
craft  still  burdened  with  their  troops.  Carmarthen  meanwhile  had  to  put  about  his  detachment 
of  ships  whose  rigging  and  masts  had  been  badly  damaged  during  their  engagement  with  the 
fort  and  shore  batteries.  Given  the  progress  of  the  descent  to  that  point,  it  was  perhaps 
remarkable  that  only  the  Dutch  vessel,  the  Wesep,  and  four  landing  boats  (from  which 
approximately  50  grenadiers  were  taken  prisoner)  had  to  be  abandoned;  but,  combined  with 
the  1091  seamen  and  troops  killed,  wounded  and  missing,  "  it  represented  an  additional 
failure  which  had  to  be  addressed  by  the  Council  when  it  convened  that  afternoon  on  board 
the  Dreadnought. 
The  Council  quickly  fixed  upon  the  extent  of  the  French  defences  as  the  principal 
cause  of  the  descent's  failure  but  when  Tollemache  suggested  that  a  small  squadron  be  sent  to 
bombard  Brest,  the  Council  demurred  on  the  basis  that  it  required  a  prevailing  westerly  and 
easterly  wind  respectively  to  get  in  and  out  of  Brest,  thus  raising  the  prospect  of  a 
considerable  delay  while  waiting  for  the  appropriate  wind.  Perhaps  more  revealing  however 
were  Berkeley's  fears  about  the  quantity  and  capability  of  French  ordnance  at  the  town, 
which  he  subsequently  confided  to  Trenchard.  "  Accordingly,  as  the  fleet  upon  the  Council's 
direction  returned  to  Spithead  to  land  the  soldiers  and  await  further  orders,  the  importance  of 
Vauban's  preparations  at  and  around  Brest  in  scuppering  the  descent  was  reinforced  in 
English  minds.  Yet  with  respect  to  the  execution  of  the  combined  operation,  this  perception 
71  PRO,  SP  42/3,  fos.  518-19:  'An  account  of  the  soldiers  and  seamen  that  are  killed,  wounded,  or  otherwise 
missing  since  late  action  in  Camarett  Bay.  &  what  ships  they  were  on  board';  'An  account  what  officers  and 
soldiers  are  killed,  wounded  or  missing  that  were  on  board  the  Dutch  men  of  war';  'An  account  what  seamen 
were  killed  and  wounded  belonging  to  the  Dutch  ships'.  There  are  a  variety  of  claims  made  in  both  the 
primary  and  secondary  sources  as  to  how  many  men  were  killed,  wounded  or  missing  at  Brest.  Instead  of 
trying  to  split  the  difference  between  them  all,  I  have  opted  for  the  official  tally  which  certainly  seems  well 
informed  in  terms  of  basic  information.  I  recognise  however  that  the  authorities  in  England  might  equally 
have  been  pursuing  an  agenda  in  the  presentation  of  these  figures,  and  that  accordingly  they  might  have  been 
massaged  downwards. 
72  PRO,  SP  42/3,  fos.  522-5:  Berkeley  to  Trenchard,  9  June  1694. 164 
about  the  role  of  the  French  defences  can  be  shown  to  be  largely  a  tactical  and  strategic  red 
herring. 
Firstly,  unwarranted  attention  is  often  paid  to  this  issue  because  of  the  allegation  that 
it  was  the  Earl  of  Marlborough  who  had  betrayed  the  project  to  Louis  XIV.  Childs  rightly 
warns  against  concentrating  upon  an  issue  which  Marlborough's  biographers  have  exhausted. 
In  short,  it  would  seem  (assuming  the  letter  is  not  a  forgery)  that  Marlborough  did  write  to 
Louis  about  the  descent  but  that  his  letter  was  not  the  first  which  the  French  King  had 
received  on  the  English  plans.  Effective  operational  secrecy  was  rarely  achieved  in  early 
modem  warfare  and,  as  Childs  again  appositely  remarks,  Louis's  intelligence  provision  would 
have  had  to  have  been  exceptionally  inadequate  for  him  not  to  have  known  even  as  early  as 
April  (which  he  did)  what  the  English  planned.  It  is  also  significant  that  following  the 
bombardment  of  St  Malo  in  November  1693,  Louis  had  directed  Vauban  to  make  a  swift 
inspection  of  the  defences  on  the  Cotentin  peninsula  and  the  Brittany  coast.  So,  when  on 
receiving  intelligence  of  the  projected  Brest  attack  and  ordering  Vauban  in  early  May  (NS)  to 
attend  specially  to  the  fortifications  at  Brest  and  the  defences  of  Camaret  and  Bertheaurne 
bays,  improvements  at  these  places  had  already  been  on  the  French  King's  agenda.  "' 
Stripped,  therefore,  of  the  allure  of  scandal,  the  defences  should  be  properly  placed  within  the 
context  of  the  operation. 
This  does  not  mean  that  the  importance  of  the  batteries  and  the  fortifications  in  the 
repulse  of  the  English  can  be  denied.  As  has  been  seen,  they  were  undoubtedly  the  immediate 
cause  of  failure.  The  commanders  knew  that  Vauban  had  been  fortifying  the  area,  and  his 
reputation  pointed  to  a  conclusion  that  the  defences  being  put  in  place  were  probably 
considerable.  Moreover,  it  was  an  assessment  of  the  strength  of  the  French  position  which 
led  to  the  naval  detachment  designed  for  the  bay  being  augmented.  "  The  descent  was 
launched  in  the  knowledge  that  it  would  be  opposed  and  probably  vigorously  so.  However, 
there  was  also  a  reasonable  hope  that  this  opposition  could  be  overcome.  Given  that  context, 
the  tactical  reasons  for  failure  must  therefore  be  looked  for  elsewhere.  The  King  was  of  the 
"Childs,  The  British  Army  of  william  III,  pp.  224-7,238  n.  19;  B.  Pujo,  Vauban  (Paris,  1991),  p.  191;  A. 
Blanchard,  Vauban  (  [Paris],  1996),  p.  Y.  le  Gallo,  Histoire  de  Brest  (Toulouse,  1976),  p.  130. 
74  PRO,  SP  44/205,  pp.  131-2:  Trenchard  to  Russell,  24  May  1694,  and  enclosure  'Extract  of  a  letter  from  Mr 
Wolsely',  16126  May  1694;  Tollemache  Family  Archives,  716,  unf  :  'An  Account  of  the  Proceedings  of  the 
Brest  Expedition  in  Vindication  of  the  Aspertions  Thrown  Upon  US  Excellencie  Lieutenant-General 
Tolmach';  Carmarthen,  A  Journal  of  the  Brest  Expedition,  pp.  14-17. 165 
opinion  that  Tollemache's  'too  ardent  zeal"'  had  caused  him  to  act  rashly,  thereby  implying 
that  his  military  judgement  was  suspect.  Macclesfield  also  made  this  point,  but  rather  more 
brutally,  when  he  wrote  to  Portland  after  Tollemache's  death  that  the  'King  has  lost  a  subject 
but  not  a  General'.  '  It  was  Shrewsbury  who  -  though  probably  inadvertently  -  provided  a 
credible  answer.  With  few  details  then  to  hand,  his  relation  to  the  King  of  the  events  at  Brest 
noted  the  recollections  of  an  unnamed  participant  that  boats  had  run  into  each  other  and  that 
too  many  craft  had  large  draughts  which  were  inappropriate  for  descending  upon  an  ebb 
tide.  "  The  loss  of  order  by  the  boats  -a  naval  responsibility  inasmuch  as  a  ship's  Lieutenant 
was  in  command  of  each  -  as  they  followed  Carmarthen's  detachment  into  the  bay  was  critical 
for  it  meant  that  the  anticipated strike-force  momentum  built-in  by  the  sequential  landing 
disposition  could  not  be  realised.  Moreover,  as  some  boats  struggled  with  the  ebb  tide  and 
Cutts's  irresolution  about  landing  the  grenadiers  took  hold,  a  confusion  arose  which 
prevented  Tollemache  reordering  the  nearby  boats  to  effect  a  landing  of  a  good  number  of 
troops,  albeit  not  in  the  form  of  sequential  waves.  Tollemache's  military  judgement  was  too 
severely  circumscribed  by  the  conditions  and  by  Cutts's  actions  to  be  at  fault;  zeal  was  all  he 
could  offer  as  a  substitute.  That  could  not  however  remedy  the  woeful  inadequate  strike- 
force  of  five  officers  and  nine  grenadiers  which  were  first  on  to  the  beach  nor  could  the 
additional  350  grenadiers  which  subsequently  landed.  The  tactical  deficiency  of  the  descent 
was  simply  the  failure  to  submit  the  French  opposition  to  the  maximum  potential  of  the 
English  plan. 
Strategically,  the  failure  at  Brest  has  been  attributed  -  though  probably  unintentionally 
given  that  the  context  of  the  passage  was  tactics  -  to  the  inflexibility  of  the  operational 
Instructions  which  are  considered  to  have  afforded  Tollemache  or  the  other  senior 
commanders  no  discretion  in  target  selection.  "  It  follows  that  as  they  were  unable  to  favour 
an  alternative  point  of  attack,  which  might  have  seemed  to  offer  better  prospects  of  success 
when  in-theatre,  failure  was  largely  predetermined  -  especially  given  the  extent  of  the  French 
defences  at  Brest.  In  a  confused  manner,  this  was  an  issue  which  subsequently  greatly 
exercised  those  involved.  After  the  repulse,  the  afternoon  Council  on  8  June  asked 
Tollemache  if  he  had  the  authority  to  mount  an  attack  elsewhere.  The  General  claimed  then 
75  Shrewsbury  Correspondence,  p.  46:  William  Iff  to  Shrewsbury,  I  July  1694  [NS]. 
76  NUL,  PwA  469,  unf.:  Macclesfield  to  Portland,  16  July  1694. 
"  Shrewsbury  Correspondence,  pp.  41-4:  Shrewsbury  to  William  111,15  June  1694. 166 
that  he  did  not  and  maintained  this  view  until  his  death  on  22  June.  However,  Secretary 
Trenchard  was  equally  adamant  in  his  subsequent  correspondence  that  the  orders  did  not 
restrict  Tollemache  to  land  only  at  Brest  and  that  the  Council  of  War  possessed  the  sovereign 
authority  to  alter  any  aspect  of  the  operation.  Certainly,  when  delayed  with  the  fleet  at 
Spithead,  and  in  receipt  of  intelligence  regarding  Vauban's  work  at  Brest,  Tollemache  wrote 
to  the  Court  of  his  desire  to  land  elsewhere;  and  his  Proponents  later  claimed  that  as  no  reply 
was  offered  the  General  assumed  that  the  attack  on  Brest  must  proceed  regardless.  It  cannot 
be  established  whether  the  Court  did  reply  but  before  the  fleet  left  England,  Trenchard 
reported  Tollemache's  request  to  Blathwayt,  though  he  misinterpreted  it  to  mean  that 
Tollemache  wanted  to  undertake  an  additional  attack  which  Trenchard  dismissed  on  the 
grounds  of  insufficient  resources.  The  Secretary  did  stress  to  Blathwayt,  however,  that  the 
operational  orders  did  not  fix  the  assault  at  a  particular  place:  the  Council  of  War  was  to 
advise  on  that.  These  points  Trenchard  returned  to  in  correspondence  with  Blathwayt  after 
reading  the  minutes  of  the  Council  of  the  afternoon  of  8  June.  "  The  final  Instructions  issued 
on  29  May  hold  the  answers.  In  this  document  Brest  is  clearly  stated  as  the  first  strike  target 
and  Trenchard  was  being  disingenuous  to  claim  that  no  particular  place  had  been  settled 
upon,  though  only  insofar  as  he  meant  a  wholly  different  target.  The  Instructions  only 
allowed  the  Council  full  discretion  to  determine  the  landing  site  and  the  tactical  deployment 
of  the  force  at  Brest.  Tollemache,  on  the  other  hand,  was  guilty  of  ambiguity.  His  claim  that 
he  had  no  power  to  order  an  attack  elsewhere  was  only  strictly  correct  in  that  he  could  not 
personally  sanction  such  a  move.  The  Instructions  expressively  stipulated  that  after  the  land 
forces  had  completed  whatever  was  possible  at  Brest,  then  a  Council  of  War  was  to  consider 
what  might  be  undertaken  elsewhere.  "  By  prioritising  the  targets,  the  Instructions  lacked  the 
strategic  vision  which  might  have  allowed  for  an  alternative  place  on  the  Brittany  coast  to  be 
attacked  in  pursuance  of  the  same  objectives  inasmuch  as  if  a  foothold  could  have  been 
secured  on  enemy  territory  then  a  body  of  troops  might  have  been  dispatched  to  attack  Brest 
from  the  interior.  Tollemache's  failure  at  Brest  was  not  tactical  but  strategic:  he  was  too 
willing  to  accept  the  limitations  of  the  Instructions. 
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In  the  aftermath  of  the  failure  at  Brest  the  King  -  albeit  indirectly  -  threw  his  support 
behind  further  descents  on  the  northern  French  coast  by  confirming  that  he  would  not 
immediately  recall  the  soldiers  to  Flanders  and  was  content  for  them  to  be  otherwise 
employed.  This  caused  the  Queen  to  order  Berkeley  to  hold  a  Council  of  War  of  land  and  sea 
officers  to  consider  what  might  now  be  undertaken  against  the  French  coast.  With  Brest  no 
longer  a  viable  target,  the  Council,  which  assembled  on  15  June  at  St  Helens,  seemed  bereft 
of  ideas.  It  rather  vaguely  resolved  that  the  squadron  would  sail  to  the  northern  French  coast 
with  the  soldiers  and  the  bomb  vessels  to  'give  the  enemy  as  much  trouble'  as  the  weather 
conditions  would  allow.  This  proved  insufficiently  detailed  for  the  Queen  who,  through 
Secretary  Trenchard,  ordered  the  fleet  to  the  Isle  of  Wight  to  land  the  soldiers  until  the 
Council  decided  both  upon  a  particular  target  and  the  number  of  troops  that  would  be 
deployed.  In  his  defence  of  the  Council's  deliberations,  Berkeley  drew  upon  the  military  case 
for  descents  as  expressed  by  Littleton's  first  pamphlet.  The  Admiral  claimed  that  the 
Council's  vague  resolution  to  remain  ready  in  sight  of  the  French  coast  was  a  ploy  to  keep  the 
enemy  guessing  as  to  where  a  landing  might  take  place  thereby  forcing  them  to  stretch  their 
resources  to  cover  all  possible  options.  Berkeley  also  claimed  the  more  practical  motivation 
that,  in  light  of  recent  events,  it  was  prudent  to  keep  operational  details  secret.  A  further 
Council  held  on  18  June  was  only  a  little  more  specific  in  it  resolutions,  suggesting  Calais, 
Dieppe,  and  Havre  de  Grace  as  possible  targets.  For  this,  four  regiments  were  considered 
sufficient  but  it  was  significant  that  greater  emphasis  was  placed  on  their  help  to  man  the  fleet 
and  the  bomb  vessels  rather  than  as  an  assault  force.  The  Council  was  now  promoting 
bombardment  as  a  form  of  engagement  upon  the  enemy  coast  and  in  conjunction  with  the 
increasing  impasse  between  the  Council  and  the  Queen,  descents  were  being  undermined  as  a 
part  of  the  war  policy.  " 
Obviously  keen  that  some  attack  be  made  against  the  French  coast,  the  Cabinet 
Council  attempted  to  push  events  forward  by  accepting  the  Council  of  War's  prerogative 
over  targeting.  The  Lords  were,  however,  of  the  opinion  that  the  full  ten  battalions  should  be 
embarked  if  the  Council  of  War's  objective  remained  to  keep  the  enemy  resources  stretched; 
this  they  believed  would  leave  weak  points  on  the  coast  where  the  English  troops  might  be 
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profitably  landed.  Consequently,  once  the  King  had  again  confirmed  that  he  did  not  require 
the  troops  in  Flanders,  Berkeley  was  ordered  to  embark  the  ten  battalions  with  Macclesfield 
as  their  commander.  "'  The  Admiral  and  the  Council  of  War  were  however  now  settled  upon 
the  bombardment  of  French  coastal  towns  rather  than  troops  landings.  In  early  July,  the 
Channel  squadron  set  about  bombarding  Dieppe  and  Havre  de  Grace,  reducing  the  former  to 
ashes  and  leaving  about  two-thirds  of  the  latter  ablaze.  In  Berkeley's  account  of  these  actions 
there  is  no  indication  that  the  soldiers  were  deployed  in  a  combined  action,  other  than  as  help 
in  manning  the  fleet  and  the  bomb  vessels.  Just  before  sailing  from  Dieppe,  Berkeley  did  send 
the  Elizabeth  and  a  brigantine  with  Colonel  Venner  in  command  of  200  troops  to  make  an 
assault  upon  Treport,  but  this  detachment  soon  returned  having  failed  to  effect  a  landing.  In 
truth,  the  Admiral  considered  the  ten  regiments  a  burden  -  especially  since  two  of  his 
squadron  had  been  withdrawn  to  escort  the  victualling  ships  bound  for  the  Mediterranean. 
He  warned  that  the  overcrowding  would  cause  the  spread  of  sickness  and  returned  to  his 
claim  that  four  regiments  would  be  sufficient  to  make  good  the  lack  of  seamen  manning  the 
squadron.  " 
The  bombardment  of  Dieppe  and  Havre  de  Grace  had  taken  its  toll  upon  the  bomb 
vessels  and  the  ship-borne  mortars,  and  Berkeley's  squadron  was  back  on  the  English  coast  at 
the  end  of  July  for  a  refit.  Permission  was  then  given  for  him  to  disembark  some  of  the 
soldiers  if  he  wished,  but  he  was  to  come  to  London  for  discussions  on  how  best  the 
squadron  might  be  employed  for  the  remainder  of  the  campaign  season.  At  these  it  was 
decided  to  target  Dunkirk  and  for  the  rest  of  the  summer  attempts  were  made  by  the  Channel 
squadron  first  under  Berkeley  and  then,  when  the  first  and  second  rates  had  been  laid  up  at 
the  end  of  August,  under  Shovell,  to  destroy  Dunkirk  harbour  through  bombardment  or  the 
explosion  of  fireships  and  machine  vessels.  In  mid-September,  Shovell  also  brought  the 
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squadron  in  front  of  Calais  to  bombard  it.  "  At  least  four  regiments  from  the  original  ten  were 
aboard  the  squadron  during  these  attempts"  but  at  no  point  was  a  landing  attempted  nor  is 
there  evidence  to  suggest  the  troops'  active  participation  in  the  bombardments.  In  the  event, 
these  proved  largely  unsuccessful,  though  not  sufficiently  so  to  diminish  the  increasing 
support  of  them  as  the  instrument  of  warfare  best  directed  against  the  French  coastline.  "'  A 
combination  of  the  failure  at  Brest  and  their  subsequent  frustration  by  the  commanding 
Admiral  and  the  Council  of  War  had  caused  the  descents  to  be  dropped  as  the  preferred  form 
of  coastal  attack.  Although  in  the  summer  of  1696,  a  couple  of  small  scale  descents  -  in 
reality  these  were  little  more  than  raids  -  were  undertaken  by  Berkeley  and  Captain  Messe  at 
Belle  ile,  the  islands  of  Houat  and  Hoddic,  and  Rhd  Island,  it  would  appear  that  neither 
infantry  nor  marines  soldiers  were  involved,  and  that  the  brief  landings  which  did  take  place 
were  conducted  by  the  seamen.  By  mid-decade,  bombardment  was  the  staple  form  of  assault 
upon  France's  northern  coasts  and  the  only  combined  army  and  navy  operations  being 
deployed  in  the  European  theatre  were  in  the  Mediterranean  through  the  agency  of  Russell's 
fleet.  97 
THAV:  Combined  Operations  and  Admiral  Russell's  Mediterranean  Fleet,  1695. 
Two  months  on  from  leaving  Berkeley  37  miles  south  of  Rams  head,  Admiral  Russell  led  his 
fleet  of  63  warships  through  the  Gibraltar  Straits  and  into  the  Mediterranean.  July  had  been 
spent  refitting  and  revictualling  at  Cddiz  and,  seeking  the  combined  French  fleet,  Russell  was 
bound  for  the  waters  off  Barcelona  where  Tourville  had  taken  station  to  succour  Noailles's 
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army  as  it  advanced  on  this  principal  Catalan  town.  "  For  the  1694  campaign,  Louis  XIV  had 
committed  large  resources  to  the  war  in  Spain  in  the  hope  that  Noailles,  who  had  first  led  a 
French  army  into  Spain  four  years  previously,  could  make  considerable  gains  in  Catalonia  and 
force  the  Spanish  to  a  separate  peace.  The  French  King's  calculation  was  that  this  would 
damage  the  unity  of  the  Grand  Alliance  and  perhaps  cause  the  other  members  to  seek 
individual  peace  with  the  French.  On  7  May,  Noailles's  army  decamped  from  Le  Boulou  and 
assisted  by  Tourville's  Toulon  squadron  made  good  progress.  The  Fluvia  and  Ter  rivers  were 
crossed  by  the  end  of  May  and  at  the  latter  the  Spanish  army,  commanded  by  Catalonia's 
viceroy  the  Duke  of  Escalona,  was  defeated.  A  month  later  Palam6s  and  Gerona  fell  to  the 
French  who,  shadowed  by  their  now  combined  fleet,  pressed  on  towards  Barcelona;  a  siege  in 
early  autumn  seemed  probable.  However,  news  of  Russell's  approach  caused  Tourville  to 
scurry  back  to  Toulon,  believing  his  fleet  to  be  outnumbered  by  the  Anglo-Dutch  force.  The 
balance  was  more  even  than  the  French  Admiral  thought  but  his  actions  based  on  this 
perception  had  effectively  allowed  Russell  to  complete  his  mission  of  chasing  the  French  from 
the  Mediterranean  sea;  while  it  also  meant  that  Noailles  was  without  the  necessary  fleet 
support  to  besiege  Barcelona.  " 
Running  short  of  provisions  and  with  only  a  few  weeks  left  in  which  the  larger  rated 
vessels  could  remain  at  sea,  Russell's  expectation  was  that  he  would  shortly  head  for 
England.  The  King,  wishing  to  consolidate  this  newly  gained  strategic  position  in  the 
Mediterranean,  had  other  ideas,  however.  At  the  end  of  July,  William  let  it  be  known  to  the 
Cabinet  Council  that  he  wanted  Russell  to  continue  as  long  as  possible  in  the  Mediterranean 
and  on  his  departure  to  leave  a  substantial  squadron  to  winter  in  those  parts.  William's  actual 
desire  was  for  the  whole  fleet  to  winter  in  the  Mediterranean  but,  as  political  cover,  he 
wanted  the  initiative  on  this  to  come  from  his  ministers.  However,  when  the  Cabinet  Council 
vacillated  over  interpreting  the  King's  intentions  and  then  issued  Russell  with  Instructions 
which  allowed  him  the  option  of  returning  home  depending  upon  what  stage  in  his  return 
journey  he  had  received  these  orders,  the  King  decide  to  issue  his  own  Instructions  on  7 
August.  These  were  unequivocal:  Russell  was  to  use  Cddiz  as  a  base  and  winter  with  the 
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whole  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean;  only  the  passage  of  the  French  fleet  through  the  Straits 
would  admit  Russell's  departure.  The  prospect  of  wintering  in  the  Mediterranean  had 
apparently  been  raised  with  Russell  earlier  in  the  summer  and  on  that  occasion  he  had  argued 
strongly  against  it  on  strategic  and  practical  grounds.  His  immediate  reaction  on  receiving  his 
Instructions  was  no  different.  It  was  largely  due  to  Shrewsbury's  soothing  correspondence 
that  Russell  accepted  the  King's  orders  without  first  embarrassing  himself  or  causing  his 
command  to  be  vulnerable  by  raising  objections.  "  William  now  had  the  strategic  presence  in 
the  Mediterranean  which  he  had  long  aimed  for  and  the  1695  campaign  season  offered  the 
prospect  of  converting  this  into  territorial  gains  upon  the  French  Mediterranean  coastline  or 
tangible  diplomatic  currency  by  helping  the  Spaniards  to  force  Noailles  back  across  the 
Pyrenees. 
Aside  from  the  marine  soldiers  aboard,  Russell's  fleet  had  no  additional  troops  to  use 
either  as  a  strike  force  on  the  French  coast  or  to  offer  as  support  to  the  Spanish  army.  These 
circumstances  had  in  1694  caused  him  reject  the  Spanish  Viceroy's  proposal  to  augment  his 
army  for  attacks  against  French  positions.  "  Accordingly,  it  was  decided  in  December  to 
boost  Russell's  capability  by  dispatching  to  Cddiz  four  regiments  -  about  3000  men  in  total. 
The  emphasis  of  command  was  indeed  upon  the  Admiral  for,  although  Brigadier  Stewart  was 
appointed  commanding  officer  of  the  regiments,  he  was  to  defer  to  Russell  about  their 
deployment  and  Russell  was  separately  commissioned  as  Captain-General.  The  decision  had 
been  taken  before  the  turn  of  the  calendar  year  to  ensure  that  the  troops  arrived  in  the 
Mediterranean  early  in  the  campaign  season  but  transport  arrangements  quickly  ran  into  many 
problems.  A  portion  of  the  troops  were  to  go  aboard  the  victualling  convoy  and  bomb 
vessels  set  to  leave  in  the  spring  but  for  the  remainder  ships  would  have  to  be  hired.  The 
initial  hope  that  these  vessels  would  be  ready  to  come  down  the  River  Thames  to  the  Downs 
as  soon  as  the  ice  melted  at  the  end  of  January  quickly  proved  forlorn  as  the  owners  proved 
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punctilious  in  getting  protection  for  their  crews  in  advance  of  concluding  the  Charter  Party 
negotiations.  Even  then  the  transport  ships  proved  slow  in  getting  to  the  Downs  whence  they 
were  still  to  sail  along  the  coast  to  Spithead  for  the  troop  embarkation.  In  late  March, 
William  got  Blathwayt  to  float  a  proposal  that  ships  at  Portsmouth  be  hired  instead.  When 
Lord  Cutts,  whom  the  King  had  appointed  to  inspect  and  embark  the  soldiers,  wrote  that 
there  was  a  shortage  of  800  berths  upon  his  arrival  at  Portsmouth,  Blathwayt:  might  well  have 
wished  that  he  had  pushed  the  proposal  further.  It  was  notjust  the  organisation  of  the 
transports  which  gave  rise  to  delay  for  problems  emerged  during  the  embarkation  process. 
Many  of  the  companies  remained  unpaid  due  to  their  officers'  peculation  and  it  was  the 
stifling  of  an  order  about  pay  by  an  officer  which  allegedly  led  to  the  mutiny  of  four 
companies  of  Brigadier  Stewart's  regiment  at  Salisbury  as  they  marched  to  Southampton, 
where  they  were  to  board.  Cutts's  intelligent  management  of  these  problems  ensured  they  did 
not  proliferate  and  cause  even  greater  delay,  thus  allowing  him  to  complete  the  embarkation 
towards  the  end  of  March.  Shortly  thereafter,  the  convoy  was  reported  to  be  in  mid-channel, 
off  St  Catherine's  point  and  bolstered  by  a  fair  gale  from  the  east  and  north.  Within 
approximately  three  weeks  the  troops  were  with  Russell.  " 
A  descent  on  Toulon  or  at  Marseilles  -  similar  in  form  to  that  undertaken  at  Brest  - 
was  considered  the  optimum  use  of  these  troops  by  the  Ministry  and  the  Instructions  sent  to 
Russell  in  May  actually  prioritised  these  targets  and  not  order  their  abandonment  as  Childs 
contends.  To  bolster  the  attack,  a  link-up  with  some  soldiers  provided  by  the  Duke  of  Savoy, 
Victor  Amadeus  II,  which  would  march  upon  the  target  from  the  interior  was  also  mooted 
and  the  English  envoy  in  Turin,  Lord  Galway,  was  attempting  to  co-ordinate  matters.  Russell, 
however,  first  attended  to  the  subordinate  part  of  his  Instructions  which  required  that  he  put 
troops  into  Barcelona  to  prevent  its  capture  by  the  French  who  were  considered  likely  to 
make  it  a  priority  again  in  the  forthcoming  campaign.  Then  he  took  the  fleet  to  the  hes 
d'Hy&es  whence  he  was  able  to  reconnoitre  Toulon;  while  Rear-Admiral  Neville  was  sent 
with  four  Colonels  to  assess  Marseilles.  Both  missions  reported  on  the  extensive  French 
92  Shrewsbury  Correspondence,  p.  78,222-4:  Shrewsbury  to  William  111,23  Dec.  1694,2  Jan.  1695;  Russell 
to  Shrewsbury,  10  Feb.  1695;  PRO,  WO  5/7,  unE:  Blathwayt  to  Bridgeman,  9,16,19  Jan,  6  Feb.  1695; 
Blathwayt  to  the  Commissioners  of  Transportation,  16  Jan.  21,22  Feb.,  7,8  Mar.  1695;  Blathwayt  to  Cutts, 
17  Mar.  1695;  PRO,  SP  44/168,  p.  104:  'Instructions  for  Our  Trusty  and  Welbeloved  Brigadier-General 
William  Stewart  Commanding  Our  Land  Forces  Going  for  Cadiz',  12  Mar.  1695;  Childs,  'Lord  Cutts's 
Letters,  1695',  nos.  12-14,17-20,  pp.  394-6,398-404:  Cutts  to  Blathwayt,  16,19,21,22,24  Mar.  1695; 
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defensive  preparations,  particularly  at  Toulon  where  the  French  fleet  lay,  apparently  showing 
no  signs  of  putting  out.  In  the  interval,  Victor  Amadeus,  having  set  in  train  the  negotiation 
which  would  lead  to  a  separate  peace  with  France  and  Savoy's  departure  from  the  Grand 
Alliance,  failed  to  respond  to  Galway.  Russell  then  returned  to  the  Catalan  coast  to  find  that 
the  troops  were  not  required  in  Barcelona  as  the  war  in  Spain  had  taken  a  different  course 
from  the  previous  year.  "' 
The  opportunity  for  Russell  to  intervene  in  the  Spanish  theatre  was  a  product  of  the 
altered  military  realities  in  Catalonia  where  the  energy  of  the  new  Viceroy  and  army 
commander,  the  Marquis  de  Gastaflaga,  caused  the  Spaniards  to  take  the  initiative.  In  the 
spring,  he  moved  to  capture  Ostalric  and  Castelfollit  de  la  Roca  and,  although  on  that 
occasion  French  relief  got  through,  by  the  end  of  July  the  new  French  commander,  the  Duc 
de  Vend6me,  abandoned  the  former  town  upon  Gastaflaga's  second  approach.  The  French 
had  retired  to  Gerona  and  consequently  the  Viceroy  was  keen  to  capture  Palam6s  next;  but 
with  only  an  army  of  12  000  (many  of  whom  were  sick)  and,  more  importantly,  lacking  the 
heavy  ordnance  which  would  be  necessary  to  conduct  a  successful  siege,  he  sought  Russell's 
help.  "'  At  the  beginning  of  August,  after  having  withdrawn  the  troops  from  Barcelona,  the 
two  commanders  held  a  meeting  at  Blanes,  about  a  half  days  march  from  the  Spanish  camp, 
and  it  was  agreed  that  Russell  would  provide  combined  military  and  naval  help.  95 
Initially  Gastaflaga.  had  rather  vaguely  proposed  that  Russell  land  the  troops  he  had 
aboard  at  Blanes  whence  they  would  march  with  the  Spanish  army  to  Palam6s.  The  Admiral, 
concerned  that  this  held  out  the  prospect  of  several  days  marching  and  presumably  keen  to 
firm  up  the  details  of  the  operation,  instead  informed  the  Viceroy  that  he  would  land  up  to 
4000  soldiers  at  a  bay  near  Palam6s  if  the  siege  looked  likely  to  go  ahead.  Russell  also 
Shrewsbury  Correspondence,  pp.  228-34,237-8:  Shrewsbury  to  Russell,  7  May,  2  July  1695;  Russell  to 
Shrewsbury,  2,11  May,  14  June,  21  July,  16/26  1695;  HMC,  Buccleuch  Montague  MSS,  ii.  *  182-3:  Privy 
Council  Minutes,  4  May,  afternoon  4  May  1695;  Childs,  'Secondary  Operations  of  the  British  Army',  pp.  77. 
8. 
"  Quincy,  Histoire  Militaire,  iii.  77-8  1;  Lynn,  The  Wars  oftouis  AV,  pp.  251-2. 
95  The  ensuing  account  of  the  operation  to  retake  Palam6s  is  based  upon  the  following  primary  sources  and 
secondary  authorities:  NMM,  SOU/I  6,  fos.  5-12:  'An  account  of  proceedings  from  the  f  irst  time  it  was 
desired  of  me  that  His  Majesty's  subjects  land  in  Catalonia',  16  Aug.  1689,  (printed  by  Coxe  in  Shrewsbury 
Correspondence,  pp.  237-42,  but  with  less  detail);  PRO,  SP  94/74,  fos  4-6:  Stanhope  to  'My  Lord',  28  Aug. 
1695,  and  enclosure,  'Extract  of  a  letter  from  the  Duke  of  Tursis's  Secretary  to  his  friend  in  Madrid  of  the  27 
Aug.  from  the  Roade  at  St  Feliu';  CFKS,  U1590  C9/1/33:  'Father'  to  James,  4  Aug.  1695  [NS]  (Alexander 
Stanhope  specifically  claims  that  Russell  offered  help  to  Gastaflaga  before  being  asked  for  it.  This  is  not 
however  born  out  by  the  other  evidence);  Quincy,  Histoire  Militaire,  iii.  77-81;  Lynn,  The  Wars  ofLouisXIV, 
pp.  251-2;  Childs,  'Secondary  Operations  of  the  British  Army',  pp.  78-80. 174 
claimed  that  he  then  informed  Gastafiaga  that  he  could  spare  the  troops  for  just  over  a  week 
and  that  their  disposition  at  the  siege  would  have  to  facilitate  embarkation  in  the  event  that 
the  French  navy  departed  from  Toulon.  Soon  after  their  meeting,  Brigadier  Stewart  was  set 
ashore  to  consult  further  on  military  matters,  while  Russell  took  the  fleet  south  down  the 
coast  in  anticipation  of  the  troop  landings  and  to  deliver  the  first  phase  of  naval  support. 
On  7  August  (NS),  two  bomb  vessels  were  sent  into  the  Bay  of  Palam6s  to  throw 
some  shells  as  a  preliminary  to  the  siege.  Two  days  later,  upon  Brigadier  Stewart's  word  that 
the  military  circumstances  were  propitious  with  the  French  army  camp  reportedly  at  least  four 
leagues  from  Palam6s  at  La  Bisbal  d'Emporda,  Russell  landed  3000  English  infantry  and 
about  500  Dutch  troops  under  Count  Nassau  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning  at  St  Feliu.  de 
Gufxols.  Linking  up  with  the  Spanish  army  which  had  encamped  at  Calonge,  the  whole  force 
marched  that  day  to  within  two  miles  of  Palam6s.  When  covering  these  final  miles  the  next 
day,  the  Anglo-Dutch  van  encountered  a  considerable  body  of  enemy  horse  as  they  entered  a 
defile  and,  although  they  did  not  attempt  to  stop  the  march,  it  did  contradict  the  report  that 
the  French  were  some  days  march  from  Palam6s.  As  the  allies  settled  into  their  camp  just 
outside  the  town,  Vend6me  drew  up  his  army  to  within  a  mile,  posting  his  horse  in  the  valley 
and  foot  upon  the  surrounding  hills.  The  French  had  effectively  checked  the  initial  moves  of 
the  allied  force  and  when  reports  came  though  that  Vend8me  was  expecting  over  4000 
reinforcements  from  Rousillon,  it  seemed  unlikely  that  the  allies  would  be  able  even  to  invest 
Palam6s. 
According  to  Russell  (although  it  is  necessary  to  keep  in  mind  his  contempt  for  the 
Spanish)  the  Spanish  commanders  next  panicked  and,  expecting  a  battle  the  following  day, 
they  transferred  all  power  of  command  to  Stewart.  In  the  event,  an  engagement  did  not 
occur.  The  allies  occupied  and  began  fortifying  some  high  ground  so  that  when  on  12 
August  the  French  marched  forward  to  inspect  their  opponent's  position,  they  wheeled  north 
and  left  for  the  neighbouring  town  of  Palafrugell.  Perhaps  they  felt  the  allied  position  too 
strong  or were  surprised  at  the  size  of  the  Spanish  army  given  that  they  were  probably 
unaware  of  the  arrival  of  troops  from  England;  but,  regardless,  twenty-four  hours  had  been 
sufficient  to  make  the  siege  of  Palam6s  appear  a  realistic  proposition. 
A  similar  amount  of  time  was  sufficient  to  bring  this  operation  to  an  end.  Over  12-13 
August  (NS),  Russell  had  delivered  the  second  phase  of  naval  support.  Bomb  vessels  and 
ketches  with  mortars  were  towed  into  Palam6s  Bay  to  throw  their  shells  at  the  town  and  were 175 
exacting  considerable  damage  when  a  frigate,  which  had  previously  been  dispatched  on  an 
intelligence  gathering  mission  along  the  Provence  coast,  returned.  The  Captain  had  taken 
two  Toulon  fishermen  prisoner  and  they  claimed  that  the  French  fleet  of  sixty  warships  was 
now  lying  in  Toulon  Road,  armed  and  ready  to  sail.  In  order  to  prevent  them  passing  through 
the  Straits,  Russell  wished  to  go  in  search  of  them  and  once  a  Council  of  War  had  sanctioned 
his  resolution,  he  informed  Gastafiaga  that  he  was  recafling  his  troops  so  he  could  leave  the 
Catalan  coast.  The  Spanish  Viceroy  protested,  not  the  least  because  he  had  just  begun  to 
press  the  siege  forward  by  landing  heavier  ordnance  that  had  been  brought  down  from 
Barcelona,  but  Russell  remained  firm  to  the  decision.  A  debate  on  the  viability  of  continuing 
with  the  siege  of  PalamOs  followed,  though  the  sources  place  different  emphasis  upon  the 
participants.  In  his  correspondence  with  Shrewsbury,  Russell  gave  himself  a  central  role  in 
pressing  the  futility  of  the  operation;  he  foresaw  the  principal  difficulty  as  that  -  even  with  the 
troops  he  had  put  ashore  -  the  total  number  would  be  insufficient  to  combat  the  French  relief 
army  currently  at  Palafrugell  but  which  could  return  at  any  point.  Another  source  emphasised 
instead  the  discussions  which  took  place  between  Gastaflaga,  his  Spanish  colleagues  and  the 
Imperial  officer,  the  Prince  of  Hesse-Darmstadt.  During  these  consultations,  Hesse- 
Darmstadt  heard  what  he  considered  were  defeatist,  even  treacherous,  remarks  by  the  Spanish 
commanders  to  the  effect  that  the  English  fleet  was  of  no  service  to  Spain  and  that  a  separate 
peace  treaty  would  be  of  greater  benefit.  He  accordingly  withdrew  the  Imperial  troops  and 
this  was  thought  to  have  caused  the  siege  to  be  abandoned.  All  such  discussions  probably 
contributed  to  the  demise  of  the  operation  but  with  regard  to  the  combined  operation,  it  is 
Russell's  account  of  his  own  actions  which  is  of  interest. 
Since  arriving  in  the  Mediterranean,  he  had  made  no  secret  of  his  contempt  for  the 
Spanish  in  general  and  their  military  competence  in  particular.  '  Having  agreed  to 
Gastaflaga's  request,  albeit  inserting  a  qualification  on  how  long  he  could  have  the  troops 
ashore,  as  soon  as  intelligence  came  through  which  allowed  Russell  to  recall  his  troops,  he  did 
so.  Yet  the  urgency  which  he  protested  was  necessary  to  prevent  the  French  fleet  from 
passing  through  the  Straits  did  not  seem  to  extend  to  embarking  the  troops.  They  were  not 
put  aboard  until  16  August  (NS)  and  then  Russell,  upon  Gastaflaga's  request,  agreed  to 
support  to  his  army  as  they  marched  away  from  Palam6s  all  the  while  passing  further 
96  See  for  example,  Shrewshury  Correspondence,  pp.  216-18,242-5:  Russell  to  Shrewsbury,  31  Dec.  1694,4 
Sept.  1695. 176 
derogatory  comment  upon  the  Spanish.  Such  conduct  does  beg  the  question  whether  this 
was  another  example  of  Russell's  equivocation  about  combined  operations,  similar  to  what  he 
had  displayed  in  1692  and  over  the  descent  on  Brest  in  1694. 
The  intelligence  about  the  French  fleet's  imminent  departure  proved  to  have  been  a 
ruse  concocted  by  Vend6me.  When  Russell  arrived  off  Toulon  the  fleet  were  found  to  be  Still 
in  the  harbour,  though  he  was  unable  to  determine  the  extent  of  their  preparations  for  sea  as 
bad  weather  forced  him  off  station.  By  then,  however,  any  further  combined  action  on  the 
Spanish  coast  could  not  be  contemplated  and,  although  the  French  did  evacuate  from 
Palam6s  and  Castelfollit  de  la  Roca,  they  maintained  a  presence  in  Catalonia.  In  October, 
leaving  a  squadron  of  ships  under  Vice  Admiral  David  Mitchell  which  Sir  George  Rooke  was 
on  his  way  to  augment,  Russell  returned  to  England  He  took  all  the  troops  -  save  for  a 
couple  of  companies  from  Colonel  Pusissar's  regiment  -  with  him  and  there  were  to  be  no 
further  combined  operations  in  the  Mediterranean.  For  the  remaining  two  years  of  the  war, 
England  was  able  to  maintain  a  squadron  in  the  Mediterranean  sufficient  for  the  protection  of 
trade,  but  it  did  not  have  the  military  capability  to  intervene  decisively  on  the  French  or 
Spanish  coasts.  Indeed,  Barcelona  fell  to  the  French  in  1697.  "  The  abandonment  of  descents 
or  combined  operations  as  part  of  the  war  strategy  in  the  northern  European  theatre  had  been 
quickly  followed  in  the  southern  Mediterranean  region. 
9'  Quincy,  Histoire  Militaire,  iii.  178;  Shrewsbury  Correspondence,  pp.  242-5:  Russell  to  Shrewsbury,  4  Sept. 
1695;  PRO,  WO  5/7,  unf:  Orders  to  Brigadier  Stewart,  Colonels  Brudenell,  Coote  and  Puissar,  2  Nov.  1695; 
Lynn,  The  Wars  ofLouis.  X7V,  pp.  251-2;  Harding,  Seapower  andNaval  Warfare  1650-1830,  p.  162. 177 
Section  IV:  Combined  Operations  and  the  Nine  Years  War,  1688-1697. 
As  an  adaptation  of  the  traditional  interpretation  of  early  modern  warfare,  Professor  Lynn's 
paradigm  -  'war-as-process"  -  is  correctly  applied  to  the  operational  history  of  the  Nine 
Years  War.  It  allows  for  Professor  Black's  criticism  that  the  orthodox  histories  suffered  from 
a  'present-mindedness'  which  failed  to  recognise  that  early  modem  warfare  could  be  viewed 
as  decisive';  it  also  rightly  characterises  such  warfare  on  land  and  at  sea  as  largely  static. 
When  advantage  was  sought,  the  intention  was  usually  to  out-manoeuvre  the  enemy  rather 
than  to  force  an  engagement,  and  even  when  battles  occurred  few  immediate  in-theatre 
decisions  resulted.  This  inflexible  cast  of  combat  might  not  seem  to  provide  a  propitious 
operational  context  in  which  to  assess  altemative  forms  of  warfare  such  as  combined 
operations;  but  paradoxically  its  contextual  rigidity  yields  a  clear  background  against  which 
the  developing  features  of  a  quite  different  instrument  of  warfare  can  be  illustrated. 
Despite  a  reasonably  high  incidence  of  such  operations  -  nine  executed  and  numerous 
others  planned  -  throughout  the  war,  a  clear  and  unambiguous  definition  for  this  type  of 
combat  does  not  emerge.  At  a  basic  level,  the  composition  of  force  continued  to  be  a  useful 
definitional  category  but,  aside  from  the  participation  of  land  and  sea  components,  there  was 
little  functional  similarity  between,  for  example,  the  combined  expeditions  despatched  to  the 
Caribbean  and  the  'descents'  promoted  against  the  northern  French  coast.  Operational  form 
was  often  contingent  upon  the  purpose  and  the  theatre  of  the  war  in  which  it  was  to  be 
deployed  -  factors  which  worked  against  universality.  Moreover,  the  events  of  the  Nine 
Years  War  revealed  two  further  categories  as  inherent  to  defining  early  modem  combined 
operations. 
Integral  to  the  post-1688  emergence  of  the  'fiscal-military  state"  were  the 
bureaucratic  structures  concerned  with  the  direction  of  warfare.  The  multi-component  form  of 
combined  operations  required  these  authorities  to  co-operate  or,  at  least,  liaise  in  preparing 
the  force  for  departure.  Throughout  the  war,  the  principal  organisational  relationship 
1  Lynn,  The  Wars  qfLouis  XIV,  pp.  3  67-76. 
2J.  Black,  'Eighteenth  Century  Warfare  Reconsidered',  97Hi  (1994),  215-31. 
3  This  is  a  term  developed  and  applied  by  the  historian  J.  Brewer  to  best  describe  the  form  of  the  'British 
State'  from  the  later  seventeenth  century  as  a  result  of  Britain's  perennial  involvement  in  wars  from  then 
which  necessitated  a  sharp  increase  in  spending  on  the  armed  forces  and  a  rise  in  taxation  and  the  National 
Debt.  The  argument  follows  that  this  moulded  the  state's  form.  J.  Brewer,  The  Sinews  OfPower.  *  War,  Afoney 
and  the  English  State  1688-1783  (London,  1989);  J.  Brewer,  'The  Eighteenth-Century  British  State',  in  L. 
Stone  (ed),  An  Imperial  State  at  War:  Britain  1689-1815  (London,  1994). 178 
between  the  Admiralty,  the  Secretaries  of  State,  and  William  Blathwayt  (as  King  William's  de 
facto  Secretary-at-War)  was  always  tortuous  and  often  broke  down.  Delays  were  endemic 
and  were  usually  lengthened  for  the  colonial  operations  as  the  Board  of  Trade  and  the  local 
colonial  authorities  sought  a  role.  The  identifiable  problem  was  the  absence  of  a  non-personal 
administrative  process,  which  could  be  initiated  as  the  standard  procedure  for  preparing  a 
combined  army-navy  operation.  However,  although  the  fiscal-military  state  required  further 
development,  the  authorities  could  not  simply  avoid  the  task  and  hence  their  increasing 
awareness  -  albeit  often  contingent  on  personalities  -  that  the  organisation  of  a  combined 
operation  necessitated  a  sustained  multi-level  bureaucratic  relationship.  By  1697,  this 
recognition  had  arguably  ameliorated  the  length  of  delays;  the  colonial  expedition  dispatched 
in  that  year  was  prepared  within  three  months. 
In-theatre  command  structures  was  the  second  category  to  emerge  as  important  in 
shaping  the  form  of  the  operation.  In  the  eighteenth  century,  Thomas  More  Molyneaux's 
belief  that  a  successful  combined  operation  required  the  'uniting  of  the  two  heads'  to  produce 
a  unified  and  purposeful  force  highlighted  the  inherent  significance  of  command  to 
operational  progress.  "  However,  a  recent  authority  on  early  modem  amphibious  warfare  has 
argued  for  a  shift  in  analysis  away  from  this  relationship  and  a  general  reduction  of  the 
emphasis  placed  upon  the  functioning  or  malfunction  of  the  executive  Councils  of  War  of  the 
joint  services,  which  became  the  standard  command  structure  for  such  operations.  Indeed,  in 
terms  of  operational  command,  Professor  Harding  considers  these  Councils  as  mediating  the 
separate  and  potentially  divisive  service  interests,  thus  leaving  the  senior  commanding  officers 
reasonably  content  with  their  tactical  control  when  in  theatre.  '  This  argument  rightly 
highlights  other  factors  excluded  by  Molyneaux  which  bore  upon  the  success  of  amphibious 
warfare  throughout  the  eighteenth  century;  but,  with  respect  to  the  Nine  Years  War,  it  risks 
dismissing  the  command  concerns  of  contemporaries  which  were  significant  in  shaping 
perceptions  of  combined  operations.  Representations  by  commanders  such  as  Sir  Francis 
Wheler  and  Christopher  Codrington  on  the  scope  and  form  of  their  individual  operational 
command  arose  from  their  recognition,  or  from  their  anxieties,  that  they  were  to  be  engaged 
in  a  combined  and  co-operative  venture.  Personal  or  individual  service  advantage  was  viewed 
in  this  context  as  potentially  important.  Equally,  the  drafting  of  operational  Instructions 
"  Molyneaux,  Conjunct  Fxpeditions,  Part  11,  p.  30. 
5  flarding,  'Sailors  and  Gentlemen  of  Parade',  pp.  35-55. 179 
revealed  the  Ministries'  perceptions  regarding  the  combined  service  form  of  the  intended 
operation.  Their  promotion  of  executive  Councils  of  War  was  indeed  an  attempt  to  mediate 
service  interests,  though  as  this  was  achieved  through  the  dilution  of  individual  service 
authority  it  is  questionable  whether  the  commanders  were  content.  Moreover,  the 
prescriptive  nature  of  the  Instructions  with  respect  to,  for  example,  objectives  or  chronology 
also  caused  resentment  amongst  commanders.  Notwithstanding,  by  strictly  confining  the 
issues  over  which  they  had  to  co-operate,  it  was  another  means  whereby  the  Ministry  made 
manifest  the  combined  form  of  the  operation.  From  the  perspectives  of  the  commanders  or 
the  Ministry  promoting  the  operation,  command  structure  was  viewed  as  an  important 
component  in  shaping  operational  design. 
Albeit  variously  defmed,  England's  war  policy  during  the  Nine  Years  War  did 
encompass  combined  operations,  but  equally  it  cannot  be  claimed  that  they  revolutionised  the 
military  policy  of  the  Ministry's  Grand  Strategy.  It  is  nonetheless  important  to  understand 
that  this  was  never  the  contemporary  aspiration  and  the  condemnation  by  Professor  Childs  of 
these  operations'  supposed  Grand  Strategic  ambition  tilted  at  a  historical  illusion  of  his  own 
making.  " 
Combined  operations  were  motivated  by  differing  strategic  and  tactical  reasons  across  the 
varying  war  theatres:  expeditions  overseas  were  expected  to  conquer  territory,  whereas  the 
two  operations  deployed  in  Ireland  aimed  at  rejuvenating  a  stalemated  military  theatre.  The 
experience  of  the  Nine  Years  War  thus  suggests  that  combined  operations  should  be  correctly 
looked  upon  as  embedded  within  the  Grand  Strategy  and,  depending  upon  whether  the  Whigs 
or  the  Tories  were  ascendant  in  the  Ministry,  as  handmaidens  of  their  favoured  continental  or 
maritime  policies.  The  Whigs'  commitment  to  William's  campaigning  on  the  European 
continent  disposed  them  to  the  arguments  regarding  the  diversionary  capacity  in  the  land 
theatre  of  descents  or  raids;  whilst  the  Tories  were  keen  to  link  the  amphibious  capability  to 
the  maritime  standard,  thus  promoting  the  colonial  combined  operations  as  a  means  to 
enhance  trade  and  English  commercial  supremacy.  This  political  split  on  strategy  was  more 
general  than  absolute,  however.  The  King,  principally  advised  by  Blathwayt,  kept  a  tight  rein 
over  war  policy  and  emerged  as  a  champion  of  the  combined  operation  in  either  a  maritime  or 
continental  context.  In  1690,  William's  support  ensured  that  Marlborough's  operation  to 
'6  See  Chapter  1,  Section  Ill.  i,  p.  139. 180 
capture  Cork  and  Kinsale  proceeded;  in  the  mid-  I  690s,  a  similar  level  of  commitment  to  the 
descents  and  raids  on  the  northern  French  coast  allowed  these  to  continue  longer  than  their 
manifest  failure  admitted;  and  finally  William  -  albeit  often  prompted  by  Blathwayt  - 
continued  to  promote  combined  expeditionary  forces  to  the  colonial  theatre,  both  as  a  means 
to  expel  the  French  and  also  to  assert  the  establishment  of  maritime  supremacy  in  those  areas. 
The  King's  objective  that  England  should  become  the  principal  Mediterranean  seapower  also 
embodied  maritime  ascendancy,  and  the  combined  operations  deployed  as  interventions  in  the 
Iberian  theatre  or  against  French  shipping  in  its  main  northern  and  southern  ports  were  a 
component  part  of  that  policy.  It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  a  change  of  monarch  and  the 
increasingly  divisive  Party  atmosphere  would  cause  combined  operations  to  be  more 
consistently  applied  within  the  strategic  context  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  or  to 
be  dropped  altogether. 
Combined  operations,  had  a  higher  profile  during  the  Nine  Years  War  than  Lynn's 
6war-as-process'  admits.  Their  identification  is  nonetheless  predicated  upon  accepting  an 
increased  number  of  the  categories  of  definition  to  include  the  theatre  of  war,  bureaucratic 
control  and  command  structure.  This  properly  illuminates  the  developing  contemporary 
perception  about  combined  army-navy  operations.  With  respect  to  Grand  Strategy,  combined 
operations  were  embedded  within  and  variously  applied  across  theatres  and  hence  there  can 
be  no  generic  or  revolutionising  strategic  claims  with  respect  to  their  deployment.  It  thus 
remains  to  be  seen  whether  the  history  of  the  Spanish  Succession  war  can  provide  greater 
clarity  on  both  the  form  and  strategic  function  of  combined  operations  as  amphibious  warfare. 181 
Chapter  2 
The  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  1702-1713. 
Section  1:  Combined  Operations  and  the  Mediterranean  Theatre  During 
the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  1702-1713. 
Li:  The  Outbreak  of  War  and  the  Mediterranean  as  a  Theatre  of  Combat  During 
the  Spanish  Succession  War. 
'Laugh  at  this  as  much  as  you  please,  I  was  told  it  to-day  by  a  reverend 
churchman.  " 
Thus,  the  English  Envoy  to  Spain,  Alexander  Stanhope,  concluded  a  letter  home  to  an  official 
in  the  Secretary  of  State's  office.  The  topic  for  hilarity  was  the  continued  attempt  to  cure  the 
perennially  sickly  King  of  Spain,  Carlos  11.  On  this  occasion  an  exorcist  from  Germany  had 
been  employed  to  produce  not  only  Carlos's  good  health  but  also  his  ability  to  sire  an  heir. 
Since  acceding  to  the  Spanish  throne  in  1665,  Carlos's  demise  had  been  frequently  anticipated 
by  observers  at  Madrid,  but  against  seemingly  considerable  medical  odds  he  had  lived. 
However,  he  had  also  -  despite  the  ministrations  of  exorcists  and  quacks  -  remained 
impotent.  2  It  was  this  latter  issue,  rather  than  Carlos's  well-being,  which  was  of  greater 
interest  to  the  European  capitals.  In  the  absence  of  an  heir,  not  only  would  the  Spanish 
Habsburg  line  end  with  Carlos  but  there  would  also  be  a  vacancy  on  the  Spanish  throne  and 
its  substantial  empire,  which  ranged  from  the  New  World  to  the  European  territories  in  Italy 
and  the  Netherlands. 
European  interest  in  the  Spanish  succession  also  reflected  the  fact  that  there  were  no 
shortage  of  claimants  to  the  throne.  The  principal  dynastic  candidates  were  the  French 
Bourbons  and  the  Austrian  Habsburgs  through  the  marriages  of  Louis  XIV  and  Emperor 
Leopold  I  to  the  daughters  of  Philip  IV  of  Spain  -  Maria  Thdr6sa  and  Margaret  Th6r6sa 
respectively.  There  was  (and  remains)  substantial  debate  about  the  legitimacy  of  these 
dynastic  claims.  For  her  part,  Louis's  wife  had  renounced  her  rights  and  those  of  her 
1  Spain  Under  Charles  the  Second,  p.  191:  Stanhope  to  Yard,  21  Oct.  1699. 
2  W.  Coxe,  Memoirs  of  the  Kings  of  Spain  of  the  House  of  Bourbon  (2  nd  edn,  London,  1815),  i.  45;  Spain 
Under  Charles  the  Second,  pp.  98-9,102-4,124-6,136-8,179,181-183,194:  Stanhope  to  Vernon,  5  Sept. 
1696;  Stanhope  to  Lexington,  16  Sept.  1696;  Stanhope  to  Shrewsbury,  19  Sept.,  14  Nov.  1696;  Stanhope  to 
Portland,  14  Mar.  1698;  Stanhope  to  Methuen,  29  July  1698;  Stanhope  to  his  son,  James  Stanhope,  14  Mar., 182 
descendants  to  the  Spanish  throne  on  her  marriage  but,  although  Spanish  custom  embraced 
this  act,  its  legality  under  Castilian  law  was  doubtfid  and  besides,  Louis  believed  it  invalid  due 
to  the  non-payment  of  her  marriage  dowry.  On  the  Habsburg  side,  Margaret  Thdr&sa  died 
young  having  bome  Leopold  only  one  child,  Maria  Antonia.  Her  son,  Joseph  Ferdinand,  the 
Electoral  Prince  of  Bavaria,  had  therefore  a  more  direct  claim  than  either  of  Leopold's  sons 
by  his  second  wife,  Eleanor  of  Neuburg;  but  Maria  Antonia  had  also  given  a  pre-marital 
renunciation  -  albeit  in  private  with  her  father  and  therefore  also  legally  questionable  -  to  the 
Spanish  inheritance.  3  Quite  simply,  the  issue  was  a  dynastic  and  legal  quagmire  which,  in 
early  modem  Europe,  could  only  be  solved  by  diplomacy  or  war. 
Bourbon  and  Austrian  Habsburg  diplomatic  initiatives  on  the  question  of  the  Spanish 
succession  had  been  current  even  before  Carlos  came  to  the  throne,  and  their  success  was 
usually  a  yardstick  of  either  dynasty's  European  predominance.  Partition  of  the  Spanish 
Empire  had  been  the  focus  of  this  diplomacy  and  in  the  final  years  of  the  seventeenth  century, 
when  Carlos's  death  seemed  imminent,  it  was  again  the  favoured  proposal.  At  Louis  XIVIs 
instigation,  just  after  the  end  of  the  Nine  Years  War,  the  Maritime  Powers  entered  into 
negotiations  with  him  over  the  future  of  the  Spanish  throne  and  empire.  4  In  1698,  the  First 
Partition  Treaty  was  concluded  which  identified  Joseph  Ferdinand  as  Carlos's  heir  with 
territorial  compensation  from  the  Spanish  Empire  for  the  sons  (to  whom  the  claims  had  been 
transferred)  of  Louis  XIV  and  Leopold  I-  the  Grand  Dauphin  and  Archduke  Charles.  As 
Leopold  and  the  Spanish  Court  both  opposed  partition  they  did  not  accept  this  treaty, 
however.  Indeed,  Carlos  considered  the  succession  a  domestic  matter;  and,  despite  his  Court 
being  divided  between  supporters  of  the  French  and  Imperial  candidates,  he  made  a  will 
which  left  the  whole  empire  to  Joseph  Ferdinand.  The  death  of  the  Electoral  Prince  in  the 
following  year  however  forced  the  issue  to  be  quickly  revisited.  This,  in  turn,  produced  the 
Second  Partition  Treaty.  Its  provisions  substituted  the  Archduke  Charles  for  Joseph 
29  June,  9  July  1698,15,29  July  1699;  Stanhope  to  Jersey,  24  June,  1699;  Stanhope  to  Yard,  4  Nov.  1699. 
'  P-  Lodge,  'The  Spanish  Succession',  History  New  Series  xii  (1927-1928),  333-8;  H.  Kamen,  Philip  Vof 
Spain:  The  King  Who  Reigned  Twice  (London,  200  1),  pp.  1-2;  H.  Kamen,  The  War  ofSuccession  in  Spain 
1700-15  (London,  1969),  pp.  1-4;  W.  Roosen,  'The  Origins  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession',  in  J.  Black 
(ed.  ),  7he  Origins  of  War  in  Early  Modern  Europe  (Edinburgh,  1987),  pp.  157-61;  Thomson,  'Louis  XIV  and 
the  Origins  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession',  pp.  141-4;  Lynn,  The  Wars  ofLouisXIV,  pp.  266-8; 
Hattendorf,  'Alliance  Encirclement  and  Attrition',  pp.  13-15. 
The  progress  of  these  negotiations  can  be  followed  in  Letters  of  William  III  and  Louis  XIVand  of  7heir 
Ministers,  ed.  P.  Grimblot  (2  vols,  London,  1848). 183 
Ferdinand  and  augmented  the  territorial  compensation  to  the  French  Dauphin.  The  treaty  was 
rejected  for  a  second  time  by  Spain  and  the  Emperor,  whose  interest  in  the  whole  inheritance 
was  in  truth  focused  upon  the  Spanish  Italian  territories.  Carlos's  response  was  to  draft 
another  will  which  replaced  Joseph  Ferdinand  with  Louis's  grandson,  Philip,  duc  d'Anjou, 
whom  failing  Philip's  younger  brother,  the  Duc  de  Berri,  though  with  the  codicil  that  if  the 
French  failed  to  accept  the  will  then  the  whole  inheritance  would  fall  to  the  Austrian 
Archduke.  5  Aside  from  marking  the  victory  of  the  French  influence  at  the  Spanish  Court  led 
by  Cardinal  Portocarrero,  the  will  made  it  more  likely  that  war  rather  than  diplomacy  would 
be  required  to  provide  a  solution  to  the  Spanish  succession. 
The  inevitability  of  war  on  Carlos's  death  on  I  November  1700  has  nonetheless 
remained  the  subject  of  considerable  historical  debate.  One  theory  emphasises  the  structural 
malfunction  of  the  European  states  system  in  1700  whereby  it  proved  unable  to  mediate 
Louis's  unenviable  choice  between  his  commitment  to  the  Second  Partition  Treaty  and  his 
dynastic  ambitions  now  vested  in  his  grandson  as  a  result  of  Carlos's  Will.  6  Substantive 
proposals  are  required  for  diplomacy  to  work  however,  and  in  1700  there  was  simply  no 
credible  (and  thus  compromise)  candidate  to  those  proposed  by  the  Bourbons  or  the  Austrian 
Habsburgs.  The  European  powers  were  not  therefore  at  Carlos's  death  afforded  any 
meaningful  chance  to  resolve  the  succession  issue.  Nonetheless,  although  Emperor  Leopold 
invaded  the  Spanish  Italian  territories  within  a  few  months  of  Louis's  acceptance  of  Carlos's 
will,  the  response  of  other  European  states  was  seemingly  peaceful.  Poland  and  Savoy 
quickly  recognised  d'Anjou  as  Philip  V;  while  the  United  Provinces  and  England  came  round 
to  that  position  too,  albeit  with  a  sense  of  anxiety.  7  Consideration  of  another  aspect  of  this 
historical  debate  is  perforce  required  to  provide  the  bridge  from  these  circumstances  to  the 
outbreak  of  general  hostilities. 
This  focuses  upon  the  responsibility  of  individual  rulers  and,  in  particular,  the  extent 
to  which  Louis  XIV's  actions  after  accepting  the  will  precipitated  the  re-formation  of  the 
5  Lodge,  'The  Spanish  Succession',  pp.  333-8;  Kamen,  Philip  V,  pp.  2-4;  Kamen,  7he  War  OfSuccession  in 
Spain,  pp.  1-4;  Roosen,  'The  Origins  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession',  pp.  157-6  1;  Thomson,  'Louis 
XIV  and  the  Origins  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession',  pp.  141-4;  Lynn,  The  Wars  OfLouisxIv,  pp. 
266-8;  Hattendorf,  'Alliance  Encirclement  and  Attrition',  pp.  13-15. 
Roosen,  'The  Origins  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession',  pp.  151-71. 
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Grand  Alliance  against  France  in  September  1701.8  The  letters  patent  declaring  that  dAnjou 
retained  his  right  to  accede  to  the  French  throne;  the  French  occupation  of  the  baff  ier  fortress 
in  the  Spanish  Netherlands;  the  granting  of  the  Spanish  assiento  to  French  merchants;  and 
finally  the  recognition  of  the  'Old  Pretender'  as  James  III,  have  been  interpreted  as 
particularly  inflammatory  of  English  and  Dutch  opinion  and  thereby  eliciting  a  proportionate 
response  from  these  states.  9  Equally,  it  has  been  argued  that  each  event  possessed  a  benign 
explanation  and  that  they  were  only  considered  casus  belli  because  William  and  the  Dutch 
were  looking  for  excuses  for  a  war  that  they  had  already  determined  upon.  Louis's  conduct 
was  therefore  blundering  rather  than  intentionally  malign.  "  Such  a  view  however  overlooks 
the  importance  of  perception.  To  Louis's  fellow  rulers,  his  actions  seemed  to  mark  a  return 
to  his  earlier  kingship,  which  sought  territorial  aggrandisement  and  the  destabilisation  of  the 
European  states  system.  "  This  was  why  the  Earl  of  Marlborough's  Instructions  for 
negotiating  the  second  Grand  Alliance  charged  him,  amongst  other  things,  to  limit  French 
power  and  preserve  the  European  peace.  12 
The  Alliance  Treaty  signed  by  England,  the  Dutch  Republic  and  Emperor  Leopold  on 
7  September  1701,  continued  in  a  similar  manner  by  committing  the  signatories  to  'repelling 
the  greatness  of  the  common  danger'  13  ;  and,  although  the  war  was  not  officially  declared  until 
the  early  summer  of  1702,  the  continuing  preparations  and  the  Franco-Imperial  clash  of  arms 
in  Italy  allows  this  document  to  be  considered  as  an  initial  statement  of  the  war  aims.  its 
broad  strategic  thrust  of  checking  French  power  meant  that,  while  the  succession  of  d'Anjou 
was  deplored  as  potentially  giving  rise  to  a  union  of  the  Franco-Spanish  crowns,  there  was  no 
requirement  that  the  Confederate  Powers  14  take  military  action  to  place  the  Archduke  Charles 
on  the  Spanish  throne.  That  commitment  would  only  be  made  in  eighteenth  months  time  as  a 
s  Thomson,  'Origins  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession',  pp.  140-61;  Lynn,  The  Wars  ofLouisXIV,  pp. 
268-7  1;  P.  Sonnino,  'The  Origins  of  Louis  XIV's  Wars',  in  Black  (ed.  ),  The  Origins  of  War,  p.  129;  G.  M. 
Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen  Anne:  Blenheim  (London,  1965),  i.  144-52. 
'  Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen  Anne,  i.  144-52;  Lynn,  The  W=  ofLouis  X7V,  pp.  269-70. 
10  Thomson,  'Origins  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession',  pp.  140-61. 
"  Sonnino,  'The  Origins  of  Louis  XIV's  Wars,  p.  129. 
12  PRO,  SP  104/69,  f  152-6:  'Instructions  for  Our  Right  Trusty  and  Right  Welbeloved  Cousin  and  Counsellor, 
John  Earl  of  Marlborough',  26  June  1701. 
13A  General  Collection  of  Trealys,  i.  415  :  'The  Second  Grand  Alliance  or  the  Treaty  concluded  between  the 
Emperor,  the  King  of  Great  Britain,  and  the  States  General,  September  7,1701.  ' 
"'  This  was  the  term  by  which  the  allied  powers  fighting  France  became  commonly  known. 185 
means  of  bringing  Portugal  into  the  Grand  Alliance.  15  Paradoxically  therefore,  despite  the 
wellsprings  of  war  being  the  succession  to  the  country's  throne,  mainland  Spain  was  not 
immediately  a  combat  theatre. 
That  did  not  mean  however  that  the  Peninsula  was  not  a  target  as  Spain  was  central  to 
the  military  balance  of  power.  If  French  strength  was  to  be  reduced  then  English  strategy,  at 
least,  looked  to  extend  the  war  to  as  many  fronts  as  possible  in  order  to  stretch  and  exhaust 
Louis's  resources.  16  Of  greater  strategic  importance  was  the  fact  that,  unlike  the  previous 
conflict  with  Louis,  the  country  which  stood  as  the  gateway  to  the  Mediterranean  was  now 
hostile.  This  had  considerable  implications  for  the  development  of  a  Mediterranean  strategy 
similar  to  the  one  which  William  III  had  pioneered  for  the  Grand  Alliance  in  1694-5  and 
which,  in  his  last  years  he  supposedly  vouchsafed  to  Marlborough.  17  It  has  been  argued  that 
the  latter's  commitment  to  this  Mediterranean  ideal  demonstrated  a  military  and  strategic 
mind  resembling  'the  whole  map  of  the  war'.  18  Yet,  the  same  commentator  criticises 
Marlborough's  range  across  this  map  in  downplaying  the  importance  of  the  Iberian  peninsula, 
particularly  when  compared  with  the  war  in  Flanders.  19  Such  a  view  is  though  based  on  the 
narrow  premise  that  the  war  in  Spain  was  the  principal  focus  of  the  conflict  in  the 
Mediterranean  whereas  English  Grand  Strategy  actually  incorporated  this  region  within  the 
broad  aspiration  of  asserting  English  power  from  the  Straits  through  to  the  Levant.  As  the 
Tory  Southern  Secretary  of  State,  the  Earl  of  Nottingham,  surmised:  a  Mediterranean 
presence  meant  that  England  could  secure  her  trade  routes,  assist  the  Imperial  interest  in 
Italy,  and  provide  a  powerful  diplomatic  lever  to  encourage  states  such  as  Algiers  and  Savoy 
to  break  with  France.  20 
Consideration  of  the  war  policy  with  respect  to  the  Mediterranean  must  therefore  be 
two-fold.  Spain  was  undoubtedly  an  important  element,  particularly  given  that  it  passed  from 
15  A  General  Collection  of  Treatys,  i.  356:  Article  I  of  'An  Alliance  Offensive  and  Defensive  between 
Leopold  Emperor  of  the  Romans,  Anne  Queen  of  England,  and  the  States  General  of  the  United  Provinces,  on 
the  one  part,  and  Peter  11  King  of  Portugal,  on  the  other  part.  ' 
16  Hattendorf,  'Alliance  Encirclement  and  Attrition,  p.  20;  J.  B.  Hattendorf,  Englandin  the  War  of  the 
Spanish  Succession:  A  Study  ofthe  English  New  and  Conduct  of  GrandStrategy,  1702-1712  (London,  1987), 
pp.  xiii-xviii,  267. 
17  E.  Gregg,  Queen  Anne  (London,  1984),  pp.  126-7;  Churchill,  Marlborough,  ii.  28;  Corbett,  England  in  the 
Mediterranean,  1603-1713,  ii.  468-9 
"'  C.  Barnett,  Marlborough,  (Ware,  Hertfordshire,  1999),  p.  264. 
19  ibid.,  p.  157. 
20  NRO,  FH  MSS  275,  pp.  194-6:  Nottingham  to  Marlborough,  27  Oct.  1702. 186 
one  strategic  context  to  another  during  the  course  of  the  war.  The  first,  from  1702-3,  was  as 
an  enemy  territory  forming  a  theatre  of  the  war  in  which  the  conflict  there  was  characterised 
by  attrition  The  second,  from  1703  to  the  end  of  the  war,  was  as  the  main  ob  ect  of 
acquisition  for  the  Grand  Alliance.  Although  Britain's  significant  military  commitment  to 
Spain  arrived  under  the  second  strategic  context,  combined  military  and  naval  expeditions 
were  dispatched  to  the  Iberian  peninsula  from  the  first  summer  of  the  war  and  numbered  three 
by  1706.  Then,  over  the  course  of  two  years  the  Spanish  dependencies  -  Majorca,  Ibiza, 
Sardinia  and  Minorca  -  were  captured  by  expeditions  which  were  formed  from  the  allies's 
naval  squadrons  that  plied  off  the  Spanish  coast  and  the  military  forces  that  had  been 
stationed  in  the  two  Spanish  coastal  footholds  -  Gibraltar  and  Barcelona  -  that  the  Grand 
Alliance  had  captured.  Meanwhile,  combined  operations  were  also  being  directed  further 
eastwards  against  the  southern  French  coast  where  the  naval  port  Toulon  was  a  perennial 
target;  while  they  were  also  the  favoured  operation  when  the  allies  sought  to  help  the 
Camisard  rebels  in  Languedoc  or  to  ease  French  pressure  upon  the  Duke  of  Savoy  in 
Piedmont  when  he  switched  sides  to  join  the  Grand  Alliance  in  1703.  Not  all  of  these 
operations  were  successful  and  many  merely  remained  as  plans  but  the  early  and  sustained 
commitment  of  the  Ministry  to  combined  operations  within  the  Mediterranean  proves 
instructive  with  respect  to  their  strategic  function.  A  necessary  first  step  however  is  to 
consider  in  turn  the  organisation  and  progress  of  the  operations  and  to  comprehend  how  this 
shapes  the  historical  understanding  of  early  modem  combined  operations. 
Lii:  Admiral  Sir  George  Rooke's  and  the  Duke  of  Ormonde's  Expedition  to  Spain, 
July-November  1702. 
The  decision  to  send  an  expedition  to  Spain  had,  in  principle  at  least,  actually  been  made  prior 
to  the  official  declaration  of  war  on  4  May  1702.  After  the  conclusion  of  the  Grand  Alliance 
in  September  1701,  when  it  seemed  unlikely  that  war  would  be  averted,  the  Imperial  Court 
had  pressed  for  the  immediate  dispatch  of  a  fleet  to  the  Mediterranean.  The  Emperor 
believed  that  the  Alliance  Treaty  recognised  his  pretensions  to  the  Spanish  Italian  territories 
and,  accordingly,  that  this  fleet  should  facilitate  a  descent  upon  the  Neapolitan  coast  to 
reinvigorate  the  recent  revolt  against  Spanish  rule  in  Naples.  21  The  centrality  of  the 
21  PRO,  SP  105165,  unf.:  Vernon  to  Stanhope,  17  26  Apr.  1702  [NS],  and  enclosure,  Ta  proposition  du 187 
Mediterranean  to  William's  strategic  ambitions  meant  that  he  too  wished  the  dispatch  of  a 
fleet  there  but  he  questioned  it  proceeding  directly  to  the  Italian  coast.  Encouraged  by  the 
Admiralty,  William  considered  it  first  more  important  to  secure  entry  and  a  presence  in  the 
Mediterranean  both  diplomatically  and  logistically  by  luring  Portugal  from  its  French  alliance 
and  by  capturing  a  Spanish  port  which  might  be  used  as  a  forward  naval  base.  Admiral 
Rooke  had  already  in  January  1702,  submitted  a  plan  for  a  combined  land  and  sea  attack  upon 
the  Portuguese  or  Spanish  coasts.  22  Ironically,  the  English  hand  was  strengthened  by  the 
redundant  Imperial  courtier,  Prince  George  of  Hesse-Darmstadt,  who,  since  arriving  in 
London  in  February  1702,  had  been  engaged  in  discussions  on  this  topic  with  the  English 
Court,  while  semi-detached  from  the  Imperial  Envoy,  Count  WratiSlaW.  23 
Only  a  complex  of  factors  can  explain  why  Hesse-Darmstadt  departed  for  London  at 
the  beginning  of  1702.  The  conclusion  of  the  Franco-Portuguese  alliance  the  previous 
summer  had  shelved  the  plan  that  he  would  command  some  5000  Habsburg  troops  in 
Portugal  in  support  of  the  Archduke's  Spanish  claims;  and,  since  then,  despite  being  a  cousin 
of  the  Empress  Eleanor,  he  had  found  his  influence  at  Vienna  to  be  on  the  wane.  To  Hesse- 
Darmstadt,  England  offered  a  refuge  from  his  enemies  and,  more  appealing,  potential 
employment.  Hence  his  letter  of  recommendation  suggested  that  he  be  the  Imperial 
commissary  with  any  land  force  on  board  the  English  fleet.  The  fact  that  his  letter  was  only 
signed  by  the  Vice-Chancellor  Kaunitz,  and  not  by  the  Council  of  State,  suggests  that  the 
obscure  politics  of  the  Imperial  Court  also  underlay  his  trip.  Certainly,  his  behaviour  upon 
arrival  in  London,  when  he  kept  his  distance  and  concealed  his  intentions  from  Wratislaw, 
underscored  this  point;  as  did,  in  greater  measure,  his  fon-nal  proposal  to  William  for  an 
expedition  to  Spain. 
Hesse-Darmstadt's  scheme,  which  not  surprisingly  suggested  that  he  serve  as  the 
imperial  Commissary,  reflected  previous  informal  discussions  he  had  held  with  the  King, 
during  which  William  requested  that  the  Emperor  provide  5000  troops  for  the  venture.  Such 
Ministre  de  L'Empereur  pour  envoyer  la  Flotte  sur  les  Costes  du  Royaume  de  Naples,  fonded  sur  la  neccssitd 
facilitd,  et  sur  l'utilitd  de  cette  Entreprise,  15  avril  1702';  Stepney  to  Manchester,  II  Apr.  1702  [NS];  s. 
Spens,  George  Stepney  1663-1707.  ý  Diplomat  andPoet  (Cambridge,  1997),  pp.  202-3. 
22  The  Journal  ofSir  George  Rooke,  Admiral  ofthe  Fleet  1700-1702,  ed.  0.  Browning  (London,  1897),  pp. 
144-5;  A.  D.  Francis,  The  First  Peninsular  War  1702-1713  (London,  1975),  pp.  21-2,31-2;  Trevelyan, 
England  Under  Queen  Anne,  i.  138-9,155. 
23  A.  D.  Francis,  'Prince  George  of  Hesse-Darmstadt  and  the  Plans  for  the  Expedition  to  Spain  of  1702',  BIIIR 
x1ii  (1969),  58-75. 188 
talks  have  also  been  identified  as  resolving  upon  CAdiz  as  the  target,  though  Hesse- 
Darmstadt's  proposal  did  not  name  it  specifically.  24  Undoubtedly,  Marlborough's  references 
in  his  letters  home  to  Godolphin,  less  than  a  month  after  Queen  Anne's  succession,  about  the 
'the  project  of  CAdiZ"25  implied  that  this  was  a  pre-existing  Williamite  policy;  while  this 
targeting  decision  would  also  have  been  in  line  with  the  positive  marginal  comments  William 
made  upon  Hesse-Darmstadt's  submission.  26 
The  King's  enthusiasm  for  the  project  was  probably  founded  in  the  opportunity  it 
offered  for  England  to  capture  a  forward  naval  base  so  that  the  fleet  could  enter  the 
Mediterranean  and  act  with  impunity  along  the  Italian  or  French  coasts.  Moreover,  around 
the  same  time,  it  was  decided  to  send  John  Methuen  back  to  Lisbon  -  where  he  had  served  in 
the  1690s  -  with  the  task  of  detaching  Portugal  from  its  French  alliance.  27  William's  death  at 
the  beginning  of  March  did  not  derail  the  policy  and,  although  the  Emperor  ordered 
Wratislaw  to  redouble  his  efforts  in  pressing  the  necessity  of  going  to  Naples,  Queen  Anne 
remained  firm.  to  her  Privy  Council  conunitment  on  the  evening  of  William's  death  that  his 
preparations  against  France  would  continue.  Eventually,  the  Emperor  had  simply  to  accept 
that  the  Confederate  fleet  was  to  mount  an  attack  against  the  Spanish  coast  first  and  that,  if 
success  and  time  allowed,  the  Italian  coast  would  be  the  next  target.  28 
While  Queen  Anne's  accession  may  not  have  altered  the  proposal,  it  did  initiate  the 
substantial  delay  which  beset  the  organisation  of  the  expedition.  Part  of  this  could  be 
attributed  to  the  uncertainties  over  the  composition  of  Anne's  first  ministry  and  her  desire  to 
find  a  military  and  naval  role  for  her  husband,  Prince  George  of  Denmark.  With  decidedly 
modest  abilities  in  both  spheres  he  had  to  be  found  titles  -  Generalisssimo  and  Lord  High 
24  Francis,  'Prince  George  of  Hesse-Darmstadt',  pp.  59-62;  Francis,  The  First  Peninsular  War,  pp.  31-5;  PRO, 
105165,  unf:  Stepney  to  Vernon,  22  Apr.  1702  [NS];  'Memorial  presented  to  his  Majesty  by  the  Landgraf  of 
Hesse,  concerning  the  Descent  on  Spain,  12  mars  1702'  [NS]. 
25  The  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  ed.  H.  L.  Snyder  (London,  1975),  i,  no.  53,  pp.  53: 
Marlborough  to  Godolphin,  24  Mar.  1702. 
26  PRO,  Sp  106195,  unf:  marginal  comments  on,  'Memorial  presented  to  his  Majesty  by  the  Landgraf  of 
Hesse,  concerning  the  Descent  on  Spain,  12  mars  1702'  [NS]. 
27  A.  D.  Francis,  'John  Methuen  and  the  Anglo-Portuguese  Treaties  of  1703',  IIJ  iii  (1960),  103-24;  AD. 
Francis,  'Portugal  and  the  Grand  Alliance',  BIHR  xxxviii  (1965),  71-93;  Francis,  The  First  Peninsular  War, 
pp.  35-8. 
23  Cobbett,  Parliamentary  History  ofEngland,  vi.  4;  PRO,  SP  105165,  unf:  Stepney  to  Vernon,  8,26  Apr.,  9, 
20  May  1702  [NS],  and  enclosure,  'La  proposition  du  Ministre  de  L'Empercur  pour  envoyer  la  Flotte  sur  les 
Costes  du  Royaume  de  Naples,  fondee  sur  la  necessite  facilite,  et  sur  Putilite  de  cette  Entreprise,  15/26  avril 
1702';  Stepney  to  Manchester,  II  Apr.  1702  [NS]. 189 
Admiral  -  without  any  real  executive  power.  29  It  was  May  before  Nottingham  and  Hedges 
were  appointed  to  the  two  Secretaryships  and  Prince  George's  Admiralty  Council  was  in 
place;  and,  only  then,  could  they  begin  to  pick  up  the  organisation.  of  what  was  to  be  one  of 
the  largest  expeditionary  forces  dispatched  in  the  early  eighteenth  century. 
Bringing  together  the  English  and  Dutch  Grand  Fleets  at  Spithead  on  which  twelve 
English  infantry  regiments,  some  dragoons,  and  eight  Dutch  battalions  were  to  be  embarked 
quite  simply  took  considerable  time.  Thejournals  and  correspondence  of  the  commanders, 
Admiral  Sir  George  Rooke  and  the  Duke  of  Ormonde,  detail  their  exhaustive  efforts  in  this 
regard.  Aside  from  the  standard  responsibilities  of  their  positions,  such  as  the  gathering  and 
the  provisioning  of  their  forces  and  ensuring  that  they  had  adequate  accommodation  with 
bedding,  Rooke  and  Ormonde  were  faced  with  certain  larger  administrative  tasks.  30  In 
particular,  five  regiments  had  to  be  transferred  from  Ireland;  a  sizeable  descent  train  organised 
in  conjunction  with  the  Ordnance  office;  and  oversight  provided  for  the  infantry  holding  camp 
on  the  Isle  of  Wight,  which  was  only  one  of  the  two  embarkation  points  (Plymouth  being  the 
other).  These  were  not  primarily  army  affairs  either  due  to  the  role  of  the  navy  in  organising 
transport  for  the  troops  and  embarkation.  31  Given  the  potential  for  delay  attendant  upon  all 
these  matters,  it  is  perhaps  remarkable  that  the  organisation  of  the  expeditionary  force  was 
largely  complete  by  the  beginning  of  July. 
The  same  could  not  be  said  for  the  drafting  of  the  Instructions.  This  process 
continued  on  from  the  Nine  Years  War  in  a  manner  whereby  it  was  usual  for  several  sets  to 
be  issued  along  with  attendant  shorter  Additional  Instructions.  Rooke  received  his  first 
Instructions  and  secret  additional  notes  from  Secretary  Hedges  on  7  June.  Withthejoint 
army-navy  Council  of  War  the  sovereign  command  body,  the  Instructions  required  that  CAdiz 
was  to  be  reduced,  though  Gibraltar  was  acceptable  as  a  default  target.  Moreover,  if  time 
29  W.  A.  Speck,  The  Birth  ofBritain:  A  New  Nation  1700-1710  (Oxford,  1994),  pp.  35-6 
30  The  Journal  ofSir  George  Rooke,  pp.  144-63;  BL,  Add  MSS  38159,  pp.  2-7:  The  Duke  of  Ormonde's 
Journal  of  the  Expedition  to  Spain  in  the  Year  1702  [hereafter  'Ormonde's  Journal'];  PRO,  SP  42/67:  fos.  13- 
15,18,22:  Rooke  to  Nottingham,  29  May,  1,4,13,25  June  1702;  PRO,  SP  44/168,  pp.  398-400: 
'Commission  for  the  Duke  of  Ormonde  to  be  C-in-C  of  the  Forces  to  be  Employed  on  Board  the  Fleet',  12 
Apr.  1702. 
31  PRO,  WO  4615,  p.  70:  'Your  Lordship  Most  Obedient  &  Humble  Servants'  to  'My  Lord  [Romney?  ],  20  Feb. 
1702;  PRO,  SP  44/206,  p.  21-2:  'The  Duke  of  Ormonde's  Demands  from  the  Office  of  the  Ordnance  for  the 
Sea  Expedition',  n.  d.;  Vernon  to  the  Lord  Lieutenant  of  Ireland,  26  Mar.  1702;  Vernon  to  the  Transport 
Commissioners,  26  Mar.  1702;  PRO,  SP  105165,  unf.:  Vernon  to  Sutton,  12  July  1702;  PRO,  ADM  2/28,  pp. 
76,107-8,15  1:  the  Admiralty  to  the  Transport  Commissioners,  24,31  Mar,  20  Apr.  1702. 190 
and  the  Council  allowed,  then  Vigo,  Pontevedra  or  La  Coruila  could  be  attacked  on  the 
fleet's  return.  The  secret  Instructions  directed  that  ships  and  a  garrison  be  left  at  Cadiz,  if  the 
operation  proved  succesSfUl.  32  Within  a  week,  however,  the  priorities  of  these  Instructions 
were  upset  when  the  Ministry  requested  that  Rooke's  Council  of  War  immediately  consider 
whether  a  descent  might  first  be  undertaken  at  La  Corufla  if  the  French  ships  listed  in  the 
intelligence  report  from  the  station  commander,  Rear-Admiral  Munden,  were  still  present. 
The  Council  agreed  but  stressed  that  it  was  contingent  upon  confirmation  of  the  French 
presence  in  the  harbour  and  to  facilitate  this,  Rear-Admiml  Fairborne  was  dispatched  with  a 
33 
squadron  to  keep  the  French  bottled-up  in  the  port.  Notwithstanding,  the  Instructions  were 
altered  for  a  third  time  as  a  result  of  the  poor  early  July  weather  which  delayed  Rooke's 
departure.  The  Ministry  considered  the  season  of  year  to  be  too  advanced  for  attempting  a 
range  of  targets;  hence  it  was  decided  that  if  Fairbome  reported  a  French  squadron  at  La 
Corufla  then  the  descent  was  to  be  made  there  but,  if  not,  then  the  fleet  could  proceed  on  to 
Cadiz  but  no  further.  Gibraltar  on  the  outward  and  Vigo  and  Pontevedro  on  the  return 
journeys  were  all  ruled  out  as  possible  targets;  only  La  Coruila  on  the  fleet's  return  was 
viewed  admissible  if  the  Council  of  War  agreed.  34  The  expeditionary  force's  Instructions 
were  strictly  drafted  and  this  was  ultimately  to  have  considerable  bearing  upon  the  progress 
of  the  operation. 
Once  Rooke  made  it  out  of  the  Channel  at  the  end  of  July,  the  weather  conditions 
improved  considerably  and  the  main  fleet  quickly  made  Cape  Finisterre  to  link  up  with  Rear- 
Admiral  Fairborne's  squadron  which,  as  mentioned,  had  been  sent  to  La  Coruila  at  the  end  of 
June  to  block  up  the  French  squadron  that  Munden  had  failed  to  prevent  getting  into  that  port 
in  the  first  place.  The  French  had,  however,  left  before  Fairborne's  arrival  and,  although  the 
Rear-Admiral  and  Rooke  initially  missed  each  other  at  the  latter's  station  off  the  Cape, 
Fairborne  came  up  by  the  end  of  the  first  week  in  August.  35  Within  three  days  of  this 
conjunction,  the  main  fleet  reached  the  Portuguese  coast  and  on  II  August  in  Lagos  Bay,  a 
32  PRO,  SP  44/208,  pp.  3-10:  'Instructions  for  Our  Trusty  and  Welbeloved  Sir  George  Rooke  Knt',  7  June 
1702;  'Additional  Instructions  for  Our  Trusty  and  Welbeloved  Sir  George  Rooke  Knt',  7  June  1702. 
"  The  Journal  ofSir  George  Rooke,  pp.  157-60;  PRO,  SP  44/208,  pp.  16-22:  Hedges  to  Rooke,  13,16,18 
June  1702;  'Instructions  for  Our  Trusty  and  Wclbeloved  Sir  George  Rooke  Knt',  16  June  1702. 
34  PRO,  SP  44/208,  pp.  28-30:  Hedges  to  Rooke,  20  July  1702;  'Instructions  for  Our  Trusty  and  Welbeloved 
Sir  George  Rooke  Knt',  20  July  1702. 
31  The  Journal  ofSir  George  Rooke,  pp.  163,164  n.  1,171-3;  PRO,  ADM  2/28,  pp.  226-8,438-9:  the 
Admiralty  to  Munden,  5  May  1702;  the  Admiralty  to  Rooke  or  in  his  absence  Shovell,  24  June  1702. 191 
Council  of  War  was  convened  to  consider  an  agenda  dominated  by  intelligence  on  CAdiz  sent 
by  the  English  Envoy  to  Portugal,  John  Methuen.  36 
The  defences  at  Cddiz  were  reportedly  poor,  both  with  respect  to  the  garrison  troops 
and  the  fortifications.  The  six  regiments  in  the  town  were  said  to  be  a  third  under  strength 
and,  although  several  new  works  had  been  erected  since  Carlos  11's  death,  the  speed  with 
which  they  had  been  thrown  up  had  impaired  their  quality.  Satisfied  that  no  significant 
measures  had  been  undertaken  to  defend  Cadiz,  Methuen  concluded  that  the  circumstances 
for  an  immediate  attack  were  propitious,  especially  since  the  town's  commandant,  Scipio 
Brancaccio,  was  reputedly  disliked  by  both  soldiers  and  inhabitants.  Nonetheless,  it  seemed 
to  the  Council  that  this  intelligence  merely  underscored  the  expedition's  original  strategic 
intent  to  target  Cddiz  and  that  its  assessment  of  the  doubtful  and  confused  state  of  affairs  in 
the  town  prevented  a  decision  being  taken  on  the  tactical  form  of  the  assault.  To  address  this 
concern,  a  detachment  of  grenadiers  commanded  by  Colonel  Pearce  was  to  be  put  ashore  at 
Rota  -  some  six  miles  north-west  of  Cddiz  -  to  gain  ftirther  intelligence. 
It  must  be  assumed  that  Methuen  had  not  then  sent  Ormonde  a  duplicate  of  an 
anonymous  letter  from  Tavira,  dated  10  August  (NS),  for  it  provided  considerable  detail  on 
the  disposition  of  CAdiz's  defenceS.  37  The  town  itself  was  situated  at  the  extremity  of  the 
narrow  Isla  de  Ldon  peninsula,  which  snaked  out  from  Spain's  south-west  coast,  and  was 
separated  from  the  mainland  by  the  Bay  of  CAdiz.  CAdiz's  inner  harbour  -  the  Puntales  -  was 
accessed  by  a  channel  -  the  Canon  de  Puntales  -  leading  from  the  outer  bay,  and  which  was, 
at  its  narrowest  point,  flanked  by  the  forts  Puntales  and  Matagorda,  on  the  Isla  de  Ldon  and 
the  mainland  respectively.  The  anonymous  correspondent  told  not  only  of  strong  materials 
comprising  the  chain  across  the  Puntales,  but  also  of  the  number  and  the  reach  of  the  guns  in 
the  Puntales  and  the  Matagorda  forts  and,  significantly,  of  a  new  work  built  just  up  from  the 
Puntales  Fort,  which  provided  additional  fire  from  its  sixteen  guns  across  the  inner  bay. 
36  The  ensuing  account  of  the  operation  to  capture  CAdiz  is  based  upon  the  following  primary  sources  and 
secondary  authorities:  BL,  Add  MSS  38159,  pp.  2-33:  'Ormonde's  Journal';  The  Journal  ofSir  George 
Rooke,  pp.  118-262;  Life  of  Captain  Stephen  Martin,  1666-1740,  pp.  47-56;  A  Full  and  Impartial  Ilistory  of 
the  &pedition  into  Spain  (London,  1704),  pp.  1-172;  The  Life  andAdventures  ofMatthew  Bishop  of 
Deddington  in  Oxfordshire  (London,  1744),  pp.  6-11;  PRO,  ADM  51/4320,  Part  iv,  unpaginated,  Royal 
Sovereign,  21  July47  Sept.  1702;  BL,  Sloane  2496,  pp.  42-54:  'Examinations  relative  to  the  failure  of  the 
Expedition  against  Cadiz  1702';  Spain  Under  Charles  the  Second,  pp.  206-12:  Stanhope  to  his  father  (11on. 
A.  Stanhope),  29  Aug.,  3,4  Sept.  1702  [NSI;  Owen,  War  at  Sea  Under  Queen  Anne,  pp.  77-8  1;  Colomb, 
Naval  Warfare,  pp.  283-6. 192 
Further  detail  in  the  letter  outlined  the  strength  of  the  forts  dotted  along  the  coastline  leading 
to  Cddiz.  In  addition  to  this  correspondent,  accounts  fi-om  fishermen  captured  by  the 
detachment  en  route  to  Rota  were  sent  by  Pearce;  while  other  news  filtered  through  from 
Portugal  and  elsewhere  along  the  southern  Spanish  coast.  Thus,  although  Pearce's  sally  onto 
the  mainland  failed  to  glean  anything  further,  on  reconvening  two  days  later,  the  Council 
considered  that  it  had  sufficient  information  to  facilitate  detailed  planning. 
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Certain  topographical  circumstances  were  similar  to  those  which  had  framed  the 
attack  on  Brest  in  1694  inasmuch  as  that  a  direct  landing  upon  the  principal  target  from  the 
calm  of  an  inner  harbour  was  an  unlikely  proposition  due  to  the  narrow  sea  access.  A  day 
after  this  Council,  while  waiting  for  the  transport  ships  to  gather,  Fairborne  did  suggest  that  a 
passage  through  to  the  Puntales  could  be  forced  but  he  failed  to  convince  his  naval 
colleagues.  The  other  possible  direct  route  was  from  the  Atlantic  side  of  the  Ldon  peninsula 
and  it  was  rcconnoitred  on  13  August  by  both  the  Quarter-Master-General  and  the  Chief 
Engineer.  Despite  their  report  of  three  commodious  landing  bays  (one  large  and  two  small) 
between  the  Isla  de  Santa  Pedro  (on  the  backside  of  the  Ldon  peninsula)  and  CAdiz  town,  and 
notwithstanding  Ormonde's  support,  this  approach  was  vetoed  for  leaving  the  naval  vessels 
too  exposed.  The  intelligence  also  made  it  clear  that  any  direct  route  would  have  to  contend 
immediately  not  only  with  the  considerable  ordnance  located  in  the  strategically  sited  forts  but 
also  with  some  4000  troops  based  in  the  town  and  1000  regular  horse  alongside  the  militia 
which  roamed  the  nearby  coast.  Cddiz  would  probably  have  to  be  besieged  and  the  navy  had 
doubts  about  supply,  particularly  if  the  ships  were  forced  to  lie  off  the  Uon  peninsula  in 
unsettled  weather.  As  at  Brest  in  1694,  it  was  considered  more  appropriate  to  land  troops 
some  distance  from  the  intended  target  and,  then  to  march  upon  it  with  the  aim  of  capturing 
enemy  defence  works  en  route  which  would  facilitate  the  entry  of  the  fleet  into  the  inner 
harbour  to  conduct  a  destructive  close  range  bombardment.  The  Council  therefore  resolved 
to  land  the  troops  in  the  Bay  of  Bulls,  immediately  east  of  Rota,  with  Fort  Santa  Catalina  (or 
St  Katherine's  Tower)38and  Puerto  de  Santa  Maria  on  the  road  to  the  Uon  peninsula  the 
initial  objectives. 
Ormonde,  was  principally  responsible  for  the  troop  landings,  having  issued  the 
instructions  governing  them  and  then  being  present  in  his  barge  throughout;  meanwhile,  the 
most  senior  naval  commander  present,  Fairborne  (Rooke  was  ill  in  his  flagship  with  a  gout 
38  The  1695  map  reproduced  in  Owen,  War  at  Sea  Under  Queen  Anne,  causes  confusion  on  the  question  of 
fort  names.  Its  Spanish  name  for  St  Katherine's  Tower  is  Santa  Cattalins  and  it  marks  another  fort  to  the 
north-cast  of  CAdiz  town,  called  Santa  Catalina.  Although  Owen  does  not  obviously  represent  the  capture  of 
St  Katherine's  Tower  (Fort  Santa  Catalina)  as  part  of  the  march  to  occupy  Puerto  de  Santa  Maria,  on  p.  78,  he 
refers  to  Fort  Santa  Catalina  as  being  like  Fort  Matagorda  on  the  'northern  arm'  of  the  inner  harbour,  which 
must  be  the  fort  labelled  Santa  Catallins  on  the  map.  Other  secondary  literature  such  as  Colomb's  Naval 
Warfare,  pp.  2834  and,  more  importantly,  the  primary  sources  listed  in  n.  36  above  generally  refer  to  the  fort 
east  of  Puerto  de  Santa  Maria  as  Santa  Catalina,  though  7he  Journal  ofSir  George  Rooke,  occasionally  makes 
reference  instead  to  Fort  Santa  Catarina. 194 
induced  fever)  could  only  maintain  a  supervisory  role  from  the  deck  of  the  Swifisure. 
Ormonde's  descent  Instructions  bore  a  remarkable  similarity  to  Tollemache's  intentions  at 
Best.  Some  1200  grenadiers  were  to  be  first  ashore  with  the  landing  thereafter  configured  as 
mutually  reinforcing  waves  of  regiments  in  line;  the  English  would  take  the  place  of  seniority 
on  the  right  leaving  the  Dutch  to  the  left.  Significantly,  two  important  lessons  had  been  learnt 
from  the  Camaret  Bay  ddbdcle:  the  forward  landing  craft  were  to  be  of  the  shallowest  draft; 
and  the  Instructions  indicated  that  it  was  the  responsibility  of  the  general  officers  and  also  the 
individual  platoon  commanders  to  ensure  an  orderly  landing.  Naval  lieutenants  were  not  on 
this  occasion  -  as  they  had  been  at  Brest  -  solely  in  charge  of  the  landing  craft.  Although 
additional  ammunition  and  war  stores  were  to  follow  immediately  behind  the  third  wave, 
Ormonde  also  shrewdly  ensured  that  his  men  were  each  carrying  two  days  full  provisions, 
thereby  providing  them  with  the  capacity  to  sustain  a  period  -  albeit  short  -  of  operational 
independence  in  the  event  that  the  landing  was  vigorously  contested. 
It  was  late  morning  on  15  August  before  the  operation  commenced.  Four  third  rates 
stood  into  the  bay  to  guard  against  the  French  galleys  known  to  be  in  the  Puntales  and  also  to 
engage  Fort  Santa  Catalina  whose  guns  could  rake  the  landing  she.  The  weather  proved  the 
main  obstacle  with  the  strong  winds  upsetting  several  boats  and  thus  causing  a  number  of 
men  to  drown;  only  a  very  few  soldiers  did  not  have  to  swim  or  wade  through  shoulder  high 
water  to  reach  the  shore.  The  detachment  of  grenadiers  led  by  Pearce  and  Lord  Donegal 
were  first  onto  the  beach  and,  despite  wet  ammunition,  fought  off  an  equal  number  of  Spanish 
troopers  which  charged  down  from  the  hills.  Those  horsemen  and  a  small  gun  emplacement 
(abandoned  on  the  approach  of  the  Dutch)  apart,  no  other  opposition  was  encountered  on  the 
landing  beach  and  some  6000  troops  were  successfully  ashore  by  night-fall.  Before  then, 
however,  Ormonde  had  moved  to  secure  Rota,  in  his  rear,  which  was  a  suitable  prospect  for 
additional  troop  and  artillery  train  landings. 
A  place  of  little  strength  upon  a  declination,  Rota  was  easily  threatened  by  the 
Confederate  forces.  A  summons  was  sent  ahead  and,  as  the  army  approached,  Rota's  chief 
magistrate  came  out  to  offer  Ormonde  the  town  keys.  A  camp  was  quickly  established  along 
with  a  headquarters  in  the  town  castle,  while  the  remaining  stores  and  troops  were  landed. 
Amongst  the  latter  were  a  group  of  sailors  who  had  been  asked  to  volunteer  to  go  ashore  as 
'Pioneers'  and  the  account  of  one  'Pioneer'  -  Matthew  Bishop  (then  a  seaman  in  the 195 
Swiftsure  but  later  a  celebrated  Malburian  soldier)39  suggests  that  their  experiences  were  not 
dissimilar  from  those  of  the  Naval  Brigades  some  centuries  later.  40 
Ormonde  remained  at  Rota  for  three  days  to  organise  the  next  phase  of  the  operation. 
In  anticipation  of  the  march  along  the  coast  to  the  Isla  de  Ldon  peninsula,  a  letter  was  sent  to 
the  Governor  of  Puerto  de  Santa  Maria  explaining  that  the  Confederates  intended  to  occupy 
the  port  but  pledging  that  no  harm  would  come  to  the  inhabitants  provided  that  they  remained 
quiescent.  Ormonde's  letter  recognised  that  the  operation  against  CAdiz  was  indirectly  linked 
to  the  promotion  of  another  claimant  to  the  Spanish  throne  and  the  ongoing  diplomacy  to 
bring  Portugal  into  the  Grand  Alliance.  The  necessity  of  not  alienating  the  inhabitants  of  the 
targeted  territory  meant  that  it  was  simply  not  sufficient  to  complete  the  operation  without 
thought  to  the  impact  of  the  army's  actions.  On  this  occasion,  some  restraint  in  waging  war 
was  required  which  quickly  proved  to  be  beyond  Ormonde  and  his  fellow  officers  and,  more 
importantly,  was  unrecognised  by  the  soldiers. 
Once  two  small  ambuscades  had  been  beaten  off,  the  army  was  able  to  enter  the  now 
nearly  deserted  Puerto  de  Santa  Maria;  meanwhile  a  grenadier  vanguard  captured  Fort  Santa 
Catalina.  Almost  immediately,  discipline  broke  down.  Houses  were  looted  and  churches 
despoiled;  while  drunk  troops  molested  the  remaining  women  and  nuns.  It  was  notjust  the 
army  privates  who  were  culpable,  however.  The  naval  'Pioneer',  Bishop,  contentedly 
recollects  drinking  wine  with  a  colleague  on  a  roof  prior  to  the  army  entering  the  town  and  in 
his  log  entry  of  23  August,  Captain  Ley  of  the  Royal  Sovereign  bluntly  notes  that  both 
seamen  and  soldiers  were  plundering  Santa  Maria.  Considerable  evidence  also  points  to  the 
participation  by  officers  of  both  services.  Certainly,  the  senior  generals,  Sir  Charles  O'Hara 
and  Sir  Henry  Belasis,  were  later  placed  under  arrest  by  Ormonde  for  their  alleged  role  in  the 
plunder,  while  some  naval  officers  were  implicated  in  storing  loot  in  their  vessels.  These 
actions  undoubtedly  extinguished  any  support  there  might  have  been  in  Andalucia  for  the 
Habsburg  claimant  to  the  Spanish  throne  and  Ormonde's  subsequent  declaration  against  the 
plundering  did  not  appease  the  inhabitants.  Militarily,  this  meant  that  CAdiz  would  have  to  be 
captured  and  then  defended  in  a  conventional  manner,  not  only  against  the  Franco-Spanish 
troops  but  also  against  the  town's  inhabitants  and  those  of  the  surrounding  area.  Without 
39  C.  T.  Atkinson,  'One  of  Marlborough's  Men:  Matthew  Bishop  of  Webb's',  JSAIIR  xxiii  (1945),  157-69. 
1  See,  for  example,  R.  Brooks,  The  LongArm  ofthe  Empire:  Naval  Brigadesfrom  the  Crimea  to  the  Boxer 196 
considerable  additional  resources,  the  security  of  a  Confederate  Cddiz  might  easily  be 
breached  from  within  and  hence  its  worth  as  a  naval  base  and  a  secure  gateway  to  the 
Mediterranean  was  called  into  question.  Even  before  an  attack  had  been  launched,  and 
regardless  of  whether  it  was  to  be  successful,  failure  at  Cddiz  had  largely  been  ensured  by  the 
expeditionary  force's  conduct  at  Santa  Maria. 
This  last  point  was  not  however  fully  appreciated  at  the  time  and,  although  both 
Rooke  and  Ormonde  subsequently  recognised  that  the  events  at  the  port  had  greatly  hardened 
opposition,  the  desire  to  push  forward  was  maintained.  The  Council  had  previously  agreed 
that  the  naval  bombardment  of  Cddiz  depended  upon  the  capture  of  Fort  Santa  Catalina,  thus 
allowing  the  naval  detachment  to  stand  safely  into  Cddiz  Bay,  and  also  whether  or  not 
Ormonde  decided  that  the  army  should  reach  Puerto  Real  first.  With  the  first  condition 
achieved,  Ormonde  inexplicably  deferred  his  decision  on  the  march  to  Puerto  Real  by  calling 
another  Council,  which  convened  on  24  August.  Perhaps  responding  to  the  Duke's 
unexpressed  wish,  the  officers  present  looked  at  the  next  stage  in  greater  detail  and  resolved 
that  if  the  army  could  capture  Fort  Matagorda,  then  the  navy  might  send  a  couple  of  frigates 
though  the  Canon  de  Puntales  and,  if  the  passage  proved  clear,  additional  vessels  might 
follow.  Aside  from  enabling  the  navy  to  destroy  the  French  ships  and  galleys  tied  up  in  the 
Puntales,  it  would,  more  importantly,  allow  for  a  close  range  bombardment  of  CAdiz  to  soften 
up  its  defences  against  a  land  assault.  The  Council  recognised  though  that  the  essential  first 
step  -  the  capture  of  the  Matagorda  -  was  not  an  easy  prospect,  particularly  with  respect  to  its 
approach.  Consequently,  Rear-Admirals  Fairborne,  Wassanaer  and  Grayden  were  charged 
with  assessing  the  viability  of  transporting  men  from  the  River  Xeres  (now  River  Guadalete)41 
at  Puerto  de  Santa  Maria  to  the  neck  of  land  upon  which  the  Matagorda  was  situated. 
The  Admirals  submitted  two  reports  which,  although  admittedly  taking  account  of  the 
different  conditions  at  high  and  low  water,  gave  no  clear  opinion  other  than  to  convey  their 
general  scepticism  about  this  method  of  advance.  Uncharacteristically,  it  was  a  Dutchman, 
Admiral  Allemonde,  who  forestalled  the  potential  deadlock  by  calling  another  Council  which 
decided  to  stick  with  the  resolution  of  24  August.  The  coastal  advance  upon  the  Matagorda 
Rebellion  (London,  1999). 
411  am  most  grateful  to  Dr  Roy  Alexander  of  Chester  College,  Professor  Adrian  Harvey  of  Liverpool 
University  and  Dr  Roberto  Lazaro,  Suau  of  Consejo  Superior  des  Investigaciones  Cientificas  (CSIC)  at  the 
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was  nonetheless  rejected  in  favour  of  Baron  Sparr  marching  some  2500  troops  overland, 
albeit  having  to  cross  three  rivers  in  the  process.  This  task  though  was  to  be  eased  by  use  of 
the  ships'  boats.  By  the  end  of  August,  Sparr  was  dug  in  a  half-mile  from  the  Matagorda  and, 
although  the  attack  was  getting  bogged  down  in  marshy  ground  which  was  ill-suited  for  the 
siting  of  his  field-artillery,  he  confidently  sent  for  the  rest  of  the  army  to  join  him.  That  it 
proved  not  forthcoming  was  partially  due  to  the  emergence  of  reservations  over  this  approach 
but  also  because  of  a  general  desire  to  get  some  troops  on  to  the  Isla  de  Ldon  in  quick-time. 
This  in  turn  set  in-train  a  series  of  Councils  of  both  land  and  sea  officers  which  led  to  the 
abandonment  of  the  operation  against  Cidiz. 
In  separate  letters,  Ormonde  and  Rooke  had  represented  their  doubts  about  the 
attempt  to  force  the  Puntales  by  taking  the  Matagorda.  Ormonde,  writing  to  Secretary 
Nottingham,  was  circumspect  but  seemed  to  be  preparing  the  ground  for  the  failure  by 
emphasising  that  his  preference  had  always  been  to  land  troops  on  the  back-side  of  the  Uon 
peninsula.  Rooke  meanwhile,  making  his  first  effective  intervention  in  the  Cddiz  operation, 
represented  to  the  General  that  he  would  need  to  clear  the  channel  of  blockages. 
Furthermore,  that  the  capture  of  the  Matagorda  fort  would  be  insufficient  for  him  to  send 
vessels  through  the  Canon  de  Puntales  due  to  the  prohibitive  fire  which  would  come  from  the 
fort  opposite  the  Matagorda.  A  change  of  mind  on  this  matter  meant  that  Rooke  was  now 
supported  by  his  commander  in  Cidiz  Bay,  Fairborne,  and  in  a  rarely  remarked  upon  display 
of  unanimity  with  Ormonde,  Rooke  similarly  argued  that  Cidiz  could  only  be  taken  by  a 
considerable  landing  of  troops  on  the  Uon  peninsula  in  conjunction  with  a  sea-based 
bombardment.  Accordingly,  to  expedite  the  entry  of  the  army  on  the  Isla  de  Uon,  Ormonde 
proposed  that  the  soldiers  march  away  from  the  coast  to  Puente  de  Suazo  and  cross  over  the 
bridge  there  to  Uon  and,  in  the  event  that  it  was  broken  or  defended,  he  requested  that  the 
navy  send  sufficient  boats  and  materials  to  the  river  at  Santo  Pedro,  so  that  a  make-shift 
bridge  could  be  fashioned  between  there  and  Suazo.  Chairing  his  first  Council  of  naval 
officers  since  arriving  in  the  region,  Rooke  gained  their  agreement  to  Ormonde's  proposal 
only  for  it  to  be  thrown  into  doubt  four  days  later  when  Brigadier  Seymour  brought  an 
additional  caveat  to  the  plan. 
Before  attempting  to  pass  over  on  to  Ldon,  the  Council  of  Land  Officers  considered 
conclude  that  the  Xeres  is  probably  now  the  Guadalete. 198 
what  to  do  in  the  event  that  the  bridging  manoeuvre  failed  and  the  army  was  forced  to  retreat. 
Implicit  also  in  their  deliberations  was  the  belief  that  Sparr  was  unlikely  to  succeed,  and  thus 
the  generals  sought  naval  agreement  to  bring  the  army  and  artillery  off  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Xeres.  The  naval  Council  baulked  at  this  proposal,  arguing  instead  that  the  only  safe 
embarkation  place  was  the  mole  at  Rota.  Two  days  later,  an  increasingly  discontented  naval 
Council  reconvened  to  consider  matters  further.  Rooke  had  to  contend  with  the  mounting 
concern  of  his  Captains  at  the  increasing  sickness  amongst  the  junior  officers  and  the 
,  42 
crewmen  employed  ashore  in  what  the  Council  superciliously  called  'slavish  services  ,  and 
at  the  lateness  of  the  season.  There  was  also  a  move  to  restate  the  belief  that  the  capture  of 
the  Matagorda  would  not  facilitate  the  entry  of  the  fleet  into  the  Puntales.  This  naval  Council 
of  2  September  should  not  however  be  interpreted  as  representative  of  discordant  relations 
between  the  army  and  navy,  which  contemporaries  and  commentators  have  assumed  to  be  the 
principal  reason  for  the  failure  of  the  operation.  "  It  also  passed  resolutions  that  the  flag- 
officers  in  CAdiz  Bay  reassess  their  scepticism  about  the  tactical  utility  of  the  Matagorda  and 
that  a  bombardment  of  Cidiz  be  undertaken  at  the  first  opportunity  of  good  weather.  Far 
from  actually  pulling  the  plug  on  the  operation,  the  naval  officers  merely  asked  aloud  if  there 
was  any  real  prospect  of  success  at  Cddiz  and,  if  so,  how  quickly  it  was  likely  to  come  about. 
On  the  same  day,  a  Council  of  army  officers  had  moved  to  answer  that  question. 
Considering  a  letter  that  Lord  Shannon  had  brought  from  Sparr  which  included  the 
engineering  officers'  opinions,  the  Council  decided  that  the  attack  against  the  fort  should  be 
recalled  and  that  ajoint  Council  should  convene  to  assess  matters  further.  It  was  this 
Council,  held  on  5  September,  which  concluded  that  as  the  capture  of  the  Matagorda  was  too 
difficult  a  task  with  the  resources  to  hand,  and  one  which  would  not  in  any  event  ease  the 
passage  of  the  fleet  into  the  Puntales,  then  the  operation  against  Cidiz  should  be  abandoned. 
There  is  no  record  of  rancour  at  this  Council,  nor  of  any  such  vigorous  debates  as  had 
occurred  at  the  Council  of  mid-August,  which  determined  the  tactical  advance  on  CAdiz. 
Rather,  it  would  seem  that  both  the  army  and  navy,  first  separately  and  then  in  this  Council, 
calmly  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  operation  could  not  succeed  on  the  approach  taken 
42  The  journal  of  Sir  George  Rooke,  p.  194. 
43  Life  ofCaptain  Stephen  Martin,  1666-1740,  pp.  54-6,  is  a  contemporary  account  which  considers  poor 
inter-service  relations  the  cause  of  failure  at  CAdiz.  Examples  of  histories  which  emphasis  the  role  of  army- 
naval  discord  are,  Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen  Anne,  i.  273,276  and  Coxc,  Memoirs  of  the  Kings  of 199 
and,  indeed,  that  any  attack  would  now  require  greater  resources.  Implicitly,  this  recognised 
that  the  indirect  route  to  Cddiz  was  misguided  and,  as  Marlborough  later  argued,  if  Cidiz  was 
not  from  the  outset  a  directly  attainable  target,  then  an  alternative  should  have  been 
considered.  44  More  obvious  was  the  impact  of  the  events  at  Santa  Maria  in  encouraging  the 
locals'  resistance  and  help  to  Governor  Villadarias  and  Commandant  Brancaccio  to  make  best 
use  of  their  limited  resources,  a  point  which  Hesse-Darmstadt's  letters  to  Rooke  and 
Ormonde  made  clear.  The  problem  therefore  with  Colomb's  judgement  that  the  operation 
45 
represented  a  failure  of  perseverance  is  that  it  overlooks  these  factors.  The  inter-service 
discord  frequently  referred  to,  and  particularly  the  break-down  in  relations  between  Rooke 
and  Ormonde,  principally  arose  from  the  debate  about  what  the  expeditionary  force  was  to  do 
(if  anything)  now  that  Cidiz  was  not  considered  a  feasible  target. 
Marlborough  later  stepped  into  this  debate  by  urging  to  Nottingham  that  the  situation 
on  the  Spanish  coast  be  retrieved  if  possible  for  the  'common  cause%  46  This  had  been 
Ormonde's  view,  though  unlike  Marlborough,  he  was  so  anxious  to  undertake  something  that 
no  obstacles  were  recognised.  Rooke  however  saw  complications  everywhere,  and  retreated 
behind  the  provisions  in  his  Instructions  of  20  July  which  restricted  alternative  targets  to  one  - 
La  Corufla  -  but,  as  usual,  its  viability  was  contingent  upon  the  agreement  of  a  joint  Council. 
According  to  Rooke'sjournal,  Ormonde  had  proposed  proceeding  to  La  Corufla  at  the 
Council  of  5  September  but  the  sea  officers  declared  against  it  due  to  the  lateness  of  the 
season  and  they  were  supported  by  the  testimony  of  the  Corufla  pilots  whom  Rooke  brought 
in  for  questioning.  However,  no  formal  resolution  was  apparently  adopted  by  the  Council 
and  meantime  Prince  Eugene's  campaign  in  Italy  and,  in  particular,  the  Battle  of  Luzzara  (4 
August)  was  being  interpreted  as  an  encouragement  for  the  Spaniards  to  welcome  the 
Austrian  Habsburgs.  Emboldened  therefore,  Ormonde  continued  to  lobby  Rooke  privately  as 
they  organised  the  troop  withdrawal  from  the  Andalucian  coast.  Increasingly  frustrated  by 
what  he  considered  the  General's  disregard  of  the  Instructions,  Rooke  sought  the  opinion  of 
his  fellow  senior  naval  officers,  once  the  embarkation  was  complete  on  16  September. 
Spain,  i.  224. 
44  The  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  i,  no.  139,  p.  148:  Marlborough  to  Godolphin,  21  Nov. 
1702. 
45  Colomb,  Naval  Warfare,  p.  285. 
46  The  Letters  and  Dispatches  ofJohn  Churchill,  First  Duke  ofMarlborough,  From  1702-1712,  ed.  Sir 
George  Murray  (London,  1845),  i.  47:  Marlborough  to  Nottingham,  23  Oct.  1702  [NS]. 200 
Ormonde  had  suggested  a  variety  of  targets  for  another  assault  including  CAdiz  again; 
the  Galician  coastal  towns  of  Pontevedro,  Vigo  and  La  Corufla;  and  Ayamonte,  which  was 
located  westwards  from  CAdiz  Bay  at  the  estuary  of  the  Guadiana  river.  Rooke  placed  them 
before  his  naval  Council  and,  considering  each  in  turn,  the  officers  concluded  that  Ayamonte 
was  the  only  possibility  but  even  then  concerns  were  raised  about  the  viability  of  seaborne 
supply  in  the  winter  season.  On-nonde's  earlier  disquiet  about  insufficient  resources  to 
capture  CAdiz  was  used  to  reject  a  second  attempt  there;  while  it  was  felt  that  the  Galician 
coast  could  not  be  reached  in  time  before  the  inclement  weather  and  diminishing  provisions 
made  an  attack  impractical.  A  joint  Council  was  convened  the  following  day  to  resolve  the 
future  proceedings  of  the  expeditionary  force,  when  the  specific  question  before  it  was 
whether  it  would  be  reasonable  to  make  a  second  landing  on  Spain.  Factors  such  as  the 
region's  disinclination  to  the  Austrian  House  and  the  depleted  condition  of  the  Dutch 
provisions  -  such  that  they  had  only  one  months  supply  for  their  troops  -  weighed  heavily  in 
the  balance,  and  the  Council  decided  against  another  landing  in  Spain.  Indeed,  it  resolved 
that  the  expeditionary  force  should  head  for  England.  Ormonde,  Sparr,  and  Pallandt  refused 
to  sign  the  minute  but  this  did  not  represent  a  simple  army-navy  division  for  Brigadiers 
Seymour  and  Hamilton,  Major-General  O'Hara  and  the  army's  second-in-command,  Bellasis, 
sided  with  the  eight  naval  officers  present.  As  with  Captain  Norris's  experience  at 
Newfoundland  in  1697,  it  was  Ormonde's  failure  to  carry  his  fellow  service  officers  which 
caused  the  decision  to  go  against  him. 
The  fleet  stood  out  into  the  Mediterranean  and,  in  accordance  with  the  Instructions, 
the  dispatch  of  an  expeditionary  force  to  the  West  Indies  was  organised.  "'  Ormonde  however 
proved  unable  to  accept  the  Council's  decision  and  his  attitude  quite  clearly  tilted  at  the 
Council's  sovereignty  of  command  enshrined  in  the  Instructions.  Seizing  upon  a  letter  from 
Methuen,  which  strongly  implied  that  the  Portuguese  now  offered  a  blank  cheque  of  help  to 
the  expeditionary  force,  Ormonde  began  to  agitate  again  that  the  circumstances  were 
propitious  for  a  second  assault.  Rooke  had  also  received  a  letter  from  the  envoy  but  his  was 
more  balanced  in  tone.  While  acknowledging  that  the  Portuguese  had  declared  themselves 
free  from  the  French  alliance,  Methuen  reported  that  their  only  overture  to  the  Alliance  was 
to  make  available  six  warship  berths  in  each  of  the  country's  ports.  Methuen  did  nonetheless 
"  See  Chapter  2,  Section  HAN,  pp.  309-28,  for  the  progress  of  this  force. 201 
believe  that  the  navy  should  take  up  this  offer  and  leave  some  frigates  to  winter  in  the 
Mediterranean  -a  proposal  that  had  also  been  included  in  the  Instructions.  The  Council, 
which  convened  to  consider  Methuen's  recommendation,  had  first  however  to  decide  upon 
the  scope  of  Portugal's  engagement.  The  officers  present  proved  overwhelmingly  sceptical  of 
Ormonde's  'blank  cheque'  letter,  believing  it  to  contain  'ambiguous  and  doubtful 
expressions  948  and  again  only  Sparr  and  Pallandt  supported  the  General.  There  was  also 
opposition  to  the  substantive  issue  of  leaving  some  ships  in  the  region  and,  at  a  further 
Council  held  two  days  later  on  24  September,  the  resolution  to  return  forthwith  to  England 
was  upheld. 
The  history  of  the  Rooke-Ormonde  expedition  to  Spain  would  have  remained  one  of 
failure  if  they  had  not  come  upon  a  piece  of  luck  on  their  returnjourney.  Off  Cape  Finisterre 
in  thick  weather  on  6  October,  the  Pembroke  came  into  the  fleet  from  Lagos  with  news  that  a 
substantial  French  squadron  escorting  the  Spanishflota  had  put  into  Vigo.  49  The  convoy  was 
commanded  by  Vice-Admiral  CMteaurenault  whose  squadron  had  originally  left  Brest  in 
September  1701  for  a  year  long  tour  in  the  Caribbean  where  it  was  to  defend  the  French 
possessions  and  attack  the  English  colonies.  However,  a  lack  of  resources  and  stout  English 
island  defences  caused  vacillation  in  pressing  forward  these  attacks,  and,  on  hearing  that  a 
lack  of  provisions  and  wonn  damage  had  forced  C6etlogon's  escort  squadron  to  return  home 
without  the  Spanish  silver  plate,  Chiteaurenault  considered  that  Louis's  interests  would 
instead  be  best  served  by  his  squadron  taking  up  this  task.  Throughout  June  theflota  was 
gathered  at  Havana  and,  in  the  night  of  23  July,  the  56  sail  convoy  departed.  Cddiz  was  the 
usual  destination  for  the  plate  fleet  but  the  arrival  of  the  allied  operation  against  that  town  in 
late  August  meant  that  an  alternative  had  to  be  found.  As  a  result  of  an  accurate  intelligence 
appraisal  of  the  Anglo-Dutch  fleets'  dispositions  and  a  disagreement  between  ChAteaurenault 
and  theflota  commander,  Manuel  de  Velasco,  Vigo  was  selected  as  the  safest  compromise 
option.  50  The  communication  by  Captain  Hardy  of  the  Pembroke  would  not  however  have 
"s  BL,  Add  MSS  38159,  p.  32:  'Ormonde's  Journal'. 
`9  PRO,  ADM  51/4320,  Part  iv,  un  paginated,  Royal  Sovereign,  6  Oct.  1702;  The  Journal  ofSir  George 
Rooke,  p.  227. 
'A  Full  andImpartial  History,  pp.  152-72:  An  Account  of  Monsieur  ChAteaurenau  Id's  Expedition  from  his 
First  Sailing  from  Brest  in  September  170  1,  to  his  Putting  into  the  Harbour  of  Vigo  in  September  1702;  A. 
Baudrillart,  Philippe  VEI  La  Cour  de  France  (Paris,  1890),  i.  115;  H.  Kamen,  'The  Destruction  of  the 
Spanish  Fleet  at  Vigo  in  1702',  BIHR  xxxix  (1966),  165-6. 202 
surprised  the  English  Ministry  because  two  days  previously  Secretary  Nottingham  had 
received  similar  news  from  Paris.  This  timely  report  was  the  fruit  of  the  Maritime  Powers' 
efforts  to  track  theflota  since  the  early  summer  in  the  knowledge  that  its  interception  would 
be  a  significant  financial  set-back  for  the  Franco-Spanish  war  effort.  This  priority  was 
reflected  in  the  deployment  from  mid-July  of  Sir  Cloudesley  Shovell's  squadron  on  stations 
off  the  Western  Approaches  and  the  Channel  looking  for  Chfiteaurenault.  However,  by  the 
time  Nottingham  had  informed  the  Admiralty  and  orders  to  Rooke  and  Shovell  to  consult 
over  the  destruction  of  the  French  fleet  had  been  dispatched,  Rooke  had  already  seized  the 
initiative  in  theatre.  Within  hours  of  Captain  Hardy  coming  aboard,  the  Sorlings  and  the 
Sheerness  were  dispatched  to  confirin  the  news  and  the  fleet  stood  away  for  Vigo;  meanwhile 
Rooke  called  a  meeting  of  the  Flag  Officers  for  the  following  day.  51 
This  naval  Council  quickly  brushed  aside  the  deadline  of  I  October  for  attacking 
Galician  ports,  which  it  had  set  on  16  September  when  considering  Ormondc's  list  of  targets 
for  a  second  landing  on  Spain,  and  it  determined  to  'insult  them  [the  French]  immediately,  52 
at  Vigo.  Although  the  unexpected  nature  of  the  opportunity  which  had  arisen  was  an 
argument  for  ignoring  the  cut-off  date,  the  alacrity  with  which  it  was  disregarded  suggests 
that  the  naval  officers  had  been  unnecessarily  timid  in  their  earlier  deliberations.  Indeed, 
Ormonde  might  with  some  justification  have  concluded  that  the  Navy  had  wrongly  frustrated 
the  expedition's  progress  after  the  embarkation  of  the  troops  from  Rota.  However,  delight 
that  action  was  about  to  occur  probably  led  the  General  to  abandon  this  argument,  albeit 
temporarily.  By  the  early  morning  of  8  October,  Vigo  was  in  sight  and,  although  the  Sorlings 
and  the  Sheerness  did  not  return  with  confirmation  of  Pembroke's  intelligence  until  the 
following  day,  Lieutenants  Paddon  of  the  Lenox  and  Sanders  of  the  St  George  were  sent  in 
boats  to  reconnoitre  the  French  position.  " 
They  would  have  found  that  the  eighteen  strong  French  squadron  and  fifteen  sail  of 
51  PRO,  ADM  1/4088,  f,  78:  Nottingham  to  the  Admiralty,  4  Oct.  1702;  PRO,  ADM  2/28,  pp.  508-9:  the 
Admiralty  to  Shovell,  17  July  1702;  PRO,  ADM  2/29,  pp.  30-1,92-3,98-9,146-7,150:  the  Admiralty  to 
Shovell,  20  Aug.,  11,18  Sept.,  5  Oct.  1702;  the  Admiralty  to  Rooke,  5  Oct.  1702;  PRO,  ADM  3/17, 
unpagin  ated:  Board  Minutes,  24,26  Sept.,  5  Oct.  1702;  The  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  i,  no. 
110,  pp.  114-15:  Godolphin  to  Marlborough,  13  Sept.  1702. 
52  The  Journal  ofSir  George  Rooke,  p.  228. 
5'  The  Journal  ofSir  George  Rooke,  p.  228;  PRO,  ADM  8/7,  unpaginated:  'The  present  disposall  of  all  her 
Ma  .  esties  Ships  &  Vessells  in  Sea  Pay',  I  Aug.  1702. 
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the  Spanishflota  54  had  passed  by  Vigo,  which  was  situated  in  the  middle  of  its  eponymous 
bay's  southern  shore,  and  through  to  the  estuary  where  a  capacious  inner  harbour  opened  out 
at  the  town  of  Redondela.  Just  prior  to  this,  between  the  Randa  headland  and  the  northern 
shore,  the  bay  narrowed  to  a  breadth  of  half  a  mile,  thus  forming  the  Estrecho  de  Randa 
channel,  which  was  the  only  access  to  the  harbour.  Sheltered  also  by  the  surrounding 
Galician  mountain  range,  the  French  anchorage  was  naturally  a  strong  defensive  position. 
Additional  security  was  provided  by  a  number  of  artificial  land  defences,  which 
CMteaurenault  had  augmented  since  his  arrival.  A  boom,  described  by  Bishop,  'as  strong  as 
the  "Art  of  Man"  could  devise  55had  been  placed  across  the  Estrecho,  which  was  flanked  by 
Fort  Randa  to  the  south  and  by  Fort  Corbeyo  on  the  northern  shore,  though  this  was 
essentially  little  more  than  a  boosted  gun  emplacement.  Aside  from  increasing  the  ordnance 
of  these  forts  with  naval  guns  so  that  Randa  held  nearly  30  pieces  and  Corbeyo  ten  less, 
Chiteaurenault  also  ordered  a  number  of  French  marines  to  garrison  the  southern  fort  and  to 
act  in  conjunction  with  the  Spanish  troops  that  roamed  the  coast  from  Vigo  eastwards.  Much 
of  this  detail  and  more  was  known  to  London  due  to  Methuen's  intelligence  contacts  from 
Vianna  in  southern  Spain;  but,  of  course,  such  reports  took  so  long  to  be  processed  that 
Rooke  was  forced  to  rely  upon  his  own  reconnaissance  provision.  Fortunately,  Paddon  and 
Sanders  were  able  to  furnish  Rooke  with  the  above  intelligence  picture,  while  also  informing 
him  that  much  plate  had  already  been  disembarked  for  Lugo.  56  Although  the  opportunity  to 
destroy  ChAteaurenault's  fleet  made  this  latter  point  seem  immaterial,  its  pre-eminence  in  any 
reckoning  of  the  operation's  success  has  subsequently  been  emphasised.  57 
-"  There  is  considerable  disagreement  amongst  the  domestic  primary  sources  consulted  on  the  number  of 
French  and  Spanish  ships  at  anchor  in  the  inner  harbour.  The  numbers  cited  are  taken  from  Kamen,  'The 
Destruction  of  the  Spanish  Silver  Fleet',  p.  168,  on  the  basis  that  his  authorities  are  documents  held  in  the 
Archivo,  General  de  Indias,  Seville,  and  therefore  arguably  have  greater  pretensions  to  accuracy. 
55  The  Life  andA  dventures  of  Matthew  Bishop,  p.  11. 
56  PRO,  ADM  1/4088,  fos.  91-4:  'An  Account  of  the  Present  Condition  of  Vigo  in  a  Letter  from  Mr  Lacy  an 
English  Gentleman  Living  in  Vianna  from  Vianna',  13  Sept.  1702.  Endorsed:  '27  Oct.  1702,  Nottingham 
transmits  an  account  from  Mr  Methuen  of  the  present  condition  of  Vigo  which  he  hear  from  Mr  Lacy  and 
English  Gentleman  at  Vianna';  More  intelligence  on  Vigo  from  Methuen,  n.  d. 
51  Kamen,  'The  Destruction  of  the  Spanish  Silver  Fleet',  pp.  165-73. 204 
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F  ig.  13  :  The  Attack  on  Vigo. 
While  the  naval  Council  had  taken  the  initial  decision  to  proceed  to  Vigo  with  the 
intention  ofattacking  the  French  fleet,  it  was  a  meeting  of1x)th  the  land  and  sea  officers  on 
II  October  which  lbirmulated  the  assault  tactics.  Marshal  Tallard's  aide,  I  lautclbrt.  later 
claimed  that  the  anchorage  possessed  near  'perfect  security"'  and  it  was  clear  that  Rookc's 
ships  would  not  bc-  able  to  penetrate  the  inner  harbour  without  help  from  the  land. 
Specifically,  at  least  one  of  the  two  sources  offlanking  fire  across  the  F.  strccho  would  have  to 
he  stilled  and,  to  this  end,  it  was  decided  to  land  a  detachment  ofsoldicrs  on  the  southern 
shore  of  Vigo  Bay  with  the  objective  of  capturing  Randa  Iort.  The  theorist  Callwcll  has 
written  that  military  success  must  occasionally  act  as  a  prerequisite  for  the  naval  opcratloný`, 
but  this  places  a  premium  upon  sequencing  the  separate  service  actions.  Thus  at  Vigo, 
officers  gave  considerable  thought  to  their  service  formations.  Ormondc  issued  all  equivalent 
set  of  landing  instructions  to  those  used  at  C6diz:  a  vanguard  detachment  ol'greiladiers  Would 
secure  the  beachhead  for  the  line  regiments  to  come  ashore  in  sequence,  and  the  soldiers  were 
Louis  Charles,  Marquis  de  Flautetbrt,  The  Atemoirs  ofihe  Afarquis  de  Hawelort  Wonclon,  1763),  p.  4  1. 
Callwell,  Afililary  Operalions  andAlarilime  Preponderance,  pp.  136,146-7. 205 
again  to  be  self-sufficient  for  two  days  with  order  to  be  rigorously  enforced  at  the  battalion 
and  company  level.  As  for  the  navy,  Rooke  appreciated  that  disarray  threatened  if  the  whole 
fleet  tried  to  pass  through  the  Estrecho.  Twenty-five  of  the  smaller  rates  were  therefore 
selected  as  the  initial  attack  squadron  which  was  disposed  in  seven  groups  of  up  to  four 
vessels,  each  with  a  commanding  Admiral  and  accompanied  by  ten  fireships.  Entry  to  the 
channel  was  to  be  in  line  abreast  with  the  end  ships  detailed  to  absorb  and  quell  and  any  shore 
artillery  fire,  while  the  other  line  vessels  would  concentrate  on  breaking  through  into  the  inner 
harbour  to  bombard  the  enemy  thereby  allowing  the  fireships  to  be  dispatched.  Vice-Admiral 
Thomas  Hopsonn  was  to  command  the  lead  group  in  the  Torbay  with  the  Barfleur  on  the 
starboard  post  by  the  Randa  promontory  and,  with  no  land  assault  planned  for  the  northern 
shore,  the  post  on  the  more  vulnerable  larboard  end  of  the  line  was  taken  by  Buckman's 
Association.  60 
The  haze  which  had  masked  the  fleet's  arrival  in  Vigo  Bay  -  though  not  sufficiently  to 
prevent  a  desultory  cannonade  from  Vigo's  town  defences  -  was  replaced  on  the  12  October 
by  heavy  rain  and  squanS.  61  The  morning  was  spent  landing  some  3000  troops  in  the  Punta 
de  Alameita  and  Taberna  bay  near  Teis  where  no  opposition  was  encountered.  62  The 
Grenadiers  commanded  by  Pearce  and  Shannon  were  immediately  ordered  forward  to  Fort 
Randa  and  Ormonde  was  to  follow  with  the  rest  of  the  troops.  The  march  proved  as 
uneventful  as  the  landing  and  it  was  only  upon  drawing  near  the  fort  that  Ormonde  spied  a 
body  of  Spanish  foot  advancing  between  the  fort  and  the  hills  to  the  rear  of  Redondela. 
Despite  reputedly  being  four  times  the  number  of  the  assault  force,  they  retreated  upon  the 
approach  of  the  grenadier  vanguard  after  a  rather  half-hearted  attempt  to  engage  in  a  long- 
range  skirmish.  Although  the  fort's  garrison  of  300  French  marines  and  50  Spaniards  was 
more  determined  in  its  opposition,  it  was  not  long  before  they  too  were  overcome.  Almost 
60  Anon,  A  Relation  of  the  Great  and  Glorious  Success  ofthe  Fleet  and  Forces  ofIfer  Majesty  and  the  States 
General  at  Vigo  (London,  1702). 
"  The  ensuing  account  of  the  operation  at  Vigo  is  based  upon  the  following  primary  sources  and  secondary 
authorities:  Anon,  A  Relation  of  the  Great  andGlorious  Success  ofthe  Fleet  andForces;  The  Journal  ofSir 
George  Rooke,  pp.  232-6;  Life  of  Captain  Stephen  Martin,  1666-1740,  pp.  57-9;  BL,  Sloane  MSS  2496,  pp. 
42-54:  'Examinations  relative  to  the  failure  of  the  Expedition  against  Cadi4  1702%  A  Full  andImpartial 
Ifistory,  pp.  111-25;  BL,  Add  MSS  38159,  pp.  33-7:  'Ormonde's  Journal';  PRO,  ADM  51/4375,  Part  vii 
unpaginatcd  Torbay:  11-13  Oct.  1702;  7he  Life  andAdventures  ofMatthew  Bishop,  pp.  12-13;  de  Survilie, 
77je  Memoirs  ofthe  Marquis  de  Hautefort,  pp.  40-5;  Owen,  War  at  Sea  Under  Queen  Anne,  pp.  83-5. 
"  Owen,  War  at  Sea  Under  Queen  Anne,  p.  84,  claims  that  some  3000  Spanish  militia  had  to  be  driven  from 
trenches  along  the  shore  but  none  of  the  primary  sources  listed  in  the  above  reference  refer  to  this. 206 
immediately  upon  coming  up  to  the  fort,  the  grenadiers  captured  the  lower  gun  platform 
which  housed  the  majority  of  the  ordnance  and,  as  the  garrison  retreated  into  the  old  stone 
tower,  Charles's  Churchill's  regiment  arrived  in  support  to  secure  the  western  end  of  the 
fortifications.  This  frecd  the  grenadiers  -  in  a  typically  opportunistic  fashion  -  to  rush  in  and 
overpower  the  garrison  when  its  commander,  the  French  naval  Captain,  Sorel,  opened  the 
tower  gate  to  make  a  sortie.  Randa  fort  was  in  Confederate  hands  and  if  Hopsonn  could 
correctly  time  his  run  up  to  the  boom,  he  would  be  spared  the  potentially  devastating  flanking 
fire  from  the  south. 
Sailing  ships  are  however  too  reliant  upon  the  wind  for  their  sailors  to  be  more  than 
approximate  in  their  timing  and,  having  rather  precipitously  set  off  immediately  the  soldiers 
had  landed,  a  calm  descended  which  forced  Hopsonn  to  drop  anchorjust  short  of  the  boom 
before  Ormonde's  grenadiers  had  even  taken  the  fort's  outwork  battery.  Accordingly,  the 
French  turned  all  their  ordnance  upon  the  motionless  squadron,  only  to  squander  the 
opportunity  to  force  its  retreat  through  inaccurate  fire.  As  the  shells  fell  around  him, 
Hopsonn's  proximity  to  the  boom  allowed  him  to  observe  the  scope  of  the  French  defence  of 
the  inner  harbour.  It  looked  much  stronger  than  the  previous  reconnaissance  mission  had 
suggested  and  consequently  he  thought  Rooke  should  see  this  too.  The  Admiral  along  with 
Fairborne  completed  the  perilous  journey  to  the  Torbay  and  retired  to  Hopsonn's  cabin  for 
discussions  on  how  they  might  act. 
Although  the  Admirals  decided  to  adhere  to  the  original  plan,  the  weather  proved  the 
important  element  inasmuch  as  a  fresh  gale  shortly  sprung  up  to  allow  the  squadron  another 
run  at  the  boom.  With  the  Barfleur  and  Association  disposed  against  the  two  forts,  Hopsonn 
signalled  his  division  to  set  both  fore  and  top  sails  and  then  he  'steered  directly  for  the 
booMs,.  63  It  was  at  this  point  that  Ormonde  began  the  final  assault  on  Randa  Fort,  having 
earlier  taken  its  principal  battery.  The  sequencing  was  only  therefore  slightly  disrupted  by  an 
early  naval  move  but  it  did  mean  that  the  lead  ship,  the  Torbay,  received  a  considerable 
amount  of  fire,  particularly  from  the  French  ships,  Le  Bourbon  and  LEsperance,  placed  just 
inside  the  harbour.  Nonetheless,  Torbay's  ramming  of  the  boom  allowed  her  to  break  clean 
through  and,  although  the  remainder  of  her  division  and  that  of  Vandergoes  had  to  set  about 
the  obstacle  with  cutting  equipment,  it  was  not  long  before  three  divisions  of  the  attacking 
"'  Quoted  in  Owcn,  War  at  Sea  Under  QueenAnne,  p.  84. 207 
squadron  entered  the  inner  harbour.  For  the  vessels  first  inside  the  Puntales,  there  was  still  an 
awkward  engagement  to  be  fought  before  the  French  squadron  could  be  destroyed  or 
captured.  The  harbour's  confined  sea  space  increased  the  destructive  potential  of  the  French 
fireships.  Indeed,  Hopsonn  had  to  abandon  the  Torbay  as  it  was  very  nearly  destroyed  by  the 
blazing  Le  Favori  -  only  its  premature  explosion  allowed  crew  to  return  to  the  English  ship 
and  extinguish  the  flames.  Within  about  forty  minutes  from  first  breaching  the  boom,  the 
Confederates  had  silenced  Le  Bourbon  and  LEsperance  and  consolidated  their  presence  both 
in  the  harbour  and  on  the  coast  around  Randa.  In  such  circumstances,  ChAteaurenault  was 
quick  to  conclude  that  his  defence  was  now  untenable  and  he  ordered  the  French  squadron  to 
be  fired  and  abandoned.  The  loss  of  fifteen  ships  of  the  line  so  early  in  the  war  was  a 
considerable  set-back  for  the  French  navy  which,  even  in  less  troubled  times,  struggled  for 
recognition  at  Versailles. 
It  has  been  argued  that  the  Confederates  could  also  only  really  feel  pleased  at  the 
losses  suffered  by  the  French  marine  for  fiscally  the  operation  did  not  prove  to  be  (as  hoped) 
a  debit  upon  the  Franco-Spanish  war  finance.  The  silver  taken  from  theflota  was 
insignificant  compared  to  the  amount  previously  landed;  and  it  was  revealed  that  the  Maritime 
Powers'  trading  communities  possessed  a  capital  and  financial  interest  in  theflota.  Anglo- 
Dutch  embarrassment  over  these  circumstances  was  compounded  by  Philip  V's  shrewdness  in 
using  the  attack  as  a  pretext  to  exact  additional  contributions  from  foreign  traders  and  raise 
loans,  thus  further  upsetting  established  trade  patterns.  64  These  reservations  do  however 
ignore  the  psychological  impact  of  the  operation.  The  financial  disparities  were  not  widely 
appreciated  at  the  time  -  indeed,  as  the  merchandise  and  silver  were  recovered  from  the 
prizes,  the  officers  and  men  anticipated  considerable  pay  bonuses  -  and  the  practical 
symbolism  of  the  assault  resonated  to  a  greater  extent  to  England's  benefit  throughout  the 
European  capitals  than  this  argument  admits.  Certainly  in  Lisbon,  even  if  Pedro  11  was  not 
immediately  persuaded  to  join  the  Grand  Alliance,  the  operation  helped  make  the  context  for 
Methuen's  diplomacy,  which  brought  about  that  accession,  much  more  favourable.  Equally, 
the  Emperor  now  seemed  more  willing  to  consider  temporarily  sidelining  his  Italian  ambitions 
64  Kamen,  'The  Destruction  of  the  Spanish  Silver  Fleet',  pp.  165-73;  Kamen,  Philip  V,  p.  32;  Francis,  The 
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and  sending  the  Archduke  Charles  to  the  peninsula.  65  Stripped  of  its  economic  failures,  the 
operation  might  justly  be  interpreted  as  contributing  to  the  transition  between  Spain's 
different  strategic  war  contexts  and,  in  that  regard,  the  judgement  that  the  operation  at  Vigo 
had  no  impact  upon  England's  or  the  Alliance's  Grand  Strategy  seems  wide  of  the  mark.  66 
Moreover,  even  if  this  transition  has  not  been  seen  as  heralding  an  alteration  in  the 
foundations  of  England's  and  the  Grand  Alliance's  war  strategyý  7,  it  at  least  forced  a  re- 
ordering  of  the  resource  priorities  over  a  wider  geographical  area. 
That  development  was  however  several  months  away.  The  more  immediate  strategic 
implications  were  implicitly  considered  by  Parliament  in  different  but  equally  suggestive  ways. 
Upon  their  return  in  November,  motions  of  thanks  to  Rooke  and  Ormonde  were  moved  in  the 
Commons  alongside  those  to  Marlborough.  Despite  taking  important  posts  in  the  Maas 
valley  and  the  lower  Rhine,  Anne's  Captain-General  had  had  a  torrid  campaign  on  continental 
Europe,  having  been  frequently  prevented  from  engaging  the  French  by  the  cautious  Dutch 
Field  Deputies  . 
6'  The  parity  of  esteem  implied  by  the  votes  of  thanks  suggested  that  the 
political  debate  over  the  poles  of  war  strategy  -  continental  or  naval  -  continued  in  ignorance 
that  the  Ministry  was  effectively  promoting  a  blend  of  both  and  that  the  combined 
expeditionary  force  sent  to  Spain  was  not  perforce  a  handmaiden  of  the  navalist  case.  This 
though  was  the  assumption  the  Lords  made  by  ordering  an  enquiry  into  the  failure  at  Cddiz. 
Doubtless,  the  Lords  had  been  provoked  by  Ormonde's  friends  whose  complaints 
about  Rooke's  conduct  at  Cddiz  were  sharpened  after  relations  between  the  General  and 
Admiral  broke  down  again  at  Vigo:  Rooke  had  refused  Ormonde's  request  to  leave  behind  a 
substantial  number  of  ships  to  support  his  troops  as  they  conducted  further  attacks  in  the 
Galician  interior,  thereby  forcing  Ormonde  to  embark  all  the  troops  on  17  October  and  to 
relinquish  his  post  on  the  Spanish  mainland.  Marlborough  did  try  to  wam  of  the  folly  of  an 
69 
enquiry  in  that  it  might  rebound  to  Ormonde's  detriment,  which  to  an  extent  it  did. 
However,  the  sense  that  the  operation  was  a  failure  of  naval  strategy  and  tactics  to  penetrate 
65  Trevelyan,  England  Under  QueenAnne,  i.  309;  Lynn,  The  Wars  ofLouisXIV,  p.  277;  Francis,  'John 
Methuen  and  The  Anglo-Portuguese  Treaties  of  1703',  p.  117;  Francis,  e  First  Peni  u  ar  ar  p.  69. 
66  Churchill,  Marlborough,  ii.  137. 
Th  ns  I 
67  1  lattendorf,  England  in  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  p.  267. 
"  Cobbet,  Parliamentaty  History  ofEngland,  vi.  94;  Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen  Anne,  i.  253;  C. 
Barnett,  Marlborough  (London,  1974),  pp.  504. 
69  7he  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  i,  no.  139,  pp.  147-8:  Marlborough  to  Godolphin,  21  Nov. 
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the  Mediterranean  -  an  opinion  held  by  the  Queen  -  drove  the  investigation.  Rooke  appeared 
before  the  committee  of  the  House  of  Lords  twice  in  January  1703,  when  he  was  subject  to 
detailed  questioning  on  matters  that  had  largely  been  the  concern  of  the  Councils  of  War 
during  the  operation.  Of  the  36  answers  to  written  and  oral  questions  Rooke  provided,  he 
referred  back  to  the  deliberations  of  the  Councils  of  War  in  twelve,  while  eight  of  these 
twelve  responses  related  to  the  joint  army-navy  Councils.  In  doing  so,  Rooke  demonstrated  a 
far  surer  grasp  of  the  nature  of  combined  operational  command  than  his  political  peers  and 
thus  took  the  sting  out  of  the  attack  on  the  navy.  It  was  probably  his  performance  in  this 
regard  which,  despite  the  best  efforts  of  the  former  Admiral  of  the  Fleet,  Torrington,  ensured 
that  Rooke  escaped  without  censure  when  the  Committee  reported  on  17  February.  Indeed, 
their  resolution  that  Rooke  had  'acted  like  and  brave  an  worthy  commander  -)70  with  respect  to 
his  Instructions  and  Councils  of  War,  recommended  him  when,  in  1704,  the  Admiralty  aimed 
to  implement  a  wide-ranging  combined  operational  agenda  against  France  and  Spain  in  the 
Mediterranean.  71 
UN:  Operations  Against  the  Spanish  Coast.  1704  and  the  Capture  of  Gibraltar.  July 
1704-April  1705. 
The  Spanish  theatre  had  been  quiet  during  1703  as  the  allies  awaited  the  outcome  of  the 
Methuens'  diplomacy  to  bring  Portugal  into  the  Grand  Alliance.  Joint  army-navy  ventures 
were  limited  to  projected  attacks  on  the  French  coasts  and  aiding  the  Camisard  revolt  in 
Languedoc  . 
72  Nonetheless,  as  two  of  the  Methuen  treatieS73  -  the  Quadruple  Offensive  and 
Defensive  Alliance  and  the  Triple  Treaty  -  were  agreed  in  the  early  summer,  a  fleet  was 
dispatched  to  the  Mediterranean.  Its  priorities  were  however  trade  protection  and  assisting 
the  imperial  forces  on  the  Neapolitan  and  Sicilian  coasts.  Descents  upon  Spain  were 
suggested  but  they  were  explicitly  categorised  as  subsidiary  services  and  it  was  only  for 
watering  that  2500  marines  were  landed  at  Altea  on  3  August.  74  The  Quadruple  Treaty  had 
70  The  Journal  ofSir  George  Rooke,  pp.  255-6. 
"'  The  Journal  ofSir  George  Rooke,  pp.  241-52,254-6  (calculations  are  based  upon  Rooke's  list  of  questions 
and  answers);  P.  Le  Fevre,  'Arthur  Herbert,  Earl  of  Torrington,  1648-1716',  in  Le  Fevre  &  Harding  (eds), 
British  Admirals,  p.  38;  Hattendorf,  'Sir  George  Rooke  and  Sir  Cloudesley  Shovell',  p.  65. 
'  See  Section  Lvii,  pp.  294-5  below. 
73  The  third  was  a  Commercial  Treaty,  which  was  not  signed  until  December  1703. 
74  PRO,  SP  44/208,  pp.  81-6:  Hedges  to  Shovell,  10  May  1703,  and  enclosure,  'Instructions  for  Our  Trusty 210 
however  completed  the  transition  of  Spain's  strategic  context  within  the  war  from  simply  a 
theatre  of  combat  to  a  target  of  acquisition  for  the  Habsburg  claimant  to  the  Spanish  throne, 
the  Archduke  Charles.  "  This  alteration  ensured  the  Peninsula's  centrality  within  the 
Alliance's  war  policy  for  the  remainder  of  the  war. 
The  strategic  commitment  to  place  the  Archduke  on  the  Spanish  throne  meant  that  the 
most  pressing  task  was  to  transport  him  to  the  Peninsula  along  with  the  12  000  troops  -  4000 
from  each  of  England,  Austria  and  the  United  Provinces  -  that  the  Alliance  was  bound  by  the 
treaty  to  augment  the  Portuguese  anny.  76  Charles  was  proclaimed  'King  of  Spain'  in  Vienna 
at  the  beginning  of  September;  however  the  Emperor's  reluctance  to  let  his  son  go,  and  the 
Archduke's  adoption  of  a  punctilious  monarchical  grandeur,  greatly  slowed  his  progress  to 
the  Dutch  coast,  where  he  was  to  embark  aboard  a  Anglo-Dutch  fleet  for  Portugal. 
Meanwhile,  the  troop  provision  proved  contentious.  The  Imperial  contribution  was  not 
forthcoming  and,  although  London  increased  England's  contribution  by  a  half  again,  the 
Dutch  only  reluctantly  agreed  to  share  the  cost  of  supplying  the  outstanding  2000.  Although 
Marlborough  indicated  a  willingness  to  furnish  6000  troops  from  the  army  in  Flanders,  he 
manoeuvred  to  limit  the  amount  withdrawn  from  that  theatre  and  directly  opposed 
Nottingham  over  having  to  provide  the  remaining  2000.  Perhaps  surprisingly  -  given 
Marlborough's  pre-emincnce  in  the  Queen's  affections  and  his  political  and  personal 
friendship  with  Lord  Treasurer  Godolphin  -  the  Secretary  prevailed.  77  Even  with  the  arrival 
and  Welbeloved  Sir  Cloudesley  Shovell  Knt',  7  May  1703;  Memoirs  Relating  to  the  Lord  Torrington,  pp.  98- 
109;  Life  ofCaptain  Stephen  Martin,  1666-1740,  pp.  70-  1. 
" 
14  General  Collection  of  Treatys,  iii.  356:  Article  I  of  'An  Alliance  Offensive  and  Defensive  between 
Leopold  Emperor  of  the  Romans,  Anne  Queen  of  England,  and  the  States  General  of  the  United  Netherlands, 
on  the  one  part,  and  Peter  11  King  of  Portugal  on  the  Other',  16  May  1703.  Despite  the  facts  that  he  was 
proclaimed  Carlos  111,  King  of  Spain,  by  the  allies  and  others  opposed  to  Philip  V,  and  that  he  even  entered 
Madrid  as  King,  his  'reign'  (unlike  Philip's)  achieved  no  legitimacy  outside  of  the  war.  Therefore,  in  relating 
events  in  the  Peninsula,  I  shall  continue  to  refer  to  him  as  the  Archduke  Charles. 
76,4  General  Collection  of  Treatys,  iii.  357-8:  Article  IX  of  'An  Alliance  Offensive  and  Defensive',  16  May 
1703. 
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Oct.  1703  [NS];  Marlborough  to  Stanhope,  23  June  1703  [NS];  Marlborough  to  Hill,  30  Aug.  1703  [NS], 
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245-6,255,  pp.  182  n.  1,227-8,246-7,254-5:  Marlborough  to  Godolphin,  13  May,  29  July,  23,27  Sept.,  19 
Oct.  1703;  The  Correspondence  1701-1711  ofJohn  Churchill,  First  Duke  ofAlarlborough  andAnthonie 
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of  the  Archduke  on  the  coast,  and  the  embarkation  of  the  troops  aboard  the  transports  by 
November,  planning  continued  to  be  frustrated.  Over  the  two  days  (26-7  November),  the 
west-south-westerly  winds  of  the  celebrated  Great  Storm  blew  up  the  Channel  and  along  its 
coasts  wreaking  devastation  on  a  grand  scale.  78  Several  of  the  troop  transports  off  Holland 
were  run  aground  forcing  the  soldiers  ashore  and  the  senior  Lieutenant-General  on  the  coast, 
Lord  Cutts,  was  faced  with  the  unenviable  logistical  task  of  re-organising  the  embarkation  of 
the  troops  before  large  scale  desertions  occurred.  Despite  considerable  effort,  however,  not 
all  the  transports  were  ready  by  December  when  Admiral  Rooke's  squadron  collected  the 
Archduke,  and  the  remainder  had  to  follow  in  the  New  Year.  79 
The  original  hope  that  Charles,  along  with  the  troops,  would  reach  Portugal  by 
September  had  been  dashed  by  these  delays  and,  thus,  instead  of  proceeding  directly  to  the 
Peninsula,  he  was  landed  at  Spithead  on  Boxing  Day  whence  he  travelled  to  Windsor  to  be 
received  by  the  Queen.  His  subsequent  journey  to  the  Peninsula  aboard  Rooke's  fleet  was 
however  attended  with  considerable  delay,  partly  caused  by  Rooke's  unwillingness  to  leave 
without  the  troop  transports  and  partly  by  bad  weather.  The  fleet  did  not  reach  Lisbon 
harbour  at  the  mouth  of  the  River  Tagus  until  the  beginning  of  February.  " 
The  triumphal  reception  and  ceremonies  for  the  Archduke  in  Lisbon  bored  Rooke 
and,  after  participating  in  those  that  he  was  duty  bound  to,  he  left  with  a  squadron  of  some 
[NSI. 
's  A  fW  I  account  of  the  Great  Storm  on  land  and  at  sea  can  be  found  in  Daniel  Defoe's  two  works,  The  Storm. 
Or  a  Collection  of  the  Most  Remarkable  Casualties  and  Disasters  Which  Happend  in  the  Late  Dreadful 
Tempest,  Both  By  Sea  and  Land  (London,  1704)  and,  A  Collection  ofthe  Most  Remarkable  Casualties  and 
Disasters,  Which  Happend  in  the  Late  Dreadful  Tempest  Both  By  Sea  and  Lang  On  Friday  the  Twenty-Sixth 
offavember,  Seventeen  Hundred  and  7hree  (2  ad  edn,  London,  1713)  -  albeit  recognising  the  warning  given 
in  Martin-Leake,  Yhe  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  i.  126  n.  I  with  respect  to  Defoe's  inventive  methodology  in 
compiling  his  A  Journal  ofthe  Plague  Year  (London,  1722).  Other  accounts  of  the  storm  can  be  found  in, 
CFKS,  UI  590  C9/4  unf  :  Philip  Stanhope  to  James  Stanhope,  29  Nov.  1703;  Memoirs  Relating  to  the  Lord 
Torrington,  pp.  116-18;  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  i.  126-9;  Life  of  Captain  Stephen  Martin, 
1666-1740,  pp.  72-3. 
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DecJ1  II  Jan.  1704;  PRO,  ADM  51/4317  Part  vii,  unpaginated,  Royal  Katherine,  26-27  Dec.  1703. 
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eighteen  sail  for  a  commerce  protection  cruise  between  Capes  St  Vincent,  St  Marys  and 
Spartell.  Sir  John  Leake,  who  on  3  March  had  brought  into  the  Tagus  those  auxiliary  ships 
left  behind  by  Rooke,  remained  at  Lisbon  with  six  men-of-war  to  organise  the  trade  convoys 
and  the  landing  of  stores  from  the  Content.  "  It  was  on  his  return  to  Lisbon  in  early  April 
after  an  uneventful  cruise  when  Rooke  turned  his  attentions  to  the  fleet's  three  sets  of 
Instructions  issued  during  March.  Although  descents  against  the  Spanish  coast  were 
recommended,  none  of  the  Instructions  were  exclusive  to  the  Peninsula  and,  indeed,  a  wide 
range  of  tasks  within,  and  at  either  end  of,  the  Mediterranean  were  given.  More  pressing 
however  were  the  secret  Additional  Instructions  which  ordered  the  fleet's  participation  in  a 
land  and  sea  attack  against  Toulon.  The  Ministry,  and  Secretary  Nottingham  in  particular, 
considered  this  operation  of  great  importance.  Only  the  relief  of  Nice  and  Villefranche82 
(directed  by  the  open  Instructions)  had  priority.  Given  that  Rooke  concealed  these 
Additional  Instructions  even  from  his  Council  of  fellow  Flag  officers,  which  met  three  times 
following  his  return,  it  is  understandable  that  the  Portuguese  Court  failed  to  appreciate  his 
haste  to  depart  for  the  Mediterranean.  83 
The  Portuguese  priorities  were  descents  against  Spain  and  the  stationing  of  a 
squadron  off  the  Atlantic  coast.  An  apparent  problem  with  respect  to  the  former  was  that 
Rooke's  fleet  had  no  army  soldiers  aboard,  but  when  a  specific  suggestion  for  a  landing  of 
troops  in  Catalonia  was  made,  Rooke  claimed  that  he  had  been  assured  2000  Portuguese 
troops  by  the  Archduke's  'Court'.  Neither  John  Methuen  nor  King  Pedro  knew  of  this 
commitment,  and,  although  the  latter  was  not  unwilling  to  provide  the  men,  he  was  unable  to 
do  so  in  the  time  Rooke  laid  down  for  the  fleet's  departure.  Accordingly  a  row  developed 
which  was  only  compounded  by  Rooke's  intention  to  take  the  whole  fleet  into  the 
Mediterranean,  thus  leaving  the  Portuguese  coast  without  a  defensive  squadron.  Pedro 
81  PRO,  SP  89/18,  fos.  85-6:  Paul  Methuen  to'Sir',  12  Mar.  1704;  PRO,  SP  42/67,  f.  5013:  Rooke  to 
Nottingham,  29  Feb.  1704;  BL,  Add  MSS  5440,  lbs.  165-8:  'At  a  Council  of  War  of  Flag  Officers,  29  Feb.,  5 
Mar.  1704;  BL,  Add  MSS  47970,  pp.  25-6:  Journal  of  Admiral  Leake  [hereafter  'Leake's  Journal'],  20  Feb.,  3 
Mar.  1704;  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  qfSir  John  Leake,  i.  135-8;  Life  of  Captain  Stephen  Martin,  1666-1740, 
p.  74. 
82  Their  Italian  names  -  Nizza  and  Villafranca  -  were  then  current. 
83  PRO,  SP  44/208,  pp.  121-35:  Hedges  to  Rooke,  14,24,28,29  Mar.  1704,  and  enclosures,  'Instructions  for 
our  Right  Trusty  and  Welbeloved  Sir  George  Rooke  Knt',  14,24,28  Mar.  1704,  'Additional  Instructions  for 
Our  Right  Trusty  and  Welbeloved  Sir  George  Rooke  Knt',  29  Mar.  1704;  NRO,  I'll  275,  pp.  16-17: 
Nottingham  to  Rooke,  29  Feb.  1704;  BL,  Add  MSS  5440,  fos.  169-74:  'Att  a  Councill  of  War  of  Flag 
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considered  this  a  breach  of  the  Quadruple  TreaY84  and  it  took  all  Methuen's  personal 
currency  with  the  King,  and  guile  in  arguing  that  Portugal's  security  would  be  best  served  if 
French  fleet  could  be  destroyed  in  the  Mediterranean,  before  tempers  calmed.  85  Given  the 
existence  of  Rooke's  secret  Instructions,  it  could  have  been  that  he  engendered  this  row  to 
hasten  the  fleet's  departure  and  to  prevent  it  being  locked  into  plans  for  descents. 
Nonetheless,  by  not  informing  his  fellow  Flags  of  the  Additional  Instructions,  Rooke  risked 
the  Council  of  War  frustrating  his  intentions,  which  to  an  extent  it  did.  The  final  Council 
before  Rooke  left  Lisbon  bound  the  fleet  in  the  first  instance  to  the  relief  of  Nice  and 
Villefranche  but  also,  on  the  basis  of  a  proposal  submitted  by  the  Almirante  de  Castille, 
committed  the  Admiral  to  helping  the  Archduke's  cause  on  the  coast  near  Barcelona.  " 
This  pledge  was  temporarily  prioritised  during  the  outward  voyage  due  to  the  tireless 
lobbying  of  Prince  George  Hesse-Darmstadt,  who  had  taken  passage  with  the  Anglo-Dutch 
fleet  as  a  military  adviser  to  the  Archduke.  On  10  May,  when  seven  cruisers  previously 
dispatched  on  a  fruitless  chase  of  six  French  ships  that  had  fallen  in  with  the  fleet  off  Cape 
Palos  returned,  a  Council  of  War  was  held  in  Altea  Bay  at  which  Hesse-Darmstadt 
successfully  argued  that  an  appearance  of  the  fleet  before  Barcelona  would  greatly  help  the 
Archduke's  cause  in  Spain.  Barcelona,  and  indeed  the  wider  province  of  Catalonia,  had  a 
history  of  opposition  to  the  Castilian-based  Spanish  crown,  and  reports  had  filtered  through 
that  it  favoured  the  Archduke  over  Philip  V.  Hesse-Darmstadt  -a  former  Governor  of 
Barcelona  in  the  1690s  -  did  not  therefore  wish  merely  to  show  the  flag  and  when  the  current 
governor,  Don  Francisco  de  Wasco,  refused  to  admit  Hesse-Darmstadt's  secretary, 
Zingerling,  with  the  summons  to  surrender,  the  German  Prince  proposed  a  landing  of  the 
marine  soldiers  and  two  small  companies  of  Spanish  deserters  aboard  the  fleet  to  encourage 
the  inhabitants'  defiance  of  Velasco.  Initially,  the  naval  Council  rejected  his  proposal  on 
consideration  that  there  were  insufficient  officers  to  command  the  forces  ashore,  and  also 
because  Rear-Admiral  Wishart  had  recently  reported  that  several  French  sail  had  been  spotted 
"A  Collection  of  General  Treatys,  iii.  359:  Article  XVIT  of  'An  Alliance  Offensive  and  Defensive'.  16  May 
1703. 
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apparently  heading  westwards.  However,  the  following  day  brought  news  that  Barcelona 
was  on  the  brink  of  declaring  for  the  Archduke  and  that  a  naval  bombardment  in  addition  to  a 
landing  would  comprise  a  sufficient  display  of  support  to  act  as  a  trigger.  Pressing  his  case 
again  in  the  Council,  and  with  the  strategic  importance  of  controlling  Barcelona  with  respect 
to  the  neighbouring  provinces  of  Valencia  and  Aragon  highlighted,  Hesse-Dan-nstadt  secured 
agreement  to  land  some  1600  English  and  Dutch  marines  along  with  the  companies  of 
Spanish  deserters,  while  several  bomb  vessel  approached  the  town.  87 
Covered  by  the  Tiger,  the  Tartar,  the  Newport,  and  two  Dutch  vessels,  Hesse- 
Darmstadt  landed  with  the  troops  towards  the  north-east  of  Barcelona  in  the  late  morning  of 
19  May;  meanwhile  the  bomb  vessels  took  up  position.  As  the  landing's  objective  was  merely 
to  precipitate  the  rebellion,  the  operational  orders  restricted  the  troops  from  marching  beyond 
a  secure  line  of  retreat;  therefore,  they  did  not  advance  much  upon  Barcelona,  despite 
attracting  some  1000  local  volunteers.  Hesse-Darmstadt  nonetheless  immediately  sent  another 
summons  to  Velasco,  which  elicited  the  same  response  as  before.  More  alarming  however 
was  the  news  that  the  town  council  could  not  deliver  the  town  and  that,  on  being  informed  of 
the  smallness  of  the  land  force  and  its  finite  time  ashore,  Velasco  had  moved  against  the 
dissent:  the  revolt  against  Philip  V's  rule  in  Barcelona  was  stillborn.  Hesse-Darmstadt 
quickly  sent  word  to  Rooke  for  the  marines  to  be  embarked  the  following  morning  but  that, 
meantime,  the  bomb  vessels  should  continue  to  bombard  the  town.  The  numerous  shells 
expended  in  this  manner  proved  a  woeful  denouement  to  an  operation  which  had  held 
sufficient  promise  to  distract  the  fleet  from  the  pursuit  of  its  more  pressing  orders.  89 
The  fleet  spent  the  remainder  of  May  and  early  June  aiming  to  implement  these 
Instructions  with  respect  to  Nice  and  Villefranche;  while  Rooke  also  at  this  juncture  revealed 
his  secret  orders  for  Toulon.  Ultimately,  neither  Savoyard  town  required  relief  and  the 
s'  if.  Kuenzel,  Das  Leben  unddasBriefwechsel  des  Landgrafen  Georg  von  Ilessen-Darmstadt  (London, 
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18-19  May  1704;  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  A.  149-5  1:  Hesse-Darmstadt  to  Rooke,  10,  IS  May  1704; 
Rooke  to  Hedges,  8  June  1704;  Martin-Leake,  77je  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  i.  145-7;  Lediard,  77je  Naval 
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reluctance  of  the  Duke  of  Savoy,  who  was  to  commit  troops  overland  from  Piedmont-Savoy, 
meant  that  the  Toulon  operation  seemed  unlikely  to  proceed,  thus  causing  Rooke  to  focus 
upon  seeking  the  French  fleet  that  was  reportedly  operating  in  the  area.  London  had  been 
aware  early  in  the  season  of  the  extensive  French  naval  preparations  at  Brest  and,  although  it 
was  initially  thought  that  a  concentration  in  the  Channel  was  intended,  by  the  time  that 
Shovell's  squadron  sailed  to  cover  the  port,  the  Comte  de  Toulouse  had  journeyed  south  to 
join  the  Toulon  squadron.  There  had  been  various  reported  sightings  of  French  naval  vessels 
since  the  Anglo-Dutch  fleet's  entry  into  the  Mediterranean,  but,  when  lying  off  iles  d'Hyares 
on  25  May,  Rooke  received  credible  information  that  both  French  commanders  had  recently 
been  near  the  mouth  of  the  Straits.  89  Sailing  westwards,  Rooke  spotted  Toulouse  passing 
Minorca,  whereupon  he  tacked  the  fleet  northward  and  cleared  for  battle.  A  calm  prevented 
the  allies  reaching  the  French  fleet  until  it  was  sufficiently  close  to  Toulon  for  the  egress  of 
reinforcements  to  worry  the  Anglo-Dutch  Flags  and,  consequently,  the  Council  decided  to 
put  about  for  Lisbon.  Prior  to  leaving  the  Mediterranean  however,  another  brief  landing  on 
10  June  was  undertaken  at  Alicante  where  some  400  marines  commanded  by  Lord  Nugent 
temporarily  occupied  two  forts  and  transported  the  Governor  northwards  in  an  attempt  to 
intimate  the  Bourbon  authorities  to  adopt  a  softer  policy  against  dissenting  local  inhabitants.  " 
Off  Lagos  on  16  June,  the  fleet  met  Shovell's  squadron  of  22  warships  which  had 
followed  Toulouse  down  from  Brest  to  reinforce  the  Mediterranean  fleet.  Rooke  also  then 
received  new  Instructions  from  London  which  significantly  altered  the  fleet's  strategical  and 
tactical  priorities.  These  recognised  that  the  operations  on  the  Italian  and  French  coasts  were 
either  no  longer  required  or  were  not  possible  and  instead  directed  the  fleet  to  the  reduction 
of  Spain  as  'the  main  and  principall  service'.  "  Accordingly,  Rooke  was  to  consult  with  the 
Archduke  and  Lisbon  as  to  what  might  be  done.  Capturing  CAdiz,  supporting  Catalonia  or 
7. 
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vii,  unpaginatcd,  Royal  Katherine,  22  May46  June  1704;  PRO,  SP  44/208,  pp.  141-2,146-8,153-6:  Hedges 
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any  other  province  inclined  to  the  Archduke,  and  coastal  troop  transportation  were  all 
recommended.  In  anticipation  of  Charles  and  Pedro  formally  making  their  intentions  known, 
the  Council  of  Flags  dispatched  an  escort  squadron  for  Portugal's  Brazilflota  in  response  to 
Methuen's  warnings  about  Portuguese  anxieties  for  its  safety,  and  resolved  that  the  remainder 
of  the  fleet  would  take  up  station  in  the  Straits.  92  Charles  and  Pedro,  meeting  at  Santarem, 
fixed  upon  Cddiz  as  the  primary  target  for  bombardment  and  a  landing  of  marines,  with  Port 
Mah6n,  Minorca,  the  alternative.  Rooke's  naval  Council  considered  the  Cidiz  proposal  on 
17  July  and,  despite  the  emphasis  in  the  Instructions  to  act  at  the  Archduke's  behest  (an 
approach  which  bore  the  personal  approval  of  Queen  Anne)  93  they  rejected  it  as  unworkable 
without  army  co-operation.  The  Council's  decision  was  not  surprising  inasmuch  as  it  had  at 
earlier  meetings  made  the  provision  of  some  army  soldiers  a  prerequisite  for  attacks  on  Cddiz 
or  Barcelona.  This  did  not  however  account  for  overlooking  the  second  option,  Port  Mah6n, 
which  Zingerling  had  strongly  advocated  at  Santarem.  It  was  sidelined  by  Hesse-Darmstadt's 
proposal  to  capture  Gibraltar  through  a  bombardment  and  a  marine  landing.  This  action, 
which  had  originally  been  a  possibility  on  the  fleet's  first  passage  through  the  Straits  in  May, 
was  now  resolved  upon  by  the  Council  of  War.  94 
Situated  at  the  north-west  foot  of  a  three  mile  long  rocky  mountain  (the  Rock)  that 
forms  a  peninsula  of  southern  Andalucia,  and  which  is  connected  to  the  mainland  by  a  small 
flat  isthmus,  Gibraltar  had  a  long  history  of  attention  from  English  seamen  and  politicians.  Of 
the  latter,  Cromwell  had  advocated  its  capture  in  the  mid-  I  650s;  while  its  use  as  a  temporary 
naval  base  between  1680-2  when  Admiral  Herbert  tired  of  Tangier,  may  well  have  been 
within  recent  memory  for  many  of  the  sailors  of  1704  -  Rooke  and  Shovell  had  certainly 
served  with  Herbert  during  the  1680s.  Although  one  contemporary  report  compared  its 
harbour  facilities  favourably  with  Cddiz,  it  was  Gibraltar's  strategic  position  as  guardian  of 
the  Straits  accessing  the  Mediterranean  which  comprised  its  worth.  Certainly,  it  was  this 
92  PRO,  SP  44/208,  pp.  147-50:  Hedges  to  Rooke,  9  May  1704  and  enclosure,  'Instructions  for  Our  Right 
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command  of  the  Straits,  together  with  the  aim  of  capturing  a  bridgehead  on  the  Spanish 
mainland  for  the  Archduke,  which  was  again  the  principal  attraction  for  the  Anglo-Dutch 
Flags.  95 
Early  morning  fog  on  20  July  caused  an  inauspicious  start  to  the  Gibraltar  operation 
as  the  Lenox  collided  with  the  Prince  George.  96  By  about  II  o'clock  however,  the  weather 
had  sufficiently  improved  to  allow  Rooke  to  signal  the  fleet's  attack  disposition.  it  had 
previously  been  agreed  that,  although  the  whole  fleet  would  stand  into  Gibraltar  Bay,  Rear- 
Admiral  Byng  would  position  a  squadron  of  some  twenty  Anglo-Dutch  vessels  much  closer  in 
against  the  town  to  conduct  the  bombardment  and  cover  the  marines.  One  account  implies 
that  Byng  was  given  this  command  because  of  Rooke's  pique  that  the  junior  Admiral  had 
opposed  the  operation  at  the  Council,  though  Byng's  subsequent  conduct  did  not  betray  any 
lingering  resentment.  97 
Dating  from  1627,  the  town's  shore  defences  were  not  extensive  and  the  50  small 
guns  along  the  sea  wall  had  been  poorly  maintained  over  the  years.  Notwithstanding,  on  the 
squadron's  first  approach  cannon  fire  damaged  the  Flagship's  mainmast  and,  as  Byng's 
operational  orders  prohibited  firing  until  a  summons  had  been  sent  to  Governor  Don  Diego  de 
Salinas,  he  withdrew  the  squadron  out  of  cannon  range.  Meanwhile,  to  the  north  of  the  Old 
Mole,  Captain  Whitaker  of  the  Dorselshire  was  directing  the  landing  of  around  1800  marines 
War,  pp.  108-9;  G.  Hills,  Rock  of  Contention:  A  History  of  Gihraltar  (London,  1974),  pp.  167-9. 
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primary  sources  and  secondary  authorities:  BL,  Add  MSS  10034,  fos.  5-6,91:  'A  Short  Account  of  Gibraltar 
from  the  time  of  its  being  Possessed  by  the  Crown  of  Great  Britain  in  1704  to  1745,  W.  Skinner,  Chief 
Engineer  of  Great  Britain';  'Journal  of  the  Taking  of  Gibraltar  by  the  Combined  Ficet  in  1704,  and  Defence  of 
the  Garrison  by  the  Prince  Hess',  21  July4  Aug.  1704;  BL,  Egerton  2521,  fos.  91-2:  Whitaker  to  'Sir'  [Sir 
Richard  Haddock],  29  July  1704;  BL,  Add  MSS  47970,  pp.  34-5:  'Leake's  Journal',  17-26  July  1704;  Add 
MSS  5440,  fos.  197-8,201-2:  'Att  a  Councill  of  War  of  Flag  Officers',  17,25  July  1704;  PRO,  ADM  51/4317 
Part  vii,  unpaginated,  Royal  Katherine,  17-25  July  1704;  PRO,  ADM  51153  Part  i,  unpaginated,  Lennox,  17- 
25  July  1704;  PRO,  ADM  1/2642,  unf  :  Jumper  to  'Honorable  Sir'  [the  Admiralty],  22  Mar.  1705,  and 
enclosure,  'To  His  Royall  Highness  Prince  George  of  Denmark,  Lord  High  Admiral  of  England  &c.  The 
Humble  Petition  of  Sir  William  Jumper  Captain  of  HMS  Lennox';  HMC,  House  ofLordsAISS  NS,  vi.  164-5: 
Rooke  to  Hedges,  28  July  1704;  Memoirs  Relating  to  the  Lord  Torrington,  pp.  137-46,189-94,  Appendix: 
,  [Some  Extracts  from  the  Journal  of  the  Rev.  Thomas  Pocock]';  Martin-Leakc,  The  Life  ofSirJohn  Leake,  i. 
154-6;  The  Life  andAdventures  ofMatthew  Bishop,  p.  19;  Hills,  Rock  of  Contention,  pp.  169-75;  J.  A.  C. 
Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain  (London,  1974),  pp.  89-99;  Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen  Anne,  i.  423-7. 
'  Memoirs  Relating  to  the  Lord  Torrington,  p.  137. 218 
and  200  Catalaneg  under  Hesse-Darmstadt  near  Punta  Mala  on  the  isthmus  connecting 
Gibraltar  to  the  mainland.  Once  the  marine  grenadiers'  fire  had  frightened  off  a  party  of  up  to 
50  Spanish  horse,  which  came  down  from  the  town  during  the  landing,  Hesse-Darmstadt 
secured  the  immediate  objective  of  severing  Gibraltar's  line  of  communication  by  taking  post 
amongst  the  mills  at  the  foot  of  the  Rock  within  musket  shot  of  the  Puerto  de  Tierra  (the 
town's  landward  gate,  also  known  as  the  Land  Port).  A  summons  was  then  sent  to  the 
Governor. 
The  tensions  between  Salinas's  instinct  to  hold  out  and  his  persuading  the  City 
Council  to  do  so  despite  the  dilapidated  fortifications  and,  more  importantly,  the  crucial 
shortage  of  manpower  (the  garrison  had  only  about  60  regulars  and  300  raw  militia, 
notwithstanding  a  previous  request  for  additional  troops  to  the  Andalucian  Captain-General, 
the  Marquis  de  Villadarias)  probably  caused  the  delay  in  responding  to  Hesse-Darmstadt.  As 
a  result,  before  the  garrison's  statement  of  loyalty  to  Philip  V  reached  the  Puerto  de  Tierra, 
Byng  had  deftly  warped  his  squadron  in  overnight  so  that  on  23  July  it  ranged  in-line  ahead 
from  the  Old  Mole  at  the  north  of  the  town  to  the  New  Mole  in  the  south.  This  meant  that 
when  Rooke  received  word  of  the  summons's  rejection,  Byng  was  prepared  for  the  Red  Flag 
being  raised  at  the  Royal  Katherine's  foretop,  to  signal  the  beginning  of  the  bombardment. 
Until  then  only  a  few  bombs  had  been  thrown  into  the  town  as  cover  for  the  squadron  and  the 
marines  but  now,  and  for  nearly  six  hours,  Byng  unleashed  a  bombardment  upon  the  town 
that,  Bishop  observed,  made  the  'Houses  shack'.  99 
98  Hills,  Rock  ofContention,  p.  169-70,  n.  26  and  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  pp.  90-1  discuss  the 
number  and  composition  of  troops  landed.  As  Rooke  had  no  regular  troops  aboard,  it  is  accepted  that  the 
burden  of  the  force  landed  was  (as  the  Admiral  himself  noted)  around  1800  English  and  Dutch  marine 
soldiers.  However,  references  by  others  -  and  in  particular  Whitaker  -  put  the  number  of  troops  landed  at 
2000.  Hills  and  Hugill  credibly  suggest  therefore  that  the  additional  troops  comprised  the  companies  of 
Spanish  deserters  originally  embarked  by  Hesse-Darmstadt  and  some  of  the  local  Catalans  which  joined  him 
at  his  landing  at  Barcelona  in  May. 
"  The  Life  andAdventures  ofMatthew  Bishop,  p.  20. 219 
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Fig.  14  :  The  Rock  of  Gibraltar. 
Having  led  a  night  raid  into  the  Old  Mole  to  disable  a  10-gun  French  privateer  which 
had  been  firing  into  the  marines'  camp,  Captain  Whitaker  had  not  brought  the  Dor.  vervhire 
into  Byng's  line  and  he  was  thus  acting  as  liaison  between  Rooke,  Byng  and  the  individual 
ships  of  the  attack  squadron.  The  hot  calm  weather  of  23  July  caused  the  gun  smoke  to  lie 
particularly  heavily  in  the  air,  and  by  mid-morning  it  was  clear  that  only  a  temporary  cease- 
fire  would  allow  its  dissipation  so  that  the  bombardment's  progress  could  be  eflýctivcly 
reviewed.  Whitaker  was  carrying  this  cease-fire  order  throughout  the  squadron  when,  upon 
reaching  the  English  ships  at  the  southern  end  ofthe  line,  his  attention  was  drawn  by  Captain 
Jumper  of  the  Lennox  to  the  silence  of  the  New  Mole's  battery  and  the  Torre  dcl  Tucrto 220 
Fort'  00,  situated  just  south-east  of  the  Mole.  Through  the  smoke,  both  Captains  perceived 
that  an  attack  by  the  ships'  boats  at  this  sector  might  well  be  unopposed.  Whitaker  took  this 
suggestion  back  to  Byng  who  ordered  the  squadrons'  boats  to  be  armed  and  manned  while 
Whitaker  sought  Rooke's  agreement.  This  was  readily  given  by  the  Admiral  who  released  the 
remaining  fleets'  boats  and  appointed  Whitaker  to  command  the  attack.  By  the  time  he 
returned  to  the  Lennox,  however,  the  sailors  from  about  a  dozen  boats  had,  with  little 
opposition,  already  landed  and  were  entering  the  fort. 
It  remains  unclear  why  Jumper  began  the  attack  without  a  direct  order.  Some 
commentators  have  suggested  that  he  and  Captain  Hicks  mistook  as  a  signal  the  warning  shot 
fired  by  the  Ranelagh  across  the  path  of  the  women  and  children  who  were  fleeing  back  to 
the  town  from  their  shelter  in  the  Europa  Point  shrine.  Another  has  suggested  that  Whitaker 
agreed  to  Jumper  beginning  the  attack  before  he  returned  to  Byng  and  Rooke.  There  seems 
no  irrefutable  evidence  for  either  suggestion,  however,  and  a  more  accurate  picture  would 
probably  emphasise  a  number  of  factors  -  the  warning  cannon  shot;  poor  communication 
between  Jumper  and  Whitaker;  and  news  passing  along  the  line  that  the  commanding  Rear- 
Admiral  wished  the  attack  -  as  precipitating  the  action.  Whitaker  was  not  however  without  a 
crucial  leadership  role  at  the  New  Mole.  Either  through  a  seaman's  carelessness  in  carrying  a 
lighted  match  or  as  a  result  of  an  enemy  mine,  the  powder  magazine  in  the  Torre  del  Tuerto 
Fort  exploded  as  the  sailors  took  control,  Ming  up  to  50  and  wounding  over  100.  The 
surviving  sailors  panicked  and  feld  back  to  the  boats.  Whitaker,  on  coming  ashore  at  Rosia 
Bay,  had  immediately  to  rally  these  men  to  the  task  in  hand.  His  swift  action  sent  Captains 
Aston  and  Roffy  along  the  sea  rampart  with  some  50  men  to  take  the  8-gun  southerly  bastion 
of  the  town  walls;  while  another  detachment  of  troops  was  dispatched  to  secure  Europa 
Point.  With  operational  composure  restored,  Whitaker  and  the  rest  of  the  sailors  followed 
Aston  and  Roffy. 
As  the  attackers  at  the  New  Mole  fastened  in  upon  the  town  from  the  south,  the  fleet 
recommenced  their  bombardment  against  the  centre;  and  meanwhile  to  the  north,  the  marines 
...  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  pp.  89-90,93-4  refers  to  four  forts  in  total  near  the  New  Mole:  the 
Nuestra  Senora  de  Europa,  (New  Mole  Fort)  and  three  others,  one  of  which  is  identified  as  the  Torre  del 
Tucrto-  Hugill's  description  of  their  exact  location  is  vague  and  given  that  the  primary  sources,  and  the  other 
secondary  histroies,  identify  only  one  fort  behind  the  New  Mole  -  the  Torre  del  Tuerto  -  it  may  be  that  flugill 
conflated  some  smaller  gun  redoubts  with  fortifications.  This  piece  concentrates  upon  the  Torre  del  Tuerto  as 
the  focus  of  the  attack  at  the  New  Mole. 221 
had  kept  up  a  steady  musket  fire  against  the  defenders  of  the  Puerto  de  Tierra.  Salinas's 
instinct  to  hold  out  was  appearing  increasingly  misguided  as  the  Anglo-Dutch  operational 
momentum  took  hold  -a  trend  underscored  by  Byng  leaving  his  Flagship  to  join  Whitaker  at 
the  southern  gate  on  the  evening  of  23  July.  Indeed,  the  following  day,  Hesse-Darmstadt  and 
Byng  sent  in  summons  from  their  respective  positions  and,  although  Salinas  requested  time  to 
consult  with  the  City  Councfl,  there  was  little  doubt  that  it  would  seek  a  surrender  upon 
terms.  Hesse-Darmstadt  did  however  suspect  Salinas  of  one  final  delaying  ruse  by  sending 
negotiators  without  any  proposals,  but  the  threat  of  imposing  an  unconditional  surrender  led 
to  the  north  gate  being  relinquished  as  a  sign  of  good  faith  and  the  negotiations  proceeded 
apace.  The  subsequent  terms  were  reasonably  generous  inasmuch  as  the  garrison,  with  all 
their  equipage  and  colours  flying,  had  three  days  to  depart  after  the  Anglo-Dutch  entry  and, 
provided  an  oath  was  sworn  to  the  Archduke  as  King,  only  French  subjects  would  be 
imprisoned.  On  25  July,  the  march  of  the  marine  soldiers  into  Gibraltar  town  and  the  signal 
ordering  the  seamen  at  the  New  Mole  back  to  their  vessels  marked  the  end  of  the  operation. 
Two  historiographical  myths  quickly  arose  about  this  operation  at  Gibraltar:  that  the 
Rock  was  captured  for  Queen  Anne  and  that,  at  the  moment  of  surrender,  Rooke  replaced  the 
Austrian  Flag  with  the  Union  Ensign.  101  To  these  it  is  possible  to  add  a  third:  that  it  was  in 
1704  that  Gibraltar  could  be  considered  captured  for  either  the  Queen  or  the  Austrian  House. 
Undoubtedly,  the  Anglo-Dutch  land  and  sea  operation  gained  control  of  Gibraltar  in  late  July 
but  it  is  not  always  recognised  that  besides  a  subsequent  naval  engagement,  a  combined 
action  sustained  between  the  late  autumn  of  1704  and  the  spring  of  1705  would  be  required 
before  the  town  could  be  described  as  captured. 
The  capability  of  the  French  fleet  to  imitate  the  allies's  action  at  Gibraltar  and  regain 
the  town  was  immediate  and  real.  Toulouse  heard  of  the  allies'  success  while  lying  off 
Barcelona  with  some  50  men-of-war  and  immediately  headed  for  the  Straits.  Meanwhile,  the 
allied  Flags  had  decided  to  remain  off  Gibraltar  until  Charles  issued  further  orders,  though  the 
Council  ruled  out  further  operations  upon  Spain's  coasts  due  to  the  lateness  of  the  season  and 
would  only  support  a  siege  upon  CAdiz  if  the  marines  at  Gibraltar  were  relieved.  A  week 
later,  just  as  the  fleet  completed  watering  on  the  Barbary  coast,  the  Centurion  with  its 
toPgallants  fully  set  and  firing  warning  shots,  came  in  with  the  news  that  Toulouse  had  been 
'01  Hills,  Rock  of  Contention,  pp.  475-7,  Appendix  A:  'Two  Myths  about  the  Capture  of  Gibraltar,  17041. 222 
spotted  off  Fuengirola.  Despite  Hesse-Darmstadt's  protests,  Rooke  immediately  embarked 
about  half  of  the  marines  from  the  garrison  at  Gibraltar  and  sailed  to  engage  the  French.  102 
The  only  set  piece  naval  battle  of  the  Spanish  Succession  war  took  place  off  Milaga 
on  13  August.  103  Mahan  and  Colomb  judged  it  indecisive  and,  although  neither  side 
dominated  after  seven  hours  of  fighting,  this  view  does  not  reflect  contemporary  or 
subsequent  historical  opinion.  104  Toulouse's  decision  -  admittedly  pressed  upon  him  by  his 
senior  cofleagues  -  to  disregard  the  following  morning's  opportunity  to  re-engage  from  the 
windward  in  favour  of  returning  to  Toulon,  has  been  interpreted  as  both  a  French  and  an 
Anglo-Dutch  victory.  In  France,  news  of  the  engagement  caused  Te  Deums  to  be  sung;  while 
Toulouse's  return  to  Toulon  was  greeted  with  bunting  and  general  joy.  However, 
Marlborough's  casual  note,  after  some  initial  doubts,  that  this  public  rejoicing  did  not  seem  to 
be  quickly  followed  up  in  the  French  news-sheets  or  pamphlets  raised  questions  about  the 
nature  of  the  purported  French  victory.  'O'  It  was  narrowly  based  on  the  belief  that  the  refusal 
to  re-engage  from  the  windward  on  14  August  was  consonant  with  the  epoch's  preference  for 
a  'victory  of  etiquette'  over  the  'decision  of  a  battle'.  106  Since  Toulouse  had  sufficiently 
established  the  French  fleet's  reputation  during  the  previous  day's  fight,  the  appropriate 
course  of  action  had  been  to  preserve  its  future  capability.  Nonetheless,  as  Admiral 
Torrington  found  out  after  Beachy  Head,  explanations  of  the  'fleet-  in-being'  thesis  lack 
popular  appeal  -  hence  the  absence  of  instructive  French  literature  to  accompany  the  people's 
rejoicing  on  simply  being  told  that  they  had  won  a  naval  victory.  Marlborough's  remark 
could  also  have  indicated  French  recognition  that  Toulouse's  return  to  port  was  a  strategic 
victory  for  the  allies,  with  such  success  subsequently  underscored  by  France's  abandonment 
of  Grand  Fleet  actions  for  the  rest  of  the  war.  Paradoxically,  interpreting  MAlaga,  as  a 
102  MeMoirS  Relating  10  the  Lord  Torrington,  pp.  146-9;  Martin-Leakc,  The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  i.  157; 
HMC,  House  oftords  MSS  NS,  vi.  172:  Rooke  to  the  Lord  High  Admiral,  27  Aug.  1704. 
103  Contemporary  accounts  of  the  battle  can  be  read  in  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  A.  172-3:  Rooke  to  the 
Lord  High  Admiral,  27  Aug.  1704;  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  i.  158-67,176-8  1;  Afemoirs 
Relating  to  the  Lord  Torrington,  pp.  150-63.  Standard  secondary  accounts  include:  L.  G.  Carr-Laughton,  'The 
Battle  of  Velez  Malaga,  1704',  JRUSI  1xviii  (1923),  367-90;  J.  Creswell,  BrifishAdmirals  of  the  Eighteenth 
Century:  Tactics  in  Battle  (London,  1972),  pp.  50-62;  Harding,  Seapower  andNaval  Waoýwe  1650-1830,  pp. 
171-2;  Corbett,  England  in  the  Mediterranean,  1603-1713,  ii.  530-5. 
104  Mahan,  The  Influence  ofSea  Power  Upon  History,  p.  211;  Colomb,  Naval  Warfare,  p.  303. 
'05  de  la  Ronci6re,  Histoire  de  la  Marine  Frangaise,  A.  368;  PRO,  SP,  87/2,  fos.  158-9,169-9:  Marlborough 
to  'Sir',  26  Sept.  1704  [NS];  Marlborough  to  Harley,  3  Oct.  1704  [NS];  The  Marlborough-Godolphin 
Correspondence,  i,  no.  379,  p.  372:  Marlborough  to  Godolphin,  15  Sept.  1704. 
""  de  la  Ronci&e,  Histoire  de  la  Marine  Frangaise,  A.  365. 223 
strategic  naval  victory  for  the  Alliance  highlights  the  distinctive  role  of  combined  operations 
within  war  policy  because  it  did  not  -  contrary  to  the  consensus  of  naval  historians'07_  fUll  y 
secure  Gibraltar  for  the  allies.  The  French  marine  may  have  begun  to  concentrate  upon  the 
guerre  de  course,  but  smaller  squadrons  could  still  undertake  coastal  attacks  or  assist  military 
forces  ashore.  It  was  against  this  latter  possibility  that  the  allies  had  to  defend  Gibraltar  by 
mounting  an  eight  month  long  combined  operation. 
Since  the  garrison's  surrender  in  late  July,  the  Andalucian  Captain-General, 
Villadarias,  had  been  preparing  to  regain  Gibraltar  by  a  siege  action.  His  efforts  received  a 
timely  boost  in  late  September  when  Pointis's  squadron  of  nineteen  men-of-war  from  Toulon 
landed  supplies  and  up  to  3000  troops  on  the  isthmus,  north  of  Gibraltar.  Astutely,  the 
French  had  taken  advantage  of  the  absence  of  an  allied  naval  presence  in  the  Straits.  The  fleet 
had  departed  for  home  on  24  August  and,  although  there  remained  a  winter  squadron  under 
Vice-Admiral  Leake,  the  majority  of  its  vessels  were  undergoing  necessary  repairs  at  Lisbon. 
Accordingly,  Villadarias  moved  quickly  to  reap  the  full  benefit  of  these  circumstances  by 
opening  his  trenches  at  the  beginning  of  October  and  slowly  moving  his  besieging  force  of 
between  7000  and  11000108  men  towards  the  town's  northern  walls. 
Inside  Gibraltar,  Hesse-Darmstadt  was  struggling  with  a  lack  of  resources  and  with 
dissent.  Prior  to  Rooke's  departure  all  the  marines  had  been  put  back  ashore,  but  along  with 
the  Catalan  companies  and  about  60  naval  gunners,  the  garrison  only  made,  according  to  the 
Quarter-Master-General,  about  2600  men.  Its  effective  disposal  moreover  was  threatened  at 
an  early  stage  by  friction  between  the  marine  Brigadier,  Fox,  and  the  Irish-born  Imperial 
Major-General,  Henry  Nugent,  whom  Hesse-Darmstadt  appointed  Governor.  Despite  this 
dispute,  which  continued  until  the  death  of  both  officers  in  November,  the  garrison  worked  to 
improve  Gibraltar's  defences  in  advance  of  the  desperately  needed  additional  materials 
arriving  from  England.  The  Round  Tower,  situated  north-east  of  the  northern  walls,  marked 
the  garrison's  first  line  of  defence.  Guns  placed  there  and  at  the  audaciously  constructed 
Willis's  battery  further  north-east  again  on  the  Rock's  northern  face  provided  an  cnfilading 
fire  against  an  enemy  approach  in  that  sector.  The  area  was  also  partially  mined,  while  gun 
107  flarding,  SeapowerandNaval  Waoýve  1650-1830,  p.  171;  Carr-Laughton,  'The  Battle  of  VelczMAlaga, 
1704',  p.  367-8;  Corbett,  England  in  the  Mediterranean;  1603-1713,  ii.  535. 
108  There  is  no  agreement  amongst  the  sources  on  an  exact  figure,  but  this  probably  accurately  represents  the 
operational  peaks  and  trough  as  forces  were  brought  up  in  stages  and  were  killed,  wounded  or  withdrawn. 224 
emplacements  were  erected  at  the  Old  Mole.  Finally,  conscious  perhaps  oftheir  success  at 
the  New  Mole,  the  garrison  positioned  several  32  pounders  to  contest  an  attack  there.,  0" 
These  efforts  meant  that  the  Anglo-Dutch  position  at  Gibraltar  was  not  weak.  Moreover,  in 
addition  to  the  defences  being  strategically  disposed,  the  provisions  left  by  Rooke  would  last 
until  December  and,  once  refitted,  Leake's  squadron  might  establish  a  sea-borne  supply  line. 
Hesse-Darmstadt  could  nonetheless  only  be  aware  that  if  the  French  established  footholds 
north  and  south  (as  the  allies  had  in  July)  then  the  town  could  be  reduced  with  minimal  enemy 
effort  through  blockade  rather  than  by  siege. 
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Fig.:  15:  The  Garrison  Defences  ofthe  Town  ol'Gibraltar. 
After  landing  reinforcements,  however,  Pointis  decided  to  put  about  for  Cddiz,  thus 
"9  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  qfSir  John  Leake,  i.  181-2;  Kuenzel,  Oas  Leben  und  der  Briesivechsel,  no.  3,  pp. 
465-6:  Hesse-Darmstadt  to  Galway,  21  Sept.  1704  [NS];  B  L,  Add  MSS  100.34,  fos.  5-6,99-101:  'A  Short 
Account  of  Gibraltar',  n.  d.;  'A  Letter  from  the  Engineer  Mr  Bennet',  6  Dec.  1704. 225 
reducing  the  immediate  threat  of  a  combined  French  attack  on  Gibraltar.  Still  the  six  frigates 
left  behind  served  notice  of  the  French  capability  and  Pointis's  Cddiz  station  suggested  that 
the  priority  might  be  to  strangle  Gibraltar's  supply  route  from  Lisbon.  "O  These  were  the 
circumstances  Leake  faced  when  Hesse-Darmstadt  requested  relief  for  the  garrison, 
particularly  powder  and  provisions.  The  Admiral  had  first  been  informed  on  19  September 
that  the  French  were  before  Gibraltar  by  his  scout,  Tiger,  but  it  was  only  when  Hesse- 
Darmstadt  and  Captain  Fotherby  corroborated  this  news  that  the  Council  of  War  convened  to 
address  the  issue.  Its  meeting  on  I  October  considered  the  squadron  too  small,  and 
possessing  too  few  supplies,  for  an  immediate  departure  to  Gibraltar.  Nonetheless,  while 
awaiting  further  details  on  the  enemy  dispositions  in  the  area,  four  vessels  designed  for 
England  as  a  trade  escort  were  held  back  and  one  small  rate  sped  for  home  to  request 
additional  men  and  materials.  Fortunately,  Hesse-Darmstadt  continued  to  get  news  to  Leake 
and  on  13  October,  this  included  the  important  report  that  Pointis  was  thought  to  be  lying 
between  the  Puntales  and  CAdiz  and,  thus,  not  well  placed  to  trouble  Leake's  passage  to 
Gibraltar.  "' 
Upon  receipt  of  this  advice,  Leake  called  another  Council  of  War.  Three  ships 
carrying  provisions  from  England  had  recently  arrived  at  Lisbon,  as  had  a  small  Dutch 
squadron  of  five  sail,  and  Leake  recommended  a  swift  departure  for  Gibraltar.  The  Council 
agreed  to  send  a  23-strong  Anglo-Dutch  squadron,  but  its  departure  was  to  be  delayed  by 
five  days  in  the  hope  that  John  Methuen  would  procure  the  desperately  needed  powder, 
which  was  the  only  commodity  lacking  from  the  six  months  provisions  for  Gibraltar  now 
stowed  aboard  the  squadron.  Fortunately,  200  barrels  duly  arrived  by  24  October  and  the 
squadron  was  able  to  depart  the  following  morning,  bound  on  a  operation  to  combine  with 
Gibraltar's  military  garrison  to  raise  the  French  siege.  112 
Hesse-Darmstadt's  belief  that  Pointis  posed  little  threat  at  CAdiz  proved  prescient  and 
the  squadron  completed  an  uneventful  four  day  passage  to  Cape  Spartell.  In  advance  of 
110  de  la  Ronci6re,  Histoire  de  la  Marine  Franqaise,  vi.  368-9;  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  p.  128. 
111  BL,  Add  MSS  5440,  fos.  33,49-50,215-16:  Fotherby  to  'Sir'  [Leake],  9  Oct.  1704;  Hesse-Darmstadt  to 
Leake,  24  Oct.  1704  [NS];  'Att  a  Councill  of  Flag  Officers',  I  Oct.  1704;  BL,  Add  MSS  5437,  fos.  58-60,75: 
Leake  to  the  Admiralty,  26  Sept.,  2  Oct.  1704;  Leake  to  the  Secretary  of  State  to  His  Majesty  the  King  of 
portugal,  I  Oct.  1704;  'Capt.  Fotherby's  Acount  of  the  French  Ships  and  Army  before  Gibraltar',  8  Oct.  1704. 
112  BL,  Add  MSS  5437,  fos.  66-7,70:  Leake  to  John  Methuen,  21,22  Oct.  1704;  Leake  to  Hesse-Darnstadt,  21 
Oct.  1704;  Leake  to  the  Admiralty,  24  Oct.,  3  Nov.  1704;  BL,  Add  MSS  47970,  p.  41:  Tcake's  Journal',  24-5 
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crossing  the  Straits  to  enter  Gibraltar  Bay,  Leake  sent  ahead  all  the  clean  frigates  to  prevent 
the  egress  of  any  enemy  vessels;  he  also  -  rather  unscrupulously  -  ordered  colours  be  struck 
to  increase  the  surprise.  In  the  event,  neither  measure  was  necessary  for,  although  the 
L'Etoile  slipped  through  the  frigate  screen,  she  was  captured  by  the  Swallow  after  a  short 
chase,  while  the  rest  of  the  enemy  vessels  in  the  bay  -  including  two  French  warships,  a  frigate 
and  a  fireship  -  were  either  burnt  or  ran  aground  upon  the  squadron's  appearance  on  30 
October.  The  immediate  French  naval  threat  had,  at  least,  been  combated  without  much 
effort,  and  Leake  could  land  his  supplies  and  some  twenty  armed  sailors  unimpeded.  '  13 
The  squadron's  arrival  had  the  more  important  consequence  of  helping  the  garrison 
frustrate  an  imminent  three-pronged  French  attack.  '  14  Towards  the  end  of  October, 
Villadarias's  siege  guns  had  breached  both  the  Round  Tower  and  St  Paul's  bastion,  which 
guarded  the  Old  Mole,  and  thus  preparations  had  begun  for  an  assault  upon  these  openings. 
Simultaneously,  3000  men  were  to  be  landed  at  the  New  Mole,  and  an  attack  launched  on  the 
town  from  the  heights  of  the  Rock  to  the  east  or  ideally  from  within  the  town,  if  the  Spanish 
troops  managed  to  descend  unnoticed.  Tactically,  these  attacks  aimed  at  spreading  the 
garrison  so  thinly  throughout  the  town  that  the  entire  defence  of  Gibraltar  would  implode. 
However,  the  destruction  of  the  French  vessels  in  the  bay  meant  that  they  could  not  supply 
cover  for  the  assault  on  the  breaches;  instead  an  allied  naval  force  might  now  confine 
Villadarias's  force  to  the  trenches.  Meanwhile,  as  the  Anglo-Dutch  squadron  prevented  the 
bay  being  traversed,  the  rendezvous  of  the  New  Mole  assault  force  at  the  beaches  was  simply 
abandoned.  The  appearance  of  Leake's  squadron  could  not  however  forestall  the  attack  from 
the  east.  Colonel  Figueroa's  force  of  500  men  had  already  made  their  way  to  the  Rock's 
south-eastem  slopes  some  distance  beyond  Catalan  Bay,  where  the  native  goat  herd,  Simon 
Susarte,  was  to  guide  their  ascent.  This  vanguard  expected  a  detachment  of  1500  troops  to 
follow  but,  having  spent  the  night  of  30/3  1  October  in  St  Michael's  Cave,  they  awoke  to  find 
113  BL,  Add  MSS  47970,  p.  4  1:  'Leake's  Journal',  29-31  Oct.  1704;  BL,  Add  MSS  5437,  E  69:  Leake  to  John 
Methuen,  3  Nov.  1704;  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  ii.  199-200;  The  Life  andAdventures  of 
Matthew  Bishop,  p.  25. 
114  The  ensuing  account  of  the  planning  and  frustration  of  the  French  attack  is  based  upon  the  following 
primary  sources  and  secondary  authorities:  BL,  Add  MSS  5437,  f.  66:  Leake  to  John  Methuen,  3  Nov.  1704; 
BL,  Add  MSS  5440,  fos  57-8:  Hesse-Darnstadt  to  Leake,  12  Nov.  1704  [NS];  BL,  Add  MSS  47970,  p.  4  1: 
'Leake's  Journal',  31  Oct.  1704;  BL,  Add  MSS  10034,  f  92:  'Journal  of  the  Taking  of  Gibraltar',  31  Oct. 
1704;  The  Life  andAdventures  ofMatthew  Bishop,  pp.  25-6;  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  qfSirJohn  Leake,  ii. 
200-2;  Hills,  Rock  of  Contention,  pp.  187-9;  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  pp.  1334. 227 
the  summit ridge  deserted.  G.  Hills  argues  that,  in  the  absence  of  clear  evidence,  the  larger 
detachment's  non-appearance  should  be  understood  as  Villadarias's  fmal  attempt  to  facilitate 
the  northern  sector  attack.  Probably  aware  that  a  self-imposed  oath  prohibited  Colonel 
Figueroa's  force  returning  until  Gibraltar  was  taken,  Villadarias  envisaged  this  vanguard 
entering  the  town  regardless  of  their  number.  Once  inside,  he  hoped  that  they  might  cause 
sufficient  distraction  to  make  an  assault  upon  the  breaches  tenable.  Mindful  however,  that 
Leake's  squadron  tipped  the  balance  of  force  against  him  to  the  north,  Villadarias  retained  the 
1500  men  to  ensure  a  concentration  of  troops  in  the  attack.  His  error  was  the  failure  to 
recognise  that  for  Figueroa  the  1500  men  did  not  just  represent  an  enhanced  capacity;  as  his 
troops  carried  only  small  arms  with  three  rounds  of  ammunition  each,  the  reinforcement  was 
essential  fire  support  for  the  main  attack  to  get  inside  the  walls.  In  the  event,  Figueroa's  men 
were  simply  outnumbered  and  outgunned  by  Colonel  Borr's  800  strong  mixed  force  of 
sailors,  marines  and  their  grenadiers,  which  was  dispatched  on  31  October  when  the 
Spaniards  were  spotted  on  the  ridge.  Bishop  colourfully  described  them  as  'swarms  of  bees 
upon  the  hill'  whose  confusion  caused  them  to  be  easy  prey  to  the  garrison,  which  acted,  'like 
lions  in  the  valley'.  '  15  An  assault  on  the  breaches  was  now  impossible.  116  Despite  the  French 
reverses,  however,  the  siege  was  not  raised,  nor  did  Pointis  return  to  Toulon.  The  allies's 
control  of  the  Rock  remained  vulnerable  and  the  combined  operation  had  to  be  maintained. 
In  the  period  immediately  following  the  failure  of  Villadarias's  attack,  Hesse- 
Darmstadt  did  suggest  a  counter-attack:  the  garrison  would  sally  forth  against  the  French 
trenches  and  a  couple  of  frigates  would  cannonade  the  east  side  of  the  enemy  camp  and  their 
battery  where  it  lay  open  to  the  sea  thus  softening  it  up  for  an  attack  by  the  ships'  boats.  117  it 
is  a  misrepresentation  to  portray  Hesse-Darmstadt  as  enthusiastically  -  even  recklessly  - 
urging  this  action.  '"  The  whole  project  was  to  be  left  to  Leake's  'very  best  consideration 
'"The  Life  andAdventures  ofMatthew  Bishop,  pp.  25-6. 
116  Hills,  Rock  of  Contention,  p.  189  n.  41,  claims  that  the  north  front  attack  did  in  fact  begin.  Ile  cites  in 
support  13L,  Add  MSS  5440,  fos.  57-8:  Hesse-Darmstadt  to  Leake,  12  Nov.  1704  [NSI  and  specifically  I  lesse- 
Darmstadt's  phrase,  '...  the  enemy  were  attacking  us  that  very  night  of  your  entrance  in  many  places  at  once... 
However,  this  is  a  misquotation.  Hesse-Darmstadt  used  the  imperfect  subjunctive  tense  'were  to  attack'  rather 
than  the  imperfect  'were  attacking'.  Accordingly,  the  letter  cannot  evidence  the  beginning  of  an  attack  in  the 
northern  sector;  indeed,  the  sense  of  the  letter  is  that  Leake's  arrival prevented  all  imminent  attacks.  On  this 
issue,  I  am  grateful  to  my  Chester  College  colleague,  Mr  John  Doran,  for  an  enlightening  discussion  upon 
grammatical  form. 
J17  BL,  Add  MSS  5440,  fos  57-8:  Hesse-Darmstadt  to  Leake,  12  Nov.  1704  [NS]. 
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what  may  be  thought  most  proper  to  be  executed"'9  and,  moreover,  with  respect  to  the 
landward  sally,  Hesse-Darmstadt  implied  it  would  be  reckless  to  release  the  necessary  two- 
thirds  of  his  current  garrison  force.  Leake's  naval  Council  promptly  rejected  the  sea-based 
elements  of  the  counter-attack  as  unsafe  for  the  time  of  the  year  and  Hesse-Darmstadt  lodged 
no  official  protest.  120  Perhaps  the  senior  commanders  were  influenced  by  the  broader 
operational  reason,  that  large  set-piece  land-sea  attacks  against  the  French  positions  had  to  be 
avoided  during  the  last  two  months  of  1704.  The  July  operation  had  only  gained  an  insecure, 
and  now  besieged,  foothold  within  Gibraltar  and  its  translation  into  a  secure  bridgehead 
required  Hesse-Darmstadt  and  Leake  to  prioritise  its  succour;  a  combined  operation  based 
upon  attrition  was  required.  Such  an  operation  had  not  been  common  in  Europe  during  the 
last  decade,  however.  Most  of  the  combined  military-naval  ventures  had  either  been  single 
strike  coastal  incursions  such  as  the  descents  of  the  1690s  or  operations  to  capture  territory  in 
which  the  target  had  been  successfully  secured  by  the  initial  amphibious  action  or  not  at  all  - 
Cork  (1690)  and  Brest  (1694),  for  example.  Lacking  experience  and  specific  Instructions  to 
guide  their  actions,  Hesse-Darmstadt  and  Leake  had  to  achieve  an  combined  modus  operandi 
themselves. 
Not  surprisingly,  theirjoint  action  over  this  two  month  period  was  multifaceted, 
though  the  fleet  undoubtedly  bore  the  heavier  burden.  The  squadron  provided  a  considerable 
quantity  of  materials,  provisions  and  ordnance,  while  seamen  worked  ashore  with  their 
number  peaking  at  a  daily  contribution  of  600  in  early  November.  About  half  acted  as  relief 
guard  for  the  southern  posts  so  that  the  garrison  could  set  about  improving  the  defences  and 
another  half  helped  with  these  works.  Hesse-Darmstadt  did  offer  the  sailors  payment  for 
their  labour;  while  Leake  carefully  husbanded  the  naval  resources  by  levying  fines  on  non- 
returned  or  broken  equipment,  though  many  sailors  simply  side-stepped  this  penalty  by 
stealing  from  the  garrison's  stock.  Under  the  expert  guidance  of  the  engineer,  Colonel 
Bennett,  the  town's  defences  were  vastly  improved  and,  despite  Villadarias's  bombardment 
from  recently  augmented  batteries  the  siege  made  little  headway.  "' 
119  BL,  Add  MSS  5440,  f  57:  Hesse-Darmstadt  to  Leake,  12  Nov.  1704  [NS]. 
120BL,  Add  MSS5440,  fos.  57-8,217-18:  Hesse-Darmstadt  to  Leake,  12  Nov.  1704  [NS];  'Att  a  Councill  of 
War  of  Flag  Officers',  2  Nov.  1704. 
12  1  BL,  Add  MSS  5440,  fos.  67-8,71-4,78-9,82-3,217-20,225-26,229-32:  Hesse-Darmstadt  to  Leake,  13, 
16,18,22,25  Nov.  1704  [NS];  'Att  a  Councill  of  War  of  Flag  Officers',  2,6,27  Nov.,  14,16  Dec.  1704;  BL, 
Add  MSS  10034,  fos.  92-3,100-1:  'Journal  of  the  Taking  of  Gibraltar',  1-27  Nov.  1704;  'A  Letter  from  the 229 
Equally,  however,  the  garrison  lacked  the  manpower  to  use  the  improved  defences 
for  attack,  while  the  increasing  sickness  daily  reduced  their  number.  Upon  his  return  to 
England,  Rooke  had  raised  questions  about  the  garrison's  strength  as  part  of  a  general  plea 
for  resources;  while  Leake  believed  it  to  be  the  most  pressing  issue  from  the  outset. 
Crucially,  Marlborough  -  who  represented  the  strategic  importance  of  Gibraltar  to  the  Court  - 
proved  an  ally  and,  locally,  the  army  commander  in  Portugal,  Lord  Galway,  was  also 
impressed  by  Gibraltar's  needs.  News  of  the  latter's  support  was  manifest  in  the  promise, 
conveyed  by  John  Methuen,  that  Gibraltar  would  receive  a  detachment  of  troops  from  the 
reinforcements  to  arrive  at  Lisbon,  including  soldiers  from  the  Irish  Establishment.  122 
The  safe  transfer  of  these  soldiers  from  Lisbon  opened  a  fault-line  in  the  relationship 
between  Leake  and  Hesse-Darmstadt  and  strained  the  effectiveness  of  their  combined 
operation  to  defend  Gibraltar.  Since  early  November,  the  increasingly  poor  weather  had 
made  it  difficult  for  the  Admiral  to  keep  station  safely  within  Gibraltar  Bay.  Consequently, 
towards  the  end  of  the  month,  Leake  suggested  departing  for  Lisbon  with  the  dual  purpose  of 
getting  replacement  ship  parts  and  of  securing  the  expected  troop  convoy,  either  on  route  or 
directly  from  the  Tagus.  Given  that  Pointis  was  known  to  be  in  Cddiz  and,  according  to 
recent  intelligence,  had  been  preparing  his  squadron  for  departure,  the  convoy's  security 
seemed  a  pressing  matter  to  Leake.  He  even  raised  the  prospect  of  looking  into  Udiz  to 
offer  the  French  Admiral  battle.  Hesse-Darmstadt  had  however  become  frustrated  by  the 
squadron's  variable  motion  in  the  bay,  which  he  believed  eased  the  pressure  on  the  enemy  by 
allowing  the  naval  bombardment  and  the  ships'  boats  attacks  against  enemy  camps  to  be 
inconsistent.  Perhaps  not  surprisingly  therefore,  he  opposed  the  departure  of  the  squadron, 
believing  that  it  would  leave  Gibraltar  vulnerable  to  attack.  The  commanders'  respective 
positions  turned  upon  different  predictions  of  Pointis's  immediate  intentions,  and  both  views 
were  based  upon  narrow  service  interests.  Leake  considered  that  Pointis  would  engage  the 
troop  convoy  in  a  naval  action,  thereby  denying  the  garrison  vital  reinforcements;  while 
Hesse-Darmstadt  believed  that  the  French  Admiral's  intention  was  to  combine  with 
Villadarias  to  mount  an  attack  upon  Gibraltar  from  the  landward.  Despite  there  being  a 
Engineer  Mr  Bennet',  6  Dec.  1704;  The  Life  and,  4dventures  qfMalthew  Bishop,  pp.  27-9. 
122  BL,  Add  MSS  5440,  fos.  36-7,77:  Rooke  to  Leake,  9  Oct.  1704;  John  Methuen  to  Leake.  9  Nov.  1704;  BL, 
Add  MSS  5437,  fos.  69,71:  Leake  to  John  Methuen,  3,10  Nov.  1704;  The  Letters  andDispatches  ofJohn 
Churchill,  i.  526:  Marlborough  to  Hedges,  3  Nov.  1704  [NS];  Kuenzel,  Das  Leben  und  der  Brieswechsel,  no. 230 
majority  of  naval  officers  at  the  Council,  the  garrison  officers  present  -  Hesse-Darmstadt,  and 
Colonels  Purcell  and  Borr  -  secured  agreement  after  a  lengthy  debate  that  the  squadron  would 
remain  in  front  of  Gibraltar  -  either  in  the  bay  upon  an  easterly  wind  or,  nearby,  if  out  at  sea 
under  a  westerly.  123  Other  than  the  implication  that  the  naval  Flags  were  more  willing  to 
compromise,  there  is  no  indication  why  the  three  soldiers  prevailed  at  this  Council. 
Nonetheless,  this  wholesale  neglect  of  an  important  naval  concern  nearly  undermined  the 
combined  operation  then  being  sustained  to  defend  Gibraltar.  Indeed,  it  was  largely  luck  that 
ensured  the  garrison  survived  the  winter. 
Leake  had  been  correct  to  think  that  the  troop  transports  would  require  additional 
protection  against  Pointis.  The  21-strong  convoy  left  Lisbon  on  I  December  withjust  a  four- 
frigate  escort  and  dispersal  was  the  convoy's  only  defence  when  it  fell  in  with  Pointis's 
squadron  of  22  warships  off  Cape  Spartell  on  6  December,  having  first  thought  the  French 
were  Leake's  squadron  coming  to  their  aid.  The  Admiral  had  had  news  of  their  departure  a 
day  previously  but,  despite  immediately  resolving  to  sail  to  their  aid  without  consulting  the 
garrison,  the  wind  proved  contrary.  124  Although,  paradoxically,  this  variable  weather 
enhanced  the  effectiveness  of  dispersal  as  a  defensive  tactic,  the  allies  were  very  fortunate  that 
some  fifteen  transports  made  it  through  to  Gibraltar,  thereby  depriving  the  garrison  of  some 
20  infantry  companies  and  200  recruits.  125  The  events  of  the  early  winter  of  1704-5  quickly 
6,  p.  468:  Hoffmann  to  Hesse-Darmstadt,  II  Nov.  1704  [NS]. 
123  BL,  Add  MSS  47970,  pp.  41-3:  'Leake's  Journal',  2-27  Nov.  1704;  BL,  Add  MSS  5437,  fos.  72,79-8  1, 
89-91:  Leake  to  Vanderdussen,  14  Nov.  1704;  Leake  to  Hesse-Darmstadt,  22  Nov.  1704;  Hesse-Darmstadt  to 
John  Methuen,  26  Nov.  1704;  Leake  to  the  Admiralty,  28  Dec.  1704;  BL,  Add  MSS  5440,  fos.  80-3  225-6: 
Hesse-Darmstadt  to  Leake,  25  Nov.  1704  [NS];  'Att  a  Councill  of  War  of  Flag  Officers',  27  Nov.  1704; 
Martin-Leakc,  7he  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  ii.  214-2  1. 
124  BL,  Add  MSS  5437,  fos  82,89-9  1:  Leake  to  Hesse-Darmstadt,  5  Dec.  1704;  Leake  to  the  Admiralty,  28 
Dec.  1704;  BL,  Add  MSS  5440,  fos.  227-9:  'Att  a  Councill  of  War  of  Flag  Officers',  5  Dec.  1704;  BL,  Add 
MSS  47970,  pp.  44-5:  Leake's  Journal',  6-14  Dec.  1704;  BL,  Add  MSS  47972A,  pp.  9-11:  Journal  of  Captain 
Thomas  Kempthorne,  26  Nov.  -  19  Dec.  1704;  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSirJohn  Leake,  ii.  223-5. 
125  The  exact  number  of  troops  and  transports  actually  lost  to  the  French  as  opposed  to  simply  escaping  back 
to  Lisbon  is  uncertain.  Hills,  Rock  of  Contention,  p.  194  claims  that  one  transport  was  lost  and  three 
captured,  thus  losing  13  companies  of  Barrymore's  regiment,  three  companies  of  Donegal's  regiment,  six 
Dutch  companies  and  200  recruits.  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  p.  136,  claims  that  only  one  transport 
was  captured  by  the  French  with  four  others  returning  with  Kempthorne's  Roebuck  to  Lisbon,  though  no  total 
of  soldiers  lost  is  given.  The  primary  sources  do  not  consistently  support  either  Hills  or  Hugill.  Kuenzel,  Das 
Leben  und  der  Brieswechsel,  no.  62,  p.  532:  Hesse-Darmstadt  to  'King  Charles  Ill',  27  Dec.  1704  [NS],  notes 
the  loss  of  7  English  and  6  Dutch  companies,  but  it  makes  no  reference  to  Donegall's  men  or  the  recruits. 
13L,  Add  MSS  5437,  fos.  89-91:  Leake  to  the  Admiralty  28  Dec.  1704,  suggests  tentatively  that  only  400  men 
werelost.  Kempthorne'sjournal  -BL,  Add  MSS  47972A,  pp.  10-11:  Journal  of  Captain  Thomas 
Kempthorne,  28  Nov.  -  19  Dec.  1704  -  makes  no  mention  of  accompanying  transports  back  to  Lisbon.  The 
point  is  that  the  evidence  is  only  conclusive  in  the  positive  sense  as  to  how  many  transports  passed  through 231 
underscored  the  significance  of  this  incident.  The  2000  troops  which  did  arrive  safely  proved 
essential  reinforcements  for  the  garrison  as  its  number  continued  to  fall  due  to  sickness. 
Hesse-Darmstadt's  problems  were  not  yet  over,  however.  Leake  was  forced  to  remove  the 
squadron  to  Lisbon  for  refit  at  the  end  of  December,  and  the  Marshal  de  Tess6  arrived  in 
Spain  to  succeed  the  Duke  of  Berwick  with  direct  orders  from  Louis  XIV  to  make  a  personal 
assessment  of  the  siege's  progress.  Even  before  Tessd's  arrival  at  Gibraltar,  moreover, 
Hesse-Darmstadt  had  to  defend  the  town  against  another  major  assault  launched  by 
Villadarias,  which  -  probably  due  to  the  jealousy  and  anxiety  he  felt  at  the  imminent  arrival  of 
the  French  General  -  proved  particularly  vigorous.  126 
Bolstered  by  some  4000  reinforcements  brought  down  by  General  de  Thouy, 
Villadarias  launched  a  two-pronged  assault  against  the  breaches  in  the  Round  Tower  and  the 
northern  curtain  wall  on  7  February.  Initially,  the  weight  of  the  enemy  force  enabled  them  to 
capture  the  Tower  and  penetrate  the  northerly  first  line  of  defence.  Quickly  negotiating  the 
scree  slope,  this  Franco-Spanish  force  next  took  the  four-gun  batteryjust  40  yards  from  the 
old  Moorish  citadel,  which  stood  as  an  outwork  to  Gibraltar's  castle,  guarding  the  north-east 
edgeofthetown.  Only  the  sacrificial  actions  of  Captain  Fisher,  commanding  just  over  a  third 
of  a  company  of  Seymour's  marines,  gained  the  allies  time  for  reinforcements  commanded  by 
Lieutenant-Colonels  Rivett  and  Moncal  to  come  up  from  the  town  and  along  the  covered 
way.  Once  these  deployed,  the  enemy  momentum  was  halted  and,  after  a  bloody  combat, 
reversed.  Within  the  hour,  Villadarias's  men  had  been  forced  back  down  the  scree  and  out  of 
the  Round  Tower.  It  was  the  Spaniard's  last  attempt  to  recapture  Gibraltar  as  Tessd  arrived 
to  take  command  within  two  days.  127 
The  French  Marshal  was  pleasantly  surprised  at  the  progress  of  the  siege  but,  despite 
bringing  with  him  an  additional  3000  troops,  he  remained  sceptical  about  the  potential  for  its 
success  and  believed  this  could  only  come  about  if  the  siege  was  consistently  supported  from 
the  sea.  As  a  result  of  the  representations  Tessd  made  to  the  French  and  Spanish  Courts, 
Pointis  was  positively  ordered  to  Gibraltar,  where  he  arrived  on  16  February.  Bad  weather, 
however,  frustrated  the  putting  of  supplies  ashore,  and  also  prevented  the  co-ordinated  land 
the  Straits. 
126  Mimoires  et  Lettres  du  Marichal  de  Tessj  (Paris,  1806),  ii.  136-9;  G.  M.  Trevelyan,  England  Under 
QýTen  Anne:  Ramillies  and  the  Union  with  Scotland  (London,  1965),  ii.  57-8. 
."  Hills,  Rock  of  Contention,  pp.  196-7;  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  pp.  13941;  MmoiresetLetlresdu 232 
and  sea  attacks  envisaged  by  Tess6.  By  the  end  of  February,  the  worsening  weather  had 
largely  dispersed  the  French  squadron,  leaving  only  five  warships  in  the  bay.  Meanwhile, 
Leake's  squadron  had  returned  to  Lisbon  on  23  December  for  a  much  needed  refit;  but  a  lack 
of  supplies  and  the  requirement  that  Leake  attend  to  a  variety  of  outstanding  tasks  -  such  as 
the  transport  to  Gibraltar  of  some  500  Portuguese  soldiers  collected  at  Lagos  by  Paul 
Methuen  back  in  November  -  caused  delay.  Nonetheless,  with  the  Garland  left  to  serve 
Gibraltar  and  some  frigates  continuing  to  cruise  the  Straits,  the  French  naval  actions  were 
recorded  and  communication  with  Hesse-Darmstadt  was  maintained.  Leake  was  therefore 
well  aware  of  the  pressing  need  to  relieve  Gibraltar  but,  with  the  sanction  of  his  Council,  he 
determined  to  wait  for  the  additional  supplies  expected  with  Rear-Admiral  Dilkes's  squadron 
from  Spithead. 
Dilkes's  arrival  at  the  Tagus  shortly  thereafter  meant  that  only  contrary  winds 
prevented  the  departure  of  Leake's  squadron  prior  to  6  March.  As  before,  his  intention  was 
to  rendezvous  at  Cape  Spartell,  and  then  cross  over  the  Straits  to  surprise  the  enemy  in 
Gibraltar  Bay.  The  strong  south-westerly  that  blew  on  10  March  disrupted  this  plan, 
however;  but  it  also  forced  the  five  French  vessels  out  of  the  bay,  allowing  Leake  to  spy  them 
as  he  rode  two  miles  off  Cape  Caberta.  A  shot  fired  at  the  French  from  the  Europa  Point  led 
the  Admiral  to  conclude  that  the  garrison  was  secure  and  he  immediately  gave  chase.  Within 
four  hours,  LArrogant  struck  to  the  Newcastle,  while  the  elapse  of  another  four  saw 
LArdent  and  Le  Marquis  captured  by  two  Dutch  ships  and  Le  Magnanime  and  La  Lys 
Vaisseau  run  ashore.  On  board  Le  Magnanime,  Pointis  had  been  wounded,  though  not 
fatal.  ly,  unlike  the  French  naval  challenge  at  Gibraltar.  Tess6  was  now  denied  the  sea-borne 
support  of  his  military  operations  that  he  had  considered  a  prerequisite  for  the  recapture  of 
Gibraltar,  and  this  circumstance  increased  his  scepticism  about  pursing  the  siege.  Louis  was 
also  of  this  opinion,  believing  that  his  troops  might  be  more  usefully  deployed  elsewhere  on 
the  peninsula.  Understandably,  given  that  it  would  mean  conceding  the  loss  of  part  of  his 
mainland  kingdom,  Philip  V  remained  to  be  convinced.  This  took  less  than  a  month  as  the 
evidence  that  allied  garrison  had  an  uninterrupted  sea-borne  supply  line  and  could  still, 
despite  the  ravages  of  sickness,  mount  sallies  against  the  besiegers'  positions,  was  balanced 
against  the  pressing  allied  threat  on  Spain's  Portuguese  borders.  On  12  April,  on  Philip's 
, Xlardchal  de  Tesso.  ii.  146-7. 233 
orders,  Tess6  raised  the  siege  of  Gibraltar.  128 
The  lifting  of  the  Franco-Spanish  siege  in  April  1705  meant  that  Gibraltar  could  be 
effectively  considered  as  captured  by  the  allies.  There  was  certainly  a  qualitative  difference  in 
their  control  of  the  town  from  when  the  marines  first  took  possession  on  25  July;  and  it  was 
not  simply  that  their  numbers  had  been  boosted  by  line  infantry.  For  nine  months,  the  land 
garrison  maintained  a  constant  operational  relationship  with  Sir  John  Leake's  Mediterranean 
squadron  to  defend  Gibraltar,  and  more  specifically  to  cause  the  Franco-Spanish  siege  to  be 
fifted.  Twice  -  in  November  1704  and  March  1705  -  as  the  garrison  resolutely  maintained 
their  presence  in  the  town  against  the  enemy  siege,  the  navy  brought  in  essential 
reinforcements  to  help  defend  against  assaults  and  neutralise  the  French  naval  threat. 
Moreover,  in  the  interval,  Leake  stationed  his  squadron  within  Gibraltar  Bay  and  combined 
with  Hesse-Darmstadt's  forces  to  pressurise  Villadarias's  siege  works:  sailors  were  sent 
ashore  to  help  the  garrison  with  their  defences;  bombardments  were  conducted;  feint  attacks 
by  ships'  boats  against  the  enemy  camps  facilitated  garrison  sallies.  Clearly,  there  is 
considerable  evidence  to  characterise  the  capture  of  Gibraltar  as  the  product  of  a  successful 
combined  operation  undertaken  between  the  summer  and  spring  of  1704-5. 
It  might  equally  be  argued  however  that  the  action  at  Gibraltar  cannot  be  conceived  as 
a  combined  operation  in  the  traditional  manner  inasmuch  as  the  land  force  deployed  was  not 
precisely  an  army.  Despite  the  presence  of  some  regular  soldiers  and  the  Archduke's  military 
representatives,  the  force  was  comprised  mainly  of  the  marine  soldiers  which  had  been  raised 
for  sea  service  in  April  1702.  The  legislation  expressly  stated  that  these  men  were  to  serve 
aboard  naval  ships  and  they  were  ultimately  placed  under  the  direction  of  the  Lord  High 
Admiral;  certainly,  the  War  Office  had  no  bureaucratic  interest  in  these  men.  It  is  nonetheless 
essential  to  set  the  marines'  traditional  'army'  features  against  this  prevailing  Admiralty 
influence  in  their  administrative  and  command  structures.  Specifically,  the  men  were 
organised  into  standard  infantry  regiments  (indeed  Edward  Fox's  and  George  Villiers's 
marine  regiments  first  raised  in  1702  were  subsequently  translated  into  the  line  and  continued 
128  Memoires  el  Leltres  du  Marichal  de  Tessi.  ii.  147-54,186:  Tessd  au  Prince  de  Conde,  21  fdvricr,  II  avril 
1705  [NS];  BL,  Add  MSS  5437,  fos.  89-91,93-4,100-1,105-7,110-13:  Leake  to  the  Admiralty,  28  Dec. 
1704,13,27  Jan.,  24  Feb.,  3,31  Mar.  1705;  Leake  to  John  Methuen,  4  Feb.  1705;  Leake  to  Clarke,  7  Feb. 
1705;  Leake  to  Hesse,  28  Mar.  1705;  BL,  Add  MSS  5440,  f  77:  John  Methuen  to  Leake,  9  Nov.  1704. 234 
-  albeit  under  different  guises  -  into  today's  army)  129  with  two  grenadier  companies.  Perhaps 
more  significantly,  (as  Gibraltar  demonstrated)  the  marines  undertook  many  traditional 
soldierly  functions,  which  could  allow  them  to  be  considered  as  soldiers  rather  than  sailors 
which  operated  ashore.  Thus,  although  this  operation  was  not  technically  an  example  of  co- 
operation  between  the  Royal  Navy  and  the  English  Army,  the  marines  functional  ambiguity 
contributes  to  the  conclusion  that  there  was  a  sufficiently  strong  element  of  co-operation 
between  a  military  land  force  and  the  navy  to  enable  it  to  be  included. 
Insofar  as  this  is  an  appropriate  characterisation  of  a  combined  operation,  it  broadens 
its  definition.  The  operational  co-operation  was  between  forces  on  land  and  at  sea  with  the 
exact  composition  and  specific  function  of  these  forces  less  important.  With  respect  to  the 
Grand  Strategy,  the  significance  of  the  combined  operation  at  Gibraltar  was  two-fold.  It  was 
integral  to  England's  strategic  penetration  of  the  Mediterranean,  which  was  necessarily  being 
headed  up  by  the  Royal  Navy;  while  it  was  equally  important  in  furthering  the  military  cause 
of  the  Archduke  on  Spanish  mainland.  This  operational  pattern  which  emerged  to  capture 
Gibraltar  was  repeated  later  in  1705  when  the  allies  attempted  to  take  Barcelona,  the  principal 
city  of  the  symbolic  and  strategic  Spanish  province  of  Catalonia. 
Liv:  The  Capture  of  Barcelona,  and  Other  Lesser  Spanish  Coastal  Towns.  1705- 
1706. 
Although  the  popular  slogan  -  'No  Peace  Without  Spain'  -  emerged  from  a  Parliamentary 
address  presented  to  the  Queen  on  23  December  1707  as  part  of  the  Lords's  debate  on  the 
130 
progress  of  the  war  in  Spain,  it  did  not  invoke  a  new  war  strategy.  Rather,  it  was  a  public 
declaration  of  a  policy  determined  by  Portugal's  accession  to  the  Grand  Alliance  and  given 
military  expression  upon  the  Archduke's  arrival  in  the  region  in  1704.  From  then  on,  the 
conquest  of  Spain  had  remained  high  on  the  Ministry's  strategic  agenda,  either  as  an  end  in 
itself  or  as  part  of  England's  penetration  of  the  Mediterranean.  In  the  latter  respect,  the 
capture  of  substantial  coastal  ports  not  only  provided  footholds  in  Spain  for  the  Archduke  but 
129  Fox's  and  Villiers's  marine  regiments  evolved  to  form  part  of  the  current  Light  Infantry  and  Queen's 
Regiments. 
"0  The  specific  origin  of  the  phrase  was  the  passage  in  the  address:  '...  That  no  Peace  can  be  honourable  or 
safe,  for  Your  Majesty  and  Your  Allies  if  Spain,  The  West  Indies  or  any  part  of  the  Spanish  Monarchy,  be 
suffered  to  remain  under  the  Power  of  the  House  of  Bourbon...  '  -  L1,  xviii.  400.  The  House  of  Lords  spent 
much  of  the  first  session  of  the  First  Parliament  of  Great  Britain  considering  the  state  of  the  war  in  the 235 
also  bases  to  sustain  a  permanent  naval  presence.  Even  before  Gibraltar  had  been  secured, 
Admiral  Mitchell  was  again  sent  to  negotiate  with  the  Dutch  about  the  creation  of  a  Grand 
Fleet  with  troops  aboard,  which  was  to  depart  for  the  Mediterranean  in  the  coming  campaign 
year.  Agreement  was  reached  that  the  United  Provinces  would  contribute  some  20  warships 
and  2400  troops,  while  England  was  to  provide  as  half  as  much  again.  The  English 
Parliament  showed  its  commitment  to  such  a  venture  by  voting  funds  to  raise  six  new 
regiments  for  'sea  service'.  "'  The  specific  strategic  and  tactical  intent  of  this  fleet  and  the 
land  force  remained  however  undefined  until  the  spring  of  1705  when  discussions  began  in 
the  Cabinet  Council. 
Julian  Corbett  has  argued  that  the  Ministry's  ambition  for  this  Grand  Fleet  did  not 
relate  to  the  Spanish  mainland  but  was  instead  directed  towards  broadening  English  influence 
in  the  Mediterranean.  This  would  require  the  fleet  to  maintain  a  regional  sea  command  and 
protect  the  trade  routes,  and  a  contemporary  pamphlet  emphasised  the  capture  of  Minorca  to 
gain  use  of  its  superior  and  strategically  shed  Port  Mah6n  harbour.  On  this  occasion, 
however,  according  to  Corbett,  Marlborough's  advocacy  of  an  attack  against  the  principal 
southern  naval  base  of  Toulon  formed  the  focus  of  deliberations  on  possible  combined 
operations  for  the  Grand  Fleet.  132  Corbett's  argument  implies  that  both  the  Ministry  and 
Marlborough,  in  particular,  were  indifferent  towards  the  conquest  of  Spain  and  that  it  was  not 
conceived  of  as  part  of  a  wider  Mediterranean  theatre.  At  a  strategic  and  political  level, 
however,  Marlborough,  along  with  Godolphin,  had  first  given  expression  to  the  'No  Peace 
Without  Spain'  resolve  when  they  sought  to  undermine  French  peace  overtures  in  the  late 
summer  of  1705;  while  previous  operational  priorities  had  demonstrated  an  appreciation  of 
the  naval  and  military  logistical  advantages  that  might  accrue  from  captured  enemy  ports  on 
the  Spanish  coast  or  nearby  island  dependencies.  133  More  specifically,  an  attack  on  Toulon 
might  fulfil  the  diversionary  purpose  of  a  descent  as  articulated  by  Littleton's  1690s 
Spanish  theatre  -  see  LI,  xviii.  359,397400  and  HMC,  Ifouse  oftords  MSS  NS,  vii.  xxix-xxxv. 
131  PRO,  ADM  1/4090,  fos.  14-15:  Hedges  to  'Iffis]  R[oyal]  H[ighness,  Prince  George'],  30  Nov.  1704;  PRO, 
SP  41/3,  f.  38:  St  John  to  Hedges,  3  Apr.  1705;  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  pp.  160-1. 
132  Corbett,  England  in  the  Mediterranean,  ii.  546-8;  Anon,,  4n  Inquiry  into  the  Causes  of  Our  Naval 
Miscarriages  (2  rid  edn,  London,  1707),  pp.  iii-v. 
133  The  Correspondence  1701-1711  ofJohn  Churchill,  nos.  256,323,333,  pp.  160,202-3,208-9: 
Marlborough  to  Heinsius,  9  Jan.,  5  Sept.  1705  [NS];  Heinsius  to  Marlborough,  15  ao0t  1705  [NS];  Yhe 
Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  i,  nos.  489,493,  pp.  473,478-9:  Marlborough  to  Godolphin,  8 
Aug.  1705;  Godolphin  to  Marlborough,  18  Aug.  1705;  Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen  Anne,  ii.  734. 236 
pamphlets  since  it  would  ease  the  French  military  pressure  in  Spain.  ""  Thus,  when  the 
Cabinet  Council  met  to  consider  three  target  options  in  February,  the  Ministry's  ambition  and 
Marlborough's  preference  for  Toulon  suggested  that  both  possessed  a  strategic  vision  with  a 
broader  tactical  bottom  than  characterised  by  Corbett. 
The  Admiralty  rejected  an  assault  against  Toulon  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  wholly 
contingent  on  easterly  winds.  The  Board  also  managed  to  get  the  second  option  -  Barcelona 
-  overruled  on  the  basis  that  its  defensive  fortifications  were  too  strong  and  that  the 
retribution  following  the  allies'  previous  landing  in  May  1704  would  have  had  a  demoralising 
impact  upon  its  inhabitants.  This  left  Cddiz,  which  was  thought  to  be  poorly  defended  and 
ready  to  declare  for  the  Archduke;  thus  the  Admiralty  was  to  prepare  a  memorandum  upon 
targeting  it.  Any  self-congratulation  by  the  Admiralty  on  its  influence  over  the  objectives  of  a 
joint  army-navy  operation  would  have  been  premature,  however.  A  detailed  report  of  the 
Cabinet  Council  meeting  soon  reached  the  French  thereby  enabling  Philip  V  to  begin 
defensive  preparations  at  Cddiz.  When  London  leamt  of  this  leak,  the  Ministry  was  forced 
into  a  rethink.  135 
This  process  began  at  the  end  of  Marchjust  after  the  appointment  of  Charles 
Mordaunt,  P  Earl  of  Peterborough  as  C.  -in-C.  of  the  land  forces  to  be  embarked  aboard  the 
fleet,  which  was  followed  in  May  by  his  commission  to  bejoint  Admiral  with  Sir  Cloudesley 
Shovell.  136  Although  Peterborough  would  still  have  to  work  through  a  Council  of  War,  this 
dual  commission  undoubtedly  placed  him  in  the  senior  command  position  with  responsibility 
for  both  the  naval  and  army  components.  His  appointment  attracted  considerable  surprise 
and  subsequent  critical  comment  for  not  only  was  Peterborough's  military  experience  limited, 
he  possessed  an  uneven  temperament  that  was  thought  to  be  unsuitable  for  command.  Only 
two  years  previously  he  had  stepped  back  from  both  the  Governorship  of  Jamaica  and 
command  of  a  expeditionary  force  to  the  West  Indies,  when  he  considered  that  preparations 
for  the  latter  were  proceeding  in  a  slow  and  haphazard  manner.  In  March  1705  however,  two 
factors  were  in  Peterborough's  favour.  Firstly,  Marlborough  did  not  veto  his  appointment 
134  See  Chapter  1,  Section  IIIJ,  pp.  139,154,  for  a  discussion  of  Littleton's  pamphlets. 
135  Mimoires  et  Lettres  du  Marichal  de  Tessi.  ii.  169-74:  'Memoire  sur  les  project  des  ennemis,  et  relation 
d'un  homme  bien  informe  et  bien  intentionne  quej'entretiens  aupres  de  milord  Gallowai,  n.  d.;  Ilugill,  No 
peace  Without  Spain,  pp.  149-50. 
13"  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  vii.  361:  Copy  of  a  warrant  from  the  Queen  to  Charles,  E.  Peterborough, 
31  Mar.  1705. 237 
despite  -  as  he  explained  to  his  wife  (who  reportedly  liked  and  corresponded  with 
Peterborough,  albeit  infrequently)  -  not  expecting  much  of  the  Earl.  Secondly, 
Peterborough's  aristocratic  lineage  and  political  experience  embodied  the  essential  position  of 
rank  for  working  with  Archduke's  'Court'.  137  Indeed,  it  is  surprising,  given  the  subsequent 
emphasis  and  form  of  Peterborough's  operational  Instructions,  that  the  importance  of  this 
latter  criteria  has  been  neglected. 
Throughout  April  and  early  May  the  Cabinet  Council,  along  with  both  Peterborough 
and  invariably  Shovell,  drafted  these  Instructions.  The  perfunctory  nature  of  Harley's 
minutes  of  these  meetings,  which  recorded  the  bureaucratic  process  rather  than  revealed  the 
discussion,  meant  that  it  was  not  until  the  Instructions  were  first  issued  on  I  May,  and  then 
added  to  on  2  and  4  May,  before  the  debate  over  objectives  was  glimpsed.  Given  that 
concerns  over  the  increased  defences  at  Cadiz  had  caused  the  rethink,  it  was  noteworthy  that 
this  port  remained  a  listed  target.  Along  with  Barcelona,  the  Instructions  identified  Cadiz  as  a 
town  whose  capture  was  essential  for  the  Archduke's  conquest  of  Spain.  However,  as  to 
which  to  assault  first,  the  Cabinet  Council's  only  recommendation  was  that  the  in-theatre 
Council  of  War  leave  any  attempt  on  Cadiz  until  the  fleet's  return  from  the  Catalan  coast.  139 
Undoubtedly,  this  would  have  been  thought  of  as  prescriptive  and  certainly  the  Cabinet 
Council  would  not  have  expected  to  be  ignored,  but  nonetheless,  the  measure  of  strategic 
command  devolved  to  the  Council  of  War  on  this  occasion  was  noteworthy.  Operational 
Instructions  had  been  in  the  past  most  strictly  drafted  and,  although  the  Council  of  War 
usually  possessed  immediate  tactical  control,  it  was  rare  for  this  body  to  be  able  to  exercise 
strategic  discretion  on  the  initial  operational  objectives. 
Two  explanations  are  possible.  Firstly,  and  the  reason  which  brings  the  appointment 
of  the  aristocratic  Peterborough  into  focus,  London  recognised  that  the  war  in  Spain  since 
137  Churchill,  Marlborough,  iii.  52-3;  Francis,  The  First  Peninsula  War,  pp.  174-3;  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without 
Spain,  pp.  156-9;  Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen  Anne,  ii.  79-80,  all  comment  upon  Peterborough's 
character  and  give  explanations  for  his  appointment;  as  do  his  principal  biographers:  W.  Stebbing, 
Peterborough  (London,  1890),  pp.  47-8;  F.  S.  Russell,  The  Earl  ofPeterborough  andMonmouth  (London, 
1887),  i.  166-7;,  4  Memoir  of  Charles  Mordaunt  Earl  ofPeterborough  andMonmouth:  With  Selectionsfrom 
his  Correspondence,  ed.  G.  D.  Warburton  (London,  1853),  i.  14,130-2;  Lord  Ribblesdale,  'Lord 
Peterborough',  FR  xxxviii  NS  (July-Dec.,  1885),  206-7.  For  details  on  Peterborough's  colonial  appointment 
in  1703,  see  Chapter  2,  Section  ll.  ii,  pp.  310-11. 
133  BL,  Add  MSS  70335,  unf:  Council  Minutes,  9,10,13,17,20,22,24,27,28  Apr.,  1,6,8  May  1705; 
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1703  had  been  principally  one  of  conquest  on  behalf  of  a  man  whom  they  had  already 
crowned  'King'  and  who  was  now  in-theatre  with  his  own  'Court'.  Etiquette  and  military 
effectiveness  combined  to  direct  that  the  operational  Instructions  should  allow  for  some  of 
the  strategic  and  tactical  detail  of  the  whole  war  effort  in  Spain  to  be  generated  by  the 
Archduke;  or,  at  least,  provide  for  the  Council  of  War's  operational  decisions  to  be  moulded 
by  the  in-theatre  circumstances  of  the  war.  It  was  of  course  customary  for  Councils  to  take 
account  of  such  immediate  theatre  conditions  when  deliberating  upon  courses  of  action  but, 
on  this  occasion,  there  did  seem  to  be  a  qualitative  difference  in  the  Council's  discretion  over 
individual  targets.  The  second,  and  probably  more  compelling  explanation,  was  that  the 
Ministry  kept  the  Instructions  regarding  the  operation  against  Spain  vague  because  a 
combined  action  against  Toulon,  previously  advocated  by  Marlborough,  was  in  fact  to  be 
secretly  vouchsafed  to  both  Peterborough  and  Shovell  as  the  principal  objective.  These  secret 
Instructions,  issued  on  7  May,  explained  the  recent  assurance  by  the  Comte  de  Briangon 
(chief  minister  of  the  Duke  of  Savoy,  Victor  Amadeus  11,  who  had  in  the  autumn  of  1703 
broken  with  Louis  to  join  the  Grand  Alliance)  139  that  the  Duke  now  yielded  to  the  pressure  to 
co-operate  in  an  attack  against  Toulon,  and  that  the  start  of  the  combined  action  awaited  only 
confirmation  from  the  English  Envoy  at  Turin,  Richard  Hill.  The  previously  issued  open 
instructions  had  only  recommended  succouring  the  Savoyard  Duke  if  opportunity  arose  and 
this  loose  prescription,  along  with,  more  particularly,  those  for  the  operations  against  Spain, 
were  to  provide  cover  for  the  Toulon  operation.  140 
Unlike  the  preparations  for  the  projected  Anglo-Dutch  expedition  to  the  Caribbean  in 
1703,  Peterborough  was  not  really  vexed  by  delay  or  a  lack  of  momentum  -  though  this  did 
not  prevent  his  occasional  complaint.  While  drafting  the  Instructions,  the  Cabinet  Council 
had  kept  a  close  oversight  on  those  authorities  responsible  for  bringing  both  the  land  and  sea 
elements  of  Peterborough's  force  together.  "'  The  Admiralty  and  the  Secretary  of  State's 
correspondence  certainly  demonstrated  an  urgency  to  get  the  warships  and  auxiliary  vessels 
Admiralls  of  Our  Fleet',  1,2,4  May  1705. 
119  G.  Symcox,  VictorAmadeus  M  Absolutism  in  the  SavoyardState  167S-1730  (London,  1983),  pp.  138-43. 
140  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  vii.  363-4:  Copy  of  instructions  to  Charles,  E.  Peterborough  and  Sir 
Cloudesley  Shovell,  7  May  1705;  PRO,  SP  104/207,  pp.  1-14,18-20:  'Instructions  for  Our  Trusty  and  Right 
Welbeloved  Cousin  and  Councillor  Charles,  Earl  of  Peterborow  and  Monmouth  and  Our  Trusty  and 
Welbeloved  Sir  Cloudesly  Shovell  Knt  Joint  Admiralls  of  Our  Fleet',  1,2,4  May  1705. 
141  PRO,  ADM  1/4090,  f0s.  183-4:  Hedges  to  the  Admiralty,  16  May  1705;  BL,  Add  MSS  70335,  unf.: 
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fitted  out  and  present  at  the  two  troop  embarkation  ports  -  Portsmouth  and  Plymouth. 
Notably  though,  attention  to  detail  was  not  sacrificed.  In  the  light  of  the  previous  year's 
experience,  when  several  ships  ran  out  of  ordnance  supplies  at  the  battle  of  Milaga 
supposedly  as  a  consequence  of  their  prior  bombardment  of  Gibraltar,  the  Admiralty  was 
particularly  attentive  to  its  negotiations  with  the  Ordnance  Office  over  all  aspects  of  gunning 
the  fleet,  including  in  particular  the  bomb  vessels.  Meanwhile,  Secretary  Hedges  contributed 
to  the  punctilious  tone  by  prompting  a  transfer  to  the  fleet  for  one  Hepburn,  a  naval  chaplain 
who  reputedly  possessed  a  solid  knowledge  of  fortification  engineering.  112 
There  was  from  the  outset  however  one  aspect  of  the  preparations  which,  if  handled 
badly,  threatened  to  undermine  any  prospect  of  the  fleet's  departure  in  good  time.  None  of 
the  six  newly  raised  regiments  for  'sea  service'  were  scheduled  to  be  embarked  aboard  the 
fleet.  Instead  three  of  these  regiments  (Luke  Lillingston's,  Owen  Wynne's,  and  Nicholas 
Leppell's)  were  to  replace  an  equivalent  number  coming  from  the  Irish  Establishment,  with 
the  other  2500  men  of  the  projected  5000  strong  expeditionary  force  to  be  provided  by  three 
previously  raised  regiments  on  the  English  Establishment.  14'  As  the  Irish  regiments  were 
currently  billeted  in  the  south  of  Ireland,  the  decision  whether  their  arrival  from  Cork  should 
be  awaited  or  whether  a  separate  convoy  to  Lisbon  should  be  organised  obviously  bore  upon 
the  sailing  of  the  main  fleet.  Moreover,  the  potential  for  delay  resulting  from  bureaucratic 
muddle  was  raised  by  the  particular  arrangements  for  the  transport  of  these  Irish  regiments. 
Whereas  responsibility  for  ensuring  that  three  English  regiments  reached  the  appropriate 
embarkation  port  lay  wholly  with  the  War  Office  and  its  marching  orders,  the  transport  of  the 
Irish  regiments  required  Secretary-at-War  St  John  to  liaise  with  both  the  Admiralty  and  its 
Transport  Board.  Merchant  vessels  had  to  be  hired  as  auxiliaries  and  complex  'Charter  Party' 
negotiations  threatened.  In  the  event,  the  reasonably  smooth  preparations  for  the  main  fleet 
continued  for  the  transport  of  the  Irish  Regiments.  144  At  the  end  of  April,  Captain  William 
142  PRO,  ADM  1/4090,  fos.  181-2:  Hedges  to  the  Admiralty,  28  Apr.  1705. 
143  PRO,  WO  4/3,  pp.  207-8,220:  St  John  to  Hedges,  10  Apr.  1705;  St  John  to  Southwell,  17  Apr.  1705.  The 
three  English  Establishment  regiments  were  Hans  Hamilton's,  James  Rivers's,  and  Richard  Elliot's;  while  the 
three  regiments  from  the  Irish  Establishment  were  John  Caulfield's,  Lord  Charlemont's,  and  Richard 
Gorges's. 
144  SP  41/3,  fos.  38,40,43,53:  St  John  to  Hedges,  3,10,20,30  Apr.  1705;  'Extract  of  Orders  Issued  about 
the  Three  Regiments  that  go  to  Sea',  20  Apr.  1705;  PRO,  WO  5113,  fos.  109,114,121  123-5,127:  Orders  to 
Colonel  Hans  Hamilton,  6,9,19,20  Apr.  1705;  Orders  to  Colonel  Roger  Elliot,  19,20  Apr.;  'Dispositions  of 
the  Three  Regiments  that  are  to  go  onboard  the  Fleet  in  England  under  the  Command  of  the  Rt.  lion.  the  Earl 240 
Jumper  of  the  Lennox,  accompanied  by  the  Grafton  and  the  Burford,  was  appointed  to 
convoy  thirteen  auxiliary  vessels  to  Cork,  which  was  reached  on  18  May.  Although  it  was 
only  five  days  later  that  the  main  fleet  began  making  its  way  down  the  Channel  from 
Portsmouth  to  collect  more  troops  at  Plymouth  before,  on  30  May,  sailing  out  into  the 
Western  Approaches,  an  early  decision  had  in  fact  been  taken  that  the  Irish  troops  would 
travel  separately  to  Lisbon  under  Jumper's  convoy,  thus  eliminating  any  impact  upon  the  main 
fleet's  timetable.  This  was  fortuitous  inasmuch  as,  although  the  regiments  were  largely  ready 
for  Jumper  to  embark  on  his  arrival  at  Cork,  he  found  them  considerably  understrength  and 
he  had  to  await  the  enforcement  of  Lord  Lieutenant  Ormonde's  augmentation  order.  Hence, 
despite  receiving  instructions  from  the  Joint  Admirals  to  proceed  on  31  May,  Jumper  was 
unable  to  leave  Cork  for  another  week  and  only  did  so  with  some  200  soldiers  short  of  full 
compliment.  145 
The  Grand  Fleet  arrived  at  Lisbon  in  separate  groups.  The  Dutch  Admiral  Allemonde 
came  up  the  Tagus  first  on  3  June  with  the  Dutch  warships  and  a  majority  of  the  auxiliary 
vessels,  to  be  followed  within  the  week  by  Peterborough  and  then  Shovell  and  Fairborne. 
Once  the  Irish  convoyjoined  them  in  late  June,  the  fleet  left  Lisbon  to  cruise  between  Cape 
Spartell  and  the  mouths  of  the  Straits  to  prevent  the  junction  of  the  French  Brest  and  Toulon 
fleets  -  an  event  which  had  been  feared  since  the  departure  from  England,  despite  Vice- 
Admiral  Sir  George  Byng's  Channel  Squadron  keeping  watch  over  Brest.  There  was 
however  little  reason  to  worry  for  the  French  had  no  intention  of  combining  a  Grand  Fleet  in 
1705.  On  the  Anglo-Dutch  fleet's  departure,  Peterborough  remained  behind  to  design  with 
the  Archduke  and  the  Portuguese  Court  the  forthcoming  operations,  and  their  discussions 
werejoined  on  3  Jyly  by  the  talismanic  commander  at  Gibraltar,  Prince  George  of  Hesse- 
Darmstadt.  A  decision  on  a  specific  target  proved  elusive,  however  and,  although  Portuguese 
vacillation  came  in  for  much  criticism  -  particularly  from  Peterborough  -  the  bigger  problem 
was  the  varied  agendas  of  the  participants.  146  Bound  by  his  secret  Instructions  of  7  May, 
of  Peterborough',  23  Apr.  1705;  Orders  to  Colonel  James  Rivers,  24  Apr.  1705;  PRO,  ADM  1/3729,  unf.: 
Atkinson  and  Colby  to  the  Admiralty,  27  Feb.,  15,27  Mar.,  20  Apr.,  8,10  May  1705;  Atkinson,  Roope,  and 
Colby  to  the  Admiralty,  1,6,  Mar.,  5,14  Apr.  1705;  Atkinson  and  Roope  to  the  Admiralty,  10  Apr.  1705. 
145  PRO,  ADM  1/3729,  unE:  Atkinson  and  Colby  to  the  Admiralty,  27  Feb.  1705;  PRO,  ADM  1/1980,  unf.: 
Jumper  to  'Honoured  Sir'  [Burchett],  27  Apr.,  5,8,18,22,31  May,  2,5,7  June  1705. 
146  PRO,  SP  42/67,  f  61:  Copy  of  a  letter  of  Sir  George  Byng,  24  June  1705;  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSir 
John  Leake,  ii.  277-9;  CFKS,  Ul  590  0135111,  pp.  1-3:  'Journal  Kept  by  Arnet  Furly  for  the  Earl  of 
Peterborough  Proceeding  in  his  Expedition  to  Spain  1705'  [hereafter  Turly's  Journal'],  10-28  June  1705 241 
Peterborough  could  not  contribute  frankly  to  the  consultations;  while  his  contributions  only 
became  more  complex  throughout  July  when  it  became  increasingly  clear  both  to  himself  and 
to  London  that  the  operation  against  Toulon  was  not  going  to  proceed.  Far  from  confirming 
Victor  Amadeus's  readiness,  the  English  Envoy,  Richard  Hill,  wrote  home  that  Briangon  had 
acted  without  the  Duke's  authority,  and  that  the  Savoyards  could  not  currently  contribute  to 
such  an  scheme.  Hill  suspected  that  Briangon's  assurances  about  the  attack  on  Toulon  might 
have  been  a  ruse  to  get  the  fleet  to  relieve  the  westerly  Savoyard  towns  of  Nice  and 
Villefiranche,  which  the  Duc  de  la  Feuillade's  army  had  occupied  in  April.  But,  in  any  event, 
the  Envoy  maintained  his  previous  candid  advice  that  the  expeditionary  force  should 
concentrate  first  on  any  important  operations  it  had  planned  for  the  Spanish  coast.  In  this 
respect,  Hesse-Darmstadt's  contribution  proved  equally  problematic  for  he  did  not,  as 
expected,  latch  on  to  the  suggestion  in  the  original  public  Instructions  of  I  May  to  attack 
Barcelona  but  had  instead,  before  coming  from  Gibraltar,  sent  the  Archduke  a  proposal  for 
landing  the  troops  in  Valencia  province  whence  they  might  march  directly  to  Madrid.  This 
left  Cadiz  from  the  Instructions's  original  suggestions  and,  apart  from  the  Dutch  envoy 
Schonenberg,  it  attracted  little  support.  147  It  became  apparent  however  that  Hesse- 
Darmstadt's  reluctance  to  attack  Barcelona  was  indexed  to  evidence  of  the  inhabitants' 
enthusiasm.  As  previously  remarked  the  Catalans  were  traditionally  ill-disposed  to  the 
ccntrism  of  the  Castilian-based  Spanish  throne,  which  they  now  associated  with  the  Bourbon, 
Philip  V;  there  were  nonetheless  fears  that  their  rebellious  ardour  might  have  been  quelled 
following  the  allies'  aborted  landing  in  1704.  The  activities  of  the  English  agent  in  Genoa, 
Mitford  Crowe,  proved  essential  in  challenging  such  perceptions.  On  his  own  suggestion, 
Crowe  -  who  had  excellent  contacts  among  the  Catalans  and  who  knew  Hesse-Darmstadt 
from  the  Prince's  time  as  Governor  of  Barcelona  -  had  been  sent  by  the  Court  under  the 
cover  of  a  trade  mission  to  Genoa  to  engage  the  Catalans  about  declaring  for  the  Archduke. 
Manipulating  his  network  of  associates  in  the  region  he  was  able,  despite  encountering  some 
PRO,  SP  104/207,  pp.  34-5:  Hedges  to  the  Joint  Admirals,  12  June  1705;  The  Byng  Papers,  ed.  B.  Tunstall 
(London,  1930),  i.  61-3,66,74-8,80-2,85:  From  Prince  George  of  Denmark,  14  Feb.,  6,11  June,  21  July 
1705;  From  Josiah  Burchett,  19  June  1705;  From  George  Clarke,  19  June  1705;  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS 
NS,  vii.  500-6:  Peterborough  to  Godolphin,  [?  July  17051. 
147  PRO,  SP  92/27  Part  i,  fos.  60-3,83-8,93-4:  Hill  to  'Sir'  [Hedges],  8,28  Apr.,  13  May  1705  [NS];  PRO,  SP 
94/73,  unf  :  Peterborough  to  Hedges,  12,28  July  1705;  RMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  vi  i.  500-6: 
Peterborough  to  Godolphin,  [?  July  1705];  Francis,  The  First  Peninsular  War,  pp.  176,178;  A.  Parnell,  7he 
War  ofthe  Succession  in  Spain  (London,  1888),  p.  IIIn.  I. 242 
initial  reluctance,  to  send  home  encouraging  reports  about  the  regional  support  for  the 
Archduke  and  the  likelihood  of  a  rebellion  against  the  Bourbon  control  in  the  event  of  an 
allied  landing;  moreover,  he  could  point  to  areas  such  as  Vich,  Urgell,  Manlleu  and  Cardona, 
where  the  local  peasantry's  armed  bands  -  the  Miqueletes  -  had  already  been  active  in 
encouraging  opposition  to  Philip.  By  mid-June,  Crowe  had  concluded  a  pact  with  the 
representatives  of  the  Catalan  rebels  which,  in  the  short  term,  afforded  them  arms, 
ammunition  and  money  in  return  for  supporting  the  Archduke  and  raising  some  6000  men  to 
aid  an  allied  landing;  while  they  also  gained  the  longer  term  commitment  that  their  traditional 
constitutional  and  cultural  privileges  would  be  upheld  if  Charles  captured  the  Spanish  throne. 
Although  the  details  of  this  pact  did  not  reach  the  expeditionary  force  until  it  was  anchored 
off  Altea  in  late  July,  Crowe  had  sent  positive  reports  through  to  Lisbon  as  the  discussions 
were  being  held  and  a  consensus  -  albeit  weak,  given  that  Peterborough  still  retained  some 
expectation  for  the  Toulon  project  -  evolved  around  operations  in  Catalonia.  148 
In  mid-July  the  participants  to  these  talks  were  back  on  board  the  fleet  and  later  that 
month,  a  Council  of  Flags  confirmed  that  a  descent  would  be  made  on  the  Catalan  coast. 
Measures  were  then  were  taken  to  augment  the  expeditionary  land  force.  Two  Dragoon 
regiments  -  Cunningham's  and  the  Royal  Regiment  -  had  already  been  embarked  from 
Portugal;  while  when  anchored  off  Gibraltar  between  20-24  July,  Elliot's  and  Catifield's 
regiments  were  exchanged  with  a  Guards  battalion,  Barrymore's,  Mountjoy's  and  Donegal's 
regiments,  and  a  detachment  of  marines  -  all  from  the  Rock's  garrison.  It  was  while  off 
Gibraltar  that  the  Archduke  landed  on  the  Spanish  mainland  to  be  received  for  the  first  time 
as  'King  of  Spain'.  149 
As  the  fleet  made  its  way  around  the  Spanish  coast,  it  halted  next  at  Altea  to  water, 
where  there  proved  to  be  considerable  local  support  for  the  Archduke,  with  many  inhabitants 
coming  directly  to  the  coastline  to  offer  their  services.  Appropriately,  Charles  capitalised  on 
this  by  settling  a  governor  ashore  and  by  drafting  a  manifesto  for  widespread  distribution.  He 
149  HMC,  House  ofLordsMSSNS,  vii.  378:  Instructions  to  Mitford  Crowe;  PRO,  SP  79/3  Part  iii  fos.  500.1, 
510,513,520-1,539,541,545,552,571:  Crowe  to  Hedges,  2,13,30  May,  7,10,12,17  June,  8  July,  5  July 
[NS]  1705;  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  pp.  161-3;  Francis,  The  First  Peninsular  War,  pp.  175-8. 
149  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  vii.  409-10:  Peterborough  and  Shovell  to  the  Admiralty,  3  Aug.  1705;  At  a 
Council  of  War  of  English  and  Dutch  Flag  Officers,  21  July  1705;  CFKS,  U1  590  0135/11,  pp.  3-6:  Turly's 
Journal',  28  June-30  July  1705;  NMM,  SOU/7,  f.  169:  'Mr  Holland's  Journal  of  the  Campaign  in  the 
Mediterranean'  [hereafter  'Holland's  Journal'];  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSirJohn  Leake,  ii.  279;  Owen,  War 
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also  made  clear  his  preference  at  the  Council  of  War,  which  convened  on  2  August,  for  a 
landing  at  Barcelona.  With  details  of  Crowe's  pact  with  the  Catalan  rebels  also  now  arriving, 
along  with  more  assurances  of  support  for  the  Archduke  in  Barcelona's  environs,  there 
seemed  a  real  prospect  -  albeit  paradoxical  -  that  Charles  might  make  the  principal  city  of  the 
fiercely  independent  anti-Castilian  province  of  Catalonia  his  power  base  for  the  capture  of  the 
Castilian-dominated  Spanish  crown.  With  further  correspondence  from  Hill  and  Hedges 
dashing  Peterborough's  hopes  for  the  secret  Instructions,  Barcelona  was  now  the  only 
realistic  target.  "O 
The  Council  on  2  August  certainly  thought  so.  It  resolved  to  press  forward  to 
Barcelona,  and  the  fleet  entered  the  town's  bay  on  II  August.  On  board  the  Britannia,  a 
Council  of  General  Officers  met,  though,  given  that  any  operational  item  on  their  agenda  - 
troop  landings,  for  example  -  would  necessarily  involve  the  navy,  it  remains  unclear  why  this 
meeting  did  not  take  the  form  of  a  combined  land  and  sea  Council.  Perhaps  it  was  assumed 
that  as  joint  Admiral,  Peterborough  could  act  as  the  naval  representative  at  meetings  of  the 
General  Officers.  On  this  occasion  the  participants  were  only  required  to  listen  to  a 
'handsome  speech"51  from  the  Archduke  regarding  the  necessity  of  landing  the  troops 
immediately.  To  this  proposal,  all  present  unanimously  agreed.  A  prevailing  easterly  causing 
a  heavy  swell  held  up  the  landing  on  the  day  of  arrival  and  the  sea  had  improved  little  the 
following  morning  as  the  soldiers  began  to  come  ashore  when,  on  exiting  the  boats,  many  had 
to  wade  through  water  at  chest  height.  Despite  some  desultory  shore  fire  upon  the  transports 
first  coming  to  anchor,  the  landing  at  Badalona,  three-quarters  of  a  league  cast  of  Barcelona 
near  the  rivers  Basoz  and  Secchia,  was  unopposed.  Moreover,  its  disciplined  execution 
caused  some  fifteen  English  and  Dutch  infantry  regiments  to  be  landed  within  five  hours;  the 
dragoons  and  horse  followed  the  next  morning.  112 
On  17  August,  the  Archduke  went  ashore  to  the  camp  which  had  been  established  at 
St  Martin.  Both  during  his  progress  there  and  inside  the  camp  he  received  a  warm  reception. 
150  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  ii.  279-80;  HMC,  House  oftords  MSS  NS,  vii.  4  10:  At  a 
Council  of  War  of  English  and  Dutch  Flag  Officers,  2  Aug.  1705;  Shovell  to  the  Admiralty,  10  Sept.  1705; 
PRO,  SP  94/73,  unf.:  Peterborough  to  Hedges,  28  July  1705;  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  pp.  169-70. 
151  CFKS,  U1590  0135111,  p.  5:  Turly's  Journal',  I  lAug.  1705. 
152  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  vii.  410:  At  a  Council  of  War  of  English  and  Dutch  Flag  Officers,  2  Aug. 
1705;  NMM,  SOU/7,  fos.  169-70:  'Holland's  Journal';  CFKS,  UI  590  0135111,  p.  5:  Turly's  Journal',  30 
July-  11  Aug.  1705;  PRO,  SP  94/73,  unf.:  'At  a  Council  of  War  consisting  of  General  Officers',  II  Aug.  1705; 
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This  however  belied  a  major  dispute  which  had  arisen  between  Charles  and  his  senior  generals 
for  on  the  previous  day  a  Council  of  land  officers  had  rejected  his  proposal  to  begin  a  siege 
against  Barcelona.  On  the  grounds  of  the  garrison's  reputed  strength  -  as  much  as  7000  men 
-  which  was  expected  to  be  enhanced  by  Madrid,  and  the  engineers'  assessment  that  the 
current  allied  position  fronted  by  marshland  was  disadvantageous  for  the  construction  of 
siege  works,  the  generals  concluded  that  a  siege  would  have  no  hope  of  success.  They  were 
also  of  the  view  that  an  army  five  times  the  size  of  the  one  encamped  at  St  Martin  would 
struggle  to  capture  Barcelona  and  these  troops  could  be  more  productively  employed  in 
helping  the  Duke  of  Savoy,  who  was  hard  pressed  in  the  Italian  theatre,  or,  as  proposed  by 
Peterborough,  in  campaigning  through  Catalonia  and  the  nearby  provinces  to  secure  their 
allegiance.  153  It  was  thought  that  a  successful  prosecution  of  the  latter  option  might  allow  the 
Archduke  to  begin  a  march  on  Madrid  in  the  spring.  Although  in  the  interval  a  Council  of 
senior  naval  officers  expressed  their  wish  to  attempt  Barcelona  on  the  basis  that  this  action 
was  the  clear  intent  of  the  Instructions,  the  General  Officers'  opposition  to  a  siege  remained 
fmn  for  a  further  two  meetings  of  their  Council  (22  and  25  August).  154 
It  is  noteworthy  that  combined  Councils  were  still  not  being  called,  and  since 
Peterborough  was  both  C.  -in-C.  and  joint  Admiral,  this  placed  a  premium  on  his  views  -a 
circumstances  which  was  to  have  a  significant  bearing  on  the  immediate  direction  of  the 
combined  operation.  Until  the  Council  of  22  August,  the  Earl  had  agreed  with  the  other 
generals  that  a  siege  was  not  practicable  but,  on  this  occasion,  he  switched  his  opinion  to 
support  the  Archduke's  position  as  set  out  in  two  letters  that  the  Council  was  then 
considering.  In  particular,  Peterborough  argued  that  Charles's  point  that  Barcelona  would 
probably  surrender  upon  a  breach  being  opened  was  valid;  and,  further,  that  the  Queen's 
regard  for  the  Archduke  should  afford  his  views  greater  deference,  especially  about  an  action 
where  there  was  some  hope  of  success.  Peterborough's  multiple  roles  -  land  commander, 
Admiral,  and  the  force's  liaison  with  the  Archduke's  'Court'  -  combined  with  his  naturally 
is'  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  ii.  282  claims  that  the  land  officers  favoured  succouring  the 
Duke  of  Savoy,  but  this  is  not  evident  from  the  Council's  minute  -  PRO,  SP  94/73,  unf.:  'At  a  Council  of  War 
consisting  of  General  Officers',  16  Aug.  1705. 
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mercurial  nature  meant  that  there  could  not  be  any  certainty  that  this  was  his  settled  opinion 
about  the  operation.  To  underline  the  point,  his  presentation  to  the  naval  Council  on  24 
August  as  to  whether  the  fleet  might  succour  an  army  campaign  ashore  after  the  eighteen 
days  of  siege  requested  by  the  Archduke  or  whether  help  could  be  given  to  the  Duke  of 
Savoy  if  the  troops  were  embarked  within  seven  days,  has  been  described  as  Prejudiced 
against  the  siege  and  thus  marking  a  return  to  his  earlier  position.  Moreover,  when  the 
Generals  softened  their  opposition  sufficiently  at  a  Council  on  26  August  to  begin 
contemplating  a  siege,  and  accordingly  asked  the  fleet  to  provide  daily  some  1500  seamen 
ashore,  Peterborough  advised  the  Flags  to  reject  the  request  and  recommended  instead 
proceeding  immediately  to  Italy.  According  to  Leake's  biographer,  the  Flags  refused 
Peterborough's  advice  and  agreed  to  provide  2500  armed  men  ashore,  though  this  number 
included  those  I  100  marines  already  at  the  St  Martin  camp.  The  minute  of  the  subsequent 
General  Officer's  Council  however  stated  that  the  fleet  had  agreed  to  release  only  900  men  of 
whichjust  300  could  work  everyday,  which  the  soldiers  considered  insufficient.  Whatever 
the  exact  number  of  men  offered  by  the  navy,  the  important  point  was  that  the  General 
Officers  returned  to  a  position  of  implacable  opposition  to  a  siege.  The  conflicting  views  of 
the  soldiers  and  the  sailors,  together  with  Peterborough's  varying  opinions,  led  in  late  August 
to  a  loss  of  all  coherence  and  momentum  in  the  operation.  155 
The  deadlock  was  broken,  probably  unintentionally,  by  a  letter  from  the  Archduke, 
who  wrote  to  Peterborough  to  affirm  once  again  his  resolution  to  make  at  least  one  attempt 
on  Barcelona.  He  also  indicated  that  he  had  favourably  considered  the  proposal  -  first  aired 
at  the  General  Officers'  Council  of  16  August  -  to  mount  a  campaign  through  the  nearby 
provinces.  Peterborough  seized  on  this  apparent  concession  and  suggested  that,  while  he 
could  not  contravene  his  orders  from  the  Queen,  if  the  Archduke  promoted  Hesse-Darmstadt 
Vicar  and  Captain-General  then  a  Council  might  be  convened  under  the  Prince's 
chairmanship.  It  could  thus  legitimately  set  aside  his  and  the  land  officers'  settled  disposition 
to  go  to  Italy,  in  favour  of  a  campaign  in  the  provinces.  Peterborough  was  of  course  being 
disingenuous,  for  his  orders  to  link  up  with  the  Duke  of  Savoy  in  Italy  were  contingent  upon 
the  Toulon  operation,  which  was  clearly  not  going  ahead.  His  Instructions  required  that  he 
155  PRO,  SP  94/73,  unf:  'At  a  Council  of  War  consisting  of  General  Officers',  22,26,28  Aug.  1705;  Martin- 
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work  through  a  Council  of  War,  but  as  noted  previously,  the  Ministry's  latitudinarian  design 
of  the  Instructions  on  this  occasion  had  afforded  the  Archduke  and  the  in-theatre  Council  of 
War  greater  discretion  over  both  strategic  and  tactical  targeting.  Hence  Peterborough  might 
easily  at  the  Archduke's  behest  have  manoeuvred  a  Council  to  alter  the  operation's  objective 
to  Catalan  countryside.  In  this  respect  it  is  noteworthy  as  Francis  points  out  that,  despite 
references  to  Peterborough  seeking  a  letter  of  indemnity,  there  remains  no  record  that  Hesse- 
Darmstadt  ever  convened  a  Council.  Thus,  although  Charles  did  appeal  separately  to  Shovell 
to  prevent  the  abandonment  of  the  Barcelona  operation,  it  would  simply  seem  that  at  the  end 
of  August  he  and  Peterborough  agreed  to  march  the  troops  first  to  Tarragona  and  then 
onwards  to  Tortosa.  As  these  were  two  small  Catalan  towns,  the  decision  was  far  short  of  a 
campaign  through  Valencia  and  Aragon  as  first  envisaged;  but  it  did  nonetheless  represent 
action.  156 
The  roles  of  Peterborough  and  Hesse-Darmstadt  over  the  three  days  following  this 
decision  to  march  forwards  to  Tarragona  has  been  subject  to  an  intense  historical  debate.  It 
might  seem  tempting  to  heed  Professor  Childs's  previous  warning  against  concentrating  upon 
an  already  over-written  historiographical  dispute.  157  On  this  occasion  however,  the  debate 
embodies  the  actual  course  of  events  and  not  simply  the  expostfacto  rationalisation  of 
operational  failure  (as  with,  for  example,  the  descent  on  Brest),  and  thus  it  merits  greater 
attention. 
The  origins  of  the  historical  controversy  lie  in  the  departure  on  2  September  of  a 
thousand-strong  detachment  of  allied  troops  in  the  direction  of  Tarragona  but  with  the  secret 
intention  instead  of  swinging  round  in  an  arc  to  attack  the  Montjuich  fortress,  which 
commanded  Barcelona  from  the  south-westerly  heights  overlooking  the  town.  There  was 
however  no  consensus  amongst  the  sources  as  to  whether  Peterborough  or  Hesse-Darmstadt 
was  responsible  for  the  clandestine  plan  and,  as  will  be  seen,  the  subsequent  success  in 
capturing  Barcelona  gave  this  debate  an  added  edge.  In  the  early  1930s,  G.  M.  Trevelyan 
seemed  to  resolve  the  question  in  the  Earl's  favour  by  drawing  fully  upon  the  journal  of  the 
156  CFKS,  U1590  0135/11,  p.  9:  Turly's  Journal',  30-1  Aug.  1705;  HMC,  llouseofLordsAfSSNSvii.  425: 
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senior  allied  artillery  officer  present,  Colonel  John  Richards.  158  Hitherto,  the  value  and 
credibility  of  other  contemporary  accounts  -  such  as  those  by  Captain  George  Carleton, 
Peterborough's  secretary  Arent  Furly,  and  his  physician  Dr  John  Freind"9  -  which  believed 
Peterborough  to  be  wholly  responsible  for  the  attack  had  been  successfully  undermined  as 
hagiography.  160  This  in  turn  gave  rise  to  histories  about  the  Spanish  Succession  War  like 
Colonel  Parnell's,  which  was  irnmoderate  in  its  criticism  of  Peterborough  and  considered 
Hesse-Darmstadt  to  be  the  sole  architect  of  the  Montjuich  attack.  161 
TrevelYan  argued,  however,  that  Colonel  Richards's  testimony  was  of  greater  weight 
due  to  his  reliable  reputation  -  illustrated  by  his  extant  letters  and  chronicles  covering  his  five 
year  involvement  on  the  Peninsula  -  and  also  by  his  presence  at  Peterborough's  side  during 
the  relevant  period  of  time.  His  eyewitness  account  is  that  intelligence  received  on  2 
September  indicated  that  Montjuich  was  poorly  defended,  and  that  this  prompted 
Peterborough  to  propose  a  meeting  with  Hess-Darmstadt  at  which  it  was  resolved  to  attack 
the  fortress.  This  seemed  to  confirm  the  opinion  of  Carleton  and  others  that  the  attack  was 
Peterborough's  idea.  162  Historical  instinct  might  agree,  but  Trevelyan's  argument  ultimately 
rested  on  implication:  Peterborough  was  in  receipt  of  the  intelligence  and  arranged  the 
meeting  therefore  he  must  have  put  the  proposal.  In  his  journal,  Richards  did  not  explicitly 
record  that  the  Earl  sought  the  meeting  to  propose  the  attack  and  also  that,  despite  being 
present,  he  did  not  record  what  was  said  at  the  conference.  Thus  the  conclusion  that  the 
Prince  suggested  the  attack  during  the  course  of  their  discussion  could  be  equally  valid.  A.  D. 
Francis  draws  upon  the  work  of  the  contemporary  Spanish  historians,  N.  Fcliu  de  la  Pena  and 
Franciso  de  Castellvf,  163  to  show  that  it  was  plausible  that  the  deserters  with  the  intelligence 
'53  G.  M.  Trcvelyan,  'Peterborough  and  Barcelona,  1705',  CHJ  iii  (1931),  253-9.  On  p.  254,  Trevelyan  noted 
that  Professor  John  Knox  Laughton's  entry  on  Peterborough  in  the  DNB,  xiii  (London,  1909),  843, 
foreshadowed  -albeit  bricfly  -  much  of  the  argument  in  his  article.  Two  copies  of  Richards's  journal  -  'A 
Memorial  of  the  Expedition  to  Barcelona  anno  1705'  [hereafler  'Barcelona  Memorial,  1705']  -  can  be  found 
in  BL,  Stowe  471,  pp.  1-10  &  11-19  but  the  first  copy  seems  incomplete  and  thus  I  have  used  the  second 
longer  copy  at  pp.  11-19.  For  biographical  information  on  John  Richards  see  Chapter  1,  Section  ll.  vi,  p.  126 
n.  194. 
15'  Memoirs  of  Captain  Carleton,  ed.  C.  H.  Hartmann  (London,  1929);  CFKS,  U1590  0135/11,  pp.  1.59: 
'Furly's  Journal';  Freind,  An  Account  ofthe  Earl  ofPeterborough's  Conduct  in  Spain. 
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believed  that,  on  occasion,  Richards  wrote  his  dates  wrongly. 
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about  Montjuich  went  first  to  Hesse-Darmstadt  who  informed  the  Archduke.  Then,  on  31 
August,  Hesse-Darmstadt  and  the  Archduke  convened  a  meeting  with  Peterborough  and 
Shovell  to  discuss  this  news,  though  ultimately  arriving  to  no  firm  resolutions.  As  Richards 
was  not  present  at  this  meeting,  Peterborough  was  therefore  able  on  2  September  to  create 
the  impression  that  not  only  was  the  intelligence  he  then  described  was  fresh  but  also  -  by 
calling  a  meeting  with  Hesse-Darmstadt  -  that  he  had  proposals  based  upon  it.  With  no  exact 
record  of  either  meeting,  Peterborough  and  Hesse-Darmstadt  could  have  returned  on  2 
September  to  issues  previously  discussed,  however  obliquely.  Francis  concludes  this  scenario 
which  posits  Hesse-Darmstadt  as  the  originator  of  the  Montjuich  attack  by  pointing  to  the 
lack  of  surprise  in  the  Archduke's  subsequent  good  luck  note  (issued  after  the  attack  had 
been  'revealed'  to  him)  and  also  by  mentioning  that  Shovell  ordered  a  landing  of  men  and 
materials  below  the  fortress  without  first  seeking  permission.  '  64 
This  outline  does  rather  improbably  require  Hesse-Darmstadt  to  have  shown 
uncharacteristic  magnanimity  towards  Peterborough  but  nonetheless  the  Prince  perhaps 
thought  that  his  conduct  during  the  attack  would  make  it  clear  that  he  was  the  initiator; 
certainly  some  of  the  troops  were  of  this  view.  "'  However,  the  Prince's  leadership  at 
Montjuich,  as  long  as  it  lasted,  was  not  unblemished.  166  When  the  detachment  swept  east 
away  from  Tarragona  towards  the  fortress  it  got  temporarily  lost  and,  although  the  local 
guides  were  immediately  responsible  for  this  blunder,  Hesse-Darmstadt's  knowledge  of  the 
area  gained  during  his  time  as  Barcelona's  Governor  in  the  1690s  should  have  helped  prevent 
such  an  error.  In  the  short  term,  this  diversion  meant  that  the  troops  were  late  in  arriving  on 
the  hill  slopes  upon  which  Montjuich  stood,  and  with  the  passing  of  the  night,  the  element  of 
Ifistoricas,  eds  J.  M.  Mundet  i  Gifre  &  J.  M.  Alsina  Roca  (2  vols,  Madrid,  reprintý  1997). 
164  Francis,  The  First  Peninsular  War,  pp.  187-8. 
165  A  Royal  Dragoon  in  the  Spanish  Succession  War.  A  Contemporary  Narrative,  ed.  C.  T.  Atkinson  (London, 
1938),  p.  14. 
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surprise  was  lost.  The  predominately  Neapolitan  garrison  commanded  by  Lieutenant-General 
de  Carracioli  spied  the  allies'  arrival  and  began  to  fire  upon  them.  Although  few  were  killed, 
Barcelona  was  loudly  notified  of  the  impeding  attack  thereby  enabling  Governor  de  Velasco 
to  organise  reinforcements.  At  this  point  however  -  probably  in  an  attempt  to  gain  cover  -  the 
grenadier  commander,  Colonel  Southwell,  launched  his  vanguard  detachment  into 
Montjuich's  covered  way  in  which  the  troops  fortuitously  found  a  good  portion  of  the 
garrison  encamped.  The  grenadiers  swiftly  expelled  the  enemy  from  their  tents  and  the  ditch. 
whereupon  they  fled  over  the  fortress's  incomplete  outer-works  and  into  the  small  four 
bastion  citadel;  and,  although  the  allied  ladders  proved  insufficiently  tall  for  the  outer  works, 
this  action  by  Southwell's  grenadiers  had  rescued  a  very  uncertain  start  in  time  for  the  arrival 
of  Peterborough  and  Hesse-Darmstadt  on  the  hillside. 
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Fig.  16:  The  Attack  on  Fort  Mont.  juich  and  Barcclona. 
Their  assessment  of  the  position  moved  Peterborough  to  retrace  his  steps  to  bring  Lip 
the  I  300-strong  force  under  Brigadier  Stanhope,  which  had  been  held  in  reserve  at  The 250 
Covered  Cross,  a  mile  from  Mon1juich;  meanwhile,  Hesse-Darmstadt  was  to  lead  a 
detachment  of  troops  to  cut  the  communication  between  the  fortress  and  Barcelona.  Some 
historians  judged  his  objective  to  be  the  capture  of  the  small  St  Betram  outwork  which  stood 
mid-way  on  the  coastal  path  from  the  town.  If  this  was  correct,  Hesse-Darmstadt  did  not  get 
near  it  for,  as  a  result  either  of  losing  his  way  or  of  consciously  taking  a  prodigious  gamble, 
he  led  his  men  too  near  to  the  principal  gate  and  wall  of  the  citadel  whereupon  a  Neapolitan 
bullet  struck  the  Prince's  right  thigh.  With  his  femoral  artery  severed,  the  Prince  quickly  bled 
to  death.  The  troops  were  disordered  by  this  dramatic  loss  of  their  charismatic  leader  and 
Lord  Charlemont,  who  as  Lieutenant-General  was  now  the  senior  officer,  coped  poorly  with 
the  command  responsibilities  that  fell  upon  him.  He  was  vacillating  between  pressing  on  or 
retreating  when,  according  to  certain  reports,  the  garrison  tricked  the  allied  troops  into  an 
ambush  by  crying  out  Viva  Carlos  Tercerco  and  seeming  to  lay  down  their  arms,  to  then  only 
discharge  a  thunderous  fire  when  Colonel  Allan  approached  with  a  group  of  some  200 
soldiers  to  receive  the  surrender.  Either  convinced  that  retreat  was  now  necessary  or  simply 
overwhelmed  by  the  troops'  alarm,  Charlemont  did  not  attempt  to  stop  the  men  as  they  began 
a  chaotic  descent  away  from  the  outer  works.  En  route  to  Stanhope,  Peterborough  heard  the 
firing,  and  upon  receiving  some  news  of  the  events  on  the  hilltop,  he  turned  back.  The  scale 
and  ill  disciplined  nature  of  the  retreat  soon  became  apparent  and  it  was  then  that  his  quixotic 
character  served  him  well  as  he  fell  into  the  'Horriblest  Passion  9  167  and,  with  half-pike  aloft, 
single-handedly  exhorted  the  soldiers  back  uphill  to  reclaim  the  outer  works. 
Although  still  strongly  placed  inside  Mon1juich's  citadel  the  Neapolitan  defenders 
were  becoming  isolated.  Reinforcements  sent  out  by  Velasco  returned  to  the  city  afler  their 
commander  assumed  wrongly  -  following  a  conversation  with  the  captured  Captain  Allan  - 
that  Peterborough  had  his  whole  force  at  Montjuich.  Meanwhile,  the  local  Miquelets 
managed  to  sever  the  fortress's  line  of  communication  by  taking  St  Betram.  The  advantage 
was  thus  increasingly  with  Peterborough  and,  although  Captain  Cavendish's  eight-vessel 
naval  detachment  carrying  the  additional  men  and  supplies  had  been  delayed  by  bad  weather, 
Richards  returned  quickly  to  the  Archduke's  camp  to  bring  up  some  artillery  pieces,  including 
two  seven  inch  mortars.  As  these  began  to  play  upon  the  citadel's  wall,  Cavendish  brought 
his  flotilla  to  anchor  opposite  the  fortress,  and  on  4  September  began  unloading  the  heavier 
"'  BL,  Stowe  471,  p.  17:  'Barcelona  Memorial,  1705'. 251 
naval  ordnance,  which  sailors  and  soldiers  were  to  haul  to  the  top  of  hill.  It  was  anticipated 
that  these  would  be  primarily  required  for  besieging  of  Barcelona,  though  it  was  only  luck 
which  allowed  Montjuich  to  be  reduced  after  two  days  of  mortar  fire.  On  6  September,  a 
shell  providentially  landed  in  the  citadel's  magazine  causing  a  massive  explosion  which  killed 
Carraccioli  and  ruptured  one  of  the  walls.  Isolated,  without  their  commandant,  and 
vulnerable  to  an  assault  through  the  breach  in  the  damaged  wall,  the  garrison  surrendered  .1 
68 
In  possession  of  the  strategic  height  overlooking  the  town,  Peterborough  pressed 
forward  to  besiege  Barcelona.  Shovell  had,  upon  Peterborough's  prior  request,  already 
agreed  the  naval  contribution  with  his  senior  colleagues  at  a  Council  on  4  September.  This 
endorsed  their  previous  commitment  of  27  August  to  provide  over  50  guns  with  crews 
(thought  to  amount  to  about  600  men)  and  some  2500  armed  sailors  to  help  dig  trenches  and 
construct  siege  batteries;  in  addition  the  Dutch  agreed  to  provide  600  armed  men  from  their 
vessels.  Also  upon  Peterborough's  request,  the  naval  Flags  detached  a  small  squadron  under 
Fairborne  close  inshore  to  bombard  the  town.  Although  its  role  was  not  as  significant  as  that 
of  Byng's  detachment  at  Gibraltar  inasmuch  as  the  warships  discharged  no  broadsides,  the 
shells  from  its  bomb  vessels  effectively  maintained  pressure  upon  the  city  between  the  capture 
of  Montjuich  and  the  commencement  of  fire  from  the  largest  land  battery  on  17  September. 
This  was  positioned  just  400  yards  from  the  curtain  of  Barcelona's  new  town  near  to  the  St 
Antonio  Gate  and,  according  to  most  accounts,  both  its  erection  and  that  of  the  smaller 
batteries  which  opened  a  week  earlier,  had  involved  soldiers  and  sailors  in  an  unprecedented 
degree  of  logistical  co-operation.  There  was  no  simple  route  up  from  the  shore  south  of 
MontJuich  where  the  naval  ordnance  was  landed.  The  carpenters  had  to  adapt  the  naval 
carriages  for  transport  overland;  while  Captain  Littleton  of  the  Cambridge  apparently 
163  The  exact  progress  of  the  early  stages  of  the  attack  on  Montjuich  is  unclear.  Many  of  the  primary  sources 
and  secondary  authorities  -  CFKS,  U1590  0135111,  p.  11:  Turly's  Journal';  A  Royal  Dragoon  in  the  Spanish 
Succession  War,  p.  14;  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  p.  183;  and  Francis,  7he  First  Peninsular  War,  p. 
188,  for  example  -  elide  the  details.  Others,  such  as  Memoirs  of  Captain  Carleton,  pp.  91-2  and  Dickinson, 
'Peterborough  and  the  Capture  of  Barcelona,  1705',  p.  711,  suggest  that  the  detachment  largely  aff  ived  as  an 
unit  which  Peterborough  disposed  for  a  three  pronged  attack  upon  the  morning  light.  Richards,  however,  in 
BL,  Stowe  471,  p.  16:  'Barcelona  Memorial,  1705'  was  clear  that  Southwell's  grenadiers  arrived  first  to 
engage  the  Neapolitans  in  the  covered  way,  and,  although  as  Trevelyan  pointed  out  in  'Peterborough  and 
Barcelona,  1705',  p.  259  there  are  differences  in  detail  between  Richards's  account  in  his  'Memorial'  and  his 
'Diary'  in  BL,  Stowe  467:  'Diary  of  J.  Richards  1704-1705',  1  have  relied  on  his  'Memorial'  for  it  arguably 
provides  the  fuller  account  and  relates  the  grenadiers  in  a  forward  assault  role,  which  is  consonant  with  recent 
historical  experience.  My  approach  is  the  same  as  Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen  Anne,  ii.  87,  but  he  gave 
no  explanation  for  relying  on  this  piece  of  evidence  more  than  the  other. 252 
foreshadowed  Captain  Hoste's  scientific  skills  a  hundred  years  later  by  reputedly  devising  a 
human  harness  to  facilitate  the  hauling  of  the  guns.  169  Service  integration  was  not  just 
restricted  to  shared  material  and  logistics,  however.  With  the  ships'  gun  crews  manning  the 
ordnance  ashore,  three  junior  Captains  and  six  Lieutenants  were  landed  on  II  September  to 
work  a  command  rota.  Richards  was  one  of  the  few  to  grumble  about  this  combined 
endeavour  on  land  and  he  formed  a  poor  view  of  the  sailors'  work  ethic.  Hisdismissive 
opinion  was  however  influenced  by  his  disapproval  of  Peterborough's  retention  of  the 
principal  army  camp  at  the  distant  St  Martin,  to  which  he  had  to  send  for  the  land  train's 
materials,  and  by  the  fact  that  the  demands  on  his  time  forced  him  to  devolve  much  of  the 
immediate  oversight  of  the  siege  to  Colonel  Petit. 
The  siege  quickly  fell  into  an  unremarkable  bombardment  pattern  as  the  besiegers 
sought  the  necessary  breach  prior  to  launching  an  assault.  As  at  Montjuich,  the  advantage 
seemed  to  be  with  the  allies,  for  not  only  did  they  have  open  sea  based  supply  line  and 
additional  naval  bombardment,  there  was  also  no  immediate  prospect  of  a  Franco-Spanish 
relief  army  to  threaten  the  siege  works.  Moreover,  declarations  of  support  for  the  Archduke 
were  now  belatedly  being  made  in  the  principal  Catalonian  towns  and  villages  surrounding 
Barcelona.  A  number  also  came  through  from  the  neighbouring  provinces  of  Valencia  and 
Aragon.  Admittedly,  in  most  cases  these  declarations  were  not  spontaneous,  since  a  notable 
villager  or a  band  of  Miquelets  was  usually  required  to  galvanise  the  community,  while  at 
Tarragona,  it  was  fire  from  a  small  naval  flotilla  commanded  by  Cavendish  which  proved 
decisive.  They  were  nonetheless  a  psychological  boost  to  the  Archduke's  cause  and  more 
importantly  isolated  Barcelona  as  a  Bourbon  enclave  within  the  region  thereby  offering,  if  the 
siege  was  successful,  the  prospect  of  a  secure  Catalan  base  from  which  to  effect  the  conquest 
of  the  rest  of  Spain. 
Possession  of  these  advantages  did  not  mean  that  the  progress  of  the  siege  was 
without  difficulties.  Peterborough  quickly  deemed  his  batteries  to  be  of  insufficient  scale  and 
low  on  resources,  while  he  was  also  troubled  by  a  shortage  of  funds  for  the  land  force's 
subsistence.  Once  again,  the  navy  was  pressed  to  help.  Following  a  personal  visit  by 
Peterborough  to  Shovel],  the  Council  of  Flags  agreed  on  17  September  to  release  the 
169  M.  Duffy,  '"Science  and  Labour".  The  Naval  Contribution  to  Operations  Ashore  in  the  Great  Wars  with 
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seamen's  short  allowance  money  and  a  substantial  proportion  of  the  fleet's  contingency  fund 
to  total  40  000  dollars  for  the  army's  living.  Furthermore,  subsequent  Councils  over  a  four 
day  period  from  19  September  sanctioned  the  landing  of  14  more  guns  and  the  provision  of 
ordnance  supplies  which  would  reduce  the  English  ships  to  a  minimum  30  rounds  apiece  for 
their  18  and  24  pounders;  and,  although  the  ratio  established  for  the  respective  operational 
contributions  by  England  and  the  United  Provinces  meant  that  the  Dutch  contribution  had  not 
yet  brought  their  ships'  guns  to  that  level,  they  agreed  to  supply  more  shot  and  powder  if 
required.  The  totals  of  powder  and  shot  already  provided  for  the  18  and  24  pounders  ashore 
had  informed  this  decision  and  the  minute  of  the  meeting  at  which  it  was  discussed  (22 
September)  betrayed  just  the  vaguest  sense  of  apprehension  amongst  the  Flags  that  this  might 
not  prove  sufficient.  "O 
Their  concerns  would  have  been  eased  by  the  events  of  the  night  following  this  last 
meeting.  A  breach  had  just  recently  been  opened  between  the  St  Antonio  Gate  bastion  and 
the  St  Pauls  demi-lune  to  the  east,  against  which  Peterborough  was  to  dispose  his  troops 
(albeit  that  the  majority  were  still  some  distance  away  at  the  St  Martin  camp)  for  an  assault. 
First  though,  in  accordance  with  the  contemporary  conventions,  a  summons  was  sent  to 
Velasco.  Although  historians  agree  that  the  Governor  resolved  to  surrender,  there  is 
disagreement  on  the  timing  of  his  decision.  One  claim  was  that  the  Governor  rejected  the 
summons  in  the  first  instance  and  attempted  to  shore  up  the  breach  with  mined  earthworks 
only  for  this  gambit  to  fail  when  accurate  fire  from  the  allied  battery  exploded  the  mines.  "' 
Another  is  that  Velasco  sought  a  four  day  respite  to  make  up  his  mind  about  surrender.  A 
third  possibility  is  that  his  decision  was  immediate.  172  It  is  difficult  to  locate  all  these  various 
explanations  in  the  primary  sources;  but  on  the  basis  that  Stanhope  and  the  Conde  de  Riberia 
were  exchanged  as  hostages  for  the  duration  of  the  negotiations  on  23  September,  any  delay 
over  Velasco's  acceptance  of  the  summons  could  really  only  have  been  a  matter  of  hours. 
The  negotiations  about  terms  however  lasted  much  longer.  Velasco  sought  a  settlement 
similar  to  that  offered  by  the  French  in  the  Nine  Years  War,  vouchsafing  him  privileges 
(London,  2000),  pp.  47-9. 
170  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  vii.  420-1:  At  a  Council  of  English  and  Dutch  flag  Officers,  22  Sept. 
1705. 
171  Dickinson,  'Peterborough  and  the  Capture  of  Barcelona  1705',  p.  712. 
172  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  p.  189;  Francis,  The  First  Peninsula  War,  p.  190;  Parnell,  The  Mar  ofthe 
Succession  in  Spain,  p.  13  6. 254 
beyond  those  commensurate  with  his  present  military  position.  Desiring  a  quick  resolution, 
Peterborough  was  reportedly  sympathetic,  but  the  Archduke's  advisor,  Lichtenstein,  strongly 
disagreed  and  the  two  men  clashed  over  the  conditions  to  be  imposed  upon  the  French.  Even 
when  agreement  on  the  49  Articles  was  reached  on  28  September,  the  siege  was  not  resolved 
smoothly.  Under  the  agreement,  nearly  a  week  was  to  pass  before  Velasco,  his  garrison  and 
any  supporters  were  to  march  out  and  be  transported  by  the  navy  to  southern  Spain.  During 
this  time,  the  pro-Habsburg  faction  in  Barcelona  began  to  assert  its  victory  by  rioting  and 
inciting  violence  against  the  town's  pro-Bourbon  inhabitants.  A  massacre  entirely  antithetical 
to  the  contemporary  conduct  of  war  thus  threatened  and  Stanhope,  who  was  still  inside  the 
town,  got  word  out  to  Peterborough.  The  Earl  moved  quickly  to  quell  this  rebellion  by 
leading  an  occupation  force  into  Barcelona  on  3  October  before  the  garrison  marched  out 
and,  besides  giving  rise  to  the  romantic  tale  of  his  periwig  sustaining  a  bullet  as  he  carried  the 
winsome  Duchess  de  Populi  to  safety,  Peterborough's  action  proved  effective  in  ensuring  the 
security  of  the  town. 
The  main  fleet  under  Shovell  departed  Barcelona  for  England  on  12  October,  leaving 
behind  Peterborough  with  the  land  force,  and  also  a  small  eight-vessel  winter  squadron  to  be 
stationed  at  Lisbon  under  Sir  John  Leake.  Within  days  of  Shovell's  departure  the  Archduke 
made  his  formal  entry  into  the  town,  attended  by  considerable  ceremony,  to  be  proclaimed 
King.  The  allies  were  keen  for  Charles  to  take  the  first  opportunity  to  march  onwards  to 
Madrid  and  Peterborough  spent  the  winter  of  1705/6  at  the  head  of  a  body  of  troops  in  the 
province  of  Valencia  securing  the  support  previously  demonstrated  for  the  Archduke  in  that 
region.  173  However,  Charles's  cause  was  quickly  hampered  by  a  lack  of  money  and 
resources,  both  of  which  were  made  worse,  according  to  Peterborough,  by  the  'wretches  for 
Ministers'"',  who  advised  the  Archduke.  The  deflation  of  the  allies'  momentum  was 
manifest  by  the  French  making  the  first  significant  move  at  the  turn  of  the  year.  1705  had 
been  a  poor  year  for  the  Bourbon  cause  in  Spain,  even  though  Marshal  de  Tessd  had 
successfully  expelled  the  Anglo-Portuguese  force  from  Estremadura  province.  Following  on 
from  the  loss  of  Gibraltar,  the  French  could  not  afford  to  relinquish  the  strategic  benefits  that 
173  Martin-Lcake,  The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  ii.  294-5;  CFKS,  Ul  590  0135111,  p.  21-3:  Turly's  Journal',  12- 
14,27  Oct.  1705;  BL,  Add  MSS  5438,  fos.  7-9:  Leake  to  Burchett,  17  Jan.  1706;  A  Royal  Dragoon  in  the 
Spanish  Succession  War,  P.  14-17. 
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land  base  such  as  Barcelona  provided  the  Archduke.  Perhaps  even  more  important  was  the 
political  imperative  that  Philip  V  should  predominate  in  the  principal  city  of  the  region  most  ill 
disposed  to  his  rule.  Accordingly,  Louis  prompted  his  already  enthusiastic  grandson  to  an 
early  attempt  by  land  and  sea  to  recapture  Barcelona  and  thus,  as  at  Gibraltar,  the  allies  were 
forced  to  mount  a  combined  army-navy  operation  to  maintain  and  enhance  their  possession  of 
the  Catalan  City.  175 
Having  left  Madrid  early  in  the  new  year,  a  pessimistic  Tess6  arrived  in  Saragossa  on 
21  January  1706  to  assemble  the  army  which  was  to  march  on  Barcelona.  About  a  month 
later,  and  with  some  12  000  men  mustered,  he  was  joined  by  Philip  V  at  Caspe.  The 
Marshal's  intention  while  en  route  to  Barcelona  had  been  to  cut  the  allies'  communication 
throughout  the  provinces  of  Aragon,  Catalonia  and  Valencia,  and  also  to  secure  his  own 
flanks.  Many  of  his  colleagues  however  thought  this  approach  ponderous  and  argued 
successfully  that  the  army's  swift  appearance  in  front  of  Barcelona,  combined  with  the  arrival 
of  the  Toulon  fleet  under  the  Comte  de  Toulouse  off  the  coast,  would  cause  the  city  to 
capitulate  with  the  same  rapidity  it  had  to  the  allies.  Thus,  as  Prince  Lichtenstein's 
intelligence  correctly  predicted,  the  force  under  Philip  and  Tessd  marched  directly  for 
Barcelona  and,  despite  their  failure  to  pacify  the  hostile  Catalans  as  they  passed  through  the 
province,  the  River  Llobgregat,  which  ran  down  to  the  Mediterranean  just  south  of 
Barcelona,  was  reached  in  the  last  week  of  March.  The  siege  of  Barcelona  was  to  be  pressed 
forward  from  this  position,  but  first  some  9000  reinforcements  from  Roussillon  were  awaited. 
Meanwhile,  Toulouse  had  been  fitting  out  a  40-vessel  fleet,  including  some  seventeen 
warships,  at  Toulon  whence  he  was  to  sail  to  Barcelona  to  perform  a  similar  function  for 
Tess6  as  the  allied  fleet  had  for  Peterborough.  Departing  Toulon  in  the  last  week  of 
February,  Toulouse  was  expected  to  arrive  off  Barcelona  well  in  advance  of  the  land  force; 
but  in  the  event  bad  weather  greatly  hampered  him  and,  when  Tessd  sought  to  make  contact 
on  arriving  at  the  Llobgregat,  the  Admiral  was  onlyjust  bringing  the  French  fleet  to  anchor.  176 
It  has  been  claimed  that  London  knew  of  the  French  intentions  with  respect  to 
2:  Peterborough  to  Stanhope,  18  Nov.  1705. 
175  Quincy,  Ifistoire  Militaire,  iv.  655-60;  Lynn,  The  Wars  ofLouisXIV,  p.  302,3  10-11;  Trevelyan,  England 
Under  Queen  Anne,  ii.  92-3. 
176  Mimoires  el  Lettres  du  Markhal  de  Tessi.  ii.  207-8,217;  Marquis  de  DangCau,  Abroge  des  AVmoirs  ou 
Journal  de  Marquis  de  Dangeau  (Paris,  1817)  ii.  412-13;  BL,  Add  MSS  5438,  f  71:  Lichtenstein  to  'Sir' 
[Leakel,  26  Mar.  1706  [NS];  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  pp.  202-4. 256 
Barcelona  by  January  1706,  but  Galway's  letter  of  late  November  1705  which  referred  to  the 
westward  movements  of  Philip  and  Tess6  plus  the  imminent  departure  of  the  Toulon  fleet, 
only  related  them  to  a  general  French  desire  to  recover  Catalonia  and  not  a  specific  action 
against  Barcelona.  177  The  Ministry  did  plan  though  to  reinforce  the  Archduke's  capability. 
Five  regiments  -  three  from  England  and  two  from  Ireland  -  were  to  be  dispatched,  along  with 
six months  provisions  for  the  5000  allied  troops  plus  a  commitment  to  provide  for  10  000  in 
the  immediate  future.  It  was  also  agreed  that  at  least  nine  of  the  naval  vessels  convoying  this 
supply  from  England  and  Ireland  would  remain  in  the  Mediterranean  to  augment  Leake's 
winter  squadron.  The  dispatch  of  these  reinforcements  and  provisions  was  however 
continually  delayed  throughout  the  winter  months.  178 
Aside  from  Catalonia,  the  Ministry  attention  during  these  months  was  partially 
occupied  by  schemes  for  the  Archduke  to  capitalise  on  the  reported  pro-Habsburg 
incffiations  of  the  Spanish  West  Indian  possessions  but  mainly  by  the  deteriorating  situation 
of  the  Duke  of  Savoy.  In  April  1705,  the  French  had  occupied  Nice  and  Villefranche,  with 
the  former's  citadel  eventually  falling  to  the  Duke  of  Berwick  in  the  winter;  while  the  Duke's 
stronghold,  Turin,  was  expected  to  be  the  Duc  de  La  Feuillade's  target  for  the  opening  of  the 
1706  campaign.  Assuming  that  the  Archduke  remained  secure  in  the  Peninsula,  the  Ministry 
aimed  to  use  the  resources  already  in  the  Mediterranean,  perhaps  along  with  the  additional 
men  and  materials  then  being  prepared  at  Portsmouth  for  Catalonia,  to  succour  the  Duke. 
The  Court's  concern  for  Victor  Amadeus  only  deepened  in  the  new  year  when  his  emissary, 
Conte  Annibale  Maffei,  arrived  in  town  seeking  help;  and,  in  early  March,  the  Admiralty  tried 
to  expedite  the  departure  of  the  supplies  (men  and  material)  for  Catalonia  by  appointing  the 
C.  -in-C.  Portsmouth,  Sir  George  Byng,  to  the  sea-going  command  of  the  convoying 
squadron.  Byng's  Instructions  simply  referred  to  the  pressing  need  to  reinforce  Leake,  while 
the  latter's  orders,  issued  on  2  April,  prioritiscd  getting  material  help  through  to  the  Duke;  in 
neither  document  was  the  fate  of  Barcelona  specifically  cited  as  a  concem.  179  This  was 
171  The  Byng  Papers,  i.  99;  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  vii.  388-9:  Extract  of  a  letter  from  Galway  to 
Hedges,  7  Dec.  1705  [NS]  [refers  to  an  earlier  letter  in  late  November]. 
"'  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  vii.  390-4:  Extract  of  a  letter  from  Hedges  to  Galway,  4  Dec.  1705,8,29 
Jan.,  12,26  Feb.  1706;  Extract  of  a  letter  from  Hedges  to  Methuen,  18,26  Dec.  1705. 
179  PRO,  SP  104/207,  fos.  57-63,70-3,89-91:  Hedges  to  John  Methuen,  II  Sept.  1705;  Hedges  to  Hill,  II 
Sept.  1705;  Hedges  to  the  Admiralty,  4  Dec.  1705;  Hedges  to  Peterborough,  II  Dec.  1705,7  Feb.,  2  Apr. 
1706;  'Instructions  for  Our  Right  Trusty  and  Welbeloved  Cousin  and  Councillor  Charles  Earl  of  Peterborow 
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curious  inasmuch  as  by  spring  the  signs  were  that  London's  ignorance  regarding  the 
impending  threat  to  Barcelona  had  been  significantly  enlightened.  French  intelligence  current 
among  the  Ministry  from  the  end  of  February  had  been  referring  to  a  prospective  siege  of  the 
city;  while  notably  Leake's  Instructions  of  2  April  did,  albeit  as  a  general  point,  direct  him 
first  to  ensure  Charles's  safety  in  the  city,  particularly  from  the  French  fleet.  Ultimately  the 
rumours  Godolphin  referred  to  on  19  April  about  Barcelona  being  besieged  from  the  land 
were  confirmed  three  days  later  when  he  received  Marlborough's  letter  of  16  April  from  The 
Hague,  which  told  of  the  French  opening  their  trenches.  The  Lord  Treasurer's  response  was 
simply  to  hope  that  Leake  would  get  round  the  coast  in  time.  180 
Leake  had  largely  remained  as  uncertain  of  the  specific  threat  posed  to  Barcelona  as 
London.  The  winter  months  had  been  spent  refitting  the  fleet  and  planning  an  attempt  on  the 
French  galleons  thought  to  be  harbouring  in  CAdiz.  Nonetheless,  when  cruising  off  Cape 
SPartel  in  March,  he  had  received  news  that  Toulouse  had  left  Toulon  bound  for 
Barcelona.  "'  The  fact  that  on  receipt  of  this  information  he  did  not  sail  immediately  to  the 
town  was  doubtless  due  the  optimism  of  his  principal  mainland  correspondent  - 
Peterborough.  Now  based  in  Valencia  province,  the  Earl  seemed  relatively  untroubled  by  the 
developing  events  to  the  north,  and,  perhaps  more  significantly,  he  wished  the  expected 
additional  troops  to  be  brought  by  Leake  to  augment  his  force.  This  remained 
Peterborough's  view  even  though  Charles  and  Liechtenstein  had  sent  Leake  letters  in  mid- 
March  outlining  the  peril  faced  by  the  town  and  requesting  that  he  come  with  all  the 
reinforcements  sent  from  England  for  Catalonia.  Peterborough  calculated  that  the  supply 
maintained  by  Toulouse's  fleet  was  the  essential  link  in  the  enemy's  operation  and  that 
Leake's  squadron  would  be  better  placed  to  chase  it  from  the  coast  if  unencumbered  by  the 
troop  transports.  182  This  analysis  was  not  without  foundation.  By  rejecting  Tessd's  approach 
1706;  The  Byng  Papers,  i.  112-14:  From  Prince  George  of  Denmark's  Council,  4  Mar.  1706;  Quincy,  Ifistoire 
Afilitaire,  iv.  589-92,627-35;  Symcox,  Victor  Amadeus  II,  pp.  149-50. 
18011MC,  House  ofLordsMSSNS,  vii.  393-4:  Extract  of  a  letter  from  11cdges  to  Galway,  19,26  Feb.  1706; 
The  Afarlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  i,  nos.  539,541,544,  pp.  520,522,524:  Marlborough  to 
Godolphin,  16  Apr.  1706;  Godolphin  to  Marlborough,  19,22  Apr.  1706. 
131  BL,  Add  MSS  5438,  fos.  7-9,17-18,25:  Leake  to  Burchett,  17  Jan.,  19  Mar.  1706;  Leake  to  Peterborough, 
18  Feb.  1706;  BL,  Add  MSS  47970,  p.  77:  Teake's  Journal,,  19  Mar.  1706. 
182  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  vii.  427-8:  Peterborough  to  the  Admiral  or  officer  commanding-in-chief  of 
her  Majesty's  squadron  in  the  Mediterranean,  18  Mar.  1706;  Peterborough  to  Leake,  19  Mar.  1706;  'King  of 
Spain'  to  Leake,  26  Mar.  1706  [NS];  Lichtenstein  to  Leakc,  26  Mar.  1706  [NS];  BL  Add  MSS  5438,  fos.  48- 
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and  proceeding  directly  to  Barcelona,  the  French  army  had  failed  to  establish  any  mainland 
fines  of  communication  and  its  isolation  was  increased  by  the  debilitating  attacks  undertaken 
by  the  Conde  de  Cifuentes's  band  of  Miquelets.  Using  the  local  topography  to  full  effect,  the 
Miquelets  seemed  to  the  French  to  be  simultaneously  nowhere  and  everywhere:  a  raid  at 
Philip's  headquarters  at  Sarria  nearly  resulted  in  his  capture,  while  another  seized  some  700 
sheep  from  the  French  field  depot.  "'  Whereas  at  Gibraltar  the  siege  army  had  largely  relied 
on  the  fleet's  additional  attack  capability,  the  French  land  force's  maritime  dependency  at 
Barcelona  was  total. 
The  weakness  of  the  French  besiegers  was  not  however  apparent  to  the  allies  inside 
the  town.  Although  augmented  by  the  arrival  of  the  1800  strong  Gerona  garrison 
commanded  by  Lord  Donegal  along  with  some  1500  Miquelets,  the  regular  garrison  soldiers 
only  totalled  approximately  1400.184  Improvements  to  the  city  defences  had  been  effected 
under  the  guidance  of  Colonel  Petit,  including  the  replacement  of  the  St  Betram  outwork'  85 
with  a  trench  running  to  Montjuich  which  made  the  severing  of  its  communication  with  the 
city  a  more  elusive  military  proposition.  Notwithstanding,  there  was  little  confidence  that  the 
garrison  could  resist  Tessd's  20  000  men  supported  by  Toulouse's  fleet.  A  measure  of  this 
was  the  proposal  made  during  the  siege  to  send  the  Archduke  out  of  the  city  to  ensure  his 
safety,  though  Charles  was  ultimately  aware  of  the  damage  that  flight  would  inflict  on  his 
claim  to  the  throne  and  thus  decided  to  stay  on.  '  86  In  doing  so,  he  at  least  aimed  to  act  like  a 
King  by  providing  a  figurehead  for  the  defence  of  the  town. 
The  differing  reflections  on  Barcelona's  situation  and  its  relief  posed  a  dilemma  for 
Leake,  inasmuch  as  he  was  not  in  receipt  of  a  consistent  land  opinion  to  guide  what  was 
necessarily  a  land  and  sea  venture.  Off  Gibraltar  on  6  April,  this  circumstance  was  partially 
resolved  by  his  naval  Council  when  it  considered  all  the  correspondence  previously  received 
from  the  Archduke  and  Peterborough  and  resolved  upon  Barcelona's  relief  as  a  priority.  The 
intention  was  not  for  the  whole  fleet  to  appear  immediately  before  the  city,  but  rather  to 
proceed  in  stages  along  the  Spanish  coast  in  order  to  gain  intelligence  about  the  size  of 
Toulouse's  fleet.  The  Council  also  on  this  occasion  adopted  Peterborough's  point  about  the 
"I  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  p.  205;  Francis,  The  First  Peninsular  War,  p.  206. 
184  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  p.  204;  Francis,  Me  First  Peninsular  War,  p.  206. 
'85  Francis,  The  First  Peninsular  War,  p.  206  wrote  of  it  still  being  erect. 
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benefits  of  not  being  hindered  by  troop  transports  by  ordering  all  the  soldiers  to  be  embarked 
aboard  the  fleet  vessels.  Altea  was  reached  on  18  April,  whereupon  another  naval  Council 
was  held.  Although  again  recognising  Barcelona's  need,  its  members  were  reluctant  to  sail 
much  further  without  either  Byng's  reinforcements  or  the  other  convoy  from  Ireland.  There 
was  also  the  additional  problem  that  Peterborough  continued  to  press  for  all  the  troops  to  be 
landed  at  either  Altea  or  Denia  and  in  so  doing  he  attempted  to  assert  his  authority  by  sending 
Leake  his  commission  asjoint  Admiral.  Leake  was  not  disposed  to  heed  Peterborough's 
demands  and  upon  learning  that  Byng  was  not  far  away,  the  Council  decided  to  await  his 
arrival  overnight.  Interestingly,  during  the  night  Brigadier  Gorges  appeared  with  further 
correspondence  from  the  Earl,  indicating  a  subtle  shift  in  his  position.  He  now  suggested  that 
Leake  should  retain  at  least  1000  soldiers  on  board  to  be  immediately  landed  as  a  descent 
force  on  reaching  Barcelona.  '  87 
Peterborough  wrote  this  letter  after  marching  with  a  number  of  his  troops  to  a  new 
position  in  the  mountains  surrounding  Barcelona  and  it  may  well  have  been  that  sight  of  the 
city  informed  his  shift  in  opinion.  By  mid-April,  the  French  had  clearly  made  gains  from  the 
landward.  Siege  works  had  been  erected  in  front  of  the  city  walls,  but  Montjuich  was 
targeted  first  with  a  constant  mortar  fire  and  on  10  April,  Tessd,  despite  having  suffered  a 
repulse  a  week  earlier,  launched  a  large  scale  assault  under  the  command  of  the  Marquis  de 
Aytona.  The  commandant  of  Montjuich,  Lord  Donegal,  mounted  a  vigorous  defence  during 
which  he  and  300  troops  died  but  ultimately  the  fortress  could  only  hold  out  for  four  days 
before  surrendering.  Undoubtedly  this  action  at  Montjuich  delayed  the  enemy's  advance  on 
the  city  and  also  afforded  more  time  for  Leake's  approach,  but  as  Barcelona's  garrison  was 
largely  unaware  of  the  relief  squadron's  progress  and  now  faced  a  besieging  force  that 
commanded  the  south-westerly  heights  of  the  town,  they  remained  beleaguered.  "' 
Leake's  squadron  was  augmented  by  the  arrival  of  Byng's  detachment  on  20  April 
and  of  the  Irish  convoy  only  days  later.  He  proceeded  through  bad  weather  to  Tortosa, 
where  on  26  April  he  received  a  letter  from  the  Archduke  which  represented  the  city's  bleak 
"'  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  vi.  432-3:  At  a  Council  of  War  of  Flag  Officers  and  Captains,  6  Apr. 
1706;  BL,  Add  MSS  5438,  fos.  48-50:  Peterborough  to  'Sir'  [Lcake],  7  Apr.  1706;  BL,  Add  MSS  5442,  E 
114:  'Att  a  Councill  of  War  of  Flag  Officers',  18  Apr.  1706;  BL,  Add  MSS  47970,  pp.  78-9:  Teake's 
Journal',  4-6  Apr.  1706;  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSIr  John  Leake,  ii.  10-16. 
M  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  ii.  15-17;  de  la  Ronci6re,  Ifistoire  de  la  Marine  Franqaise,  vi. 
381-2;  Hugil  1,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  pp.  205-7. 260 
situation.  More  importantly  it  rebuffed  Peterborough's  call  for  the  majority  of  the  troop 
reinforcements  to  be  landed  elsewhere  and  directed  that  they  must  be  brought  to  Barcelona 
immediately.  There  was  also  correspondence  from  Peterborough  in  Leakc's  mail  bag,  which 
showed  him  firm  in  his  belief  that  Barcelona's  relief  required  only  a  smaller  descent  force 
covered  by  the  fleet.  To  this  end  he  had  collected  several  boat  loads  of  troops  at  Sitges,  21 
miles  west-south-west  of  Barcelona,  which  only  awaked  the  fleet's  support.  Leake  however 
remained  resolved  to  bring  his  whole  fleet,  including  all  the  reinforcements  round  into 
Barcelona  Bay,  and  engage  Toulouse  if  necessary.  The  paradox,  which  only  Peterborough 
had  considered,  was  that  Toulouse  had  no  intention  of  fighting  to  supply  Tess6.  On  learning 
from  a  Genoese  vessel  on  the  night  of  26/27  April  that  Leake  was  fast  approaching  with  a 
larger  fleet,  he  signalled  the  French  fleet  to  weigh  and  returned  to  Toulon.  '" 
Given  that  the  French  siege  only  lasted  for  another  four  days  following  Toulouse's 
departure,  Peterborough's  opinion  that  the  allies  had  only  to  target  the  French  fleet  to  relieve 
Barcelona  seemed  accurate.  Nonetheless,  just  as  Leake  approached  the  empty  Barcelona 
Bay,  the  town  was  at  its  most  vulnerable  from  the  landward.  A  breach  of  considerable  width 
had  been  opened  in  the  walls  and,  with  a  French  infantry  assault  imminently  expected,  the 
troops  landed  from  Admirals  Byng's  and  Wassenar's  flagships,  which  Leake  had  ordered 
ahead,  proved  invaluable  in  immediately  augmenting  the  garrison's  defence.  The  remaining 
troops  and  marines  landed  when  Leake  came  to  anchor  and  the  1400-strong  descent  force 
compiled  by  Peterborough  at  Sitges  enabled  the  allies  to  put  into  Barcelona  some  5000 
reinforcements.  This  so  dispirited  the  French  that  their  threatened  assault  on  the  breach  was 
never  launched  and  they  retreated  quickly  from  the  walls,  leaving  artillery  and  ammunition 
behind.  190  Toulouse's  departure  clearly  enfeebled  the  siege,  but  the  landing  of  all  available 
infantry  reinforcements  had  been  necessary  to  neutralise  the  very  immediate  threat  to 
Barcelona. 
When  bringing  his  descent  force  from  Sitges  to  the  main  fleet  just  before  it  entered 
""  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  ii.  17-22;  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  vii.  437-8:  King  of 
Spain  to  Leake,  4  May  1706  [NS];  BL,  Add  MSS  5438,  fos.  53-5:  Peterborough  to  'Sir'  [Leake],  30  Apr. 
1706,5  May  1706  [NS];  BL,  Egerton  2521,  f  94:  Haddock  to  'Hon.  Sir'  [Sir  Richard  Haddock],  I  May  1706. 
"0  BL,  Egerton  252  1,  f.  94:  Haddock  to  'Hon.  Sir'  [Sir  Richard  Haddock],  I  May  1706;  BL,  Add  MSS  47970, 
p.  80:  Teake's  Journal',  28  Apr.  -I  May  1706;  Lord  Mahon,  History  ofthe  War  ofthe  Succession  in  Spain 
(2"d  edn,  London,  1836),  Appendix,  pp.  vi-viii:  To  Secretary  Sir  Charles  Hedges,  9,12  May  1706  [NSI;  Life 
ofCaptain  Stephen  Martin,  1666-1740,  p.  94;  Francis,  The  First  Peninsular  War,  p.  212. 261 
Barcelona  Bay,  Peterborough  had  boarded  Leake's  flagship  and  asserted  what  he  believed 
was  his  superior  command  by  hoisting  his  flag  at  the  main  mast.  Peterborough  presumably 
predicated  this  action  on  his  dual  commission  as  C.  -in-C.  of  the  land  forces  and  joint  Admiral. 
It  was  unclear  whether  this  commission  applied  with  an  Admiral  other  than  Shovel];  certainly 
later  in  June,  Burchett  sent  out  a  fresh  commission  for  Peterborough  to  be  joint  Admiral  with 
Leake  but  Leake  at  this  stage  made  no  comment.  His  restraint  did  not  mean  that  he  forgot 
Peterborough's  insensitive  gesture  and  future  relations  between  the  two  commanders  proved 
increasingly  strained.  "'  This  was  significant  in  the  aftermath  of  relieving  Barcelona  when  a 
Grand  Council  of  War  convened  by  the  Archduke  on  10  May  upheld  the  resolutions  of  the 
naval  Council  of  4  May  to  combine  with  the  land  forces  to  extend  full  control  over  Valencia 
province.  However,  as  the  first  target  was  to  be  Alicante,  which  it  was  thought  would 
surrender  simply  at  the  appearance  of  the  fleet  off  the  coast,  no  combined  land  and  sea  action 
was  immediately  envisaged  and  Leake  merely  had  to  land  Peterborough  along  with  some  600 
troops  at  either  Altea  or  Denia,  where  they  would  be  joined  by  a  party  of  horse  marching 
overland. 
192 
The  squadron  left  Barcelona  on  18  May  and  within  four  days  Peterborough  caused  the 
plans  to  be  changed  by  convincing  a  Council  of  War  that  the  troops  should  be  landed  at 
Valencia  town,  so  that  the  enemy  might  be  cleared  from  the  road  linking  it  with  Denia. 
Progress  was  further  disrupted  when  four  days  later,  on  arriving  off  the  town  on  24  May, 
Leake  at  last  received  from  London  the  Instructions  of  2  April  directing  him  to  the  urgent 
succour  of  Savoy.  A  naval  Council  -  at  which  Peterborough  was  present  -  took  a  decision  in 
principle  to  fulfil  these  Instructions,  and  the  Earl  agreed  to  embark  those  troops  he  felt  he 
could  release  for  this  service.  However,  to  Leake's  considerable  frustration,  Peterborough 
cast  these  proceedings  in  doubt  the  next  day  by  advising  the  Admiral  of  the  subsequent 
decision  of  his  Council  of  land  officers:  that  the  Archduke  should  adjudicate  on  this  impeding 
departure  to  Italy,  and  that  in  the  interval  operations  in  Valencia  province  should  continue. 
When  Leake  sought  clarification  on  their  next  step  from  Peterborough,  the  Earl  claimed  to  be 
191  BL,  Add  MSS  5438,  f  31:  Leake  to  the  'Secretary  to  HRH'[Burchett],  15  May  1705;  BL,  Add  MSS  5441, 
f81:  Burchett  to  Leake,  5  June  1706;  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  ii.  23,30-9;  Trevelyan, 
England  Under  Queen  Anne,  ii.  169. 
192  HMC,  House  ofLordsMSSNS,  vii.  439:  Ata  Council  of  War,  4  May  1706;  CFKS,  U1590  0135/11,  p.  36- 
40:  Turly's  Journal',  6  Apr.  -I  June  1706;  Martin-Lcake,  Ihe  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  ii.  43-5;  BL,  Add  MSS 
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too  indisposed  to  attend  a  Council  of  War  but  wrote  that  the  operation  against  Alicante 
should  continue  and  that  he  had  readied  some  of  his  men  to  march  in  that  direction  so  that  an 
attack  from  the  landward  could  be  launched  in  the  event  that  the  town  did  not  surrender  on 
the  appearance  of  the  fleet.  Shrewdly,  Peterborough  had  managed  simultaneously  to  out- 
manoeuvre  Leakc  and  to  undermine  his  authority  over  the  fleet.  Recalling  the  Admiral's 
deference  to  the  Archduke's  commands  for  the  relief  of  Barcelona,  Peterborough  calculated 
that  Leake  would  not  or  could  not  ob  ect  to  the  referral  of  the  Council's  decision  to  Charles, 
despite  the  Instructions  being  solely  addressed  to  him  as  Admiral.  Moreover,  the  referral 
afforded  Peterborough  time  in  which  to  exercise  his  authority  over  a  full  complement  of 
troops  and  thus  place  him  in  a  position  to  determine  the  direction  of  both  the  land  operation 
and  the  combined  action  with  the  fleet.  This  point  was  manifest  when  the  naval  Council  of  30 
May  agreed  fully  with  Peterborough's  resolution  and  on  I  June,  the  fleet  weighed  for 
Alicante.  193 
The  dissociation  in  command  between  Peterborough  and  Leake  was  further  confirmed 
only  three  days  after  leaving  Valencia.  Off  Altea,  Leake  received  credible  intelligence  that 
Major-General  Mah6ni  was  to  command  for  Philip  V  in  Alicante  with  500  horse,  whereas 
Cartagena  had  no  such  defence  and  inhabitants  who  were  said  to  be  well  inclined  to  the 
Archduke.  Considering  this  information  on  5  June,  the  naval  Council  inverted  the  previous 
intelligence  perception  and  resolved  that  Alicante  would  have  to  be  besieged  from  the  land 
and  sea  but  Cartagena  might  submit  simply  on  appearance  of  the  fleet.  Peterborough  was 
merely  to  be  informed  of  this  decision,  with  the  additional  note  that  the  fleet  would  proceed 
to  Alicante  later.  194 
Leake  and  his  naval  Council  were  able  to  assert  this  independence  of  action  due  to  the 
presence  of  a  number  of  marine  soldiers  on  board  the  fleet.  As  demonstrated  at  Gibraltar, 
these  men  could  -  depending  on  their  number  and  the  operational  circumstances  -  provide  the 
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31  May  1706;  Peterborough  to  'Sir'  [Leake],  9,10  June  1706  [NS];  BL,  Add  MSS  544  1,  fos.  126,128: 
Peterborough  to  'Sir'  [Leake],  9,10  June  1706  [NS];  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  qfSir  John  Leake,  ii.  48-53; 
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fleet  with  a  temporary  land  capability;  and  the  prospects  for  reducing  Cartagena  suggested 
that  they  would  be  sufficient,  without  additional  support  from  Peterborough's  infantrymen. 
This  was  apparent  when  the  fleet  reached  Cartagena  on  12  June,  and  the  Governor  and  the 
city  magistrates  requested  a  day  to  think  about  Leake's  summons.  Fearful  that 
reinforcements  would  get  into  the  town  during  this  24-hour  period,  Leake  disposed  a  smaller 
ten-vessel  squadron  under  Sir  John  Jennings  to  proceed  inside  the  harbour,  with  1000  Dutch 
and  English  marines  to  be  landed  nearby.  If  the  city  authorities  refused  to  submit  to  a  second 
summons,  Jennings  was  to  cannonade  the  city  and  the  castle,  which  stood  on  a  elevation  just 
behind  the  harbour,  while  the  marines  would  march  in  to  secure  the  harbour  area  and  act  as  a 
garrison.  This  deployment  had  just  begun  the  following  morning  when  some  city 
representatives  rowed  out  to  Leake's  flagship,  the  Prince  George,  to  relinquish  Cartagena. 
Leaving  Jennings  in  the  harbour  with  four  warships  and  a  600-marine  garrison  commanded  by 
Major  Richard  Hedges  to  settle  the  city  affairs,  Leake  departed  Cartagena  for  Alicante  on  18 
June.  195 
The  fleet  reached  Altea  Bay  on  20  June  where  Leake  received  the  Archduke's 
response  to  Peterborough's  referral  of  the  Council's  earlier  decision  to  succour  Savoy 
according  to  the  London  Instructions.  Not  surprisingly,  Charles  did  not  want  to  spare  Victor 
Amadeus  any  troops  from  the  Peninsula,  and  believed  that  Queen  Anne  would  be  of  a  similar 
opinion  if  fully  aware  of  recent  events.  Certainly,  he  could  not  conceive  that  she  wanted  to 
render  vulnerable  those  Spanish  provinces  already  secured  by  the  allies  nor  threaten  further 
success.  The  Archduke  stated  that  he  would  accept  Leake  detaching  a  squadron  to  Italy,  if 
the  Admiral  believed  it  might  be  of  help;  but  that  he  would  prefer  Leake  to  continue  the 
combined  land  and  sea  operations  against  the  eastern  Spanish  coast  and  also  to  begin 
operations  amongst  the  Spanish  island  dependencies.  The  Archduke  believed  that  both 
Minorca,  with  its  commodious  Port  Mah6n  harbour,  and  Majorca  were  particularly  well 
disposed  to  him.  Along  with  the  Archduke's  letter  was  a  typically  flighty  one  from 
Peterborough.  He  now  expressed  sympathy  with  Victor  Amadeus  and  claimed  that  even 
Marlborough's  victory  at  Ramillies  (12  May),  which  captured  Flanders  for  the  allies,  would 
195  BL,  Add  MSS  5442,  lbs.  128-30:  'Att  A  Council  of  War  of  Flag  Officers',  13,16  June  1706;  BL,  Add 
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not  compensate  for  the  loss  of  Turin.  However,  hiding  behind  the  Archduke's  refusal  to 
release  troops,  Peterborough  concluded  that  a  decision  about  Savoy's  succour  would  have  to 
await  the  arrival  of  a  fleet  from  England  with  further  reinforcements.  Peterborough  was  not 
then  aware  that  the  other  combined  operations  currently  being  considered  in  London  would 
thwart  the  early  arrival  of  this  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean.  On  21  June,  Leake  presented 
Charles's  letter  to  his  Council.  In  considering  the  dispatch  of  a  squadron  to  Savoy  without 
troops  to  be  a  futile  exercise,  it  clearly  did  not  regard  the  land  capability  of  the  marines 
sufficient  on  this  occasion.  This  was  in  addition  to  the  concern  that,  as  marines  often  helped 
man  the  ships,  the  garrisoning  of  Cartagena  combined  with  the  current  sickness  of  crews  had 
meant  that  further  manpower  detachments  could  not  be  made  safely  from  the  fleet. 
Operations  against  the  Spanish  Mediterranean  islands,  as  suggested  by  the  Archduke,  were 
therefore  currently  ruled  out,  because  those  which  declared  for  Charles  would  probably 
require  a  garrison  from  the  ships'  complements.  Recalling  Peterborough's  previous 
commitment  to  march  upon  Alicante  from  the  landward,  the  Council  therefore  resolved  to 
maintain  its  earlier  decision  to  proceed  there.  196 
Two  days  into  the  voyage  to  Alicante,  the  Rye  brought  Leake  another  set  of 
Instructions  from  England  urging  him  to  Savoy's  aid.  Dated  14  May,  these  had  been  drafted 
in  the  knowledge  of  Toulouse's  retreat  to  Toulon  and  Barcelona's  relief  thereby  leaving,  in 
London's  opinion,  Turin  as  the  most  imperilled  operational  theatre.  However,  as  the  Court's 
policy  had  been  to  devolve  control  over  the  conduct  of  the  war  in  the  Peninsula  to  the 
Archduke,  the  Instructions  directed  Leake  to  seek  his  opinion  first.  This  had  of  course 
already  been  done  and  Leake  concluded  he  could  for  the  moment  postpone  further 
consideration  of  succouring  Savoy  and  continue  with  the  projected  action  against  Alicante. 
This  decision  was  timely,  for  on  the  same  day  as  he  received  the  mail  from  England  the  fleet 
came  into  Alicante  road.  197 
Leake  dispatched  a  summons  to  both  the  Governor  and  Major-General  Mah6ni,  who 
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had  previously  been  reported  as  proceeding  with  500  horse  to  provide  the  main  defence  of  the 
town.  '98  It  was  the  latter  who  responded  to  Leake  by  forwarding  a  copy  of  a  letter  he  had 
previously  sent  to  Peterborough  outlining  his  commitment  to  Philip  to  defend  to  the  last  the 
area  between  Montesa  and  Cidiz.  This  of  course  included  Alicante,  where  he  had  currently 
based  himself  Such  a  negative  response  to  his  summons  caused  Leake  to  convene  a  Council 
on  the  following  day  to  consider  the  fleet's  options.  At  least  two  alternatives  were 
considered  and  rejected:  sending  succour  to  Italy,  and  seeking  to  augment  the  convoy  of  the 
returning  Turkey  merchantmen.  On  the  first,  despite  the  receipt  of  the  Court's  recent 
Instructions,  there  seemed  no  reason  to  alter  previous  resolutions  until  the  Archduke  agreed 
to  spare  some  troops;  while  on  the  second,  more  information  about  the  Turkey  convoy's 
whereabouts  was  thought  necessary.  This  left  action  against  Alicante;  but,  until 
Peterborough's  promised  troops  arrived  in  support,  there  was  little  the  fleet  could  profitably 
do.  Hence,  Leake's  Council  could  only  resolve  to  remain  at  anchor  in  the  bay  and  send  word 
to  Peterborough  at  Valencia  in  the  hope  that  this  would  hasten  the  troops  southwards. 
Leake  received  letters  from  Peterborough  on  28  June  and  7  July,  and  both  were 
dominated  by  the  question  of  sending  help  to  Savoy.  Ostensibly  this  was  curious  for,  albeit 
cloaked  by  the  Archduke's  refusal,  Peterborough  had  already  expressed  a  settled  opinion  to 
help  Victor  Amadeus's  once  the  expected  fleet  for  England  arrived  with  reinforcements. 
However,  references  in  the  letters  to  the  Archduke's  recent  inclination  to  dispatch  aid  if  at  all 
possible,  and  the  pressure  he  was  placing  upon  Peterborough  to  effect  this,  indicated  that  the 
Earl  was  trying  to  manoeuvre  Leake  or,  more  accurately,  the  naval  Council  to  decide  whether 
the  fleet  should  sail  now  with  succour.  And,  as  argued  by  the  Admiral's  biographer  there  was 
a  devious  edge  to  this  correspondence  because  at  this  point  Peterborough  reputedly  knew 
privately  that  the  reinforcement  fleet  from  England  was  designed  for  another  service  and  thus 
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the  naval  Council's  responsibility  for  the  operation  would  extend  to  causing  a  drastic 
reduction  in  manpower  in  Catalonia.  Peterborough  was  seeking  to  avoid  the  blame  for  any 
subsequent  operational  failure  but,  on  this  occasion,  Leake  had  the  measure  of  the  Earl  and 
deftly  side-stepped  Peterborough's  trap  by  moving  his  Council  to  resolve  that  succouring 
Savoy  could  not  be  achieved  due  to  a  lack  of  resources.  This  left  Peterborough  in  charge  of 
his  2500  men  in  Valencia  but  it  also  forced  him  to  continue  with  the  Alicante  operation, 
whose  prospects  he  had  downplayed  in  the  second  of  the  two  letters  which  announced  that 
the  land  force  had  been  detached. 
The  arrival  of  Brigadier  Gorges  in  charge  of  four  infantry  regiments  and  200  horse  to 
undertake  the  landward  attack  on  Alicante  could  not  come  soon  enough  for  Leake.  A  force 
of  400  marines  had  already  been  put  ashore  to  secure  the  local  militia's  possession  of  the  St 
Facie  convent,  while  delay  provided  the  enemy  with  time  to  work  on  their  defences. 
However,  when  the  Brigadier  came  aboard  the  Prince  George  on  9  July,  he  proved  as 
pessimistic  about  the  operation  as  Peterborough.  Dismissing  any  possible  contribution  by  the 
2000  militiamen  nearby,  Gorges  pointed  out  that  his  force  totalled  only  1450  horse  and  foot 
whereas  he  believed  that  Alicante  could  not  be  captured  by  less  than  3000  regulars.  Leake's 
attempt  to  call  a  combined  Council  of  War  on  this  question  foundered  when  Gorges  refused 
to  give  his  view  without  the  approbation  of  his  fellow  field  officers.  At  their  separate  Council 
the  next  day,  agreement  to  begin  the  siege  was  made  contingent  on  the  fleet  making  good  the 
shortfall  of  some  1500  troops  plus  providing  all  the  necessary  siege  materials.  Doubtless  not 
wishing  the  operation  to  be  abandoned,  the  naval  Council  acceded  to  the  soldiers' 
requirements  and  along  with  the  guns  and  their  crews,  some  800  marines  and  500  sailors  were 
to  be  put  ashore.  Furthermore,  a  commitment  was  made  to  deploy  those  marines  currently  at 
Cartagena,  once  they  had  been  relieved  by  the  infantry  regiment  that  Peterborough  had 
reputedly  promised  for  the  town.  Even  though  Leake  personally  delivered  these  resolutions 
to  the  land  officers  at  Luga  Nova  on  II  July,  it  was  a  week  later  before  Gorges,  having  been 
prcssed  again  by  Leake,  convened  another  land  Council  which  agreed  to  commence  the  siege. 
In  a  subsequent  letter  to  the  Archduke,  Leake  laid  the  blame  for  the  tardiness  in 
commencing  the  operation  at  Alicante  wholly  upon  Peterborough  and  the  conduct  of  the  land 
forces.  Undoubtedly  there  was  some  truth  to  this  but  the  Admiral  was  not  blameless.  I  le 
tended  to  call  a  Council  upon  any  daily  development,  however  incidental.  For  example,  upon 267 
receiving  correspondence  on  19  July  from  both  the  Archduke  and  Peterborough  which  did 
not  materially  affect  the  decision  to  attack  Alicante,  Leake  still  considered  a  Council  of  War 
necessary  to  consider  the  letter.  Predictably,  this  resolved  to  uphold  its  former  resolutions 
about  the  impending  operation,  but  it  took  another  meeting  of  the  Council  before  the  attack 
disposition  was  formulated. 
Finally,  on  21  July,  the  marines  and  sailors  were  landed  from  the  fleet  just  eastwards 
of  the  bay  whence  they  were  to  march  the  following  morning  to  meet  Brigadier  Gorge's 
force,  which  was  moving  south  from  Elche,  about  a  mile  outside  the  town.  For  this  purpose, 
the  sailors,  whose  number  had  been  increased  to  800,  were  regimented  with  three  naval 
Captains  given  temporary  command  as  Colonel,  Lieutenant-Colonel  and  Major.  During  the 
night  of  the  landing,  a  number  of  bomb  vessel  threw  shells  into  the  town  as  a  preliminary  to 
the  main  bombardment  the  following  morning  by  an  eight-ship  squadron  commanded  by 
Byng.  Continuing  throughout  the  day,  Byng's  cannonade  proved  remarkably  accurate  in 
silencing  the  town's  sea  batteries,  leaving  only  those  mounted  in  the  castle,  and  this  enabled 
the  allies'  ordnance  and  crews  to  be  landed.  On  23  July,  Jennings  brought  in  the  marines  from 
Cartagena's  garrison  and,  in  accordance  with  the  naval  Council's  commitment,  these  were 
immediately  deployed  ashore. 
The  action  ebbed  and  flowed  over  the  following  five  days  as  Byng's  squadron  kept  up 
its  bombardment  from  the  bay,  and  the  recently  erected  shore  batteries  engaged  those  enemy 
emplacements  outside  of  the  ships'  range  or  elevation.  Little  gave  on  either  side  however 
until  28  July  when  in  the  early  hours  Gorges's  men  managed  to  claim  the  town's  suburbs  and, 
in  particular,  the  windmill  acting  as  an  enemy  forward  post,  which  the  allies  had  held  briefly 
four  days  previously.  On  the  morning  of  this  advance,  Leake  boarded  the  Shrewsbury  and 
ordered  all  the  fleet's  boats  -  armed  and  manned  -  to  congregate  around  it.  Placing  them 
under  Jennings's  command,  he  awaited  an  obvious  weakening  in  the  enemy's  sea  front  against 
which  to  launch  them.  The  actual  occasion  of  their  departure  did  not  initially  appear 
propitious,  however.  A  breach  had  been  opened  in  the  Round  Tower  at  the  western  end  of 
the  town's  wall  and,  without  orders,  a  small  detachment  of  grenadiers  had  broken  ahead  of 
Gorges's  main  force  advancing  through  the  suburbs  to  attack  this  post.  On  observing  these 
developments,  Leake  ordered  Jennings's  boats  in  support  but,  before  the  sailors  got  ashore, 
the  grenadiers  had  been  repulsed.  Nonetheless,  rallying  around  the  Captain  of  the  Royal  Oak, 268 
Evans,  who  quickly  assailed  the  breach,  some  three  boats'  crews  got  inside  the  wall.  Seamen 
commanded  by  Captains  Passenger  and  Watkins  quickly  followed,  and  it  was  not  long  before 
the  boat  crews  under  Jennings  combined  with  the  soldiers,  who  had  first  occupied  the 
suburbs,  secured  the  town.  As  the  main  gates  were  opened  to  Brigadier  Gorges  and  the  rest 
of  the  troops,  Major-General  Mah6ni  in  command  of  a  party  of  horse  retreated  uphill  to  the 
castle,  situated  on  an  elevation  over  the  town.  The  siege  of  Alicante  castle  lasted  for  over  a 
month  until,  on  22  August,  Mah6ni  sought  terms.  He  claimed  to  have  run  out  of  drinking 
water,  but  when  entering  the  castle  a  week  later  the  allies  found  at  least  a  month's  provision 
left.  Closer  inspection  revealed  this  supply  to  have  been  spoiled  and  it  seemed  that  the 
garrison's  heavy  loss  of  life  had  caused  Mah6ni's  subordinates,  many  of  whom  were 
Neapolitans,  to  indulge  in  an  act  of  sabotage,  to  force  his  surrender. 
The  effectiveness  of  the  allied  siege  was  largely  due  to  it  being  waged  both  from  the 
land  and  sea.  The  castle's  elevation  meant  that  the  onshore  batteries  manned  by  the  soldiers, 
marines  and  ship  gun  crews  would  have  been  on  their  own  of  little  consequence;  however 
they  were  tellingly  supported  by  the  bomb  vessels.  It  was  to  their  credit  that  this  co- 
operation  between  the  two  services  endured  considerable  tension  and  alarm  during  the  course 
of  the  siege.  Once  again  Leake  showed  tact  and  restraint  when  a  land  Council  of  War 
requested  that  he  re-embark  those  sailors  ashore  -  save  for  the  marines  and  gun  crews  - 
because  it  was  feared  they  would  loot.  The  Admiral  also  suffered  a  scare  that  twelve  French 
warships  were  about  to  appear  and  trap  his  detachment  in  the  bay.  Absorbing  such  pressures, 
Leake  and  Gorges  pressed  the  month-long  siege  to  its  conclusion  and  it  proved  to  be  the  final 
combined  operation  undertaken  again  the  Spanish  mainland  for  the  remainder  of  the  war. 
-  The  operational  history  of  the  war  years  1705  and  1706  produces  in  the 
Mediterranean  theatre  and,  more  specifically,  on  mainland  Spain  a  number  of  combined  army- 
navy  operations.  It  was  apparent  even  before  the  beginning  of  1705  that  the  Ministry  wished 
to  extend  the  strategic  scope  of  these  ventures  as  an  instrument  of  warfare.  A  Grand  Flect 
and  a  considerable  detachment  of  troops  were  combined  under  the  direction  of  Peterborough 
and  Shovell.  Guided  by  latitudinarian  Instructions,  the  in-theatre  Council  of  War  had 
considerable  independence  in  determining  this  force's  objectives  and  eventually  Barcelona 
was  settled  upon.  Its  capture  however  required  more  than  a  first  strike  operation  for  at  the 
beginning  of  the  next  campaign  season  the  enemy  quickly  placed  the  allies'  control  of  the 269 
town  under  threat.  With  patchy  intelligence  and  communication  the  Ministry,  the  land 
commanders  -who  luckily  were  split  between  the  garrison  and  the  nearby  provinces  -  and  the 
Vice-Admiral  commanding  the  regional  naval  squadron,  all  had  to  co-operate  in  an  operation 
to  bring  relief  to  the  town.  That  this  proved  successful  was  undoubtedly  due  in  large  part  to 
good  fortune  and  the  enemy's  irresolution.  With  Barcelona  secured  by  April  1706,  the  allies 
were  emboldened  to  extend  the  Archduke's  control  through  Spain's  eastern  provinces.  In 
pursuit  of  this  object,  combined  operations  played  a  role  when  both  Cartagena  and  Alicante 
were  captured,  by  the  fleet  either  deploying  its  marines  as  land  soldiers  or  linking  up  with 
detachment  of  troops  that  had  marched  through  the  interior.  Nonetheless,  by  the  autumn  of 
1706  such  operations  were  at  an  end.  Lcake  left  Alicante  at  the  behest  of  the  Archduke  to 
target  Ibiza  and  on  8  September  this  island  declared  for  Charles  immediately  on  the 
appearance  of  the  fleet.  Majorca,  next  capitulated  on  16  September  afler  the  threat  of  naval 
bombardment  sparked  an  uprising  against  the  Bourbon  governor.  Of  the  three  Spanish  island 
dependencies,  this  left  Minorca  and  in  particular  its  prized  harbour,  Port  Mah6n.  Two  years 
would  pass  before  it  fell  to  a  British  combined  operation;  and  in  the  interim  the  frequently 
touted  combined  army-navy  attack  on  Toulon  would  become  a  reality. 
a IF  Sr.  .  V.  The  'Proiect':  The  Attack  on  Toulon.  June-August  1707. 
During  a  halt  at  the  Crown  Inn,  Farringdon,  in  September  1707,  Robert  Harley  reflected  that 
his  first  conversation  with  King  William  in  1691  had  concerned  a  'very  extraordinary 
proposal'  about  Toulon.  '99  Harley's  recollection  was  representative  of  William's  concern  to 
establish  England  as  the  principal  Mediterranean  power,  in  pursuance  of  which  a  combined 
land  and  sea  attack  on  Toulon  became  a  perennial  aspiration  of  England's  war  policy.  In  the 
context  of  the  twenty-five  year  conflict  with  France  (1688-1713),  its  capture  was  thought  to 
entail  a  double  prize:  denying  the  French  the  port  which  served  as  their  main  southern  naval 
arsenal  whence  they  sought  military  and  commercial  control  of  the  Mediterranean  rcgion;  and 
secondly,  providing  an  point  of  entry  to  the  French  Mediterranean  coastline,  along  which  the 
allies  might  extend  their  control  by  linking  up  with  armies  marching  across  the  Pyrcnccs  from 
Spain  or,  to  the  cast,  over  the  Alps  from  Piedmont-Savoy.  Implicit  in  any  attack  was  also  the 
iminediate  benefit  that  the  port's  importance  to  France  would  necessitate  a  vigorous  defence 
I"  I  IMC,  portlandMSS,  iv.  451-2:  Robert  Harley,  25  Sept.  1707. 270 
whereby  troops  and  resources  would  probably  have  to  be  withdrawn  from  other  war  theatres. 
Accordingly,  during  the  succession  war,  Toulon  was  actively  targeted  from  the  outset 
and  Marlborough,  as  heir  to  William's  strategic  conception,  was  often  the  inspiration.  The 
Captain-General  was  not  alone,  however.  Lord  Treasurer  Godolphin  was  at  times  equally 
enthusiastic,  and  successive  Secretaries  of  State  and  Admiralty  Boards  proved  receptive; 
proposals  also  often  emerged  from  continental  Europe.  Indeed,  it  has  been  suggested  that  a 
plan  drafted  by  an  Italian  engineer  and  divulged  to  Marlborough  by  the  Envoy  at  Vienna, 
George  Stepney,  formed  the  basis  of  the  deployment  in  1707.200  Certainly,  there  had  been 
little  detailed  planning  until  1705  when,  following  Marlborough's  advocacy  at  the  Cabinet 
Council,  a  proposal  to  mount  a  combined  attack  with  the  Duke  of  Savoy  was  contained 
within  the  secret  Instructions  issued  to  Peterborough  and  Shovell.  This  plan  could  not  of 
course  be  implemented  because  early  in  the  year  the  French  forced  the  Duke  of  Savoy  on  to 
the  defensive  by  capturing  Nice  and  Villefranche  and  also  by  threatening  his  Piedmont 
stronghold,  Turin,  thereby  rendering  it  impossible  for  him  to  lead  an  army  across  the  Alps  and 
westwards  into  Provence.  Victor  Amadcus  was  similarly  occupied  for  most  of  the  following 
year  by  the  celebrated  battle  for  Turin,  but  once  he  and  the  senior  Imperial  General,  Prince 
Eugene,  broke  the  French  siege  in  September  and  saved  the  city,  the  Grand  Alliance,  and 
England  in  particular,  were  able  in  the  winter  months  of  1706/7  to  resurrect  the  plans  for  an 
attack  on  Toulon.  201 
The  decision  to  make  this  a  focus  of  the  1707  campaign  in  the  Mediterranean  again 
owed  much  to  Marlborough's  support  as  the  Ministry  pressed  forward  the  dispatch  of  the 
'Project'  -  expressed  in  the  form  of  Instructions  -  in  February  1707  to  the  senior  allied 
Admiral  in  the  Mediterranean,  Sir  Cloudesley  Shovell.  202  Shovell  had  been  in  the  region  since 
200  Churchill,  Marlborough,  iii.  230;  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  i.  337  n.  5;  7he  Diplomatic 
Correspondence  of  the  Right  Honourable  Richard  Hill,  ed.  W.  Blackley  (London,  1845),  i,  pp.  130-1: 
Godolphin  to  Hill,  27  June;  PRO,  SP  105/77,  unE:  Stepney  to  Harley,  27  Jan.  1706  [NS];  Spens,  George 
Stepney,  p.  266. 
201  JIMC,  House  oftords  MSS  NS,  vii.  363-4:  Copy  of  instructions  to  Charles,  E.  Peterborough  and  Sir 
Cloudesley  Shovell,  7  May  1705;  Quincy,  Histoire  Militaire,  iv.  589-92,627-35;  Symcox,  rictorAmadeus 
11,  pp.  149-50;  7he  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  ii.  755-6  n.  5;  see  also  Chapter  2,  Section  Liv, 
pp.  235-6,238,  above. 
202  7he  Letters  andDispatches  ofJohn  Churchill,  iii.  268:  Marlborough  to  the  Prince  of  Savoy,  27  Dec.  1706; 
BL,  Add  MSS  28153,  fos.  9-17:  Instructions  for  Attack  on  Toulon,  Feb  1707;  HMC,  House  oftords  AfSS  NS, 
, Vii.  pp.  516-17:  Extract  of  a  letter  from  Sunderland  to  Shovell,  23  Dec.  1706;  Extract  of  a  letter  from 
Sunderland  to  Shovell,  14  Feb.  1707;  Churchill,  Marlborough,  iii.  230;  Francis,  The  First  Peninsular  lflarý  p. 
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the  autumn  of  1706,  when  his  fleet  arrived  at  Lisbon  along  with  Earl  Rivers's  detachment  of 
troops.  Originally  it  had  been  intended  that  this  combined  force  would  undertake  a  descent 
on  the  French  Atlantic  coast,  but  when  this  action  was  cancelled  before  the  fleet  departed 
England,  the  new  Instructions  charged  them  with  helping  the  war  effort  in  the  Peninsula  and 
suggested  CAdiz  or  Seville  as  possible  targets  for  a  descent.  In  the  event,  no  combined  action 
took  place  for  Rivers  and  the  Ministry  reckoned  that  augmenting  the  allied  armies  in  Spain 
was  the  more  pressing  necessity.  203  Shovelljoined  Sir  George  Byng's  winter  squadron,  which 
had  been  established  following  the  departure  in  September  1706  of  Leake's  main  fleet,  to  act 
as  an  escort  convoy  to  troops  and  war  materials.  It  was  on  return  to  Lisbon  from  delivering 
troops  to  Valencia  in  early  March  that  ShoveU  received  the  February  orders  about  the  Toulon 
204 
attack  . 
The  operation  outlined  in  the  'Project'  document  was  similar  to  the  1705  proposal:  a 
combined  Savoyard  and  Imperial  army  would  march  from  Piedmont  through  the  Alps  into 
French  Provence.  As  this  force  advanced  to  attack  Toulon  from  the  interior,  a  substantial 
Anglo-Dutch  fleet  commanded  by  Shovell  would  approach  Toulon  harbour  with  the  aim  of 
calibrating  a  bombardment  with  the  Duke  of  Savoy's  landward  assault.  The  greater  detail  of 
the  1707  plan  compared  with  the  1705  outline  did  however  give  rise  to  two  particular  points 
of  interest.  The  prohibition  in  Article  Fourteen  against  the  fleet  having  troops  aboard  due  to 
the  military  exigencies  of  the  Peninsula  shaped  a  different  combined  army-navy  dynamic  for 
this  operation,  compared  with  that  of  other  operations  considered.  Without  a  self-contained 
descent  force  launched  from  the  fleet,  the  amphibious  element  was  to  consist  of  the  co- 
ordination  and  mutual  reinforcement  of  free-standing  land  and  sea  forces.  This  absence  of  a 
combined  expeditionary  force  specifically  dispatched  from  England  might  ostensibly  place  the 
Toulon  operation  outside  the  scope  of  this  study;  but,  albeit  different,  the  operational  plan  did 
embody  an  inherent  land-sea  relationship  which,  along  with  London's  administrative  and 
policy  input  in  terms  of  operational  design  and  the  material  provision  manifest  in  both  the  40- 
vessel  fleet  and  war  supplies  for  the  land  forces,  meant  that  it  can  be  appropriately  considered 
as  a  British  combined  operation.  The  second  notable  item  to  emerge  from  the  instructions 
203  See  Chapter  2,  Section  Lvii,  pp.  297-9,  for  a  relation  of  the  abandonment  of  the  Shovell-Rivers  descent. 
204  JIMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  vii.  516-17:  Extract  of  a  letter  from  Sunderland  to  Shovell,  23  Dec.  1706; 
Extract  of  a  letter  from  Sunderland  to  Shovell,  14  Feb.  1707;  BL,  Add  MSS  28141,  fos.  32-3:  Shovell  to  the 
Duke  of  Savoy,  28  Mar.  1707  [NSI. 272 
was  the  command  structure.  Hitherto,  the  sovereign  command  authority  for  British  combined 
operations  had  typically  been  -  both  in  theory  and  largely  in  practice  -  the  Council  of  War. 
The  1707  'Project'  for  the  assault  on  Toulon  however  placed  full  command  with  the  Duke  of 
Savoy.  Shovell  would  still  have  to  call  a  naval  Council  of  War  for  the  regulation  of  fleet 
actions  but,  with  respect  to  the  overall  operation,  he  was  specifically  directed  to  'confortn' 
1,205  himself  to  the  Duke's  'orders  and  advises  .  Accordingly,  this  was  clearly  going  to  place 
heavy  responsibilities  on  the  fleet  liaison  officer  to  the  Duke's  Court  at  Turin,  which  Shovell 
was  ordered  to  appoint. 
To  fill  this  appointment  Shovell  turned  to  his  former  Flag  Captain  and  recently 
promoted  Rear-Admiral  of  the  Blue,  Sir  John  Norris.  Aside  from  their  personal  friendship, 
Norris  had  performed  a  similar  role  -  albeit  in  an  unofficial  capacity  -  as  Shovell's  emissary  to 
the  Archduke  Charles's  'Court'  in  late  August  1705  when  it  seemed  that  the  operation  to 
capture  Barcelona  might  be  given  up.  He  therefore  at  least  had  some  experience  of  what 
would  in  later  years  be  termed  a  Staff  appointment.  Norris's  early  transport  to  Turin  to 
establish  the  Duke's  readiness  was  clearly  an  imperative;  but  Shovell  also  recognised  that  he 
had  to  guard  against  the  possibility  that  the  land  march  might  already  have  begun,  thus 
necessitating  the  early  arrival  of  the  naval  squadron  off  Toulon.  Moreover,  besides  this 
operation,  the  Admiralty  had  recently  dispatched  orders  requiring  the  fleet  to  keep  a  presence 
in  the  Mediterranean  and  to  be  ready  to  undertake  whatever  tasks  were  deemed  appropriate 
to  assist  the  war  effort  in  Spain.  With  his  own  squadron  badly  in  need  of  a  refit  and  unable  to 
sail  immediately,  Shovell  was  faced  with  a  problem  of  resource  deployment.  The  naval 
Council  of  War  at  two  meetings  on  13  March  therefore  decided  that  in  the  absence  of 
reinforcements  the  only  way  to  satisfy  the  demands  upon  the  fleet  was  to  dispatch  Byng  and 
the  Dutch  Admiral  Vandergoes  to  the  Mediterranean  with  as  large  a  squadron  as  could 
quickly  be  brought  together.  It  would  carry  to  Valencia  the  land  supplies  now  ready  at 
Lisbon  and  undertake  any  other  tasks  required  of  it  by  the  Archduke.  Norris  was  to  sail  with 
13yng's  squadron  into  the  Mediterranean  and,  at  an  appropriate  early  moment,  he  would 
proceed  onwards  with  four  warships  to  Genoa  whence  he  would  transfer  overland  to  Turin. 
As  required  by  the  Instructions,  these  four  ships  would  remain  on  the  coast  guarding  the 
Italian  ports  to  prevent  enemy  egress  or  coastal  transportation;  and,  if  this  number  was  to 
21513L,  Add  MSS  28141,  fos.  24,28-30:  Shovell  to  Norris,  28  Mar.  1707  [NS];  'The  Project'. 273 
prove  insufficient,  Norris  could  request  Byng  to  detach  vessels  from  his  squadron.  Equally, 
Byng  was  to  bring  his  squadron  before  Toulon  if  news  was  received  that  the  Duke  had 
punctually  begun  his  march.  Meanwhile,  Shovell  was  to  prepare  his  squadron  tojoin  Byng; 
and,  under  the  anticipated  operational  timetable,  the  combined  fleet  would  sail  to  Toulon.  206 
Byng  left  Lisbon  at  the  end  of  March  with  an  Anglo-Dutch  squadron  of  22  men-of- 
war,  six  frigates  and  slooPs,  and  some  auxiliary  vessels.  He  reached  Alicante  on  Spain's 
south-eastern  coast  in  the  second  week  of  April.  Liaising  with  its  Governor,  Major-General 
John  Richards,  and  the  commander  of  the  allied  forces  in  Spain,  the  Earl  of  Galway,  Byng's 
squadron  provided  coastal  transportation  for  troops  and  provisions;  and,  although  mundane, 
this  service  proved  vitally  important  in  getting  reinforcements  to  Galway's  shattered  army  at 
Tortosa,  where  it  had  retreated  fo  flowing  its  defeat  by  Marshal  Berwick  at  Almanza  (14 
April).  Whilst  engaged  with  this  task  and  also  assisting  the  organisation  of  an  enhanced 
defensive  posture  for  Alicante,  Denia  and  Valencia,  which  were  now  thought  to  be  vulnerable 
as  a  result  of  Berwick's  victory,  the  Orford  and  the  Winchester  joined  from  Lisbon  on  22 
April  with  important  letters  for  the  Duke.  Prompted  by  their  arrival,  Byng  and  Norris 
immediately  met  aboard  the  RoyalAnne  and  decided  that  the  Rear-Admiral  should  leave 
immediately  for  Savoy,  even  though  only  two  of  the  four  ships  originally  scheduled  for  this 
voyage  were  available.  The  storeship  would  also  have  to  remain  with  Byng  due  to  uncertain 
intelligence  of  a  French  fleet  off  Cape  Mallorca.  The  Admirals  were  nonetheless  hopeful  that 
Shovell's  arrival  with  the  rest  of  the  fleet  was  imminent,  as  this  would  release  all  the  vessels 
thought  necessary  for  the  Toulon  operation.  Norris  raised  his  Flag  in  the  Orford  that  same 
day  and  made  good  time  to  put  into  Genoa  harbour  on  3  May;  two  days  later  he  reached 
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Turin  and  met  the  English  envoy,  William  Chetwynd. 
To  facilitate  agreement  on  the  final  details  of  the  plan,  Shovcll  had  fumished  Norris 
with  a  number  of  heads  for  discussion,  but  on  presenting  himself  for  the  first  time  in  the 
2'"BL,  Add  MSS28141,  fos.  24-8:  Shovell  to  Norris,  28  Mar.  1707[NSI;  Harris,  Sir  CloudesleyShovell,  p. 
311;  The  Byng  Papers,  L  146-7,152-62:  Prince  George  of  Denmark  to  Shovell,  10  Feb.  1707;  At  a  Council  of 
War,  13  Mar.  1707  [There  are  separate  minutes  for  the  two  Councils  held  on  the  same  day];  From  Sir 
Clowdisley  Shovel],  13,28  Mar.  1707. 
207  The  Byng  Papers,  L  138,162-88:  At  a  Council  of  War,  10,16,17,18  Apr.,  19  May  1707;  From  Lord 
Galway,  21,23  Apr.,  5,8,10,15,17,20,25,  May  1707  [NS];  From  Major-General  Richards,  28  Apr.  1707;  At 
a  Consultation  between  Sir  George  Byng,  Kt.,  Vice  Admiral  of  the  Blue  and  Sir  John  Norris,  Kt.,  Rear 
Admiral  of  the  Blue,  22  Apr,  1707  [NSI;  BL,  Add  MSS  28141,  fos.  31-2:  Norris  to  Sunderland,  3,7  May 
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Duke's  bedchamber  it  quickly  became  clear  that  Victor  Amadeus  was  unfamiliar  with  the 
substantive  proposal.  This  was  largely  London's  fault.  In  an  attempt  to  keep  the  plan  from 
Peterborough,  who  having  finally  goaded  the  Ministry  into  his  recall  was  expected  to  travel 
through  Italy  on  his  return,  Chetwynd  had  not  received  any  specific  instructions  about  the 
plan  to  communicate  to  the  Savoy  Court.  It  now  meant  that  the  Duke  wished  to  go  through 
and  respond  to  each  article  of  the  'Project'  but  only  once  his  fellow  land  commander,  Prince 
Eugene,  had  arrived  in  Turin.  Until  Eugene  appeared,  the  Duke  would  only  discuss  with 
Norris  the  wider  strategic  impact  and  context  of  the  attack,  particularly  with  respect  to  the 
Peninsula.  These  discussions  did  allow  Norris  to  establish  Victor  Amadeus's  enthusiasm  for 
the  project  and  his  belief  that  it  would  ease  the  military  pressure  on  the  allies  in  Spain.  20'  The 
articulation  of  this  latter  argument  was  significant  inasmuch  as  it  challenged  the  increasingly 
prominent  view  in  some  allied  quarters  that  the  transfer  of  a  substantial  number  of  troops 
from  the  Italian  theatre  to  the  Peninsula  would  be  beneficial  measure  to  the  allied  cause  in 
Spain.  Post-Almanza,  the  Archduke  Charles's  desire  for  reinforcement,  supported  - 
unhappily  from  the  English  perspective  -  by  Prince  Eugene,  threatened  to  undermine  the 
Toulon  operation.  Their  claims  were  eventually  thwarted  by  Marlborough's  intervention 
against  any  troop  transfers  and  Shovell's  resolve  to  undertake  the  operation  . 
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Consultations  upon  the  'Project'  began  in  earnest  when  Eugene  arrived  on  8  May,  and 
it  was  soon  clear  that  troop  transfers  to  Spain  was  not  the  only  resource  issue  which 
threatened  the  operation.  Ever  since  being  forced  to  concede  the  assault  against  CAdiz  in 
1702  rather  than  a  descent  on  Naples,  the  Imperialists  had  continued  to  advocate  the  latter. 
This  reflected  the  Emperor's  primary  territorial  interest  in  the  Spanish  Empire's  Italian  lands 
rather  than  the  mainland  crown,  and  there  had  been  no  change  in  this  regard  upon  the 
succession  of  the  Archduke's  elder  brother,  Joseph  1,  following  the  death  of  their  father, 
Leopold  1,  in  May  1705.  Imperial  ambition  in  northern  Italy  had  only  been  enhanced  by  the 
20s  BL,  Add  MSS  28141,  fos.  28,39-41:  'Some  Heads  which  Sir  John  Norris  is  to  Concert  with  his  Royal 
Ifighness  the  Duke  of  Savoy';  Norris  to  Shovell,  12  May  1707. 
209  Ae  Letters  andDispatches  ofJohn  Churchill,  iii.  382-3,399-400,404:  Marlborough  to  Comte  Maffcy,  28 
May  1707  [NS];  Marlborough  to  Chetwynd,  8  June  1707  [NS];  Marlborough  to  the  'King  of  Spain',  II  June 
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gains  made  there  -  including  Milan  and  the  Duchy  of  Mantua  -  in  the  autumn  of  1706  afler  the 
defeat  of  the  French  at  Turin.  Although  the  armistice  signed  by  Eugene  in  March  1707, 
boosted  the  French  army  by  allowing  those  remaining  French  garrisons  in  northern  Italy,  a 
route  to  Naples  was  now  open  and  the  Emperor  pressed  firmly  again  for  an  attack  against  it. 
in  preparation  he  sought  to  detach  substantial  numbers  of  troops  from  the  army  Eugene  was 
to  join  with  the  Duke's  men  at  Turin,  thus  undermining  the  size  of  the  landward  attack  on 
Toulon.  The  design  of  the  'Project'  anticipated  this  turn  of  events  inasmuch  as  Article  Fifteen 
expressly  rejected  a  descent  on  Naples  as  both  'impracticable',  and  'prejudicial'  to  the  Toulon 
project;  and  this  was  the  theme  Marlborough  and  Godolphin  adopted  in  conjunction  with  the 
importance  of  the  proposed  operation  in  that  year's  strategic  thrust  when  lobbying  against  the 
withdrawal  of  troops  once  the  Emperor's  intention  became  clear.  It  was  however  to  no  avail, 
for  the  joint  response  by  Eugene  and  the  Duke  to  the  'Project'  simply  stated  that  there  were 
sufficient  troops  for  both  assaults.  Nonetheless,  the  folly  of  relinquishing  between  10  000-  15 
000  troops  to  Count  Daun  for  the  Naples  enterprise  was  inadvertently  admitted  by  Eugene 
when  he  subsequently  complained  of  a  lack  of  manpower  to  push  forward  the  siege  at 
Toulon. 
210 
A  lack  of  heavy  ordnance  supplies  -  powder  and  cannon  ball  -  for  the  prospective 
siege  batteries  was  the  principal  resource  insufficiency  that  the  Duke  pressed  on  Norris  during 
the  consultations.  According  to  the  Rear-Admiral,  this  problem  would  only  be  increased  by 
the  Duke's  intention  to  capture  Monaco,  Villefranche  and  Antibes  during  the  march  upon 
Toulon.  It  was  however  largely  London's  fault  that  the  difficulty  over  the  supply  of  powder 
and  shot  had  arisen.  Firstly,  loose  phrasing  of  the  'Project'  document  did  not  make  it 
expressly  clear  who  was  responsible  for  supplying  or  paying  for  the  ball,  though  since  the 
Admiral  had  been  detailed  to  provide  the  cannons,  Victor  Amadeus  with  some  justification 
assumed  this  included  the  shot;  secondly,  although  the  fleet  was  to  provide  some  powder,  the 
exact  amount  remained  unstated.  Norris  made  it  plain  to  the  Duke  that  the  fleet  could  only 
supply  such  materials  consistent  with  its  own  safety;  but,  perhaps  recognising  the  implied 
obligations  of  the  planning  document,  he  lobbied  Secretary  Sunderland  for  additional  supply, 
210rhe  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  ii,  nos.  784,  pp.  755-6  n.  5,772-3  n.  3:  Godolphin  to 
Marlborough,  9  May  1707;  The  Letters  andDispatches  ofJohn  Churchill,  iii.  388-90:  Marlborough  to 
0  Noyelles,  3  June  1707  [NS];  Marlborough  to  Wratislaw,  6  June  1707  [NS];  BL,  Add  MSS  28141,  f  s.  3,38: 
-rb  e  Project';  'Answers  to  the  Memorial  of  Sir  John  Norris',  II  May  1707;  Owen,  War  at  Sea  Under  Queen 276 
particularly  of  ball  which  he  considered  harder  to  obtain.  He  also  worked  with  Chetwynd  on 
procurement  deals  from  Leghorn  and  Genoa  and  wrote  to  Shovell  for  help.  Moderate 
success  was  achieved  inasmuch  as  Marlborough  lent  his  authority  to  procurement  without 
London's  permission  and  Shovell,  now  with  Byng  off  Barcelona,  dispatched  two  ships  to 
Gibraltar  for  additional  supplies  which  yielded  some  12  000  ball.  Nonetheless,  Shovell  was 
eventually  forced  to  reduce  the  fleet  rounds  per  gun  to  35  and  extend  his  own  private  credit 
for  purchases,  which  understandably  greatly  irked  him.  211 
The  more  immediate  significance  of  the  continuing  bickering  over  ordnance  supply 
was  that  it  delayed  the  departure  of  the  land  force  on  its  march  to  Toulon.  212  Upon  Shovell's 
arrival  with  the  main  fleet  of  some  43  warships  off  Finale  on  2  June,  Norr  is  informed  him  that 
the  army  would  be  ready  to  march  within  the  week  . 
21'  Although  the  fleet  auxiliary  vessels 
had  been  loading  supplies  at  Leghorn,  Genoa  and  Savona  before  and  after  Shovell's  arrival  at 
Finale,  there  was  still  much  to  be  prepared  on  the  landward  side  and  it  was  nearly  three  weeks 
before  Eugene  began  to  march  his  35  000  strong  army  from  Turin.  Norris  and  Chctwynd 
caught  up  with  him  three  days  later  on  22  June  at  Limone  just  before  he  began  to  make  the 
crossing  of  the  Maritime  Alps.  Negotiating  the  mountain  passes  via  Tenda,  Breil  and  Sospel, 
the  army  made  reasonable  progress  by  keeping  up  a  steady  pace  of  between  ten  to  fourteen 
rniles  daily  along  arduous  terrain,  though  this  caused  a  number  of  men  and  horses  to  be  lost  - 
principally  from  slipping  down  the  mountain  side.  Resistance  was  threatened  only  once  from 
a  small  fort  at  Sospel  with  a  100-strong  French  garrison  but  it  soon  surrendered.  A  day's  halt 
was  taken  there  on  27  June  to  allow  the  remainder  of  the  army  to  come  up  and  Norr  is  took 
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this  opportunity  to  forward  the  Duke's  request  that  the  fleet  be  anchored  near  the  %%  ide  Var 
river  estuary.  just  west  of  Nice  to  assist  the  army's  crossing  of  this  river. 
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Fig.  17:  The  Route  ofthe  Allies'  Advance  on  Toulon 
The  rapidly  flowing  River  Var  was  not  only  a  considerable  natUral  obstacle,  the 
French  had  dug  entrenchments  along  its  western  bank  some  Ibur  miles  inland  firoln  the 
estuary,  and  in  these  were  stationed  under  Monsieur  de  Sailly  upwards  ofseven  int".  111tr\ 
battalions  and  three  of  horse  and  dragoons.  An  additional  three  battalion  strong 
reinforcement  was  also  expected.  At  a  dinner  hosted  by  Shovell  aboard  the  Association 
Flagship  on  29  June,  it  was  agreed  with  the  Duke  and  Prince  F'ugene  that  the  11cet  \Nould 
undertake  a  diversionary  action  by  bombarding  the  French  entrenchments  nearest  to  the 
estuary,  thus  allowing  the  army  to  cross  unmolested  up  river.  Norris  was  appointed  to 
command  the  small  nine-vessel  inshore  squadron  and,  upon  the  Duke's  ordcr  at  noon  the 
following  day  to  begin  the  bombardment  two  hours  hence,  the  Rcar-AdmIral  began  to  kkarp 
the  squadron  in  towards  the  shore  line  on  the  French  bank  ol'the  Var  near  Cagncs.  At  this 278 
Shovell,  Byng  and  the  fleet's  other  Rear-Admiral,  Dilkes  joined  Norris  aboard  the  Monmouth. 
Shovell  as  the  senior  Vice-Admiral  was  now  in  command  and  he  justified  this  seniority  by 
quickly  appreciating  that  the  bombardment  was  causing  the  enemy  horse  to  draw  away  from 
the  river  side  and  thus  a  flank  attack  by  the  ships'  boats  might  well  capture  the  angle  of  the 
redoubt  nearest  to  the  water.  The  descent  of  some  600  marines  and  seamen  in  boats 
commanded  by  Norris  proved  even  more  effective  than  Shovell  envisaged,  however,  for,  on 
the  boats'  approach,  the  enemy  abandoned  their  works  and  fled.  On  retreat  westwards  to 
Toulon  they  came  upon  reinforcements  under  the  renegade  Irishman,  Lieutcnant-Gcneral 
Dillon,  only  eight  miles  from  the  Var.  Sailly's  experience  of  the  allied  combined  force  at  the 
river  caused  him  to  convince  Dillon  to  abandon  his  base  at  the  small  village  of  St  Paul  and 
seek  sanctuary  in  Toulon.  Notwithstanding  the  French  garrisons  in  Antibes  and  Monaco,  the 
road  to  the  port  was  clearing  for  the  allies.  During  a  two-day  rest  period  at  St  Laurent 
following  the  crossing  of  the  Var,  Shovell  hosted  another  dinner  for  the  Duke  which  Eugene, 
Norris  and  Chetwynd  also  attended.  Shovell  and  his  guests  considered  the  next  stage  of  the 
'Project'  and  it  was  now  that  the  Admiral  persuaded  the  Duke  to  rethink  his  intention  to 
undertake  a  circuitous  march  to  Toulon.  Victor  Amadeus  had  legitimately  reasoned  that  such 
a  route  would  allow  the  capture  of  Villefranche,  Antibes  and  Monaco,  which  would  not  only 
provide  a  secure  line  of  retreat  in  the  event  of  failure  but  also,  when  in  front  of  Toulon, 
relieve  any  anxieties  about  a  French  force  operating  in  his  rear.  On  first  coming  to  Finale, 
Shovell,  supported  by  Marlborough,  had  agreed  that  these  places  should  be  targets  but 
considered  that  the  fleet's  dependence  upon  the  weather  meant  that  it  was  better  for  it  to  be 
headed  for  just  one  place  rather  than  to  have  to  regulate  its  appearance  at  various  different 
points  along  the  coast.  Furthermore,  although  the  French  knew  of  the  operation,  the  allied 
army's  elongated  disposition  when  congregating  at  Turin  had  kept  them  guessing  as  to  the 
direction  of  their  march,  thereby  causing  the  main  French  defence  force  of  26  squadrons  and 
53  infantry  battalions,  which  Louis  had  dispatched  under  Tessd,  to  be  largely  based 
throughout  the  Dauphin6  and  in  the  Provence-Alpes  region.  Intelligence  returns  indicated 
that  there  were  few  defenders  actually  inside  Toulon.  Shovell  now  argued  convincingly  that  a 
direct  and  quick  march  upon  the  port  might  allow  its  capture  before  Tess6  arrived  to  mount  a 
credible  defence.  To  allay  the  Duke's  principal  concern  about  keeping  a  secure  line  of 
retreat,  Shovell  did  commit  the  fleet  to  withdrawing  the  troops  back  along  the  coast  aboard 279 
ship  if  necessary.  A  naval  Council  subsequent  to  the  Duke's  change  of  mind  also  tried  to 
address  many  of  his  fears  and  his  arguments  for  a  gradual  direct  approach  upon  Toulon.  In 
the  absence  of  the  interior  line  of  communication  forfeited  by  not  holding  Antibes  and 
Monaco,  it  was  decided  that  two  frigates  would  be  left  cruising  between  these  places  to 
maintain  a  sea  based  communication  link.  Meanwhile,  a  twelve-ship  squadron  under  Sir 
George  Byng  would,  along  with  the  auxiliary  vessels,  sail  close  inshore  to  shadow  the  army's 
march,  while  being  ready  to  land  immediately  at  least  twenty  guns  if  required.  Shovell  would 
sail  the  remainder  of  the  fleet  to  a  sheltered  anchorage  at  the  hes  d'Hy6res,  where  it  would 
await  the  land  force's  arrival  in  front  of  Toulon.  The  Council  also  took  this  opportunity  to 
settle  upon  upwards  of  100  guns  with  proportional  powder  and  shot  as  the  amount  of 
ordnance  and  supplies  that  the  fleet  was  to  provide  for  the  land  force.  This  supply,  combined 
with  the  ammunition  that  the  Duke  had  eventually  agreed  to  procure,  made  a  total  of  60  000 
shot  which,  even  if  the  fleet  was  unable  to  broadside  the  port,  armed  the  allies'  prospective 
siege  batteries  with  considerable  fire  power. 
The  troops  began  marching  again  on  4  July  and  in  eleven  days  they  reached  the 
environs  of  Toulon,  camping  about  one-and-half  to  two  miles  to  the  east  of  the  port  with  the 
village  of  La  Valette  serving  as  the  Duke's  headquarters.  The  march  had  however  taken  a 
heavy  toll  on  the  land  force.  The  road  to  Cannes  had  been  difficult  to  pass  along  and,  from 
there,  the  sixteen  mile  stretch  to  Frejus  involved  an  arduous  hill  climb  in  insufferable  summer 
heat.  Not  surprisingly,  on  reaching  this  place  the  entire  force  was  exhausted  and  had  suffered 
a  number  of  deaths,  including  at  least  two  suicides.  The  commanders  had  also  allowed  the 
army  to  become  so  stretched  out  that  it  took  two  days  for  the  whole  to  arrive  at  Fr6jus. 
Those  who  were  first  were  occupied  in  helping  to  embark  some  500  sick  soldiers  aboard 
l3yng's  squadron.  More  significantly  however,  this  allowed  Tessd's  force  marching  from 
Barcclonnette  to  gain  time  on  the  allies  and  the  Marshal  acquired  another  day  when  the  allied 
force  rested  at  Pignans  over  the  weekend  of  12-13  July.  Ultimately,  despite  his  longer 
distance  to  march,  Tess6  brought  some  28  infantry  battalions  into  Toulon  on  the  day  before 
the  allies  arrived  at  La  Valette  and,  having  left  them  under  the  Marquis  de  G6esbriant's 
command,  Tesse  promptly  departed  to  bring  up  some  more  troops.  G6esbriant  had  also  bccn 
receiving  troops  in  the  town  from  Provence  and,  in  conjunction  with  the  town's  small 
garrison,  he  had  directed  improvements  to  the  defences. 21  80 
Reconnoitring  from  the  top  of  Mount  Faron,  which  rose  to  the  north  ofthe  town. 
Norris  along  with  Eugene  and  the  Duke  were  able  to  see  that  G6esbriant's  improvements  had 
not  yet  caused  any  palisades  to  be  erected  along  the  dry  ditch  surrounding  the  ten  bastion 
town  wall.  They  did  spy  the  three  small  redoubts  -  St  Catherine*s,  St  Ann's  and  St  Anthony's 
-  that  commanded  the  land  approaches  to  the  town,  and  also  the  towers  and  forts  - 
particularly  La  Grande  and  L'Equillette  towers  -  along  the  coastline  of  the  Great  and  Small 
Roads,  which  might  provide  a  similar  enfilading  fire  across  the  sea  approach.  In  addition, 
Norris  recorded  seeing  about  40  sail  of  the  French  fleet  in  the  westernmost  oftoulon 
harbour's  two  basins,  but  hisjournal  entry  betrays  a  vague  sense  of  puzzlement  that  these 
appeared  tightly  lashed  together.  The  reason  (unknown  to  Norris  at  the  time)  for  the  ships' 
curious  alignment  was  that,  although  Louis  had  diverted  resources  away  firom  the  battlefleet 
to  the  privateers  since  the  battle  of  Mdlaga,  he  did  not  wish  his  capital  ships  to  be  destroyed 
by  allied  fire;  therefore,  he  planned  their  preservation  by  scuttling  them.  Unlike  the  burnt 
timber  carcass  of  a  ship  set  ablaze,  water  damage  to  a  wooden  sailing  ship  could  be  rectified 
as  long  as  the  submersion  had  not  been  too  prolonged.  Shrewdly  however,  two  three-deckcrs 
-  Le  Tonnant  and  Le  Yaint  Phillippe  -  had  been  exempted  from  the  impending  general  scuttic 
and  transformed  into  buoyant  batteries  that  would  subsequently  be  situated  at  the  eastern  end 
of  the  harbour. 
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On  returning  to  their  camp  from  Mount  Faron  on  16  July,  Norris  first  became  aware 
of  an  irresolution  creeping  into  the  land  force's  command.  In  generaL  he  heard  that  Prince 
Eugene  was  beginning  to  raise  doubts  about  the  whole  enterprise;  and  in  particular,  he 
noticed  that  no  men  were  sent  to  secure  forward  posts.  This  latter  inaction  Norris  thought 
odd  for  it  was  affording  the  French  time  to  complete  the  entrenchments  around  their  camp 
outside  the  town,  which  the  reconnaissance  had  revealed  to  be  situated  in  the  ground  between 
the  town's  two  landward  gates,  around  St  Ann's  Hill  -a  much  smaller  elevation  in  the 
foreground  of  Mount  Faron.  The  operational  delay  was  to  an  extent  explained  by  the  desire 
of  the  Duke  and  Eugene  to  consult  first  with  Shovell.  The  Admiral's  progress  towards 
Toulon  had  been  eventful.  Initially  beaten  back  by  a  storm  on  approach  to  the  11cs  d'Hy6res, 
Shovell  had  then  adopted  the  coastal  town  of  Hy&es  as  the  fleet  base  following  its  ready 
submission  -  upon  realising  that  it  was  now  behind  enemy  lines  -  to  a  detachment  of  marines 
landed  from  Byng's  inshore  squadron.  Fortunately,  however,  it  was  located  westwards  of  the 
fies  and  thus  Shovell  had  a  shorter  distance  to  travel  to  Duke's  headquarters  at  La  Valette. 
According  to  Norris's  journal,  the  senior  commanders'  consultation  on  17  July  began 
to  go  over  old  ground  prompted  by  Eugene  and  the  Duke's  questioning  of  Shovell  about  the 
size  and  scale  of  the  fleet  support.  Shovell  again  confirmed  the  ordnance  supply  and  also  that 
the  fleet  would  keep  open  a  coastal  line  of  communication  along  which  the  troops  might 
retreat  aboard  the  ships.  He  also  committed  the  fleet  to  undertaking  a  more  comprehensive 
blockade  of  the  town  by  agreeing  to  dispose  it  from  the  western  end  of  the  harbour,  where 
the  ships  were  to  link  up  with  an  army  detachment  supposedly  coming  over  the  hill,  through  a 
central  position  in  front  of  the  harbour,  to  a  point  near  Hyares  in  the  east.  These  discussions 
on  details  however  simply  masked  a  more  significant  dispute.  This  had  been  current  since 
crossing  the  Var  and  was  principally  between  Shovell  and  Eugene  over  the  speed  of  the 
operation.  The  Admiral,  supported  by  the  Duke  -  albeit  not  to  the  extent  that  the  latter  was 
willing  to  assert  his  superior  command  -  now  wished  an  immediate  assault  on  the  enemy  lines 
prior  to  a  direct  assault  upon  Toulon.  Eugene  however  refused  to  countenance  such  a 
approach,  believing  that  the  French  defence  was  too  strong  and  that  the  element  of  surprise 
had  been  forfeited.  The  consultation  also  proved  an  occasion  for  the  Prince  to  air  his  general 
scepticism  about  the  whole  operation.  Since  the  Duke  refused  to  make  a  definitive  ruling,  a 
compromise  resulted:  the  fleet  would  begin  unloading  the  ordnance,  while  a  small  scale 282 
assault  would  take  place  on  St.  Catherine  Fort  as  a  first  stage  in  fastening  in  on  Toulon. 
Eugene's  real  pre-occupations  were  revealed  when  Shovell  agreed  to  detach  ships  to  Genoa 
to  carry  artillery  supplies  to  Naples  to  succour  Count  Daun.  By  not  forgetting  his  Imperial 
employer's  primary  interest,  Eugene  demonstrated  that  he  was  a  shrewd  political  general. 
The  attack  launched  against  the  St  Catherine's  redoubt  on  the  day  following  the 
consultation  proved  a  success,  but  only  after  an  additional  2500  troops  were  brought  up 
within  a  twenty4bur  hour  period  to  invigorate  an  uncertain  start.  When  General  Razendorf 
launched  an  assault  on  19  July,  the  French  abandoned  the  fort  and  fled,  though  they 
demonstrated  sufficient  presence  of  mind  to  blow  up  the  magazine  and  spike  their  guns  prior 
to  departure.  The  successful  capture  of  St  Catherine's  allowed  the  allies  to  move  their  lines 
forward  and  site  their  batteries  closer  to  Toulon.  The  next  few  days  were  taken  up  by 
breaking  the  ground  for  these  batteries  and  continuing  to  unload  and  bring  up  the  guns  to 
them.  Meanwhile,  Shovell  certainly  remained  keen  to  advance  the  operation;  he  recogniscd 
that  the  basins  of  Toulon  harbour  could  not  be  penetrated  without  first  neutralising  some  of 
the  forts  along  the  roadsteads'  shore  line,  so,  on  21  July,  he  proposed  an  attack  on  the 
starboard  sited  forts,  St  Louis  and  St  Margaret.  He  envisaged  that  the  main  thrust  would 
come  from  the  landward,  though  he  committed  the  fleet  to  a  bombardment.  Norris  and  an 
engineer  were  sent  by  the  Duke  to  undertake  a  feasibility  reconnaissance,  and  they  concluded 
that  both  forts  were  vulnerable.  An  assault  at  St  Margaret  would  however  have  to  be  without 
the  fleet  bombardment,  for  it  seemed  likely  to  the  engineer  that  the  naval  shot  would  carry 
into  the  allied  camp;  whilst  St  Louis  seemed  a  particularly  attractive  prospect  to  Norris 
because  of  its  proximity  -  with  only  a  narrow  neck  of  land  lying  between  -  to  Toulon's  south. 
castem  wall.  Accordingly  the  Duke  ordered  a  battery  to  be  constructed  against  it. 
Work  on  this,  like  all  other  building  or  action  ashore,  seemed  to  proceed  at  halr-pacc. 
-Me  suspicion  for  the  absence  of  momentum  must  fall  on  Eugene,  but  the  Duke  was  also  now 
beginning  to  have  strong  doubts  about  the  operation.  Although  the  shore  batteries  were 
finished  in  the  last  week  of  July  and  were  manned  by  a  combination  of  soldiers  and  scamcn, 
little  impression  was  made  on  the  fortifications  of  Toulon.  Furthermore,  the  enemy  began 
sallies  to  harass  the  allied  lines  and  on  the  night  of  24  July  about  200  of  the  enemy  attacked 
the  right  of  the  allied  works  and  temporarily  occupied  them.  When  several  French  galleys 
also  managed  to  leave  the  harbour,  the  Duke  began  to  worry  that  the  fleet  might  withdraw  its 283 
support  and  leave  his  men  stranded.  On  29  July  he  sought  another  meeting  with  Shovell, 
whom  Norris  warned  to  expect  the  worse.  In  the  event  the  Duke  did  not,  as  perhaps  Norris 
feared,  propose  abandoning  the  operation;  but  he  did  however  convey  his  considerable 
misgivings  about  its  current  prosecution.  He  considered  all  action  to  date  to  have  been 
slowly  implemented,  thus  causing  them  to  have  sat  in  front  of  Toulon  for  fifleen  days  without 
progress.  While  he  still  befieved  the  capture  of  Toulon  possible,  the  siege  would  have  to  be 
pushed  forward  far  more  vigorously.  Shovell  kept  private  his  own  recently  expressed  doubts 
in  letters  to  Secretary  Sunderland  about  the  likelihood  of  success  at  Toulon  and,  according  to 
Norris,  he  wholeheartedly  agreed  with  the  Duke  about  pressing  the  siege  forward.  tic 
furthermore  suggested  that  if  the  town's  capture  was  to  prove  beyond  their  capabilities,  they 
should  aim  to  destroy  as  much  as  possible  of  the  French  shipping  in  the  harbour  given  that  the 
scuttling  had  begun.  The  Duke  was  however  again  unwilling  to  assert  his  superior  command 
and  he  relied  upon  Eugene  for  suggestions  as  to  how  their  conduct  of  the  siege  might  be 
improved  and  accelerated.  Predictably,  the  Prince  proved  diffident,  proposing  only  that  the 
Generals  be  consulted  and  that  the  number  of  the  guns  on  certain  of  the  batteries  be  increased 
to  90.  Despite  not  using  his  command  authority  over  Eugene,  the  Duke  had  no  intention  of 
sharing  it  with  other  officers,  and  accordingly  the  meeting  closed  with  the  modest  resolution 
to  land  more  naval  ordnance  and  to  target  actively  both  forts  St  Louis  and  St  Margaret.  Over 
the  course  of  following  fortnight,  however,  the  allied  siege  continued  in  a  half-heartened 
manner.  Prince  Eugene's  lukewarm  attitude  began  to  permeate  throughout  the  army  and 
their  position  only  seemed  more  vulnerable  when  on  4  August  the  French  launched  around  12 
o0o  troops  along  the  whole  stretch  of  allied  lines.  Although  they  were  eventually  pushed 
back,  a  number  of  allied  officers,  including  the  Prince  of  Saxe-Gotha,  and  men  were  killed. 
More  significantly  the  assault  had  demonstrated  that  the  French  capability  at  Toulon  was  not 
purely  defensive.  Off  the  coast,  the  fleet  was  also  making  little  progress.  Squadrons  under 
Byng  and  Dilkes  had  been  struggling  to  capture  Fort  St  Louis  and  the  various  gun 
emplacements  along  the  coats  which  were  preventing  Shovell  turning  the  fleet's  fire  upon  the 
French  ships  in  the  westemmost  basin.  By  7  August,  St  Louis  and  St  Margaret  were  taken, 
though  the  former  was  actually  abandoned  by  the  French;  and  this  allowed  Shovcll  to  place  a 
detachment  of  ships,  including  the  bomb  vessels,  under  Dilkes  close  into  the  harbour.  This 
manoeuvre  had  no  future  apart  from  targeting  the  shipping  in  the  harbour.  The  Duke  had 284 
already  decided  to  raise  the  siege.  On  5  August,  he  requested  that  Norris  arrange  the 
embarkation  of  the  soldiers.  When  this  was  taking  place  at  St  Margaret's  fort,  he  decided  to 
march  away  with  Eugene,  leaving  the  remainder  of  the  army  not  yet  embarked.  A  couple  of 
days  later  Shovell  followed  the  Duke  back  to  Nice,  and  on  23  August  the  land  force  was 
disbanded. 
The  'Project'  to  capture  Toulon,  which  had  been  a  perennial  item  on  the  Alliance's 
agenda,  had  upon  its  first  implementation  five  years  into  the  war  simply  petered  out.  The 
army-navy  relationship  was  novel  in  the  context  of  the  succession  war;  however,  it  had  not 
been  at  fault.  Facilitated  by  Norris,  the  commanders  of  the  two  frcc-standing  forces  -  the 
Duke  of  Savoy  and  Shovell  -  co-operated  effectively  throughout,  with  the  Admiral  to  his 
credit  always  seeking  both  to  accommodate  the  Duke's  requirements  and  to  prompt  him 
forward.  The  problem  lay  instead  with  the  Duke's  simultaneous  exercise  of  his  land  and 
supreme  operational  commands.  With  respect  to  the  former,  he  too  quickly  deferred  to 
Prince  Eugene;  this  meant  that  he  subsequently  lacked  the  confidence  to  assert  the  latter. 
Eugene,  while  not  a  reluctant  participant,  was  certainly  sceptical  of  the  operation  from  the 
outset.  As  it  progressed,  he  was  only  able  to  view  it  through  the  prism  of  a  land  operation. 
He  considered  the  French  defences  and  manpower  at  Toulon  too  strong  for  his  troops, 
without  thinking  how  the  combination  of  land  and  sea  forces  might  be  effectively  used  to 
neutralise  the  French  strength.  Moreover,  the  Prince  made  plain  his  contention  that  there 
were  allied  armies  in  enclosed  land  theatres  which  badly  needed  the  troops.  Although  it  had 
been  made  clear  even  by  Marlborough  that  resources  were  in  the  first  instance  to  be  devoted 
to  the  Toulon  'Project',  Eugene's  attitude  did  not  engender  the  critical  operational 
momentum.  Failure  at  Toulon  was  the  product  of  irresolute  command  which  had  been 
principally  vested  with  the  land  service.  It  is  true  that  combined  Councils  of  War  have  oflcn 
been  identified  as  the  reason  for  operational  failure  or  underperformance.  On  this  occasion, 
however,  one  might  reasonably  speculate  that  a  sovereign  Council  of  War  under  Shovcll's 
guidance  might  have  provided  the  necessary  operational  momentum  to  propel  the  army  and 
navy  to  the  capture  of  Toulon. 
j.,  Vj:  The  Capture  of  Sardinia  and  Minorca,  July-September  1708. 
The  failure  to  capture  or  destroy  Toulon  meant  that,  once  the  scuttled  ships  had  been  raised, 285 
the  harbour  could  be  quickly  operational  again  and  the  French  might  continue  their  strong 
challenge  for  dominance  of  the  Mediterranean.  The  allies  needed  to  guard  against  French 
egress  or  embarkations  and  this  bore  upon  another  consequence  of  the  previous  year's  retreat 
-  the  lack  of  an  adequate  port  where  the  allied  fleet  could  winter  in  the  Mediterranean. 
Gibraltar  had  served  usefully  since  1705  and,  in  particular,  its  situation  at  the  entrance  to  the 
Mediterranean  had  helped  prevent  the  conjunction  of  the  French  Brest  and  Toulon  fleets. 
Nonetheless,  its  dockyard  could  only  cope  with  a  small  number  of  refits  and,  as  Leakc's 
squadron  discovered  upon  bringing  relief  in  November  1704,  the  roadstead  was  too  exposed 
to  provide  a  secure  anchorage  in  all  but  seasonable  weather.  None  of  the  other  captured 
islands  or  Spanish  coastal  towns  -  Majorca  and  Barcelona,  for  example  -  had  appropriate 
facilities  either,  and  the  practice  had  been  for  a  smaller  winter  squadron  to  be  based  at  Lisbon. 
This  left  the  allied  presence  in  the  Mediterranean  semi-permanent,  and  the  vessels  of  the 
winter  squadrons  faced  a  return  voyage  to  Portugal  if  disabled  at  sea.  214 
Minorca  and  its  harbour,  Port  Mah6n,  had  long  been  considered  the  key  to  the 
permanent  exercise  of  allied,  or  more  specifically  British,  naval  power  in  the  Mediterranean. 
Unlike  Gibraltar,  Minorca  did  not  share  a  land  border  with  enemy  territory  and  it  was  also 
strategically  sited  within  the  Mediterranean  as  the  easternmost  of  the  three  Balearic  Islands, 
with  the  other  two  -  Majorca  and  Ibiza  -  already  taken  by  the  allies.  As  for  Port  Mah6n,  it 
was  a  commodious  and  secure  harbour,  where  a  sizeable  fleet  comprising  the  largest  rates 
inight  easily  winter  .2"  During  the  war,  Minorca  had  frequently  been  suggested  as  a  target, 
most  recently  in  1706  when  Sir  John  Leake  had  captured  Majorca  and  Ibiza.  Then  the 
Archduke  Charles  had  particularly  urged  its  capture,  believing  the  inhabitants  to  be  well 
disposed  to  the  Habsburg  cause,  and  it  would  probably  have  fallen  to  Leake  if  he  had  not 
been  forced  to  take  the  main  fleet  back  to  England  due  to  the  lateness  of  the  season.  216  The 
Archduke  put  the  island's  capture  back  on  the  war  policy  agenda  when,  in  the  spring  of  1708, 
following  a  year  of  military  reverses  on  the  Peninsula,  he  and  the  Emperor  -  albeit  with 
214  7-hemariborough-Godolphin  CorresPondence,  ii,  no.  977,  pp.  975,975  n.  4:  Marlborough  to  Godolphin.  6 
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differing  interests  focusing  upon  Spain  and  the  Italian  coast  respectively  -  urged  the  British 
Admiralty  to  winter  a  fleet  within  the  Mediterranean.  This  clearly  required  a  forward  port 
other  than  Lisbon,  and  Minorca  seemed  the  obvious  target.  The  island  was  still  thought  to  be 
vulnerable,  although  a  new  Governor,  Diego  Leonardo  Davila  -  who  had  been  sent  to 
Minorca  in  January  1707  along  with  (albeit  temporarily)  Marshal  Villars  -  had  tightened 
Bourbon  control  and  improved  the  defences.  Notwithstanding,  London  was  curiously  slow  in 
considering  the  Archduke's  request  and  it  was  towards  the  end  of  June  before  Godolphin 
wrote  to  the  newly  appointed  commander  of  English  troops  in  Spain,  Lieutcnant-General 
James  Stanhope,  pressing  upon  him  the  necessity  of  Minorca's  capture.  217 
Interestingly,  Stanhope  was  not  sent  a  set  of  Instructions  and  had  himself  suggested 
La  Spezia  on  the  Genoese  coast  as  a  winter  port.  However,  as  Marlborough  had  also  written 
about  the  strategic  imperative  of  this  action  at  Minorca  and  criticised  La  Spezia,  the  General 
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was  left  in  no  doubt  that  he  should  take  charge  of  organising  the  operation  forthwith.  Then 
based  at  Cervera,  Stanhope  travelled  to  Barcelona  where  he  began  to  assemble  a  land  force  in 
the  middle  of  August.  Despite  Imperial  reinforcements,  troops  numbers  remained  low  in  the 
Peninsula  and  Stanhope  managed  to  secure  only  about  1800  men.  Of  this  number, 
Southwell's  was  the  sole  English  regiment  with  the  remaining  1300  being  Spanish,  Neapolitan 
and  Portuguese  drafts.  An  artillery  train  of  ten  guns  and  some  mortars  along  with  a 
reasonable  amount  of  ordnance  supplies  was  also  collected  and  Stanhope  was  fortunate  to 
obtain  the  services  of  the  experienced  gunner,  Albert  Borgard,  and  the  engineer,  Colonel 
petit.  Of  course,  this  represented  only  half  of  the  operational  force  for  the  navy  was  required 
to  project  the  land  detachment  on  to  the  island  and  also  -  particularly  if  fierce  opposition  was 
encountered  -  to  provide  fire  support  and  supply.  Aware  of  this,  Stanhope  had  upon  first 
arriving  in  Barcelona  sent  a  dispatch  with  details  of  the  proposed  operation  and  a  request  for 
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219  help  to  the  Admiral  currently  commanding  in  the  Mediterranean,  Sir  John  Leake. 
Following  Sir  Cloudesley  Shovell's  death  on  his  return  voyage  from  Toulon  when  his 
flagship  accidentally  foundered  upon  the  rocks  off  the  Scilly  Isles,  Leake  had  been  sent  to  the 
Mediterranean  as  the  senior  Admiral  for  the  beginning  of  the  1708  campaign.  The  fleet's 
tasks  during  the  early  summer  had  included  transporting  troops  and  supplies  to  the  Peninsula, 
mainly  from  the  Italian  coastline  controlled  by  the  Imperialists,  and  also  escorting  the 
Archduke's  fourteen  year  old  bride,  Princess  Elisabeth  Christina  of  Brunswick-Wolfenbuttel, 
to  whom  he  had  already  been  married  by  proXy.  220  At  a  Council  of  War  on  29  May,  the  naval 
Flags  had  resolved  to  subordinate  the  fleet  to  the  Archduke's  operational  authority  and, 
having  landed  the  Princess  safely  at  Mataro  just  north  of  Barcelona  on  14  July,  Leake  next 
expected  Charles  to  order  the  capture  of  the  island  of  Sardinia 
. 
22  1  Although  mountainous,  its 
fertile  lands  yielded  large  amounts  of  corn  and  the  contribution  this  might  make  to  the  allies 
subsistence  on  the  Peninsula  had  been  recognised.  The  principal  city,  CagliarL  located  on  the 
southern  coast,  was  however  well  defended  by  extensive  fortifications  with  over,  it  was 
reckoned,  200  cannon;  and  any  operation  against  it  would  probably  require  a  sizeable  land 
force  and  siege  train.  Albeit  still  without  a  official  order,  Leake  wrote  to  Stanhope  requesting 
materials  for  a  siege  and  additional  troops  to  bolster  the  marine  soldiers  which  were  expected 
to  comprise  the  burden  of  the  land  force.  Shortly  thereafter,  Lcake's  intuition  was  bome  out 
when  the  Archduke  did  direct  him  to  the  reduction  of  Sardinia.  In  addition,  the  fleet  was  to 
secure  the  Sicilian  and  Neapolitan  coasts  from  the  privateers  and  thus  open  a  passageway  for 
an  imperial-run  expedition  from  Naples  to  capture  Sicily.  On  21  July,  the  naval  Council 
considered  the  Archduke's  order  and  resolved  that  the  fleet  would  start  for  Sardinia  once  the 
marines  coming  from  Tarragona  had  arrived  and  the  Spanish  regiment  -  which  was  seemingly 
all  the  additional  manpower  Leake's  letter  to  Stanhope  had  yielded  -  was  embarked.  Notably, 
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the  Council  also  decided  that  seven  warships  from  the  fleet  were  to  be  lcft  behind  with  orders 
to  patrol  the  Catalan  coast  on  guard  duty. 
With  the  Conde  dc  Cifucntes  500-strong  regiment  aboard  and  about  600  marines 
brought  from  Tarragona,  Leake  signalled  the  fleet's  departure  from  Barcelona  on  25  July. 
The  voyage  proceeded  slowly  as  the  Admiral  initially  waked  for  the  Essex  and  the  Dunkirk  to 
catch  up.  These  ships  had  respectively  delayed  their  sailing  to  take  on  board  the  recent  mail 
and  some  Sardinian  exiles  who  were  to  be  landed  on  the  island  prior  to  the  fleet's  arrival  to 
fan  support  for  the  Archduke.  Next,  when  crossing  from  the  Balearics  to  Sardinia  on  30  July, 
Leake  eased  sail  to  allow  three  warships  to  go  ahead  to  chase  any  enemy  vessels  out  of 
Cagliari  Bay.  It  was  not  until  the  late  afternoon  of  I  August  that  the  fleet,  having  been  joined 
by  the  Dunkirk  earlier  that  morning  following  its  landing  of  the  exiles,  came  upon  Cagliari.  In 
accordance  with  convention,  Leake  sent  a  summons  to  the  Viceroy  and  the  City  Magistrates, 
which  they  returned  later  that  evening  requesting  a  day  to  think  about  it. 
As  at  Cartagena  in  1706,  Leake  was  not  inclined  to  afford  the  authorities  time  to  seek 
terms  nor  to  dispose  their  defences  and  he  immediately  ordered  the  bomb  vessels  against  the 
town.  While  they  kept  up  a  vigorous  bombardment  throughout  the  night  -  some  I  10  shells 
were  thrown  into  the  city  by  the  early  hours  of  2  August  -  Leake  arranged  with  MaJor- 
General  Wills  that  his  marines  and  Spanish  troops  would  congregate  in  the  fleet's  boats 
around  the  Isabella  yacht,  which  Wills  would  board,  for  a  landing  to  the  east  of  the  city.  This 
force  was  augmented  by  900  sailors  who  were  regimented  into  13  companies  with  the  naval 
captain,  Evans,  as  Colonel.  Rear-Admiral  Norris  was  also  ready  with  seven  warships  to 
continue  the  bomb  vessels'  bombardment.  However,  again  as  at  Cartagena,  the  town's 
authorities  sent  out  an  offer  to  surrender  and  then  agreed  to  submit  to  Leake's  terms 
immediately  upon  the  attack  beginning  in  the  morning  of  2  August.  The  Spanish  regiment 
was  disposed  as  a  garrison  and  the  marines  and  the  seamen  'regiment'  were  re-embarked 
aboard  the  squadron.  By  6  August,  all  the  Articles  of  Capitulation  had  been  signed  and  the 
Conde  de  Cifuentes,  as  Governor,  assumed  control  of  the  island  for  the  Archduke. 
it  was  twelve  days  later,  just  as  Leake  was  preparing  his  squadron  to  exact  retribution 
in  the  form  of  400  000  crowns  from  Pope  Clement  X1  due  to  his  alleged  fiscal  involvement  in 
the  'Old  Pretender's'  recent  attempted  invasion  of  Britain,  that  Stanhope's  letter  reached  him. 
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Also  enclosed  with  this  post  was  a  letter  from  the  Archduke  which  -  curiously,  given 
Charles's  previously  expressed  enthusiasm  for  Stanhope's  operation  -  recommended  that 
Leake  first  finish  the  operations  on  the  Italian  coast  and  then  proceed  to  Minorca;  whilst 
correspondence  from  Godolphin  emphasised  the  importance  that  Queen  Anne  placed  upon  his 
current  action  against  the  Pope.  To  decide  the  best  course  of  action,  the  Admiral  held  a 
Council  of  War  that  same  day,  18  August.  The  lateness  of  the  season  dictated  that  only  one 
substantive  operation  might  be  undertaken.  The  Dutch  were  not  involved  in  the  action 
against  the  Pope  because  the  grievance  was  an  issue  of  British  sovereignty  and  therefore  since 
Minorca  had  long  been  an  attractive  prize  for  the  Grand  Alliance,  the  Council  decided  to 
respond  to  Stanhope's  request.  222 
Once  the  Defiance  had  been  sent  to  Majorca  and,  if  necessary  Barcelona,  to  inform 
Stanhope  of  the  Council's  resolution,  Leake  lost  no  time  in  putting  the  main  fleet  under  sail 
for  Minorca  on  the  evening  of  18  August.  After  a  week's  voyage  they  approached  the 
island's  southern  coast  but,  with  no  sign  of  Stanhope  and  his  force,  the  Council  resolved  to 
cruise  off  the  island  awaiting  his  arrival.  Back  at  Barcelona,  Stanhope,  having  embarked  his 
troops  and  train  aboard  the  auxiliary  vessels,  had  encountered  a  minor  problem  in  securing  a 
convoy.  Of  the  seven  warships  left  by  the  Council  off  the  Catalan  coast  when  the  fleet  sailed 
for  Sardinia,  the  three  Dutch  vessels  were  prohibited  from  leaving  that  coastline  after  20 
August;  whilst  the  others,  in  the  absence  of  further  directions  from  Admiral  Leake,  were 
bound  by  their  original  operational  orders  to  remain  there  on  guard  duty.  223  Given  these 
circumstances,  it  is  usually  remarked  that  Stanhope  secured  an  escort  because  his  brother 
commanded  one  of  the  warships  -  the  Milrord  -  then  on  that  station.  224  Doubtless  fraternal 
loyalty  inclined  Captain  Philip  Stanhope  to  help  his  elder  brother,  but  a  Council  of  the  English 
captains  of  those  vessels  left  on  the  coast  legitimated  the  departure  of  the  Mitford  and 
Captain  Trevanion's  York  by  invoking  an  article  of  their  Instructions  which  permitted  two 
222  BL,  Add  MSS  543  1,  fos.  78-9,117-20:  'Instructions  for  Our  Trusty  and  Welbeloved  Sir  John  Leake  Knt', 
4  May  1708;  Sunderland  to  Leake,  4  May  1708;  'The  King'  to  Stanhope,  23  Aug.  1708  [NS];  Stanhope  to 
Leake,  24  Aug.  1708  [NS]  and  enclosure,  'An  Extract  of  a  Letter  from  My  Lord  Treasurer'.  22  June  1708;  'At 
a  council  of  War',  18  Aug,  1708;  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  ii.  271-8;  11MC,  Eighth  Report 
, andAppendix  -  (part  I),  Marlborough  MSS,  p.  32:  Sunderland  to  Marlborough,  7  May  1708;  Trevelyan, 
, rngland  Under  Queen  Anne,  ii.  399-400. 
223  BL,  Add  MSS  5431,  f  123:  'Att  a  Councill  of  War',  25  Aug.  1708;  Martin-Leake,  7he  Life  ofSirJohn 
L,  eake,  ii.  276,278-9. 
22,113.  Williams,  Stanhope:  A  Study  in  Eighteenth  Century  War  andDiplomacy  (Oxford,  1932),  p.  74;  Francis, 290 
vessels,  upon  the  request  of  Stanhope  or  the  Archduke,  to  sail  between  Algiers  or  Majorca 
convoying  corn  for  Catalonia.  As  the  elder  Stanhope  wished  to  go  to  Majorca  first  to  collect 
more  men  and  materials,  there  was  nothing  improper  about  the  Mit(ord  and  the  York 
accompanying  him.  In  the  event,  however,  it  would  seem  that  the  other  captains,  including 
the  Dutch,  also  attached  their  vessels  to  the  convoy  because  Stanhope's  aide-de-camp,  John 
Cope,  referred  to  a  squadron  of  ten  warships  leaving  for  Majorca  over  22-23  August.  This 
number  was  corroborated  by  the  logs  from  the  Mitford  and  the  York-,  whilst  Leake's 
biographer  notes  that  there  were  three  Dutch  vessels  present.  22'  No  extant  evidence  accounts 
for  the  increased  escort  and  the  reasons  for  the  change  in  the  Council's  resolution  remain 
unclear. 
Hours  prior  to  Stanhope's  arrival  Leake  had  received  a  letter  from  him  detailing  the 
additional  marines  and  material  supplies  that  the  expeditionary  force  had  taken  on  at  Majorca 
during  its  two  day  stay  there  (26-28  August)  en  route  from  Barcelona.  Despite  increasing  the 
number  of  troops  to  around  2000,  Stanhope  was  still  concerned  that  his  land  force  was 
insufficient,  particularly  as  the  nature  of  Minorca's  coastline  would  not  allow  the  fleet  to 
provide  close  fire  support  for  the  soldiers  on  land.  Accordingly,  he  requested  that  Leakc 
release  the  maximum  possible  number  of  marines  to  help  with  the  land  action  and  to  form  a 
garrison  in  the  event  of  Minorca's  successful  capture.  While  awaiting  the  land  force,  the 
naval  Council  had  resolved  that,  due  to  the  lateness  of  the  season,  Leake  should  prepare  to 
depart  for  England  with  as  many  warships  as  a  subsequent  Council  would  deem  desirable. 
Meeting  again  on  3  September,  it  attempted  to  comply  with  Stanhope's  request  by  directing 
the  departing  ships  to  leave  any  marines  surplus  to  the  vessel's  highest  complement  with 
Rear-Admiral  Sir  Edward  Whitaker's  seventeen-strong  winter  squadron.  This  naval  force 
was  to  assist  in  completing  the  operation  at  Minorca  for  as  long  as  the  weather  allowed,  and 
then  undertake  a  number  of  other  tasks  such  as  the  transport  of  imperial  reinforcements  to 
VX  First  Peninsular  War  p.  267;  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  p.  277. 
225  13L,  Add  MSS  2223  1,  fos.  78,8  1:  Cope  to  'Sir',  29  Sept.  1708  [NS];  Cope  to  'My  LA)rd',  30  Sept.  1708 
[NSj;  PRO,  ADM  51/4261,  Part  vii,  unpaginated,  Miý'ord,  23  Aug.  1708;  PRO,  ADM  51/4402,  Part  iii, 
Unpaginated,  York:  23  Aug.  1708;  Martin-Leake,  The  Life  ofSir  John  Leake,  ii.  283.  Oddly,  in  a  letter  to 
Sunderland  after  the  operation  -  Mahon,  War  ofthe  Succession  in  Spain,  Appendix,  pp.  Jxxvi-Ixxviii:  To  the 
F,  arl  of  Sunderland,  II  Oct.  1708  [NS]  -  Stanhope  strongly  suggested  that  there  was  no  Council  of  War  and 
that  the  Afiybrd  and  York  simply  precipitously  left  Barcelona.  The  purpose  of  this  letter  was  though  to 
recommend  Trevanion  as  one  of  the  Commissioners  of  the  Navy  and  it  may  be  that  this  objective  caused 
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Spain.  226  Stanhope  was  subsequently  critical  of  the  naval  contribution  to  the  operation,  even 
alleging  that  its  officers  were  more  difficult  to  contend  with  than  the  enemy;  this  frustration 
might  have  had  its  roots  in  Leake's  failure  to  commit  all  the  resources  under  his  control, 
which  appeared  to  mark  a  decline  in  naval  enthusiasm  for  the  operation  compared  to  when 
Leake  left  off  exacting  retribution  from  the  Pope.  The  Admiral's  biographer  -  albeit  again 
overstating  his  case  -  rescues  Leake  from  such  criticism.  Autumn  was  fast  approaching  and 
as  the  senior  Admiral,  Leake  had  always  to  have  regard  for  the  safety  of  the  whole  fleet, 
which  included  the  larger  rates  that  were  unstable  in  poor  weather.  Moreover,  in  complying 
with  Stanhope's  request  for  marines  he  increased  the  land  troops  by  about  500  and  the 
General  could  still  call  on  the  support  of  a  sizeable  naval  squadron.  It  should  also  be  recalled 
that  during  the  war  Leake  had  frequently  commanded  in  the  Mediterranean,  including  at  least 
two  tours  in  charge  of  a  winter  squadron,  and  he  was  thus  unlikely  to  forget  or  downplay  the 
necessity  for  a  secure  Mediterranean  harbour.  Most  significantly,  however,  Leake  did  not 
depart  immediately  but  remained  to  oversee  the  landing  of  the  marines  and  other  troops.  " 
This  began  in  the  evening  of  3  September  at  a  site  about  three  miles  from  the  town  of 
Mah6n  well  away  from  the  harbour's  heavy  fortifications.  228  When  the  landing  was 
completed  the  following  morning,  Stanhope  marched  a  detachment  of  100  grenadiers  to 
, %4ah6n  which,  without  opposition,  quickly  declared  for  the  Archduke.  These  circumstances, 
along  with  the  formation  of  a  small  militia  force  that  was  eager  to  join  the  allies,  seemed  to 
confirm  Charles's  contention  that  the  islands'  inhabitants  favoured  him  over  the  Bourbons. 
Stanhope  sought  to  capitalise  on  this  by  dispatching  some  400  soldiers  north  to  secure  the 
main  city,  Ciudadela;  whilst  Rear-Admiral  Whitaker  did  likewise  by  ordering  a  couple  orships 
to  Fornells,  where  they  were  to  silence  the  fort  guarding  its  harbour. 
226BL,  Add  MSS22231J.  78:  Cope  to  'Sir',  29  Sept.  1708  [NSI;  BL,  Add  MSS543  I,  fos.  124,12&8:  'Att  a 
Councill  of  War',  I  Sept.  1708;  Stanhope  to  Leake,  14  Sept.  1708  [NS];  Lcake  to  Stanhope,  3  Sept.  1708, 
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Port  Mah6n  however  remained  the  allies'  main  objective,  but  it  was  also  the  most 
stoutly  defended  part  of  the  island.  Three  forts  -  Philipet,  St  Philip  and  Charles  -  covered 
both  the  harbour  mouth  and  the  roadstead.  Of  these  three,  St  Philip  was  the  largest:  four- 
bastions,  bolstered  by  three  ravelins  and  a  ditch,  meant  that  it  was  more  accurately  described 
by  John  Cope  and  others  as  a  castle  and,  combined  with  its  situation  on  an  eminence  above 
the  harbour,  its  early  capture  was  imperative.  Additional  defence  for  the  I  000-strong  Franco- 
Spanish  garrison  commanded  inside  St  Philip  by  the  Frenchman,  Colonel  de  la  Jonqui&re,  was 
provided  by  the  harbour's  perimeter  stone  wall  along  which  were  four  towers  housing  four 
guns  each.  Due  to  the  poor  quality  of  the  ground  around  the  harbour  for  transporting 
cannon,  an  attempt  was  made  on  7  September  to  land  the  artillery  near  to  this  perimeter  wall 
but  La  Jonqui&re  effectively  directed  St  Philip's  guns  to  beat  this  off.  It  was  now  - 
notwithstanding  that  the  land  force  was  about  to  face  its  sternest  test  -  that  Leake's  reduced 
fleet  departed  for  England.  Stanhope's  frustration  with  the  Admiral  is  perhaps 
understandable,  though  prior  to  leaving  Leake  did  at  least  augment  the  ordnance. 
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Fig.  19:  Outline  Sketch  of  Port  Mah6n 
On  the  same  day  as  the  fleet's  departure,  another  attempt  was  made  to  land  the 
artillery.  This  time  a  cove  to  the  east  of  the  harbour  was  selected  as  the  site  and,  though 
there  was  no  opposition,  the  land  force,  helped  by  some  sailors,  had  to  haul  the  42  cannon 
and  fifteen  mortars  along  a  rocky  and  obstacle  strewn  countryside  for  upwards  of  twelve  days 
to  bring  them  within  range  of  the  harbour  wall  and  Fort  St  Philip.  By  17  September,  a  nine- 
Minorca',  Pp.  198-200;  Williams,  Slanhope,  pp.  75-7;  Hugill,  No  Peace  WilhoulSpain,  pp.  278-81. 293 
gun  battery  positioned  against  the  two  middle  towers  of  the  perimeter  wall  was  complete  and 
it  began  firing  at  dawn  the  following  day.  Several  hours  of  bombardment  successfully 
silenced  all  the  guns  in  the  two  towers  and  opened  breaches  in  the  wall.  Circumstances  were 
increasingly  well  disposed  for  an  assault  over  the  wall  and  on  against  St  Philip,  even  though  it 
had  yet  to  be  substantially  damaged  by  the  battery.  In  the  event,  however,  Stanhope  was 
deprived  of  the  decision  as  to  when  to  launch  the  attack  by  a  detachment  of  grenadiers  posted 
to  the  right  of  the  allied  lines  under  Brigadier  Wade,  which  advanced  without  orders.  To  his 
credit,  Stanhope  viewed  this  as  an  opportunity  and,  like  Peterborough  on  the  slopes  of 
Montjuich,  he  rallied  the  remainder  of  the  troops  to  the  attack  with  sword  in  hand.  With  the 
loss  of  only  40  men,  the  allies  carried  the  wall  and  the  area  of  habitation  in  front  of  St  Philip. 
The  troops  lodged  themselves  amongst  the  houses  here  and  in  the  fort's  glacis.  The  Franco- 
Spanish  garrison  remained  strongly  placed  however  and  Stanhope  demonstrated  his  military 
pedigree  by  adapting  his  method  of  attack.  He  had  already  distributed  pro-Habsburg 
propaganda  to  encourage  defections  and  now  he  used  a  captured  12  year  old  spy  as  a  human 
billboard,  covering  the  boy  with  notices  in  French  and  Spanish  about  the  allies'  capture  of 
Ciudadela  and  Port  Fortiells,  while  also  offering  2  pistoles  to  every  deserter.  The  boy's 
return  to  St  Philip  had  an  almost  immediate  effect  for,  the  next  day,  La  Jonqui6re  sought 
terms  and  a  capitulation  was  signed  in  early  evening. 
The  Franco-Spanish  surrender  was  premature  and,  on  entering  St  Philip,  Cope 
expressed  his  surprise  at  the  potential  defensive  strength  of  the  garrison.  This  was  Louis 
XIV's  view  and  he  imprisoned  both  Commandant  La  Jonqui6re  and  Governor  Davila  for  their 
conduct.  It  is  doubtless  correct  to  point  to  the  influence  of  the  presence  of  women  and 
children  inside  the  garrison  and  that  there  was  little  prospect  of  a  French  fleet  arriving  to 
engage  Whitaker  and  deprive  the  allied  force  of  supply  but  the  success  of  the  operation 
should  also  be  attributed  to  the  British  conduct  and  Stanhope's  command,  in  particular.  The 
General  maintained  the  unity  and  focus  of  the  combined  force.  In  this  he  was  helped  by  the 
absence  of  detailed  Instructions  from  London,  which  afforded  him  considerable  discretion  to 
shape  the  operation  from  the  outset  and  then  to  command  its  progress.  The  speed  with  which 
the  operation  was  conducted  along  with  Stanhope's  efforts  to  deceive  the  enemy  commanders 
about  the  extent  and  potential  of  his  force  in  addition  to  his  guile  in  altering  the  means  of 
Military  attack  were  also  important  contributing  factors  to  the  success.  Although 294 
understandable,  Stanhope  frustration  should  not  obscure  the  naval  input.  Leake  did  leave 
Whitaker  with  a  substantial  squadron  along  with  as  much  ordnance  as  he  could  spare,  and 
Stanhope  was  well  served  by  the  sailors  put  ashore  with  his  brother,  Phillip's,  enthusiasm  for 
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the  attack  costing  him  his  life. 
Louis's  subsequent  attitude  towards  his  commanders  at  Minorca  did  accurately  reflect 
the  island's  importance  within  the  Mediterranean  and  this  was  underlined  again  in  1756  when 
France  regained  Minorca  and  the  British  Admiralty  accounted  for  its  loss  by  imposing  a 
capital  sentence  on  the  commanding  Admiral,  John  Byng,  which  was  implemented  on  the 
quarter-deck  of  his  flagship.  That  was  in  the  future,  though.  By  September  1708  Stanhope, 
with  an  eye  to  subsequent  peace  negotiations,  had  continued  to  ensure  that  although  the 
island  had  been  captured  in  the  Archduke's  name  it  was  to  be  garrisoned  solely  by  British 
troops.  Britain  had  therefore  gained  a  Mediterranean  port  from  which  the  whole  fleet  might 
operate  all  the  year  round  . 
23'  The  permanent  penetration  of  the  Mediterranean  first  sought  by 
William  in  1694-1695  in  order  to  make  England  the  principal  regional  power  could  now  be 
effectively  consolidated.  It  is  of  some  significance  that  the  instrument  of  warfare  which 
eventually  precipitated  this  was  a  combined  army-navy  operation. 
_1.  vii-  Supporting  the  Camisards  and  Coastal  Diversions:  Unfulfilled  and  Small  Scale 
Combined  Operations  During  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession.  1703-1710. 
During  the  Spanish  Succession  war  there  were  a  number  of  occasions  when  combined 
operations  were  planned  but  never  undertaken  or  were  dispatched  on  such  a  small  scale  that 
they  comprised  little  more  than  raids  upon  the  enemy  coast  line.  Despite  such  limitations, 
interest  in  these  operations  remains  two-fold.  Firstly,  the  preparations  for  their  dispatch, 
including  the  determination  of  the  command  structure,  provided  an  insight  into  operational 
form  and  function,  which  is  material  to  deliberating  upon  a  definition  for  combined  operations 
during  this  period.  Secondly,  the  simple  fact  that  they  were  proposed  indicates  that,  amongst 
their  proponents  at  least,  there  was  a  perceived  role  for  them  within  Grand  Strategy.  An 
understanding  of  their  strategic  purpose  -  albeit  ultimately  unfulfilled  -  is  inherent  to 
contemporary  perceptions  about  combined  operations  as  an  instrument  of  warfare. 
229  BL,  Add  MSS  2223  1,  f.  80:  Cope  to  'Sir',  29  Sept.  1708  [NSI;  Hugill,  No  Peace  Without  Spain,  p.  280; 
Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen  Anne,  ii.  402. 
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Notably,  the  strategic  context  provided  a  common  theme  for  the  unfulfilled  operation 
planned  in  1706  and  also  the  limited  raiding  of  the  southern  French  coast  in  1710.  They  were 
directed  in  support  of  the  Camisard  rebellion  in  the  Languedoc  region  of  France.  The 
Camisards  -  whose  name  was  commonly  though  to  be  derived  from  the  white  peasant  smock 
or  camisia  they  wore  231  mainly  comprised  Huguenot  peasants  who  had  remained  in  France 
following  Louis  XIV's  Revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  in  1685.  Not  only  had  the 
Revocation  deprived  the  French  Protestants  of  their  limited  religious  toleration,  but  it  was 
accompanied  by  a  programme  of  forced  religious  conversion.  As  Languedoc,  particularly 
around  Mines  and  the  Cdvennes  mountain  range  west  of  the  Rhone,  contained  a  great  number 
of  Huguenots,  it  suffered  disproportionately.  Nonetheless,  the  inhabitants  sought  to  maintain 
their  religious  identity  and,  in  the  early  eighteenth  century,  several  young  Protestant  prophets 
toured  the  area  and  fuelled  religious  conviction.  In  1702,  the  intendant,  Lamoignon  de 
Biville,  along  with  his  senior  Catholic  adviser  Abbe  Chayla,  became  so  concerned  with  this 
trend  that  they  ordered  its  suppression.  The  imprisonment  and  death  of  the  prophets  and 
their  families  followed  and  combined  with  the  repressive  taxation  regime,  sparked  a  revolt. 
Although  lacking  noble  leadership,  the  peasant  rebels  organised  themselves  into  a  fairly 
effective  guerrilla  force  which  operated  with  varying  degrees  of  intensity  out  of  the 
countryside  and  the  Cdvennes  massif  for  most  of  the  war.  232 
Allied  interest  in  the  Camisards  was  focused  upon  the  scale  of  the  internal  distraction 
the  rebellion  might  cause  Louis  thereby  disrupting  the  French  war  effort.  At  an  early  stage, 
London  sought  to  supply  the  Camisards  with  war  materials  and  in  1703  arms  and  ammunition 
were  put  aboard  Sir  Cloudesley  Shovell's  squadron  bound  for  the  Mediterranean.  Shovell 
however  failed  to  make  contact  with  the  rebels  and  the  initiative  passed  to  the  newly  arrived 
English  envoy  to  the  Duke  of  Savoy's  court,  Richard  Hill.  Savoy's  accession  to  the  Grand 
Alliance  had  broadened  the  strategic  scope  of  the  war,  with  the  possibility  of  an  invasion  of 
southern  France  which  the  allies  harboured  hopes  of  effecting  with  the  Camisards'  help.  Now 
there  was  the  prospect  that  the  Mediterranean  French  coast  line  might  be  assailed  from 
23113.  C.  Strayer,  Huguenots  and  Camisards  as  Aliens  in  France,  1598-1789:  The  Sirugglefor  Religious 
Toleration  (Lampeter,  2001),  p.  294,  suggests  that  the  name  might  also  have  stemmed  from  the  notion  that 
the  rebels  were  'burners  of  idols'  as  a  camis  was  a  Japanese  idol;  or  from  the  word  camisade  which  embodied 
the  activity  of  attacking  Catholic  strongholds 
232  A.  Ducasse,  La  Guerre  des  Camisards:  La  Risistance  Huguenote  Sous  LouisXIV(Paris,  1970),  pp.  9-63; 
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Piedmont  in  the  east  and  the  Languedoc  towards  the  weSt. 
233 
234  Richard  Hill  had  some  success  in  prosecuting  what  he  referred  to  as  his  'Holy  War'. 
Money  and  supplies  got  through  to  the  rebels  in  the  Languedoc;  while  Hill  also  persuaded  the 
Duke  to  succour  his  own  Protestant  subjects  in  the  Vaudois  in  the  hope  that  they  might  form 
the  mainstay  of  Savoy's  contribution  to  any  action  which  linked  up  with  the  Camisards.  The 
Duke  was  nonetheless  reluctant  to  commit  his  troops  to  such  a  venture.  The  suggestion  in 
early  1704  by  Colonel  Pierre  de  Belcastel,  who  commanded  a  Huguenot  regiment  on  the 
English  Establishment,  that  he  lead  3000  troops  raised  in  Switzerland  into  France  in  support 
of  the  Camisards  was  in  part  blocked  by  the  Duke  on  the  basis  that  it  threatened  to  diminish 
his  own  recruitment  prospects  in  the  Cantons.  Victor  Amadeus's  hostility  continued  even 
when  Bclcastel  travelled  to  Savoy  to  seek  help  for  the  Camisards  directly  from  the  Duke.  235 
opposition  to  such  schemes  did  not  come  solely  from  Savoy.  Despite  the  inclination  of  his 
government  and,  in  particular,  Lord  Treasurer  Godolphin  towards  such  ventures, 
Marlborough  tended  to  see  little  worth  in  them.  When  later  in  1704,  another  Huguenot 
officer,  the  Marquis  de  Miremont,  proposed  leading  an  army  of  8000  men  from  Piedmont  into 
the  Cdvennes  mountains  to  help  the  Camisards  and  also  to  bolster  Savoy's  interests  in  France, 
Marlborough  argued  that  the  money  would  be  better  spent  on  raising  8000  Prussians  for  the 
Duke  of  Savoy's  service.  236 
Thus,  although  in  the  early  years  of  the  war  allied  policy  recognised  that  the  Camisard 
revolt  offered  some  military  and  strategic  advantages,  there  was  a  lack  of  agreement  on  the 
extent  to  which,  and  how,  these  might  be  exploited.  Consequently,  despite  reference  being 
made  to  possible  expeditionary  landings  and  overland  support  from  Savoy,  limited  material 
assistance  was  all  the  Camisards  received.  This  proved  inadequate  as  Louis  moved  quickly  to 
suppress  the  revolt.  The  initial  failures  of  the  local  military  commander,  the  Due  de  Broglie, 
caused  him  to  be  replaced  at  the  beginning  of  1703  by  the  Marquis  de  Montrevel,  who  began 
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an  aggressive  campaign  against  the  rebels  which  he  concluded  in  September  by  ordering  the 
dipeuplement  of  the  Uvennes.  At  the  start  of  the  campaign  in  the  next  year,  Louis 
dispatched  to  the  region  his  most  able  general,  Marshal  Villars,  who  shrewdly  pursued  a 
conciliatory  policy  of  pacification  which,  in  the  wake  of  Montrevel's  shock  tactics,  bore 
considerable  fruit.  Not  only  did  one  of  the  main  Camisard  leaders,  Jean  Cavalier,  seek  terms 
and  then  surrender,  but  the  inhabitants  of  the  region  began  to  live  more  peaceably.  231 
The  revolt  did,  however,  rumble  on,  particularly  in  the  mountainous  area  under  the 
leadership  of  Rolland;  and,  even  when  he  was  fatally  betrayed  at  Chateau  Castclnau  in  1705, 
the  wellsprings  of  rebellion  remained.  238  In  an  attempt  to  reinvigorate  this  Protestant 
opposition  to  Louis  XIV,  another  French  Huguenot  refugee,  the  Comte  de  Guiscard, 
presented  a  proposal  to  the  Cabinet  Council  for  a  descent  on  the  western  French  coast. 
Guiscard  envisaged  that  a  large  number  of  troops,  comprising  several  regiments  raised  among 
the  Huguenot  refugees,  would  land  between  the  River  Charente  estuary  to  the  north  and 
Blaye  at  the  mouth  of  the  Garonne  to  the  south;  Xantes  would  then  be  occupied  and  the 
Huguenots  would  lead  a  detachment  forward  to  the  Uvennes  to  rouse  the  Camisards. 
Guiscard  and  his  proposal  gained  support  within  the  Government.  Sccretary-at-War  St  John 
formed  a  very  favourable  opinion  of  him;  while  critically,  Marlborough  thought  it  an 
appropriate  moment  at  which  to  launch  such  an  assault,  particularly  as  he  understood  that  the 
French  would  have  few  troops  in  that  region  during  the  forthcoming  campaign.  239 
Tbroughout  the  winter  of  1705  and  into  the  spring  of  1706,  six  Huguenot  battalions 
were  raised  to  serve  alongside  eight  infantry  and  four  dragoon  regiments  from  the  English 
Establishment  and  1000  marine  soldiers;  while  four  regiments  of  foot  and  three  dragoon 
squadrons  were  to  come  from  the  United  Provinces.  Sir Cloudesley  Shovell  was  the  Admiral 
appointed  to  the  naval  squadron  from  which  this  force  would  be  projected  but  the  principal 
command  of  the  descent  was  given  to  Richard  Savage,  4"'  Earl  Rivers 
. 
240  Although  it  was 
expected  that  Rivers  would  work  through  a  Council  of  War,  his  Instructions  afforded  him 
considerable  discretion  over  the  choice  of  landing  site  and  the  land  force's  progress 
2"Y  Ducasse,  La  Guerre  des  Camisards,  pp.  142-82;  Lynn,  The  Wars  ofLouls  XIV,  pp.  278-9,297-8. 
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thereafter.  Indeed,  the  main  emphasis  of  the  Instructions  was  not  the  regulation  of  the 
descent  itself  but  rather  its  political  context.  Just  as  was  the  case  with  William  III's 
expedition  to  England  some  eighteen  years  previously,  Rivers  was  to  ensure  that  the  action 
was  viewed,  not  as  a  'conquest',  but  as  an  attempt  to  secure  the  ancient  rights  and  liberties  of 
the  French  Protestants.  To  this  end,  Rivers  was  upon  landing  to  distribute  a  manifesto 
outlining  such  intentions  and  to  punish  severely  any  soldier  who  acted  outside  of  its 
framework.  241 
The  fact  that  Rivers  did  not  receive  these  Instructions  until  the  end  of  July  reflected 
the  substantial  delay  which  beset  the  preparation  of  the  descent  force.  Raising  the  Huguenot 
regiments  proved  particularly  troublesome.  The  senior  officers  were  prickly  characters  who 
easily  took  offence  and  made  considerable  demands  upon  the  ministry;  Godolphin  was  moved 
to  call  them  'unsufferable'.  242  One  of  their  number,  the  Marquis  de  Montandre,  raised  a 
battalion  only  to  decide  late  on  that  he  could  not  serve  under  his  fellow  co-religionist, 
Guiscard,  and  the  Colonelcy  passed  to  Brigadier  de  Vimar6.  Guiscard's  place  in  the 
expedition  was  the  subject  of  a  separate  debate  as  Lieutenant-General  Thomas  Erie  was  to  act 
as  Rivers's  deputy,  a  role  that  Guiscard  considered  his.  The  Frenchman  was  eventually 
mollified  with  the  equivalent  rank  of  Lieutenant-General  and  third  place  in  seniority.  It  was 
not  only  the  establishment  of  the  Huguenot  regiments  which  caused  delay,  however.  Many  of 
the  English  troops  had  to  be  transported  from  Flanders  to  the  descent  force's  camp  on  the 
Isle  of  Wight  and,  not  for  the  first  time,  the  Dutch  proved  slow  in  providing  their 
contribution.  Consequently,  it  took  the  majority  of  the  summer  for  the  material  preparations 
to  come  together  and  it  was  10  August  before  the  squadron  of  28  warships  and  numerous 
243 
auxiliary  and  transport  vessels  weighed  from  Portsmouth  . 
immediately,  the  squadron  faced  stormy  weather  in  the  Channel  and  after  being  badly 
buffeted  for  four  days,  Shovell  put  about  for  shelter  in  Torbay.  Further  delay  was  clearly 
going  to  result  and  this  caused  the  government  and  the  commanders  to  question  seriously  the 
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viability  of  the  operation.  Doubts  based  on  the  increasing  lateness  of  the  season  had  already 
been  expressed  prior  to  the  squadron's  departure  from  Portsmouth;  and,  with  the  diversion 
into  Torbay,  these  simply  hardened.  Moreover,  Guiscard  gave  equivocal  responses  to 
questions  about  the  prospects  for  fanning  the  revolt  in  Languedoc,  which  Rivers  and  others 
put  to  him  during  this  pause  in  proceedings.  Upon  considering  these  issues  the  Queen  along 
with  her  Cabinet  Council  concluded  that  the  descent  was  unlikely  to  meet  expectations  and 
that  certainly  it  would  little  justify  the  considerable  cost  of  it  going  ahead.  WiththeSpanish 
theatre  in  need  of  additional  troops,  it  was  decided  instead  that  Shovell  and  Rivers  would 
depart  for  the  Mediterranean.  Their  new  Instructions  embraced  combined  operations 
inasmuch  as  descents  at  Cidiz  or  Seville  were  suggested.  However,  as  has  already  been 
noted,  in  the  event  both  Rivers  and  the  Government  realised  that  augmenting  the  Peninsula 
army  was  the  first  priority.  244 
With  the  abandonment  of  the  1706  operation,  plans  to  help  the  Protestant  rebels  in 
Languedoc  went  into  abeyance  as  the  Government's  interest  in  the  French  Mediterranean 
coastline  was  firmly  focused  upon  the  capture  of  Toulon  and  ensuing  support  to  the  Duke  of 
Savoy.  245  This  did  not  mean  however  that  the  advantages  offered  by  a  religious  rebellion  in 
south  central  France  were  forgotten.  In  1710,  the  Archduke  commended  a  proposal  -  first 
drafted  by  the  French  Colonel,  N.  N.  de  Seissan,  who  had  been  captured  at  the  siege  of 
Tournai  and  then,  upon  Marlborough's  recommendation,  had  joined  the  Polish  Service  -  to 
take  Cette  in  Languedoc.  Seissan  owned  an  estate  there  and  the  main  purpose  of  the  action 
was  to  aid  those  Cdvennes  rebels  who  still  maintained  their  opposition  to  Louis  XIV,  albeit  at 
a  low  level.  The  proposed  operation  was  not  on  the  same  scale  as  the  one  planned  in  1706 
inasmuch  as  it  was  to  be  put  together  from  those  naval  and  military  forces  already  in  the 
Mediterranean  and  there  were  no  specific  Instructions  drafted  for  its  regulation.  The  in. 
theatre  Service  commanders  were  to  regulate  their  own  conduct,  though  given  precedent  it 
was  expected  that  a  Council  of  War  would  facilitate  their  co-operation.  246 
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On  6  July,  Admiral  Sir  John  Norris,  whose  duties  as  Mediterranean  C.  -in-C.,  in  the 
early  part  of  the  1710  campaign  had  comprised  assisting  the  war  effort  on  the  Peninsula  and 
undertaking  raids  on  the  Genoese  coast,  met  his  fellow  Admirals,  Baker  and  van  Somelsdyck, 
to  consider  the  proposed  action  against  Cette.  247  They  agreed  to  undertake  it  forthwith  and 
that  Edward  Stanhope's  regiment  at  Tarragona,  along  with  a  detachment  of  300  troops  from 
Port  Mihon,  would  be  embarked  as  the  land  force.  Arriving  off  the  Languedoc  coast  on  13 
July,  Seissan  was  put  ashore  at  the  head  of  a  1000-strong  force  about  a  league  from  Cette. 
At  dawn,  the  troops  began  marching  towards  the  town,  while  Norris  disposed  a  number  of  his 
ships  against  its  principal  defence  -a  fort  sited  on  a  mole.  The  heavy  naval  ordnance  was  not 
however  required  as  the  town  capitulated  following  a  short  fire-fight  during  which  some  five 
British  soldiers  were  wounded.  Leaving  Major-General  Wills  in  charge  of  Cette  with  a 
garrison  of  300  men,  Seissan  immediately  pressed  forward  to  Agde.  Norris  had  reinforced 
the  Frenchman  with  some  300  marines  but  they  were  not  required  as  Agde  surrendered  that 
night  without  opposition. 
No  time  was  afforded  to  consolidate  these  gains  as  news  came  through  that  the 
French  military  commander  in  the  Languedoc,  the  Duc  de  Roquelaure,  was  planning  to 
descend  upon  Cette  from  the  nearby  lake.  The  organisation  of  a  number  of  the  ships'  boats 
on  this  lake,  along  with  a  military  force  in  the  environs,  to  thwart  Roquelaure  caused  a 
breakdown  in  communication  with  the  troops  left  guarding  Agde  and  this  post  was 
relinquished.  Seissan  and  Edward  Stanhope  wanted  to  return  immediately  to  retake  town  but 
the  exertions  of  the  troops  over  the  past  two  days  had  left  them  exhausted,  and  instead  the 
force  retired  to  Cette.  The  next  day,  further  consultation  upon  this  reverse  was  held  with 
Norris  offering  another  reinforcement  of  300  men  from  the  fleet  so  that  Seissan  might  attempt 
recapture  of  Agde.  However,  also  on  17  July,  intelligence  was  received  that  the  French 
General  Noailles  was  nearby  at  Mize  at  the  head  of  a  sizeable  force,  while  the  Marshal 
Berwick  had  reputedly  detached  a  number  of  troops  from  his  army  with  the  aim  of  dislodging 
the  British  from  Cette.  Ajoint  Council  of  War  resolved  to  make  a  defence  of  the  town;  but 
when,  in  the  morning  of  18  July,  both  Noailles  and  Roquelaure  brought  their  forces  into  its 
outskirts,  it  was  clear  that  they  greatly  outnumbered  Seissan's  men  and  in  addition  had  the 
247  The  ensuing  account  of  the  operations  at  Cette  and  Agde  are  based  on  the  following  primary  sources:  PRO, 
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fire  support  of  seven  field  cannon.  Accordingly,  as  the  French  Generals  began  their  attack, 
the  decision  was  made  to  re-embark  aboard  the  fleet.  The  retreat  was  completed  successfully 
save  for  the  loss  of  the  Company  of  Foot  appointed  to  cover  it  along  with  the  men  in  the  fort, 
who,  Norris  believed,  had  surrendered  accidentally  to  the  French.  With  the  enemy  fully 
mobilised  along  the  Languedoc  coastline,  it  was  agreed  that  no  further  action  could  take 
place;  and,  although  Norris  commended  the  zeal  of  the  inhabitants  towards  the  British,  the 
Protestant  rebels  were  again  left  without  material  aid. 
The  remaining  notable,  though  unfulfilled,  descent  proposal  during  the  Spanish 
Succession  War  was  developed  by  Marlborough  at  the  beginning  of  the  1708  campaign. 
During  a  conference  at  The  Hague  in  April  1708,  Marlborough  agreed  with  Eugene  that  the 
expulsion  of  the  French  from  the  Spanish  Netherlands  would  comprise  the  focus  of  the 
coming  land  campaign  and,  although  a  set-piece  battle  would  most  probably  be  the  principal 
means  of  effecting  this,  the  Duke  recognised  the  potential  of  a  diversionary  coastal  descent  to 
disrupt  French  action  in  Flanders.  During  the  early  summer,  some  II  regiments  (around  6000 
troops)  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-General  Erle  were  encamped  on  the  Isle  of  Wight 
with  Admiral  Byng  subsequently  detailed  to  command  the  naval  squadron.  As  the 
preparations  of  this  force  continued,  Godolphin  was  confident  that  a  departure  date  at  the 
beginning  of  July  could  be  met.  Then,  however,  Marlborough  defeated  the  Duc  de  Vend6me 
and  the  Duc  de  Burgundy  at  the  encounter  battle  of  Oudenarde  and  Erie's  descent  force 
became  part  of  the  calculation  as  to  how  that  victory  might  be  effectively  followed  up.  248 
Heinsius  pressed  for  the  force  to  range  along  the  northern  French  coastline  to  'augment  their 
[the  French]  consternation  '249  and  Marlborough  agreed  with  this  but  Erie's  men  were  delayed 
at  the  Isle  of  Wight  by  contrary  winds.  Fearful  that  the  wind  bound  force  might  instead  be 
detailed  to  accompany  the  Queen  of  Portugal  to  Iberia,  the  Duke  suggested  that  Godolphin 
rejuvenated  his  longstanding  plan  for  a  descent  on  Abbeville  in  Picardy.  By  mid-July,  it  was 
agreed  with  both  Erle  and  Byng  that  a  landing  would  be  effected  at  Saint-Valery  on  the 
Somme  estuary  whence  the  land  force  would  march  upon  Abbeville  some  eighteen  kilometres 
up-river.  This  operation  was  to  form  part  of  Marlborough's  wider  project  to  invade  France, 
July];  'At  a  Council  of  War',  18  July  1710;  Norris  to  Sunderland,  27  July  1710. 
248  2-he  marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  ii,  nos.  959,982,1005,  pp.  946-7  n.  5,957-8,979,100  1: 
Godolphin  to  Marlborough,  20  Apr.,  II  May,  3  June  1708;  Churchill,  Marlhorough,  iii.  310-12,333-66. 302 
for  after  linking  up  with  Erle,  the  Duke  would  use  Abbeville  as  his  principal  post  on  a  sea- 
bome,  supply  route.  250 
The  plan  to  invade  France  was  however  thwarted  by  Eugene  who,  along  with  some 
other  generals,  argued  that  it  was  more  appropriate  to  capture  Lille  first  thereby  creating  a 
secure  inland  magazine.  Probably  motivated  by  the  interests  of  allied  unity,  Marlborough 
accepted  these  representations  and  on  moving  to  invest  Lille,  the  Abbeville  descent  was 
postponed,  though  not  at  this  stage  abandoned.  Indeed,  Marlborough  hoped  that  if  the  Lille 
siege  could  be  concluded  by  September  then  there  might  still  be  time  to  invade  France  along 
with  the  accompanying  descent.  Meantime,  therefore,  Erle's  force  was  ordered  to  undertake 
raids  on  the  Normandy  coast.  However  there  seems  to  be  no  evidence  that  any  landings  took 
place  -  certainly,  Godolphin  reported  that  a  planned  raid  against  the  port  at  La  Hogue  was 
abandoned  on  approach  due  to  a  heavy  French  presence  in  the  area  -  and  it  was  not  long 
before  Byng  returned  the  descent  force  to  Spithead,  having  merely  caused  the  French  some 
alarm.  It  was  nonetheless  soon  clear  to  Marlborough  that  the  siege  of  Lille  was  going  to  last 
longer  than  he  had  hoped  and  that,  more  significantly,  the  French  defensive  strategy  for  the 
town  sought  to  mount  a  blockade  along  the  River  Scheldt  thereby  cutting  the  allies  supply 
route  and  line  of  communication  from  Brussels.  It  was  the  pressing  necessity  to  circumvent 
this  problem  which  caused  the  eventual  abandonment  of  the  unfulfilled  descent  of  1708;  it 
was  decided  instead  to  land  Erle's  force  at  the  allied  held  Ostend  whence  the  General  might 
organise  a  supply  convoy  through  to  Marlborough.  251 
For  the  sake  of  completeness  it  is  worth  mentioning  that  certain  proposals  for 
descents  on  either  the  northern  French  coast  or  against  the  Spanish  coastline  continued  to  be 
current  until  the  end  of  the  war.  In  particular,  Cidiz  remained  an  attractive  target  for  both 
the  military  and  the  naval  commanders  in  the  Mediterranean,  with  Sir  John  Jennings  in  1709  - 
some  seven  years  on  from  the  Rooke-Ormonde  expedition  -  developing  another  plan  for  its 
capture.  This  though  lapsed  due  to  the  lateness  of  the  season.  In  the  same  year,  the  Earl  of 
249  Yhe  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  ii,  no.  1037,  p.  1026:  Godolphin  to  Marlborough,  8  July 
1708. 
"0  7he  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  ii,  nos.  1035,1037,1040-1,1046,1048-9  pp.  1028,1029- 
30,1033,1034,1040-1,1043-5:  Godolphin  to  Marlborough,  6,8,12,18,20  July  1708;  Marlborough  to 
Godolphin,  12  July  1708;  Churchill,  Marlborough,  iii.  372-3. 
251  Yhe  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  ii,  nos.  1061-2,1081-2,1099  pp.  1056-8,1078-90,1098-9: 
Godolphin  to  Marlborough,  2,20,23  Aug.,  8  Sept.  1708;  Churchill,  Marlborough,  iii.  373-7,414-15; 
Chandler,  Marlborough  as  Military  Commander,  pp.  229,23  1. 303 
Galway  developed  a  project  for  a  second  descent  on  Vigo.  Nonetheless,  perhaps  as  a  result 
of  Marlborough's  advice  which  frowned  upon  such  actions  in  Spain  as  a  distraction  at  this 
stage  in  the  war  when  he  thought  that  efforts  should  be  being  made  to  create  the  appropriate 
mflitary  conditions  for  peace,  it  never  found  favour  with  the  Queen.  252  As  will  be  seen  in  the 
next  section,  a  proposal  for  a  descent  on  the  north  eastern  French  coast  with  the  land  force 
linking  up  with  Marlborough's  army  in  Flanders  was  floated  in  1710.  However  this  was 
bound  up  with  Godolphin's  efforts  to  forestall  an  expedition  to  reduce  Canada,  which  he  and 
Marlborough  disapproved  of  The  Lord  Treasurer  calculated  that  if  the  Marlborough 
proposed  alternative  employment  (such  as  the  descent)  for  the  troops  detailed  on  that 
expedition  then  the  Cabinet  Council  would  opt  for  it  instead.  Marlborough  was  however 
more  sensitive  to  their  increasingly  weak  political  position  as  Anne  began  in  1710  to  remodel 
the  Ministry  in  favour  of  the  Tories  and  accordingly  the  Duke  was  unwilling  to  reduce  further 
his  political  stock  by  promoting  projects  which  would  undermine  the  Canadian  venture.  lie 
therefore  failed  to  respond  to  Godolphin's  suggestion  and,  although  there  was  a  slight 
prospect  that  the  troops  might  have  been  employed  on  a  descent  when  the  Canadian 
expedition  was  cancelled,  in  the  event  the  proposal  never  came  to  fruition  and  the  soldiers 
were  sent  to  Spain.  253 
The  evidence  for  those  combined  operations  which  were  planned  and  abandoned,  or 
which  were  very  small  on  scale,  provides  only  a  limited  insight  into  the  military-naval 
operational  relationship.  Nonetheless,  where  operational  organisation  and  planning  occurred 
prior  to  abandonment,  this  was  not  dissimilar  to  the  preparations  undertaken  for  those 
operations  which  went  ahead.  Similar  points  of  friction  and  causes  of  delay  emerge,  while  an 
appropriate  determination  on  command  structure  had  to  be  reached.  More  significantly, 
however,  these  episodes  demonstrated  a  contemporary  recognition  of  combined  operations  as 
an  instrument  of  warfare  with  a  strategic  purpose. 
252  77ie  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  iii,  no.  1376,  pp.  1342-3,1342-3  n.  3:  Marlborough  to 
Godolphin,  15  Aug.  1709. 
253  See  Chapter  2,  Section  II.  ii,  pp.  339-42. 304 
Section  IT:  Combined  Operations  and  the  Colonial  Theatre  Durin_g 
the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  1702-1713. 
IM:  The  Overseas  Emnire  as  a  Theatre  of  War. 
The  Treaty  of  Rijswijk,  which  brought  the  Nine  Years  War  to  a  close,  did  not  alter  the 
territorial  balance  of  the  combatants'  overseas  empires-'  England  and  France  retained  control 
of  their  pre-war  island  possessions  in  the  Caribbean  and  continued  to  share  St  Kitts;  while  on 
the  North  American  continent,  English  colonial  authority  remained  concentrated  on  the 
eastern  seaboard  with  -  aside  from  the  new  colony  of  Louisiana  -  the  principal  French 
settlements  of  La  France  Seplentrionale  2  to  the  north  west.  The  points  of  friction  between 
the  imperial  powers  remained,  therefore,  fuelling  both  the  keen  trading  contest  and  the  proxy 
conflict  fought  through  the  native  American  Indians.  Accordingly,  the  prophecy  of  the 
Massachusetts  preacher,  Cotton  Mather,  on  a  fast  day  in  April  1701  that  'there  must  be 
another  Storm,  and  War  3  reflected  an  opinion  which  had  become  increasingly  widespread 
following  the  death  of  Carlos  II  six  months  previously.  4  The  Spanish  King's  demise  was 
significant  in  the  imperial  context  due  to  the  extensive  New  World  colonies  -  including 
Florida,  Cuba  and  the  Spanish  Main  (the  northern  parts  of  present  day  Venezuela  and 
Columbia)  -  that  the  Spanish  throne  held  in  addition  to  its  European  territories  in  the 
Netherlands  and  Italy.  The  prospect  that  Louis  XIV's  grandson  might  rule  these  overseas 
possessions  threatened  a  combination  of  the  French  and  the  Spanish  empires  into  a  strategic 
trading  bloc,  which  would  not  only  render  the  Anglo-Dutch  plantations  vulnerable  locally  but 
also,  more  importantly,  influence  the  European  balance  of  power.  5  The  protection  of  trade 
and  territory  therefore  brought  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  to  the  overseas  colonies 
prematurely,  just  as  European  security  was  breaking  down. 
In  early  November  1701,  Vice-Admiral  John  Benbow,  commanding  aI  0-strong 
1A  General  Collection  of  Treatys,  i.  304-5:  Articles  Vil  &  Vill  of  'Articles  of  Peace  Between  the  Most 
Serene  and  Mighty  Prince  William  111.  King  of  Great  Britain,  and  the  Most  Serene  and  Mighty  Prince  Lewis 
XIV.  the  Most  Christian  King,  Concluded  in  the  Royal  Palace  of  Reswick,  the  10/20  September  16971. 
2  French  for  what  was  more  commonly  known  as  La  Nouvelle  France  or  'New  France',  the  central  part  of 
which  was  usually  referred  to  as  'Canada'.  See  P.  S.  Haffenden,  New  England  in  the  English  Nation  1689- 
1713  (Oxford,  1974),  p.  72. 
3  Mather  quoted  in  Leach,  ArmsforEmpire,  p.  116. 
11affenden,  New  England  in  the  English  Nation,  pp.  204-8. 
J.  1.  Israel,  'The  Emerging  Empire:  The  Continental  Perspective,  1650-1713',  in  Canny  (ed.  ),  7he  Oxford 
History  of  the  British  Empire,  i.  441-2;  Len  man,  'Colonial  Wars  and  Imperial  Instability',  pp.  154-5;  Leach, 
, 
4rmsfor  Empire,  pp.  116-17;  Graham,  Empire  of  the  NorthAdantic,  p.  83. 305 
squadron,  arrived  in  the  West  Indies.  Benbow's  purpose,  based  upon  a  report  that  Louis 
XIV  and  Philip  V  had  ordered  their  colonial  Governors  to  prohibit  and  attack  the  Anglo- 
Dutch  trade,  was  in  the  first  instance  defensive.  Nonetheless,  his  Instructions  urged  him  to 
take  every  opportunity  to  attack  the  French  and  Spanish  at  sea  or,  in  conjunction  with  the 
English  colonists,  on  land,  and  also  to  seek  out  the  Spanishflo/a  which  was  thought  to  be 
proceeding  from  the  West  Indies  under  French  convoy.  6  Prior  to  the  official  declaration  of 
war  in  May  1702,  Benbow's  tour  in  the  Caribbean  proved  uneventful.  Admiral 
ChAteaurenault  arrived  in  January  but  the  two  squadrons  never  met,  and  Benbow  passed  the 
six  months  either  in  port  at'Jamaica  with  sick  crews,  or  cruising  amongst  the  islands  to  check 
their  defences  and  secure  the  trade.  7 
The  declaration  of  war  did  not  have  an  immediate  impact  for  the  news  took  nearly 
two  months  to  arrive  abroad.  Once  enlightened,  however,  the  colonists  in  the  Caribbean  and 
mainland  America  began  to  act  against  the  French  and  the  Spanish.  Demonstrating  the  same 
energy  and  aggression  as  his  father  in  the  previous  war,  the  younger  Christopher  Codrington 
(now  Governor  of  the  Leeward  Islands)  mobilised  his  militia  and  the  local  forces  of  nearby 
islands  to  expel  the  French  from  St  Kitts  at  the  beginning  of  July  1702.8  Such  early  land 
success  was  not  however  followed  up  at  sea.  In  August,  Benbow  engaged  the  small  French 
squadron  under  Ducasse  that  had  arrived  to  guard  the  French  assiento  interests  off  the 
Spanish  Main  while  Chiteaurenault  convoyed  the  Spanishflota  home.  A  running  battle  took 
place  north-westwards  from  Ri6hacha,  during  which  at  least  four  of  Benbow's  captains  failed 
to  fully  bring  their  vessels  up,  and,  by  the  end  of  the  sixth  day,  Benbow,  who  was  then 
directing  the  fight  from  a  cradle  rigged  in  his  quarter  deck  having  suffered  a  serious  wound  to 
his  right  leg,  was  eventually  prevailed  upon  to  give  up  the  chase.  On  his  return  to  Jamaica, 
the  Admiral  court-martialled  the  four  captains  and  two  were  sentenced  to  death,  although  this 
punishment  was  not  carried  out  before  Benbow  succumbed  to  his  wounds  in  November.  " 
613L,  Add  MSS  33028,  fos.  13-21:  'Instructions  for  John  Benbow  Esq.  Vice-Admiral  of  the  Blew',  23  Oct. 
1701,19  Feb.  1702. 
7  PRO,  SP  42/67,  fos.  7-8:  Benbow  to  Vernon,  Nov.  1701;  Benbow  to  'Principal  Secretary  of  State',  9  Dec. 
170  1;  Trevelyan,  England  Under  QueenAnne,  i.  26  1. 
S  CSPC,  1702,  no.  968,  p.  595:  the  Council  of  Trade  and  Plantations  to  Hedges,  17  Sept.  1702;  1  larlow, 
Christopher  Codrington,  pp.  147-5  0. 
9  CpSC,  1702,  nos.  936,1063,1063.1,1191,  pp.  x-xiii,  577-9,673-9,744:  Bcckford  to  Nottingham,  4  Sept. 
1702;  Whetstone  to  the  Principal  Secretaries  of  State,  20  Oct.,  25  Nov.  1702;  Copy  of  Proceedings  at  a  Court 
Martial  held  on  board  HMS  Bredah,  8-10,12  Oct.  1702;  CPSC,  1702-1703,  no.  123,  pp.  82-7:  Bcnbow  to  the 306 
Despite  contemporary  and  historical  misgivings  about  the  events  of  this  battle,  the  English 
had  clearly  outgunned  the  French  and  the  disengagement  should  be  viewed  as  a  missed 
opportunity.  'O  Meanwhile,  on  the  American  mainland,  heightened  tension  had  led  to  tit-for- 
tat  frontier  skirmishes  in  conjunction  with  the  respective  Indian  allies;  indeed,  in  the  south,  the 
Carolinians  combined  with  the  Creek  Confederacy  to  mount  concerted  attacks  against 
Spanish  settlements  in  Florida.  By  design  these  early  colonial  actions  were  provided  for 
locally  and  had  little  impact  on  the  wider  conflict.  " 
The  operational  intentions  of  the  Ministry  were  not  merely  limited  to  local  insurgency 
operations  and  defensive  station  squadrons.  Notwithstanding  the  attraction  of  another  theatre 
in  which  to  stretch  the  enemy,  the  mercantilist  economy  dictated  -  as  it  had  during  the  Nine 
Years  War  -  that  wartime  territorial  gain  was  a  positive  commercial  enterprise.  Indeed,  even 
before  the  onset  of  war  Sidney  Godolphin  (then  a  Treasury  Commissioner),  and  a  coterie  of 
like-minded  colleagues,  had  been  planning  to  increase  trade  through  imperial  expansion  and 
had  ensured  a  reference  to  trading  interests  in  the  Treaty  re-forming  the  Grand  Alliance.  "  Of 
greater  significance  for  the  formulation  of  war  policy  at  the  beginning  of  hostilities  was  the 
increased  Tory  representation  in  Anne's  first  Ministry,  and,  in  particular,  the  appointments  of 
the  Earl  of  Nottingham  and  Sir  Charles  Hedges  to  the  two  Secretaryships  of  State.  As  has 
already  been  seen,  traditionally  the  Tories  had  advocated  a  'Blue  Water'  strategy  that 
promoted  a  maritime  war  whereby  the  French  were  principally  opposed  at  sea,  on  the  trade 
routes,  and  in  the  overseas  empires,  rather  than  on  the  European  continent.  In  1703, 
Nottingham's  conceived  this  strategy  as  a  war  conducted  'by  a  Fleet,  and  an  Army 
accompanying  it9  13  and,  although  the  two  Secretaries  could  not  frustrate  Marlborough's 
design  to  fight  the  French  in  Flanders,  they  kept  the  maritime  alternatives,  and  specifically  the 
f  OCUS. 
14 
overseas  expeditions,  in  ( 
The  operational  pattern  which  emerged  for  the  war  overseas  was  nonetheless 
Secretary  of  State  [Nottingham],  II  Sept.  1702;  Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen  Anne,  i.  2614. 
10  The  Admiralty  Secretary,  Burchett,  in  his  A  Complete  History  ofthe  Most  Remarkable  Transactions  at  Sea, 
p.  598,  was  critical  of  Benbow's  conduct,  while  Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen  Anne,  i.  262-3,471-2  n.  4, 
notes  the  continuing  debate  on  the  conduct  of  both  Benbow  and  the  court-martial  led  captains. 
"  I.  K.  Steele,  Warpaths:  Invasions  offorth  America  (Oxford,  1994),  pp.  153-5;  LeaCkArmsfor  Empire,  pp. 
122-33. 
12  W.  G.  Bassett,  'English  Naval  Policy  in  the  Caribbean:  1698-1703',  B111R  A  (1933-1934),  1234;  PLA. 
Sundstrom,  Sidney  Godolphin:  Servant  ofthe  State  (London,  1992),  p.  87. 
13  NRO,  FH  277,  pp.  75-6:  Nottingham  to  The  Pensioner,  30  Apr.  1703. 307 
inconsistent  across  the  empire.  The  proposal  of  Lord  Cornbury,  Governor  of  New  York,  in 
September  1702  that  England  mount  a  combined  army-navy  assault  against  the  French  in 
Canada  was  largely  ignored  as  the  Ministry  concentrated  upon  the  Caribbean.  In  June, 
Codrington  had  been  ordered  to  expel  the  French  from  St  Kitts  and  also  to  forward  a 
feasibility  study  for  an  attack  on  Martinique.  By  the  time  he  received  Nottingham's  letter,  the 
Governor  had,  of  course,  already  completed  the  expulsion  at  St  Kitts  but  he  responded 
enthusiastically  to  the  Ministry's  intention  to  act  in  the  Caribbean  by  sending  home  a  proposal 
for'capturing  all  the  French  islands.  15  Yet  by  1703,  when  the  combined  expeditionary  force 
sent  to  the  West  Indies  had  failed  to  make  any  territorial  gains,  such  operations  in  the  region 
ceased  and  increasing  attention  was  paid  to  mainland  America's  proposals  for  capturing 
Canada.  16  This  pattern  contrasts  with  the  Nine  Years  War  when,  after  Lawrence  Wright's 
failure  in  1691,  a  further  three  combined  expeditions  were  dispatched  to  the  Caribbean  and, 
aside  from  Commodore  Norris's  and  Colonel  Gibson's  voyage  to  Newfoundland,  no 
combined  forces  were  directly  sent  from  England  to  America.  During  the  Succession  War,  it 
was  1708  before  the  Ministry  agreed  to  send  an  expeditionary  force  to  America  and  then  over 
the  following  two  years,  it  broke  this  commitment  twice.  Only  in  1711,  when  the  Tories 
dominated  both  the  Ministry  and  the  Parliament,  was  an  appropriately  sized  operation  to 
attempt  the  conquest  of  Canada  resolved  upon. 
This  section  will  consider  the  single  combined  expeditionary  force  sent  to  the  West 
Indies  in  1702/3  and  also  the  many  planned  expeditions,  but  specifically  the  two  actually 
dispatched,  to  the  eastern  American  seaboard  in  1710  and  1711.  This  should  illuminate  the 
developing  perceptions  on  combined  operational  warfare  which  derive  partially  from  its 
structure  and  composition,  but  mainly  from  its  role  in  the  war  strategy.  As  a  result,  if,  as 
suggested  above,  the  momentum  behind  such  warfare  in  the  colonies  was  increasingly  reliant 
upon  the  political  complexion  of  the  Ministry,  then  a  comprehensive  analysis  of  the 
operational  history  should  promote  an  understanding  of  the  comparative  lack  of  combined 
operations  in  the  Caribbean  and  the  direct,  though  unreliable,  commitment  to  America  during 
14  Gregg,  Queen  Anne,  pp.  156-7;  Horwit7,  Revolution  Politicks,  pp.  167-8. 
15  PRO,  CO  5/1047  Part  11,  fos.  517-18:  Cornbury  to  'My  Lords'  [the  Board  of  Trade?  ),  29  Sept.  1702;  BL, 
Add  MSS  29591,  fos.  13-15:  Nottingham  to  Codrington,  I  June  1702,  and  enclosure,  'Instructions'  [Draft); 
11arlow,  Christopher  Codrington,  p.  149  n.  1. 
"'  Atkinson,  'Queen  Anne's  War  in  the  West  Indies  Parts  1-11',  pp.  100-9,183-97;  W.  T.  Morgan,  'Some 
Attempts  at  Imperial  Co-operation  During  the  Reign  Of  Queen  Anne',  TRIIS  4h  Series  x  (1927),  171-94. 308 
the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession. 
TIM:  Commodore  Hovenden  Walker's  Expedition  to  the  West  Indies  and 
Newfoundland,  September  1702-October  1703. 
Serious  intent  lay  behind  Nottingham's  request  in  June  1702  that  Codrington  reconnoitre 
Martinique.  Soon  after  being  appointed  Secretary  of  State,  Nottingham  had  secured 
agreement  that  once  Sir  George  Rooke's  fleet,  which  along  with  the  Duke  of  Ormonde's  land 
force  was  then  preparing  to  depart  for  Spain,  had  completed  operations  against  the  Spanish 
coastline,  an  expeditionary  squadron  would  be  detached  from  it  for  Barbados.  Arrangements 
were  settled  in  a  'Secret  Committee'  whose  membership  varied,  but  at  its  first  recorded 
meeting  of  26  May  it  notably  included  Nottingham's  fellow  Tories  -  the  Earl  of  Rochester  and 
Sir  George  Rooke  -  and  also  William  Blathwayt,  whose  enthusiasm  for  imperial  expansion 
through  wartime  combined  operations  had  been  demonstrated  during  the  previous  war.  17 
There  were  other  members  of  the  Ministry  who  had  to  be  informed  of  the  proposals 
including,  in  particular,  the  Earl  of  Marlborough.  Although  he  attended  later  committee 
meetings,  Marlborough  was  at  the  end  of  May  already  abroad  concerting  matters  for  the 
forthcoming  land  campaign  with  the  Dutch.  "  Conveniently,  the  detachment  from  Rooke's 
squadron  was  projected  to  be  one  part  of  a  larger  Anglo-Dutch  combined  force  bound  for  the 
Caribbean;  and  thus  Nottingham  took  the  opportunity,  when  informing  Marlborough  of  the 
plans,  to  request  that  he  gain  Dutch  agreement  and  their  commitment  to  make  a  specific 
contribution.  '9 
Although  he  displayed  no  particular  enthusiasm  for  the  project,  Marlborough  lobbied 
Grand  Pensionary  Heinsius,  while  Admiral  Sir  David  Mitchell,  who  had  attended  the  Secret 
Committee,  was  sent  to  The  Hague  to  agree  the  details.  During  these  negotiations,  the  Dutch 
were  accused  of  vacillation,  though  they  in  turn  considered  Mitchell  an  evasive  participant. 
Certainly,  Marlborough  was  forced  disingenuously  to  downplay  the  size  of  this  expeditionary 
force  by  reassuring  Heinsius  in  confidence  that  the  detachment  from  Rooke's  fleet  would 
form  the  major  part  of  the  Maritime  Powers's  presence  in  the  West  Indics.  Despite 
17BL,  Add  MSS29591,  fos.  11-12:  Note  of  the  'Secret  Committee',  26  May  1702. 
"I  BL,  Add  MSS29591jos.  131-2:  Note  of  the  'Secret  Committee',  22  Dec.  1702,  records  Marlborough  as 
present.  Snyder  notes  in  The  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  i.  50,  that  Marlborough  left  England 
for  The  Hague  as  early  as  14  March  in  1702. 
19  NRO,  FH  275,  pp.  33-4:  Nottingham  to  Marlborough,  26  June  1702. 309 
Marlborough's  warm  words  the  Dutch  decided  not  to  contribute,  but  then  they  rather  bore 
out  the  charge  of  indecision  by  changing  their  minds  within  a  fortnight.  20  Meanwhile,  the 
Ministry  in  London  had,  as  part  of  the  process  of  drafting  Rooke's  Instructions,  determined 
upon  the  composition  and  general  function  of  the  detachment  that  was  to  be  made  from  his 
fleet.  Six  sheathed  ships  were  to  be  sent  to  Barbados  with  a  minimum  of  2000  troops,  though 
the  Council  of  War  had  discretion  to  increase  that  number  and,  if  Rooke  and  Ormonde  had 
21 
successfully  captured  either  Cadiz  or  Gibraltar,  then  all  the  troops  were  to  be  sent  save 
those  required  for  garrison  duty.  On  arrival  in  the  Caribbean,  the  soldiers  were  to  be 
disembarked  either  at  Barbados  or  amongst  the  other  Leeward  Islands,  depending  on  the 
advice  of  the  colonial  governors  as  to  their  respective  defensive  requirements.  Garrison  duty 
was  not  however  the  sole  military  task  envisaged,  for  the  squadron  commodore  was  also 
instructed  to  assist  the  local  authorities  in  attacking  the  French  colonies  according  to  the 
resolutions  of  a  Council  of  War.  22 
About  a  week  after  the  Dutch  finally  decided  to  contribute  to  the  projected  larger 
force,  the  detachment  from  Rooke's  fleet  left  the  southern  Spanish  coast  for  the  West  Indies. 
Although  Cddiz  had  not  been  captured,  the  Council  of  War  decided  to  send  some  500  soldiers 
more  that  the  minimum  2000  stipulated  in  Rookc's  Additional  Instructions.  The  four 
youngest  regiments  (excluding  the  marines)  -  Erle's,  Hamilton's,  Donegal's,  and 
Charlemont's  -  commanded  by  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bristow  were  embarked  aboard  the 
transports.  These  vessels  were  to  join  the  six  warships  over  which  Captain  flovenden  Walker 
had  been  appointed  Commodore.  23  parting  from  Rooke  on  25  September,  bad  weather 
bedevilled  the  voyage:  not  only  had  the  standard  provisioning  stop  at  Madeira  to  be  forgone 
20  The  Correspondence  1701-1711  ofJohn  Churchill,  nos.  36-8,39a,  40-1,45,55,  pp.  18-19,20-1,23,3  1: 
Marlborough  to  Heinsius,  13,16,18,23  July,  2,14  Aug.,  23  Sept.  1702  [NS];  Heinsius  to  Marlborough,  21 
juillet  1702  [NS];  The  Letters  andDispatches  ofJohn  Churchill,  i.  8,18-19:  Marlborough  to  Nottingham,  13 
July  1702;  Marlborough  to  Mitchell,  14  Aug.  1702;  NRO,  FH  275,  pp.  46-50,109:  'Instructions  for  Our 
Trusty  and  Welbloved  Sir  David  Mitchell  Knt',  9  July  1702;  Nottingham  to  Marlborough,  3  Sept.  1702;  PRO, 
SP  84/225,  nos.  32,35-6,42,45,48-51,53,56:  Mitchell  to  'My  Lord'  [Nottingham],  23,28  July,  7,14,25, 
28  Aug.,  4,8,16  Sept.,  4  Oct.  1702;  7he  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  i,  nos.  75,80,  pp.  82  n.  5, 
8S.  Marlborough  to  Godolphin,  6,13  July  1702. 
21  This  operational  design  was  completed  before  the  changes  to  Rooke's  Instructions  on  20  July  dropped 
Gibraltar  from  the  target  list. 
22  PRO,  SP  44/208,  pp.  8-10:  'Additionall  Instructions  for  Our  Trusty  and  Welbeloved  Sir George  Rooke',  7 
June  1702. 
23  See  Chapter  2,  Section  I-ii,  pp.  190-201,  for  an  account  of  the  Cddiz  operation;  BL,  Add  MSS  38159,  pp. 
31,33:  'Ormonde's  Journal';  The  Journal  ofSir  George  Rooke,  pp.  216-17,226;  A  Full  andImparlial 
1jisjory,  p.  98- 310 
in  favour  of  the  squadron  making  do  amongst  the  various  Cape  Verde  Islands,  it  took  nearly 
three  months  before  Barbados  was  reached  on  5  December.  24 
On  arrival,  Walker  rode  at  anchor  for  five  days  in  Carlisle  Bay  but  as  no  advice  from 
the  governors  was  forthcoming,  he  asked  the  Barbadian  Council  for  permission  to  land  the 
soldiers  and  sick  seamen.  This  authorisation  took  some  three  weeks  to  be  granted  and, 
meantime,  Walker  fell  sick,  thereby  delaying  the  disembarkation  until  the  end  of  December 
when  a  Council  of  War  signalled  that  there  would  be  no  operational  activity  over  the  winter 
months.  This  Council  also  expressed  its  hope  for  fresh  orders.  25  Limited  progress  had  been 
made  with  this  inasmuch  as  the  Earl  of  Peterborough,  who  had  at  the  end  of  October  been 
appointed  to  the  vacant  governorship  of  Jamaica,  was  assigned  to  command  the  expeditionary 
force  and  concert  its  activities  thereafter.  An  ambitious  set  of  Instructions  were  drafted  for 
the  Earl  which  ordered  him  firstly  to  ensure  that  the  French  windward  colonies  had  been 
comprehensively  attacked  before  mounting  operations  from  Jamaica  against  Havana  and  the 
Spanish  Main.  In  another  illustration  of  the  problematic  slowness  of  communications  during 
this  age,  orders  to  assist  Peterborough  were  also  to  be  sent  to  Benbow,  despite  the  fact  that 
he  had  been  dead  for  four  months  by  the  time  these  were  agreed  in  February.  26 
The  more  immediate  problem  for  the  Admiralty  was  however  the  continued  absence 
of  the  Dutch  contribution,  which  had  still  not  materialised  by  the  turn  of  the  year.  Combined 
with  the  ongoing  preparation  problems  he  was  encountering  in  England,  Peterborough 
became  increasingly  disenchanted  with  the  prospect  of  commanding  what  was  potentially  a 
small  scale  operation  in  the  Caribbean  that  currently  lacked  momentum.  The  Earl  would  also 
have  been  aware  that  in  the  recent  past  a  colonial  governorship  had  not  proved  a  particularly 
fruitful  appointment  for  martial  distinction  and  that  he  was  more  likely  instead  to  get 
14  PRO,  ADM  1/2642,  unf.:  Walker  to  the  'Secretary  to  H[is]  R[oyal]H[igness,  Prince  George  of  Denmark]', 
12  Jan.  1703;  CSPC,  1702-1703,  no.  164,  p.  115:  Walker  to  [Nottingham?  ],  12  Jan.  1703. 
25  PRO,  ADM  1/2642,  unf.:  Walker  to  the  'Secretary  to  HRIi',  12  Jan.  1703;  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  ix, 
unpaginated,  Boyne,  I  Jan.  1703.  For  Walker's  journal,  historians  usually  refer  to  PRO,  CO  15215,  no.  30, 
fos.  1-71:  'Boyne's  Journal,  Remarkable  Observations  and  Accidents'  but  I  have  found  this  to  be  simply  a 
shortened  copy  of  the  Captain's  Log  above,  and  thus  I  shall  refer  to  the  Log  throughout. 
26  CSpC,  1702,  no.  1169,  p.  733:  Nottingham  to  the  Council  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  17  Nov.  1702;  BL, 
Add  MSS  2959  1,  fos.  26-7,131-2:  'Instructions  for  the  Earl  of  Peterborough',  n.  d.;  Note  of  the  'Secret 
Council',  22  Dec.  1702;  PRO,  ADM  2/405,  pp.  176-8:  Burchett  to  Nottingham,  27  Oct.  1702  and  enclosure, 
'Instructions  for  Vice-Admiral  Benbow';  PRO,  ADM  1/4088,  f0s.  120-4:  Nottingham  to  the  Admiralty,  3 
Dec.  1702,  and  enclosure,  'Instructions  for  John  Benbow  Esq.  Vice-Admiral  of  the  Blew';  CSPC,  1702,  no. 
I  19  1,  pp.  744-5:  Whetstone  to  the  Principal  Secretaries  of  State,  25  Nov.  1702,  noted  Benbow's  death  on  4 
Nov.,  but  it  was  6  Feb.  1703  when  it  was  endorsed  K[eceived]. 311 
embroiled  in  local  planters'  disputes.  To  a  man  of  Peterborough's  energy  and  conceit,  this 
would  have  been  tedious;  and  so,  at  the  beginning  of  January,  he  indicated  a  desire  to  step 
back  from  the  projeCt.  27  The  ministers  had  not  decided  their  next  step  when  Admiral 
Vanderdussen  brought  the  long-awaited  Dutch  military-navy  contribution  into  Spithead  in 
stages  around  15  January.  By  this  time  however  both  Marlborough  and  Heinsius  were 
expressing  doubts  about  the  project  and  their  opinions,  in  addition  to  Peterborough's 
equivocation,  produced  an  evident  lack  of  confidence  in  the  eventual  dispatch  of  this  Anglo- 
Dutch  force.  28  Still  unaware  of  Benbow's  death,  the  Admiralty  had  sent  further  Instructions, 
which  afforded  him  far  greater  operational  independence  from  any  force  that  Peterborough  or 
an  alternative  new  Governor  of  Jamaica  might  bring  out.  Specifically,  once  Hovenden 
Walker  had  completed  his  actions  in  the  Windward  Islands,  Benbow  was  to  lead  the  two 
squadrons  and  a  contingent  of  troops  to  attack  the  French  settlements  on  Newfoundland. 
Perhaps  even  more  revealing  of  the  lack  of  confidence  was  the  dispatch  of  reinforcements  for 
Walker's  force.  Through  the  winter  of  1702/3,  an  additional  five  warships  were  scheduled  to 
proceed  to  the  Caribbean,  along  with  a  number  of  auxiliary  vessels  carrying  provisions, 
recruits  and  Columbine's  regiment.  Moreover,  they  were  to  carry orders  for  Walker  (the 
earliest  dating  from  October)  prompting  him  to  begin  operations  against  the  French  windward 
colonies  in  conjunction  with  the  Leeward  Islands'  authorities.  29  The  ministers  certainly 
seemed  to  be  signalling  that  he  should  not  expect  support  from  any  prospective  Anglo-Dutch 
expeditionary  force  from  England.  In  the  event,  that  project  was  officially  shelved  by  the  end 
of  January;  Vanderdussen  returned  to  Holland  and  Marlborough  announced  to  Heinsius  that 
the  Dutch  could  deploy  their  military  and  naval  contribution  on  other  services.  30 
The  Government  was  nonetheless  still  keen  to  dispatch  a  flag  officer  to  the  Caribbean 
27  CPSC  1702-1703,  no.  129,  p.  94:  Peterborough  to  [Nottingham?  ],  3  Jan.  1703;  Lord  King,  The  Life  and 
Letters  ofjohn  Locke  (New  edn,  London,  1858),  p.  242:  Peterborough  to  Locke,  27  Jan.  1703;  1  larlow, 
Christopher  Codrington,  p.  152.  For  further  details  on  Peterborough's  character,  see  Chapter  2,  Section  Liv. 
p.  237  n.  137. 
28  The  Correspondence  1701-1711  ofJohn  Churchill,  nos.  76-8,80,82-3  pp.  45-9:  Heinsius  to  Marlborough, 
12,16,23,26janvier  1703  [NS);  Marlborough  to  Heinsius,  5,12,  Jan.  1703;  1  larlow,  Christopher 
Codringlon,  p.  152. 
29  PRO,  SP  42/67,  fos.  33-5:  'Orders  to  Captain  Hovenden  Walker',  IS  Jan.  1703;  'Instructions  for  John 
1[3enbow  Esq  Vice-Admiral  of  the  White',  19  Jan  1703;  'Orders  to  Captain  Lyell,  Resolution',  19  Jan.  1703; 
PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  ix,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  9  Jan.  1703;  PRO,  ADM  1/2642,  unf:  Walker  to  the 
'Secretary  to  HRH',  12  Jan.  1703. 
30  The  Correspondence  1701-1711  ofJohn  Churchill,  nos.  84-5,  pp.  49-50:  Marlborough  to  Heinsius,  19,22 
Jan.  1703;  Harlow,  Christopher  Codringlon,  p.  152. 312 
and  Rear-Admiral  John  Graydon  was  eventually  selected.  Perhaps  in  an  attempt  to  present 
the  Admiralty  as  coping  successfully  with  the  uncertainty  over  the  Anglo-Dutch  squadron  and 
ensuring  a  seamless  transition  from  Peterborough,  Admiralty  Secretary  Burchett's  memoirs 
pre-dated  the  Rear-Admiral's  appointment  to  19  January.  However,  unless  Burchett  was 
being  unusually  inefficient,  the  fact  that  he  did  not  inform  the  Secretary  to  the  Board  of 
Trade,  William  Popple,  about  Graydon's  appointment  until  the  end  of  February,  belies  this 
earlier  January  date.  Given  that  Graydon  inherited  the  Instructions  drafted  for  Benbow  on  19 
January,  which  included  the  organisation  of  an  expedition  against  the  French  at 
Newfoundland,  and  that  the  Admiralty  only  leamt  of  the  Benbow's  death  in  the  first  week  of 
February,  then  Graydon  should  be  more  accurately  considered  as  his  replacement  and  not 
filling  the  gap  left  by  Peterborough's  withdrawal.  "  The  reality  was  that  both  the 
Government  and  the  Admiralty  had  struggled  to  bring  the  original  project  involving  the  Earl 
to  fruition,  and,  on  its  collapse,  they  lacked  an  alternative.  For  the  foreseeable  future, 
meanwhile,  the  successful  prosecution  of  the  Ministry's  war  policy  amongst  the  Caribbean 
colonies  rested  with  Commodore  Walker's  military-naval  force. 
Hovenden  Walker  had  not  received  the  Admiralty's  earliest  orders  prompting  him  to 
action  until  the  second  week  of  January  but,  once  in  receipt  of  them,  he  began  organising  the 
expeditionary  force  for  departure  to  the  Leeward  Islands.  Almost  immediately  he 
encountered  delay  as  the  land  officers  scrupled  at  not  having  separate  instructions  to  embark 
the  soldiers;  and,  when  Lieutenant-Colonel  Bristow  subsequently  received  these  orders,  other 
officers  demanded  a  second  embarkation  at  Spikes  Bay  because  they  considered  it  too  tedious 
for  the  soldiers  billeted  around  that  area  to  march  to  Carlisle  Bay.  Such  trifles  do  sccm  to 
justify  later  criticism  that  time  was  needlessly  wasted  proceeding  from  Barbados,  but  the 
delay  was  also  a  product  of  an  acute  shortage  of  crew.  Many  of  the  Masters  claimed  that 
they  had  insufficient  men  to  embark  the  soldiers  from  Carlisle  Bay  without  even  considering 
having  to  sail  round  to  a  second  embarkation  point  or,  more  importantly,  on  to  the  Leeward 
islands.  Sickness  had  claimed  a  considerable  number,  though  equally  problematic  on  this 
occasion  were  the  inducements  faced  by  the  sailors  to  remain  on  Barbados.  The  temptations 
of  the  colonists'  generous  hospitality  (some  claimed  debauchery)  and  their  help  with 
31  Burchett,  A  Complete  History  ofthe  Most  Remarkable  Transactions  at  Sea,  pp.  600-3;  PRO,  SP  42/67,  E 
34:  'Instructions  for  John  Benbow  Esq',  19  Jan  1703;  CSPC,  1702-1703,  no.  348,  p.  208:  13urchett  to  Popple, 313 
concealment  ironically  made  them  complicit  in  undermining  the  challenge  to  the  French, 
which  they  desired.  In  addition,  Walker  blamed  the  irresolution  of  the  Barbadian  authorities 
for  failing  to  round  up  the  absentees,  though  it  is  unclear  how  his  proposed  Act  prohibiting 
desertion,  which  the  Assembly  failed  to  pass,  would  have  quickly  yielded  enough  men. 
Eventually,  Walker  was  forced  to  use  soldiers  who  had  some  knowledge  of  seafaring  to  man 
vessels  and,  although  this  was  less  than  satisfactory,  it  had  become  and  would  remain  an 
increasingly  common  wartime  solution  in  this  region  to  the  problem  of  manning.  " 
The  expeditionary  force  finally  departed  Barbados  for  Antigua  on  4  February,  with  the 
Cumberland  staying  behind  for  a  couple  of  days  to  pick  up  any  stragglers.  On  receiving  the 
Admiralty's  orders  at  the  beginning  of  January,  Walker  had  sent  Governor  Codrington  a  note 
of  his  intentions  but  remarkably  this  was  also  the  Governor's  first  news  of  the  squadron  being 
in  the  region.  33  Codrington  was  predictably  frustrated  with  the  lack  of  action  when  he 
received  this  note  on  20  January  and  his  attitude  was  only  hardened  by  a  lack  of  information 
from  London  about  the  problems  with  the  Anglo-Dutch  fleet.  Nonetheless,  characteristically, 
Codrington  had  already  raised  a  regiment  and  two  independent  companies  in  anticipation  of 
Peterborough's  arrival  and,  thinking  now  that  Walker  should  not  be  far  behind  his  note,  he 
immediately  embarked  these  troops  on  several  locally  procured  sloops.  The  Governor  was, 
of  course,  unaware  of  the  delay  that  had  beset  Walker  in  preparing  his  force  for  departure 
from  Barbados  and  this  meant  that  Codrington's  troops  remained  aboard  for  some  three 
weeks  before  the  squadron  arrived  on  18  February.  His  mood  was  not  lightened  by  Walker's 
decision  to  come  to  Antigua,  which  he  thought  wrongheaded  inasmuch  as  the  whole  force 
would  have  to  beat  back  against  the  prevailing  trade  winds  to  reach  the  probable  French 
island  targets.  A  rendezvous  south  of  the  Leeward  Islands  would  have,  according  to 
Codrington,  been  more  appropriate.  Not  only  would  it  have  meant  just  his  few  vessels 
working  against  the  winds,  but  it  would  also  have  allowed  him  to  annoy  Guadeloupe's  coast 
22  Feb.  1703;  HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  v.  486-90:  Instructions  for  [John]  Graydon  Esq,  20  Feb.  1703. 
32  PRO,  ADM  1/2642,  unf:  Walker  to  the  'Secretary  to  HRH',  12  Jan.,  4  Feb.  1703;  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part 
ix,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  1-30  Jan.  1703;  CSPC,  1702-1703,  no.  362,  pp.  213-14:  Codrington  to 
[Nottingham?  ],  24  Feb.  1703;  Atkinson,  'Queen  Anne's  War  Part  V,  p.  103-4;  C.  T.  Atkinson,  'British 
Regiments  Afloat.  Cape  Passaro  and  Other  Incidents',  JSAIIR  xxiii  (1945),  46-53. 
33  Walker  had  on  his  arrival  at  Barbados  in  December  asked  the  authorities  to  notify  Codrington  and, 
although  they  agreed  to  so,  problems  subsequently  arose  over  the  cost  of  hiring  a  vessel.  CSPC,  1702-1703, 
nos.  34,56,148,  pp.  44,53-4,107:  Minutes  of  the  Council  of  Barbados,  10,16  Dec.  1702,7  Jan.  1703. 314 
as  he  sailed  by,  thus  preparing  it  as  a  target  for  a  main  attack.  34  Even  before  the  respective 
service  commanders  had  first  met,  a  familiar  picture  of  competing  land  and  sea  ideas  on 
undertaking  the  combined  operations,  attended  by  certain  notable  points  of  friction,  was 
emerging. 
That  first  meeting  took  place  on  20  February  when  a  Council  of  War  convened  aboard 
the  Boyne  to  consider  the  immediate  course  of  action  for  the  expeditionary  force. 
Nottingham's  original  intention  had  been  for  it  to  attack  Martinique  first  but  at  a  meeting  of 
the  'Secret  Committee'  in  November  1702,  all  the  principal  French  windward  islands  had 
been  surveyed  as  targets.  3'  This  may  well  have  been  prompted  by  Codrington's  plan  to 
capture  them  all,  though  it  is  not  known  whether  his  paper  was  distributed  to  the  Committee. 
During  the  autumn,  Nottingham  wrote  to  the  Governor  encouraging  him  to  attend  to 
Martinique  first  but  aside  from  a  couple  of  ambiguous  references  to  this  island,  none  of  the 
early  Instructions  issued  for  the  Caribbean  theatre  prescribed  a  plan  of  operations.  The 
Ministry  did  draft  more  detailed  instructions  for  Walker  and  Codrington  in  January  which 
attached  certain  conditions  to  their  actions.  The  Governor  was  specifically  directed  to  attack 
Martinique  first  and  then  Guadeloupe;  while  Walker  was  ordered  (like  Wheler  in  1692)  to 
discontinue  operations  on  20  May  so  that  he  could  proceed  to  Jamaica  to  link  up  with 
Benbow  (or  whoever  was  then  the  commanding  officer  on  that  station)  for  an  expedition  to 
Newfoundland.  Walker  did  not  however  receive  these  Instructions  until  late  March  and, 
although  there  is  no  certain  evidence,  it  would  seem  likely  that  Codrington's  arrived  in  the 
same  packet.  36  In  the  event,  Codrington  and  the  other  land  officers  dominated  the  first 
Council  of  War,  which  due  to  the  very  general  nature  of  the  Instructions  had  full  control  over 
nearly  all  aspects  of  operational  planning.  The  Governor  knew  that,  after  his  success  at  St 
Kitts  in  July  1702,  the  French  had  improved  the  defences  throughout  all  their  island 
31  CSPC,  1702-1703,  nos.  200,230,  pp.  132,150:  Codrington  to  [Nottingham?  ],  18,23  Jan  1703;  PRO,  ADM 
51/128  Part  ix,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  18  Feb.  1703. 
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Trusty  and  Welbeloved  Christopher  Codrington,  Esq.  ',  [18  Aug.  1702];  PRO,  ADM  1/2642,  unf:  Walker  to 
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possessions  and  that,  in  particular,  an  extra  1800  men  had  been  put  on  Martinique.  With  the 
English  expeditionary  force  having  already  lost  upwards  of  1000  men  to  sickness,  the  Council 
ruled  out  Martinique  on  the  grounds  of  its  garrison  strength.  As  in  the  spring  of  1691  when 
Commodore  Lawrence  Wright  and  Codrington's  father  were  considering  their  target  options, 
Guadeloupe  was  again  considered  a  viable  alternative.  It  was  nonetheless  necessary  for 
Walker  to  agree  to  bolster  the  land  force  to  around  3000  men  by  contributing  a  'regiment'  of 
some  400  seamen  commanded  by  two  naval  Captains  and  a  First  Lieutenant.  Having 
determined  upon  Guadeloupe,  the  Council  did  not  at  this  stage  deliberate  further  upon  the 
assault's  tactics  and  simply  resolved  to  depart  within  a  couple  of  days.  37 
Two  days  lengthened  into  six  when,  according  to  Walker,  Codrington  failed  to  meet 
his  promise  of  a  quick  departure.  Subsequent  to  this  delay,  the  squadron's  approach  to 
Guadeloupe  became  disjointed  as  a  result  of  the  cumulative  effect  of  a  variety  of  small  but 
troublesome  events.  Walker's  flagship  and  the  Samuel  and  Henry  collided,  necessitating 
repairs  to  both  vessels;  while  Codrington  pressed  the  Commodore  to  detach  two  warships  to 
the  leeward  side  of  Guadeloupe  to  meet  the  separate  hired  vessels  carrying  the  Creole 
Regiment  from  Antigua.  When  the  ma  ority  of  the  squadron  under  Walker  reached 
Guadeloupe's  coast,  just  north  of  the  island's  principal  town,  Basse-Terre,  on  7  March,  an 
anchorage  could  not  be  quickly  found  as  the  pilots  lacked  the  essential  coastal  knowledge  and 
inany  of  the  bays  proved  too  deep.  These  circumstances  forced  the  squadron  close  inshore, 
thus  rendering  it  vulnerable  to  the  French  shore  defence;  and  it  was  only  good  fortune  that 
brought  the  squadron  unscathed  to  an  anchorage  in  Guavas  Bay  on  10  March.  Almost 
immediately,  Walker  launched  a  series  of  small  scale  raids  to  ravage  the  shore  line  in  what 
seemed  to  be  preparation  for  a  landing.  However,  the  land  officers  had  determined  on  a  site 
much  closer  to  the  principal  target,  Basse-Terre,  and  accordingly,  the  squadron  quickly 
weighed  from  Guavas  Bay  and  headed  south,  leaving  only  part  of  the  late  arriving  Creole 
Regiment  under  Colonel  Byam  ashore  to  continue  devastating  the  coastline.  " 
37  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  ix,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  21-2  Feb.  1703;  CSPC,  1702-1703,  no.  362,  p.  214: 
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Close  to  where  the  troops  had  been  PLIt  ashore  in  1691,  the  suitability  ol'Petits 
1-  labitants  Bay  as  a  base  of  operations  was  next  assessed.  "'  Captain  Fairborne  ofthe 
Maidmone  was  first  to  try  an  anchorage  ofTthe  Bay*s  South  Watch  I  louse,  whereupon  he 
came  under  small  arms  fire  that  killed  a  number  ofhis  crew.  The  enemy  troops  in  (fie  Watch 
I  fouse  could  not  however  hold  out  against  the  Maitlvlone'.  v  guns  and  once  they  had  fled,  the 
rest  ofthc  squadron  dropped  anchor.  The  French  had  redeployed  behind  the  watcr-sidc 
breast  works,  though  this  position  was  equally  vulnerable  and  it  required  only  a  couple  of 
broadsides  to  hasten  the  defiendcrs  firom  the  shore  line.  With  a  landing  area  [low  secured, 
consultations  on  a  troop  disembarkation  began,  but  again  the  Council  reflected  the  concerns 
"  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  ix,  unpaginated,  Bo 
- 
vne,  23  Feb.  -  10  Mar.  1703. 
39  The  narrative  ofthis  part  of  the  operation  in  Harlow,  Chriviopher  Cotiringlon.  pp.  f  57-8  is  misleadjjjgý 
I  farlow  writes  of  the  action  at  Petits  I  labintants  Bay  as  taking  place  at  Guavas  Bay.  I'llus.  lie  overlook%  the 
pressure  exerted  by  the  land  forces  to  get  as  close  to  Basse-Terre  as  possible  bcf'orc  landiny  -a  point  ()i  ,  ollic 
importance  when  considering  the  history  of  a  combined  army-navy  operation. 
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of  Codrington  and  the  land  officers  by  deten-nining  to  look  for  a  site  further  southwards  and 
settfing  upon  La  Bayfiff.  Captain  Fairborne  was  to  command  the  landing,  which  was  to 
comprise  a  series  of  mutually  reinforcing  detachments.  The  remainder  of  the  Creoles,  along 
with  Major  Johnson's  company  of  grenadiers  from  Whetham's  regiment  and  150  other  men, 
would  go  ashore  first  in  the  early  hours  to  establish  a  bridgehead  and  they  would  then  be 
followed  within  three  hours  by  a  tranche  of  1200  soldiers  from  the  four  regiments  brought  by 
Walker.  The  Chichester  and  the  Sunderland  were  to  provide  fire  support  by  plying  the 
nearby  coastline  and,  in  particular,  silencing  La  Bayliff  s  defences.  Once  secure  inside  the 
village,  Codrington  was  to  march  the  troops  forwards  to  Basse-Terre.  40 
This  landing  proved  a  good  illustration  of  how  operational  planning  can  be  upset  by 
the  unexpected  during  its  execution.  For  unknown  reasons,  the  Creoles  and  the  grenadiers 
were  delayed  until  dawn,  by  which  time  the  first  detachment  of  regulars  should  have  been 
ashore  for  over  an  hour.  Codrington  then  either  precipitously  or  in  an  attempt  to  inject  some 
urgency  into  the  operation  -  depending  upon  the  service  provenance  of  the  source  - 
dispatched  500  of  the  1200  troops  which  had  rendezvoused  on  the  Yarmouth.  The  urgency 
possibly  caused  the  lapse  in  judgement  that  steered  these  boats  to  a  well  entrenched  area  of 
the  landing  site,  whence  the  French  were  organising  a  vigorous  fire.  Meanwhile,  as  the 
Sunderland  had  been  driven  off  the  coast  on  losing  its  anchor,  only  the  Chichester  could 
provide  any  sea-based  fire  support  -  although  the  Maidstone  was  belatedly  ordered  to  assist. 
Not  surprisingly,  it  took  Codrington  and  Colonels  Whetharn  and  Wills  over  an  hour  to  force 
the  French  from  the  trenches,  and  it  was  night  before  La  Bayliff  village  was  secure. 
Additional  troops  had  to  be  landed  for  Codrington's  assault  on  the  hill  batteries  and  the 
fortified  church  which  overlooked  the  village,  but,  once  these  had  been  captured,  the 
resistance  to  Colonel  Moses's  night  attack  on  the  village  plantation  was  negligible.  41 
Perhaps  sensing  that  the  operation  was  at  last  gathering  some  momentum,  Codrington 
was  keen  to  press  on  towards  Basse-Terre,  which  was  now  only  a  few  miles  distant.  A 
comparison  of  the  contemporary  descriptions  suggest  that  its  defensive  fortirications  had  been 
augmented  since  the  attack  in  1691.  The  'cavalier',  which  had  been  linked  by  trenches  to  the 
"0  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  ix,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  10-12  Mar.  1703;  PRO,  CO  152/5,  C  174:  enclosure, 
Council  of  War  Minutes,  II  Mar.  1703. 
41  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  ix,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  12-13  Mar.  1703;  Harlow,  Christopher  Codringlon,  pp. 
158-9. 318 
castle  now  appeared  substantially  more  like  a  fort  -  and  was  described  as  such  -  than  a  raised 
outpost.  The  strength  of  both  buildings  remained  enhanced  by  their  positioning  on  a 
precipice  overlooking  the  town  and  on  either  bank  of  the  Galion  river  that  discharged  into  the 
harbour  below.  It  was  however  the  main  area  of  habitation  around  the  sea-front  that  the  land 
force  fust  approached  on  13  March,  having  taken  the  coastal  route  from  La  Bayliff.  Here,  no 
resistance  was  encountered  for  the  town's  defenders  fled  uphill  to  the  fort  ifications.  As 
Codrington's  land  Council  recognised  when  it  convened  the  following  day,  the  French 
abandonment  of  the  lower  town  was  tactically  shrewd:  command  from  the  heights  retained 
control  of  the  town  and  rendered  the  English  position  vulnerable  to  bombardment.  Militarily, 
Codrington's  only  option  seemed  to  be  the  construction  of  a  battery  in  the  hope  that  it  would 
open  a  breach  in  the  French  position.  Accordingly,  Walker  agreed  to  the  Council's  request 
that  he  provide  six  fully  crewed  12  and  18  pounders,  which  the  naval  'regiment'  ashore  would 
position  provided  enough  ships'  carpenters  could  be  spared  to  craft  land  carriages.  The 
landing  of  this  ordnance  from  the  Boyne,  Cumberland,  Chichester  and  the.  4nglessey  was 
ordered  on  15  March. 
The  Governor  and  his  fellow  land  officers  were  nonetheless  aware  that  even  if  a 
breach  could  be  opened,  the  assault  troops  would  have  to  work  uphill  against  a  potentially 
devastating  fire.  Moreover,  the  strength  of  the  French  position  was  notjust  its  elevation:  the 
fort  and  castle  were  mutually  reinforcing  through  a  network  of  trenches,  while  a  ditch 
encompassed  both.  Thus,  although  they  resolved  to  request  the  naval  ordnance,  the  Council 
considered  alternative  means  of  attack.  One  possibility  suggested  by  Codrington  was  to 
target  the  island's  Dos  D'Asne  -  simply  a  fortified  camp  which  was  a  characteristic  feature  of 
eighteenth  century  West  Indian  colonies.  The  Council  reasoned  that  if  this  camp  was 
surprised  with  a  majority  of  the  island's  inhabitants  inside,  then  the  garrison  defence  in  the 
fort  and  castle  would  dissolve.  It  was  decided  that  Codrington  would  lead  some  2000 
soldiers  against  the  Dos  D'Asne  and  that  the  squadron  was  to  provide  the  four  days 
provisions  required  for  the  march  into  the  island's  interior  where  such  camps  were  usually 
located.  Walker  raised  no  objection  to  the  naval  contribution,  but  he  failed  to  prioritisc  its 
requirements  by  first  attempting  to  resolve  the  victualling  problems  which  had  arisen  between 
the  two  Services  since  the  landing.  Immediate  surprise  was  critical  to  a  successful  attack  on 
the  Dos  D'Asne  and  the  two  day  delay  before  the  provisions  came  ashore  sufficicntly 319 
diminished  the  prospect  of  success  to  cast  doubt  on  the  merit  of  now  launching  the  operation. 
This  view  was  quickly  confirmed  when  news  reached  Codrington  that  the  French  had  landed 
several  hundred  reinforcements  from  Martinique.  The  attempt  to  side-step  an  attack  on  the 
fortified  upper  reaches  of  Basse-Terre  thus  lapsed,  and  the  expeditionary  force  turned  its 
attention  to  constructing  the  battery.  42 
Less  two  18  pounders  which  the  squadron  failed  to  land,  the  battery  began  firing  on 
22  March  and  it  quickly  proved  to  be  of  sufficient  weight  and  accuracy  by  opening  up  a 
breach  within  a  couple  of  days.  Although  Captain  Moses  -  one  of  the  naval  officers 
commanding  the  sailors  ashore  -  reported  to  Walker  that  this  breach  was  sizeable,  the  land 
officers'  passivity  indicated  that  they  did  not  yet  consider  it  sufficiently  wide  to  risk  an 
infantry  assault.  Having  already  sent  off  additional  powder  and  supplies,  Walker  took  this 
opportunity  to  warn  Moses  that  in  his  view  the  continued  dispatch  of  further  supplies  was 
inconsistent  with  the  squadron's  safety.  43  Harlow  is  surely  correct  to  suggest  that  the 
hardening  of  Walker's  attitude  was  partially  a  consequence  of  having  just  received  the 
Admiralty  orders  regarding  the  post-20  May  expedition  to  Newfoundland,  but  his  charge  that 
Walker  behaved  like  most  sailors  of  this  period  in  having  'a  rooted  objection  to  sacrificing  the 
44 
navy  for  the  benefit  of  land  operations'  cannot  be  sustained.  This  accusation  represents 
Walker  as  committed  to  a  general  principle  whereas  in  this  instance  he  was  simply  protecting 
the  navy's  interests  in  accordance  with  the  operational  circumstances.  Walker  had  generally 
provided  -  albeit  often  delayed  -  whatever  the  land  force  requested;  he  had  even  proved 
receptive  to  Codrington's  suggestions  about  the  stationing  of  individual  ships  -a 
responsibility  usually  jealously  guarded  by  the  naval  commander.  The  Governor  meanwhile 
might  be  seen  as  rather  awkward  and  uncommunicative  about  both  his  intentions  and  the 
progress  of  the  action  ashore.  Notably,  Codrington  fell  silent  on  his  own  request  for  the 
dispatch  of  a  ship  to  the  windward  side  of  Guadeloupe  when  Walker  -  admittedly  perhaps 
mischievously  -  selected  the  Yarmouth,  which  required  the  withdrawal  of  its  sailors  from 
42  PRO,  CO  152/5,  f.  175:  enclosure,  Council  of  War  Minutes,  14  Mar.  1703;  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  ix, 
unpaginated,  Boyne,  13,15-18  Mar.  1703;  Codrington  to  Walker,  14  Mar.  1703;  Walker  to  Codrington,  14, 
16  Mar.  1703;  Harlow,  Christopher  Codrington,  pp.  157,160-1. 
"I  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  ix,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  24  Mar.  1703. 
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serving  ashore.  Furthermore,  the  Governor's  dispatch  of  various  emissaries  to  Walker  with 
digests  of  the  latest  events  on  the  island  was  spasmodic  and,  as  is  clear  from  the 
Commodore's  journal,  it  was  difficult  to  for  him  gain  a  consistent  picture  of  the  action 
ashore.  The  differing  reports  of  Lieutenant  Nesbitt  and  Captain  Keck,  for  example,  sowed 
confusion  as  to  whether  the  Dos  D'Asnc  had  in  fact  been  attacked;  while  it  was  four  days 
after  fffst  receiving  word  of  the  breach  before  Walker  was  informed  that  there  were  indeed 
assault  plans.  45 
It  is  in  this  context  that  Walker's  resistance  on  28  March  to  Codrington's  request  for 
more  battery  supplies,  including  extra  guns,  and  also  to  anchor  all  the  ships  off  Basse-Terre, 
should  be  interpreted.  Echoing  his  previous  warning  to  Captain  Moses,  Walker  now 
explained  to  Lieutenant-Colonel  WiRs  that  the  issuing  of  additional  supplies  would  leave  the 
squadron  short  and  thus  compromise  its  safety  -  especially  if  it  subsequently  encountered  the 
French  at  sea  -  which  was  contrary  to  his  orders.  He  did  nonetheless  agree  that  each  ship 
with  more  than  30  rounds  for  the  12  pounders  would  send  the  excess  shot  and  proportional 
powder  ashore,  along  with  the  small  arms  supplies  that  had  also  been  requested.  As  for 
positioning  the  whole  squadron  off  Basse-Terre,  Walker  was  exceptionally  reluctant.  The 
Captains  of  those  ships  already  anchored  there  informed  him  that  it  was  a  very  poor  roadstead 
and,  with  so  many  sailors  working  ashore,  crews  would  have  to  be  transferred  between  ships 
to  bring  them  down  individually  from  the  other  anchorage  at  Petits  Habitants.  Walker's 
explanation  to  Wills  was  merely  representative  of  his  growing  anxiety  with  Codrington's 
conduct  and  the  progress  of  the  operation;  indeed  the  private  pages  of  his  journal  vouchsafed 
his  contention  that  the  Governor  was  actively  seeking  disagreement  to  create  a  naval 
scapegoat.  Consequently,  Walker  believed  it  essential  for  the  operation's  continuance  that  a 
combined  land  and  sea  Council  of  War  convene  to  review  its  progress.  46 
Codrington  and  his  land  force  did  not  however  share  Walker's  analysis.  At  their 
separate  Council  of  30  March,  they  agreed  to  request  again  that  Walker  provide  a  further  300 
shot  cartridges  for  both  the  12  and  18  pounders  and  moreover  that  he  deploy  the  ships'  boats 
in  a  feint  attack  on  the  other  side  of  the  Galion  river.  Provocatively,  they  also  labelled  the 
45  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  ix,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  15-19,22-5  Mar.  1703,  and  enclosures,  'Order  to  Captain 
prower,  Commander  of  HMS  Yarmouth',  24  Mar.  1703;  Walker  to  Codrington,  24  Mar.  1703;  PRO,  ADM 
51/128  Part  X,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  27-28  Mar.  1703. 
46  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  x,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  28-30  Mar.  1703. 321 
Commodore's  views  on  the  operation,  including  the  request  for  an  army-navy  Council,  as  the 
6 
47 
effects  of  ill  nature,  ill  manners  and  ignorance' 
. 
The  Council's  proceedings  sparked  an 
unedifying  exchange  of  views  with  Walker  in  the  course  of  which  he  implied  that  the  soldiers 
demonstrated  a  lamentable  disregard  for  the  navy  and  the  operational  Instructions;  while  the 
land  Council  rejoined  that  Walker  interpreted  the  Instructions  'ridiculously'  and  'very 
rnalicioUS1y%48  More  significantly,  the  land  officers  expressed  their  opinion  that  the  navy  had 
been  'principally  sent'  to  serve  the  army  and  that  this  subordinate  role  could,  if  accepted  by 
Walker,  provide  for  the  squadron's  safety.  49  The  failure  by  the  land  Council  to  recognise  the 
combined  and  co-operative  nature  of  the  current  action  seemed  to  Walker  to  confirm  that 
Codrington  sought  service  discord  as  an  insurance  policy  against  operational  failure;  it  also 
forced  him  to  convene  his  own  separate  Council  of  sea  Captains  to  determine  the  squadron's 
future  conduct.  "  With  two  separate  service  Councils  of  War  convening,  the  operation  on 
Guadeloupe  seemed  to  have  relinquished  all  pretensions  to  being  a  combined  army-navy 
venture. 
This  problem  over  separate  Councils  of  War  had  arisen  not,  as  Harlow  claimed, 
through  a  lack  of  unified  command,  but  rather  because  the  original  operational  Instructions 
which  afforded  this  combined  Council  of  War  sovereign  command  authority  were  not 
prescriptive  about  its  membership.  5'  Notwithstanding,  the  Instructions  Walker  received  at  the 
end  of  March  did  direct  a  combined  Council  and  thus  his  reluctance  to  convene  the  naval 
Captains  separately  is  understandable,  especially  when,  at  their  meeting  on  31  March,  they 
decided  that  they  could  only  accede  to  the  land  Council's  demand  for  more  ordnance  supplies 
and  to  undertake  the  feint  attack.  As  Walker  recognised,  the  Captains'  options  were  limited. 
if  the  recent  Admiralty  orders  had  been  received  before  leaving  Antigua  then  the  squadron 
could  have  remained  at  that  island  to  await  the  Resolution,  which  was  bringing  supplies  from 
41  PRO,  CO  152/5,  f  175:  enclosure,  Council  of  War  Minutes,  30  Mar.  1703;  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  x, 
unpaginated,  Boyne,  31  Mar.  1703,  and  enclosure,  Thornton  to  Walker,  n.  d. 
"s  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  x,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  31  Mar.  1703,  and  enclosure,  Thornton  to  Walker,  n.  d. 
49  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  x,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  31  Mar.  1703,  and  enclosures,  Walker  to  'Sir',  30  Mar. 
1703;  Thornton  to  Walker,  n.  d.;  PRO,  CO  152/5,  fos.  175-6:  enclosures,  'The  Letter  from  the  Council  of  War 
to  the  Commodore',  n.  d.;  'The  Commodore's  Answer  to  the  Foregoing  Letter',  n.  d.;  'The  Reply  to  the 
Foregoing  Letter',  n.  d. 
50  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  x,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  31  Mar.  -I  Apr.  1703. 
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England.  However,  given  that  this  alternative  had  been  missed  by  several  weeks  and  that 
operations  had  already  begun,  the  Captains  were  obliged  to  prosecute  its  successful  outcome. 
In  terms  of  the  skewed  dynamic  of  combined  command,  they  were  reduced  to  protesting  to 
the  two  land  officers  sent  by  Codrington  as  observers  about  the  extent  of  the  naval 
commitment  and  their  corresponding  treatment  by  Codrington.  52 
The  preparations  for  the  feint  attack  indicated  that  Codrington  was  close  to  launching 
an  infantry  assault,  though  additional  heavy  bombardment  was  still  thought  necessary  to 
weaken  further  the  French  defences.  To  that  end,  Walker  detailed  the  Yarmouth  and  the 
Sunderland  -  whose  particular  gun  complement  meant  that  they  had  not  contributed  any 
ordnance  supplies  ashore  -  to  bombard  the  French  fortifications  and  to  disrupt  their 
communication  trenches.  In  conjunction  with  the  battery,  they  opened  fire  on  the  afternoon 
of  2  April.  With  the  infantry  assault  and  the  feint  coastal  attack  scheduled  for  the  following 
day,  Walker  went  ashore  to  observe  this  bombardment  and  Raise  with  Codrington.  This  was 
the  second  time  the  two  commanders  had  met  since  the  deterioration  in  relations.  The  first 
occasion  had  been  just  after  the  meeting  of  the  naval  Council  and  elicited  no  comment  from 
either  man,  but  this  time,  Walker  complained  that  his  personal  safety  while  ashore  had  been 
endangered  by  Codrington's  indifference.  In  any  event,  the  senior  commanders'  relationship 
was  not  tested  further  at  this  stage  for  the  current  focus  of  their  combined  action  -  the  naval 
feint  attack  in  conjunction  with  an  assault  on  the  breach  -  was  shelved.  In  the  early  morning 
of  3  April,  the  artillery  bombardment  alone  had  forced  the  French  from  the  castle  to  the 
trenches  and  fort  on  the  other  side  of  the  river,  and,  by  simply  retargetting  their  preponderant 
fire,  the  English  were  soon  able  to  clear  these  defences  of  the  enemy  too.  Codrington's 
forces  thus  marched  unimpeded  to  take  possession  of  the  upper  half  of  Basse-Terre.  53 
The  capture  of  Basse-Terre  placed  the  English  in  a  commanding  position  but  they  still 
lacked  full  control  of  the  island:  the  Dos  D'Asne  remained  a  place  of  defensive  strength  for 
the  French,  which  might  be  reinforced  from  neighbouring  islands.  By  effecting  a  close  coastal 
52  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  ix,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  21  Mar.  1703,  and  enclosure,  'Orders  to  Captain 
I  lovenden  Walker  C.  -in.  -C.  of  Her  Majesty's  Squadron  detached  by  Sir  George  Rooke',  18  Jan.  1703;  PRO, 
ADM  51/128  Part  x,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  I  Apr.  1703,  and  enclosure,  'Att  a  Consultation  held  aboard  the 
Chichester',  31  Mar.  1703;  PRO,  ADM  1/2642,  unf.:  'Att  a  Consultation  held  aboard  the  Chichester',  31 
Mar.  1703. 
53  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  x,  unpaginatcd,  Boyne,  1-4  Apr.  1703;  Harlow,  Christopher  Codrington,  pp.  165. 
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sea  command  and  disposing  their  troops  over  the  island,  however,  the  English  had  a  fair 
prospect  of  blockading  the  camp  into  submission;  or,  alternatively,  they  could  mount  a  direct 
attack  with  the  hope  of  capturing  it  immediately.  A  couple  of  days  after  the  success  at  Basse- 
Terre,  Codrington  and  Walker  seemed  to  be  leaning  towards  the  former  approach  by  seeking 
to  extend  their  presence  throughout  Guadeloupe.  The  Governor  boarded  the  Yarmouth  to 
reconnoitre  Guadeloupe,  windward  of  Point  Eitan.  The  Maidstone,  which  along  with  six 
other  sloops,  formed  part  of  this  mission,  returned  within  a  day  to  collect  enough  boats  to 
carry  500  men.  Codrington  had  found  breast-works  and  small  plantations  along  the  island's 
eastern  shore,  which  these  men  under  the  command  of  Lieutenant-Colonel  Martin  were  going 
to  raid.  This  incursion  and  other  raids  were  successfully  completed  and  on  17  April,  a 
Council  of  land  officers  unanimously  rejected  a  direct  assault  on  the  Dos  D'Asne  on  the 
grounds  that  it  presented  too  many  insurmountable  difficulties.  Blockade  and  a  gradual 
extension  of  control  over  the  island,  had  thus  finally  been  determined  upon  -  albeit  perhaps  by 
default  -  as  the  means  to  wrest  Guadeloupe  fully  from  the  French.  54 
The  Council  moved  to  demonstrate  its  resolve  in  this  decision  by  immediately 
organising  a  large  scale  raid  of  Grand-Terre,  the  principal  settlement  on  the  other  half  of 
Guadeloupe.  Some  600  soldiers,  including  at  least  60  grenadiers,  under  the  command  of 
Colonel  Whetham.  and  his  fellow  field  officers,  Lieutenant-Colonel  Carpenter  and  Brigade 
Major  Bowles,  were  to  be  distributed  throughout  three  warships  with  a  fourth  attending  in 
support.  However,  as  the  ships  manoeuvred  get  into  the  narrow  road  in  front  of  Grand- 
Terre,  the  operation  was  cancelled  as  a  result  of  intelligence  Major-General  Hamilton 
received,  which  indicated  that  the  French  were  waiting  to  contest  the  landing  with  an 
additional  400  men  that  had  been  recently  brought  into  the  plantation.  The  circumstances  of 
the  abandonment  of  the  Grand-Terre  raid,  revealed  the  considerable  difficulties  associated 
with  the  longer  term,  and  attritional,  approach  to  capturing  Guadeloupe  that  the  English  had 
adopted.  The  drip  feed  of  intelligence  -  credible  or  not  -  that  the  French  had  augmented  their 
forces  on  the  island  or  that  a  number  of  their  men-of-war  were  now  operating  close  by  spread 
anxiety  and  cast  doubt  amongst  the  English  as  to  whether  they  had  sufficient  manpower  and 
provisions  to  complete  the  operation.  Confidence  was  moreover  only  further  undermined  by 
-"  PRO,  ADM  51/128  Part  x,  unpaginated,  Boyne,  5-17  Apr.  1703,  and  enclosures,  'Order  to  Captain  Prower, 
Commander  of  HMS  the  Yarmoulh%  10  Apr.  1703;  Codrington  to  Walker,  15  Apr.  1703;  PRO,  CO  152/5, 324 
the  impact  of  disease,  which  significantly  felled  the  two  senior  service  commanders  towards 
the  end  of  April.  During  this  period  the  operation  lost  focus,  which  it  was  not  to  recover. 
Indeed,  on  the  last  day  of  April,  Codrington  was  so  sick  that  he  took  passage  to  Nevis  to 
recover  his  health;  but,  by  transferring  his  command  to  Colonel  Whetham,  who  was  also 
gravely  ill,  the  authority  of  daily  operational  command  passed  Walker,  whose  health  had 
temporarily  rallied. 
This  was  a  significant  development  for  two  reasons.  Firstly,  whereas  earlier 
Codrington's  separate  land  Council  had  dominated  the  operation,  Walker's  preference  for 
combined  Councils  would  now  allow  naval  opinion  to  be  actively  represented  rather  than 
forced  to  acquiesce.  Secondly,  and  more  significantly,  this  opinion  had  already  demonstrated 
its  intent  to  give  up  the  operation.  Walker's  private  reckoning  on  24  April  was  that  no  more 
could  be  achieved  against  the  enemy  on  Guadeloupe  and  the  squadron  should  prepare  to  re- 
cmbark  the  soldiers.  Two  days  later  his  naval  Council  came  to  a  similar  conclusion. 
Shrewdly,  however,  the  Captains  did  not  at  that  stage  call  for  a  withdrawal  of  the  troops; 
instead,  emphasising  that  at  least  a  fortnight  would  be  required  between  leaving  Guadeloupe 
and  departing  for  Jamaica  as  directed  by  Walker's  Instructions,  they  resolved  only  to  re- 
embark  the  sailors  posted  ashore  so  that  the  squadron  could  be  prepared  for  sea.  This 
decision  effectively  called  time  on  the  operation  and  it  required  only  concurrence  of  a 
combined  land  and  sea  Council  formally  to  end  it.  Codrington's  departure  and  then 
Whetham's  request  to  take  passage  with  three  companies  from  his  regiment  in  the  ships 
transporting  some  field  guns  to  Antigua  provided  Walker  with  an  ideal  opportunity  to 
convene  and  preside  over  this  combined  Council.  It  met  on  3  May,  and  afler  reviewing  the 
dearth  of  provisions  for  both  the  land  and  sea  forces,  the  decision  was  taken  withdraw  from 
C;  uadeloupe  in  five  days  time.  As  with  the  attack  on  Guadeloupe  in  1691,  the  naval  clement 
of  the  combined  force  had  largely  brought  about  the  conclusion  of  the  operation.  55 
in  the  early  hours  of  7  May  all  the  troops  were  successfully  re-cmbarkcd  without  loss 
of  life,  while  Basse-Terre  was  set  ablaze.  In  hisjournal,  Walker  expressed  considcmblc  regret 
at  the  withdrawal,  especially  since  Guadeloupe  was  clearly  pre-eminent  among  France's 
fos.  176-7:  enclosure,  Council  of  War  Minutes,  17  Apr.  1703. 
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colonial  possessions  in  the  Caribbean;  but,  rather  disingenuously  given  that  on  24  April  he 
was  of  the  opinion  that  operationally  little  more  could  be  achieved,  the  Commodore  noted 
that  the  island  might  have  been  held  with  only  a  modest  increase  in  resources,  if  the 
appropriate  orders  had  been  issued.  Walker's  focus  upon  the  operational  orders  can  be 
explained  inasmuch  as  he  viewed  his  Instructions  of  18  January  as  a  political  and  professional 
insurance  policy.  Even  upon  a  most  rigorous  interpretation  from  the  land  force's  perspective, 
the  Instructions  sanctioned  his  manoeuvring  to  conclude  the  operation  and  depart  for 
Jamaica.  Thus,  this  was  Walker's  defence  when  two  days  after  arriving  in  Nevis  Road, 
Codrington  sent  General  Hamilton  to  argue  that  the  Admiralty  orders  should  not  be  viewed  as 
absolute  and  that  Walker  should  instead  winter  amongst  the  Windward  Islands.  A 
commander  who  was  temperamentally  disposed  to  gamble  against  authority  might  have  been 
seduced  by  Codrington's  arguments.  However,  Walker's  character  had  already  proved  to  be 
unimaginative  and  with  the  crucial  support  of  Colonel  Bristow,  he  held  fast  to  the  timetable 
set  out  by  the  Instructions.  56 
The  original  intention  of  Walker's  orders  following  the  20  May  deadline  had  been  for 
him  to  meet  Benbow  at  Jamaica,  whence  they  would  sail  north  for  Newfoundland.  Graydon's 
appointment  in  Benbow's  stead  had  altered  these  circumstance  insofar  as  he  was  to  meet 
Walker  first  at  Barbados  or  the  Leeward  Islands  to  supervise  the  conclusion  of  the  operations 
in  the  Windward,  and  then  both  men  would  proceed  eastwards  to  Jamaica  to  execute  the 
orders  as  drafted  for  Benbow.  However,  as  a  result  of  a  skirmish  with  four  French  warships 
on  his  outward  journey  -  for  which  (as  will  be  seen)  the  House  of  Lords  subsequently 
censured  his  failure  fully  to  engage  -  Graydon  in  the  Resolution  reached  the  West  Indies  too 
late  to  fulfil  the  supervisory  role  and  he  eventually  came  upon  Walker's  dilapidated 
expeditionary  force  in  Nevis  Road  on  23  May.  In  light  of  Codrington's  allegedly  bad. 
tempered  response  to  Graydon  when  he  had  requested  bread  the  previous  day  at  Antigua,  it 
was  fortunate  that  the  Vice-Admiral  had  first  collected  supplies  at  Barbados.  Clearly 
conscious  of  the  time,  these  provisions  were  distributed  throughout  the  squadron  in  less  than 
a  day,  while  Walker  removed  to  the  Cumberland  to  allow  Graydon,  as  the  senior  o  fliccr,  to 
Boyne%  25  Apr.  1703;  Wills  to  Walker,  1,2  May  1703;  Walker  to  Wills,  2  May  1703. 
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raise  his  Flag  in  the  Boyne.  57 
Port  Royal,  Jamaica  was  reached  on  5  June  but  the  subsequent  twenty  day  stay  there 
was  doubtless  longer  than  Graydon  had  envisaged.  It  was  neither  settling  the  defensive 
station  squadron  of  four  warships  and  two  fireships  nor  landing  the  additional  400  garrison 
soldiers  which  proved  time  consuming;  but  rather,  it  was  a  quarrel  which  arose  over  the 
supply  of  additional  provisions  and  men  for  the  departing  squadron.  By  his  own  admission 
Governor  Handasyd  failed  to  persuade  the  Council  to  provide  supplies,  thus  leaving  Graydon 
dependent  upon  individual  colonists'  private  charity,  which  yielded  smaller  returns.  Despite 
this  insult,  Graydon  was  ill-advised  to  undertake  the  aggressive  press  of  men  throughout  the 
island.  The  Council  minuted  their  discontent  and  a  steady  number  of  mercantile  protest 
petitions  were  still  being  sent  back  to  London  after  the  squadron  had  arrived  home.  indeed, 
as  also  recogniscd  by  the  Lords'  subsequent  censure,  Graydon's  general  conduct  at  Jamaica 
had  only  a  negative  impact  on  the  Ministry's  often  fractious  relationship  with  the  colonies, 
particularly  with  respect  to  the  military-naval  provision.  " 
it  was  the  beginning  of  August  before  the  expeditionary  squadron  neared 
Newfoundland's  Cape  Race,  having  obviously  decided  that  time  did  not  permit  putting  into 
Boston  for  additional  help.  59Notwithstanding  some  small  settlements  dotted  elsewhere,  this 
Cape  represented  the  southerly  boundary  of  the  English  colonial  settlements  that  were 
concentrated  on  the  eastern  coast  of  Newfoundland's  Avalon  Peninsula.  French  plantations 
dominated  the  southern  coastline  westwards  to  their  main  settlement  at  Placentia,  which  was 
the  principal  target  for  Graydon's  combined  army-navy  force.  During  the  voyage  from 
Jamaica,  there  had  been  one  Council  of  land  and  sea  officers  about  the  disposition  and 
necessary  resources  for  a  landing,  but  on  first  approach,  it  was  thought  prudent  to  send  the 
barges  from  three  ships  on  a  reconnaissance  mission  along  the  River  Trapassey  which  ran 
57  PRO,  SP  42/67,  fos.  33-5:  'Orders  to  Captain  Hovenden  Walker',  18  Jan.  1703;  IIMC,  House  oftords  AISS 
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25  May-29  June  1703;  PRO,  ADM  1/2642,  unf:  Wavell  to'Honoured  Sirs',  5  Nov.  1703. 
59  The  ensuing  account  of  Graydon  and  Walker  at  Newfoundland  is  based  on  the  following  primary  sources: 
PRO,  ADM  51/222  Part  v,  unpaginated,  Cumberland,  29  June,  13,17  July,  12-13,22  Aug.,  3,8  Sept.  1703; 
HMC,  House  ofLords  MSS  NS,  v.  488:  Instructions  for  [John]  Graydon  Esq.,  20  Feb.  1703;  CSPC,  1702- 
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south-westerly  from  Ferryland.  This  yielded  no  intelligence  of  substance,  however,  and  in  its 
progress  towards  Placentia,  the  squadron  moved  round  the  coast  to  St  Mary's  harbour, 
dropping  anchor  on  12  August. 
Although  Placentia  was  the  priority  target,  Graydon's  Instructions  encouraged  when 
possible  the  destruction  of  other  French  settlements.  Despite  the  worsening  weather, 
moderate  success  in  this  regard  was  achieved  throughout  the  latter  half  of  August.  A  number 
of  raiding  parties  were  landed  in  bays  along  the  coast  from  St  Mary's,  with  at  least  one 
reaching  some  distance  westwards  as  a  result  of  intelligence  about  the  existence  of  a  large 
fortified  French  settlement.  It  was  however  found  to  comprise  only  three  small  houses  and  a 
number  of  boats.  This  event  highlighted  poor  intelligence  provision,  which  previous 
incursions  had  obviously  not  enhanced;  the  small  and  insignificant  settlement  typified  the 
majority  of  those  destroyed  by  these  raids.  By  the  end  of  August,  the  bastion  of  French 
strength  on  Newfoundland  still  remained  and,  as  the  Norris-Gisbon  expedition  during  the 
previous  war  had  demonstrated,  60  Placentia  required  to  be  comprehensively  destroyed  to 
effect  French  expulsion.  In  this  respect,  Graydon's  coastal  forays  in  late  August  were 
strategic  irrelevancies. 
Of  more  immediate  operational  concern  however,  was  the  negative  tactical  impact  of 
these  raids.  With  the  weather  deteriorating  through  August,  there  could  have  been  little 
expectation  that  it  would  improve  with  the  onset  of  autumn  and  thus  the  opportunities  to 
mount  the  attack  on  Placentia  were  diminishing.  Moreover,  as  the  majority  of  the  squadron 
had  been  at  sea  without  a  proper  refit  and  repair  since  leaving  Spithead  for  Spain  in  July 
1702,  they  were  increasingly  unseaworthy  in  poor  weather.  The  problems  posed  by 
diminished  equipment  were  only  compounded  by  the  frailty  of  the  expeditionary  force.  Many 
of  the  soldiers  and  sailors  continued  to  suffer  from  the  disease  which  had  been  prevalent  in 
the  Caribbean,  while  the  scarcity  of  provisions  reduced  further  their  immunity  and  morale. 
Certainly,  these  were  the  issues  along  with  a  shortage  of  war  supplies  upon  which  Graydon's 
Council  of  War  deliberated  on  3  September  when  it  met  to  consider  how  best  to  attack 
Placentia.  Perhaps  not  surprisingly,  the  Council  regarded  its  weaknesses  too  great  when  set 
against  the  reputed  French  strength  at  Placentia  and  it  decided  to  abandon  the  operation 
against  that  settlement  and  return  to  England  forthwith. 
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Despite  committing  themselves  to  sail  together,  the  squadron  arrived  back  home 
piecemeal.  The  two  naval  commanders  -  Graydon  and  Walker  -  parted  company  between 
Land's  End  and  the  Scilly  Isles  in  late  October  when  Walker's  Cumberland  failed  to  make  the 
passage  through  these  landmarks  and  he  was  forced  into  the  first  port  of  sanctuary  -  Milford 
Haven  -  by  sickness  among  his  crew.  Professionally  and  politically,  however,  no  home  port 
was  to  provide  shelter  for  either  Graydon  or  Walker 
. 
61  Both  their  expeditions  had  been  abject 
failures,  which  within  a  few  months  fell  under  Parliamentary  scrutiny.  Admittedly,  there  was 
less  immediate  interest  in  the  operational  shortcomings  of  Graydon  at  Newfoundland,  though 
this  was  largely  because  the  investigating  House  of  Lords  Select  Committee,  appointed  in 
February  1704,  was  more  concerned  with  his  activities  while  at  Jamaica  and  the  graver 
allegation  that  he  had  failed  properly  to  engage  a  small  French  squadron  on  his  outward 
journey.  As  previously  mentioned,  the  Lords  censured  Graydon's  conduct  in  both  respects 
and  his  naval  career  was  ended  with  their  recommendation  to  the  Queen  that  he  should  not  be 
62 
employed  again.  Although  political  considerations  clearly  underlay  such  resolutions  passed 
by  a  Whiggish  House  of  Lords  over  a  Tory  Admiral,  the  events  at  Newfoundland  might  be 
seen  as  justifying  the  judgement  of  the  House  of  Lords.  At  least  one  subsequent  report  from 
the  main  English  settlement,  St  John's,  could  not  understand  why  the  expedition  had  failed, 
and  it  specifically  criticised  the  commanders'  ignorance  of  Newfoundland's  coastal 
topography  and  meteorology.  However,  given  that  the  Council  of  War's  decision  on  3 
September  to  return  home  was  a  consequence  of  the  strength  of  the  French  defences  at 
Placentia  rather  than  the  weather,  it  is  not  obvious  that  Graydon  would  have  aimed  to  press 
ahead  even  if  he  had  known  that  the  fog  tended  to  dissipate  closer  to  the  shore.  An 
intelligence  report  in  late  September,  underscored  the  Council's  apprehensions  by  indicating 
that,  upon  spying  Graydon's  squadron  in  the  nearby  bay,  the  French  added  500  men  to  the 
3000  already  at  Placentia,  and  that  they  also  apparently  held  plans  to  put  more  warships  on 
that  station  with  a  view  to  attacking  St  John's.  The  only  contention  of  the  House  of  Lords 
about  the  Newfoundland  expedition  was  to  stress  the  lapses  in  its  secrecy.  Paradoxically,  the 
report  from  St  John's  which  criticised  Graydon  also  implicitly  recognised  these  circumstances 
by  recommending  that  a  successful  expulsion  of  the  French  would  require  at  least  fiflecri 
61  PRO,  ADM  51/222  Part  v,  unpaginated,  Cumberland,  9  Sept.,  18  Oct.,  25  Nov.  1703. 
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warships  carrying  some  2500  troops  fresh  from  England:  such  manpower  and  equipment, 
63  Graydon  simply  never  possessed  . 
The  specific  combined  operational  cndeavour  at  Guadeloupe  came  under  greater 
scrutiny  as  result  of  Codrington's  protests.  Despite  still  being  very  ill  and  hoping  for  leave, 
the  Governor  accused  Walker  in  early  August  of  a  dereliction  of  duty  with  respect  to  the 
action  at  Guadeloupe.  Clearly  this  was  a  grave  charge,  and  one  which  Codrington  did  not 
dilute  in  his  subsequent  account  of  the  operation.  Although  the  Ministry  decided  to  replace 
Codrington  as  Governor  of  the  Leeward  Islands  instead  of  affording  him  temporary  leave, 
they  were  obliged  to  consider  seriously  his  correspondence.  A  Committee  of  the  Privy 
Council  was  established  to  investigate  Walker's  conduct  with  respect  to  three  points:  that  he 
remained  too  long  at  Barbados,  while  having  failed  to  notify  Codrington  of  his  arrival;  that  he 
came  to  the  leeward  of  Guadeloupe;  and  that  he  ceased  actions  before  the  20  May.  64 
Walker  did  not  have  much  difficulty  rebutting  these  charges  when  he  appeared  before 
the  Committee  on  29  April.  It  was  already  on  record  that  illness  and  the  decision  of  a 
Council  of  War  to  await  new  orders  had  caused  the  delay  at  Barbados;  while  Walker  had  also 
specifically  directed  the  responsibility  for  notifying  Codrington  to  the  Barbadian  authorities 
soon  after  his  arrival.  The  sanction  of  a  Council  of  War  was  similarly  cited  for  the  stop  in 
operations  prior  to  20  May,  notwithstanding  Walker's  manipulation  of  the  circumstances 
attendant  to  its  meeting.  As  for  the  second  charge  of  going  to  the  leeward  of  Guadeloupe,  it 
remains  unclear  what  aspect  of  the  operation  this  referred  to.  If,  as  seems  most  likely,  the 
reference  was  to  Walker  coming  leeward  of  Guadeloupe  to  rendezvous  with  Codrington  at 
Antigua,  then  the  Commodore's  defence  that  the  Governor  agreed  with  this  approach  on  the 
grounds  that  the  ships  would  struggle  to  beat  to  the  windward  is  doubtful  for  two  reasons. 
Firstly,  there  was  no  consultation  between  Codrington  and  Walker  about  their  point  of 
rendezvous;  and  secondly,  the  Governor  was,  on  the  contrary,  critical  of  Walker  coming  to 
Antigua  because  all  the  ships  would  have  to  beat  back  to  the  windward  to  target  the  French. 
63  CSpC,  1702-1703,  nos.  1131,1191,  pp.  719-20,770:  Roope  to  the  Council  of  Trade  and  Plantations,  10 
Oct.  1703;  Copy  of  an  Examination  of  Laville  and  Belase,  2  deserters  from  Placentia,  29  Sept.  1703;  Li,  xvii. 
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Although  Walker's  defence  on  this  Point  could  be  contradicted,  his  Instructions  had 
nonetheless  required  him  to  liaise  with  the  Leeward  Islands'  authorities  and  thus  his 
proceeding  to  Antigua  could  not  be  condemned  wholesale. 
The  Earl  of  Peterborough,  who  was  appearing  for  Codrington  at  the  Committee, 
seemed  to  appreciate  the  strength  of  Walker's  defence  for  his  response  shifted  focus  from 
these  three  points.  He  now  accused  Walker  of  refusing  to  supply  ordnance  materials  and  of 
sending  Codrington  a  letter  that  was  peremptory  in  tone.  Again,  the  Commodore  easily 
parried  the  claims.  The  decisions  of  the  Council  of  naval  captains  could  justify  all  such 
supplies  as  were  sent  ashore  and  while  he  accepted  that  Codrington  may  have  taken  offence 
at  the  letter,  their  relationship  had  been  equal  and  gentlemanly.  Walker  was  of  course  being 
at  once  insincere  and  devious.  Questions  on  relationships  between  commanders  were  largely 
contingent  upon  anecdotal  and  subjective  personal  evidence  whereas  the  operational 
proceedings  could  be  accounted  for  in  the  documentary  evidence.  A  recommendation  to 
consult  these  records  was  Walker's  parting  shot  to  the  Committee  when,  at  its  second 
session,  he  was  excused  from  further  attendance.  65 
The  Commodore's  early  dismissal  indicated  that  his  evidence  had  impressed  the 
Committee  and  indeed,  when  it  reported  on  4  May,  Walker's  conduct  was  not  criticised. 
Instead  its  findings  blamed  the  Barbadian  authorities  for  failing  to  notify  Codrington  of  the 
squadron's  arrival  and  also  the  generally  poor  state  of  the  expeditionary  provisions.  Perhaps 
understandably,  Codrington  was  unimpressed  with  this  judgement:  he  looked  to  apportion 
blame,  whereas  the  Ministry  seemed  to  have  been,  in  his  opinion,  too  easily  contented  with 
the  events  at  Guadeloupe.  Certainly,  Codrington  might  have  wondered  that  the  Privy  Council 
Committee  made  no  reference  to  the  operation's  command  structure.  At  the  end  of  February 
1703  before  the  beginning  of  the  operation,  Codrington  had  complained  to  Nottingham  about 
the  absence  of  a  unified  command  and  suggested  -  as  his  father  had  done  in  July  1691  after 
the  failure  of  his  action  on  Guadeloupe  with  Commodore  Wright  -  that  both  the  land  and  sea 
forces  be  under  his  sole  jurisdiction.  66  In  169  1,  the  Admiralty  had  been  reluctant  to  concede 
65  PRO,  ADM  51/222  Part  v,  unpaginated,  Cumberland,  29  Apr.  1704;  CSPC,  1702-1703,  no.  230,  p.  150: 
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this  and  instead  had  enhanced  the  authority  of  the  combined  Council  of  War  with  respect  to 
the  movements  of  the  expeditionary  or  station  squadron.  However,  given  the  younger 
Codrington's  unwillingness  to  work  through  the  combined  Council,  there  could  not  on  this 
occasion  be  any  effective  assessment  of  its  command  performance.  Besides,  the  Privy 
Council  was  quite  correct  to  emphasise  the  failings  of  other  operational  requirements. 
Clearly,  the  lack  of  provisions  -  both  the  victuals  and  war  supplies  -  had  hastened  the  action 
on  Guadeloupe  to  a  conclusion  regardless  of  success  or  failure.  As  a  detachment  from 
another  operation  the  land  force  was  without  a  dedicated  artillery  train,  and  it  was  unrealistic 
to  expect  Walker  (as  Codrington  did)  to  deprive  his  warships  of  a  minimum  amount  of 
powder  and  shot.  Moreover,  once  in  receipt  of  the  Instructions  detailing  the  Newfoundland 
operation,  the  Commodore  had  to  think  of  reserving  enough  foodstuffs  for  that  expedition 
and  for  the  return  home  without  knowing  the  extent  of  the  supplies  being  sent  to  him  or  what 
might  be  gained  at  Jamaica. 
It  was  not  that  the  combined  operations  in  the  colonial  theatre  in  1703  suffered  from  a 
poorly  managed  army-navy  dynamic  -  although  a  more  positive  relationship  between  the 
senior  commanders  would  undoubtedly  have  facilitated  their  actions  -  rather  it  was  that  poor 
logistics  undermined  the  essential  mutuality  of  the  endeavour.  This  weakness  can  to  be 
traced  to  the  origin  of  the  expeditionary  force  in  Rooke's  larger  fleet  off  the  Spanish  coast 
and  also  to  the  failure  of  the  larger  Anglo-Dutch  fleet  to  materialise.  Notably  however,  there 
was  no  attempt  during  the  Spanish  Succession  War  to  dispatch  a  combined  expeditionary 
force  from  England  solely  bound  for  the  West  Indies  and  this  in  turn  highlights  the  political 
wellsprings  -  the  Tory  Secretary  of  State,  Nottingham  -  of  these  early  operations. 
Nottingham's  departure  from  the  Ministry  in  1704,  followed  by  the  increasing  dominancc  of 
the  Whigs  through  to  1710,  underscores  this  point.  From  1704,  there  were  fewer  advocates 
for  a  'Blue  Water'  strategy  in  the  Caribbean  and  such  sympathy  the  predominately  Whiggish 
Ministry  bad  for  combined  army-navy  ventures  was  disposed  to  acting  with  the  North 
American  colonists.  Even  then  though,  the  organisation  of  an  expeditionary  force  was  not 
forthcoming  and  it  required  the  re-emergence  of  the  Tories  in  1710  to  provide  the  necessary 
impetus.  It  is  to  these  events  that  this  study  must  now  turn. 
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1I.  iii:  The  Combined  Expeditions  to  North  America,  1708-1711. 
The  proposal  by  the  New  York  Governor,  Lord  Cornbury,  in  September  1702  that  England 
undertake  a  combined  land  and  sea  operation  to  expel  the  French  from  Canada  was  not  an 
original  suggestion.  During  the  Nine  Years  War,  Sir  William  Phips  had  aimed  to  do  likewise 
with  an  assault  against  Quebec  from  the  St  Lawrence  River,  while  a  separate  land  force 
marched  from  Albany  upon  Montreal.  Phips's  attempt  in  1690  failed  but,  with  the  colonies 
having  provided  all  the  men  and  material,  he  and  others  maintained  that  the  action  might 
easily  be  successful  if  London  was  to  commit  substantial  land  and  sea  forces.  Combury's 
proposal  was  very  similar  to  Phips's  operation  and  he  emphasised  the  necessary  role  of  the 
home  country  by  requesting  that  England  provide  at  least  eight  fully  supplied  fourth  rates  and 
some  1500  troops.  However,  despite  there  being  similar  defensive  and  economic  motivations 
for  such  an  action  in  the  continental  colonies  as  amongst  the  West  Indian  islands,  London's 
attention  was,  during  the  early  war  years,  focused  on  the  Caribbean.  Cornbury's  proposal 
was  therefore  largely  ignored;  when  the  war-time  defence  of  North  America  was  raised  in  the 
Cabinet  Council,  the  outcome  was  that  money  and  some  supplies  would  be  sent  to  improve 
fortifications  along  with  encouragement  to  the  colonial  militia  forces  operating  on  the 
frontiers.  67 
London's  response  did  not  however  discourage  the  colonial  authorities.  Both 
Combury  and  the  Massachusetts  Governor,  Joseph  Dudley,  continued  to  append  operational 
suggestions  to  their  news  dispatches.  These  often  followed  details  of  the  latest  skirmishcs 
with  the  French  and  their  Indian  allies  and,  as  an  attack  on  Canada  was  frequently  mcntioncd, 
61 
it  became  clear  that  the  colonists  considered  it  an  essential  defensive  measure.  Othcr 
proposals  related  more  to  extending  the  commercial  foundation  of  the  empire.  The  immincnt 
union  of  England  and  Scotland  prompted  Dudley  to  propose  an  expedition  to  secure  Acadia 
as  a  colony  for  the  'North  Britons.  Included  in  his  plans  was  the  destruction  of  Port  Royal 
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previously  briefly  captured  for  Frigland  during  the  Nine  Years  War  by  Sir  William  Phips  -  as 
its  harbour  provided  a  safe  haven  for  French  privateers.  The  Government  injtialýN  engaged 
with  his  proposal  and  its  encouragement  led  Dudley  to  organise  a  colonial  expeditionary  forcc 
of  20  brigantines  and  1000  musketeers  in  preparation  of  reinforcements  arriving  firom 
London.  However,  the  defeat  at  Almanza  (14  April  1707)  and  the  political  momentum 
behind  the  Toulon  operation  caused  the  ministers  to  drop  any  thoughts  of  sending  Dudlcý 
material  help  and  his  expedition  had  to  be  undertaken  solely  by  local  forces.  Thcse  proved 
insufficient  even  to  attempt  Port  Royal  and  the  troops  simply  raided  the  Acadian  coast 
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Fig.  2  1:  North  America. 
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There  is  no  clear  reason  why  1708  marked  a  change  in  London's  commitment  to  the 
war  in  North  America.  British  war  fortunes  in  that  theatre  had  not  suffered  a  significant 
reverse  which  required  remedial  action;  nor  had  there  been  any  substantial  alteration  in  the 
strategy  on  the  European  continent  or  in  the  Mediterranean.  Marlborough's  victory  at 
Oudenarde  had  doubtless  eased  pressure  on  the  allies  and,  a  year  on  from  Almanza,  the 
Imperialists  had  begun  to  provide  additional  troops  for  the  Peninsula;  but  equally  the  Ministry 
did  not  lack  military  and  naval  projects  within  Europe.  An  important  development  was 
probably  the  personal  presentation  of  the  colonists'  case  by  Samuel  Vctch.  Vctch,  an 
4eighteenth  century  knight  errant'70  was  a  Scotsman  who  had  fought  for  William  in  his  native 
country  during  the  Revolution  and  had  then  participated  in  the  failed  Darien  scheme  to 
establish  a  Scottish  colony  on  the  Panamanian  isthmus.  Upon  leaving  there  in  1699,  he 
established  himself  as  a  trader  with  the  Indians,  first  in  New  York  and  then  in  Albany,  and  his 
increasing  mercantile  prominence  in  addition  to  his  close  links  with  the  natives  caused  him  to 
be  variously  employed  as  an  emissary  by  the  colonial  authorities.  In  1705,  Dudley  sent  him  to 
Quebec  to  arrange  a  prisoner  exchange  and  assess  the  offer  of  a  neutrality  treaty  by  the 
French  Governor,  the  Marquis  de  Vaudrefl.  71  It  was  rejected  then  and  on  a  number  of 
subsequent  occasions  but  Vetch  used  his  time  in  Canada  profitably  to  gain  information  on  the 
French  colony.  Upon  his  return,  he  wrote  a  long  memorandum  entitled  'Canada  Survcy'd'. 
This  work  provided  a  comprehensive  assessment  of  the  region,  including  its  geography, 
government  and  economy,  and  aimed  not  only  to  underscore  the  necessity  of  the  conquest  or 
Canada  but  also  its  vulnerability  to  a  well  resourced  combined  operation  similar  to  that 
suggested  by  Combury:  an  attack  upon  Quebec  from  the  St  Lawrence  River  and  ovcrland 
72 
against  Montreal  . 
An  obvious  strength  of  Vetch's  pamphlet  was  the  clarity  with  which  it  outlined  the 
economic  case  for  conquest  -  albeit  based  upon  a  negative  premise.  Using  figures  from  the 
City  of  London,  Vetch  calculated  that  the  war  with  France  was  costing  English  traders  yearly 
some  tens  of  thousand  of  pounds  in  lost  Indian  trade  and  that,  overall,  the  English  continental 
empire  was  losing  several  hundred  thousand  pounds.  As  Canada  was  the  headquarters  of  the 
French  commercial  and  trading  challenge,  it  followed  that  it  would  be  cheaper  to  shut  it 
70  Morgan,  'Some  Attempts  At  Imperial  Co-operation  9,  p.  179. 
71  j.  C.  Webster,  Samuel  Yetch:  An  Address  (Annapolis  Royal,  1929),  pp.  5-7. 335 
down.  73  Supporting  Vetch  in  London  was  another  colonial  veteran,  Colonel  Francis 
Nicholson,  who  had  served  in  a  variety  of  posts  overseas;  and,  despite  having  been  recalled  in 
1705  from  his  most  recent  appointment  as  the  Governor  of  Virginia  due  to  his  high  Tory 
politics,  the  Whig  Ministry  afforded  him  an  audience.  74  The  members  of  the  Council  of  Trade 
also  contributed  to  the  momentum  by  reporting  positively  upon  Vetch's  proposal  and 
shrewdly  added  weight  to  theirjudgement  by  not  commenting  upon  its  military  form,  lest  the 
Ministry  considered  their  support  of  colonists  uncritical.  It  was  doubtless  a  measure  ofthc 
strength  of  the  arguments  in  'Canada  Survey'd'  (and  also  a  demonstration  that  the  divisions 
in  war  strategy  were  not  as  absolute  as  was  often  characterised)  that  the  Whig  ministers  who 
instinctively,  favoured  the  European  continental  war  over  the  maritime  context  of  the  colonial 
conflict  agreed  to  support  and  supply  a  combined  operational  assault  against  Canada 
. 
7, 
In  February  1709,  preparations  began  in  earnest  for  the  dispatch  of  this  operation, 
which  was  scheduled  to  begin  by  mid-May.  A  pressing  fwst  task  was  the  provision  of 
transport  to  take  Vetch  and  Nicholson  back  across  the  Atlantic  so  that  they  might  make  the 
necessary  arrangements  in  America;  for  not  only  was  the  operation  going  to  be  ajoint  army- 
navy  enterprise,  it  was  also  going  to  combine  forces  from  the  colonies  and  Britain.  Vctch's 
Instructions  -  issued  at  the  beginning  of  March  -  stipulated  that  New  York,  New  Jcrscy, 
Connecticut  and  Pennsylvania  were  to  contribute  a  total  of  1500  mce  for  the  attack  upon 
Montreal;  meanwhile  New  England  and  Rhode  Island  were  to  raise  1200  men  for  the 
seaborne  assault  against  Quebec.  In  addition,  all  the  men  raised  by  the  colonies  were  to  be 
appropriately  armed  and  provisioned  for  three  months,  whilst  the  1200  were  to  be  cmbarkcd 
aboard  transports  in  order  to  join  the  British  naval  squadron  on  its  arrival  at  Boston.  77 
Vetch  and  Nicholson  departed  Spithead  in  the  Dragon  on  II  March  with  a 
considerable  amount  of  war  supplies  aboard  and  by  the  end  of  April  they  had  put  ashorc  rrom 
Nantucket  Bay,  Boston.  Not  surprisingly,  given  the  tenor  of  recent  dispatches  homc,  thcy 
rnet  a  favourable  response  upon  delivering  the  Queen's  orders  to  the  various  colonial 
'  PRO,  CO  324/9,  fos.  221-45:  'Canada  Survey'd',  27  July  1708. 
73  ibid. 
71  S.  S.  Webb,  'The  Strange  Career  of  Francis  Nicholson',  W&MQ  xxiii  (1966),  51348. 
75  CSpC,  1708-1709,  nos.  221,221.1,  pp.  vii,  164-5:  the  Council  of  Trade  and  Plantations  to  Sundcrland,  I 
Dec.  1708,  and  enclosure,  the  Council  of  Trade  and  Plantations  to  the  Queen. 
76  The  following  quotas  of  men  were  to  make  up  this  total:  800  from  New  York;  200  from  New  icrscy;  350 
from  Connecticut;  and  150  from  Pennsylvania. 
77CSpCP  1708-1709,  no.  387,  pp.  230-2:  H.  M.  Instructions  to  Colonel  Vetch,  I  Mar.  1709. 336 
governors  and  also  when  seeking  the  local  legislatures'  authority  to  raise  the  troops.  Only  in 
the  predominately  Quaker  New  Jersey  and  Pennsylvania  did  problems  emerge.  Both  refused 
to  provide  men,  though  after  much  argument  they  agreed  as  a  compromise  to  vote  some 
fundS.  78  At  the  colonists'  end  therefore  the  operation  remained  largely  on  schedule  when  on 
25  May,  the  land  force  for  Montreal  marched  out  to  a  staging  post  at  Wood  Creek,  south  of 
Lake  Champlain.  Vetch's  Instructions  had  not  made  provision  for  the  command  of  this  force 
and  the  New  York  Assembly  pressed  for  Nicholson's  appointment.  Opposition  to  this 
development  focused  upon  Nicholson  being  ill-suited  to  liaise  with  the  Five  Nation  Indians 
who  were  to  join  this  overland  force  but  the  preferred  alternative  -  Peter  Schuyler  -  was 
selected  as  Nicholson's  deputy  and  he  had  in  any  event  been  one  of  the  proponents  of 
Nicholson's  appointment.  79 
At  Wood  Creek,  the  force  was  organised  for  the  attack  on  Montreal,  which  amongst 
other  things  involved  building  the  canoes  for  the  transfer  along  to  the  north  end  of  the  lake. 
While  these  preparations  and  those  in  New  England  continued  throughout  the  summer,  the 
colonists  fully  expected  the  British  squadron  to  arrive  at  Boston.  By  August,  however,  there 
was  still  no  indication  that  its  arrival  was  imminent  and  the  authorities  in  America  became 
increasingly  restless.  Their  arrangements  had  been  in  place  for  a  number  of  weeks  and  the 
strain  of  keeping  men  at  arms,  whether  aboard  transports  at  Boston  or  in  camp  at  Wood 
Creek,  was  beginning  to  show.  Indeed,  Nicholson's  forces  skirmished  with  some  French 
outguards  and  their  Indian  allies  near  to  Lake  Champlain  thereby  advertising  not  only  their 
presence  in  that  area  but  also  the  fact  that  an  operation  was  imminent.  The  continuing  delay 
thus  allowed  the  French  time  to  prepare  their  defences.  By  early  September,  it  was  clear  to 
78  PRO,  CO  5/9,  fos.  96-9:  'Journal  of  the  Proceedings  of  Col.  Vetch  and  Col.  Nicholson  from  New  York  to 
Sunderland'  [hereafter  'Journal  of  Vetch  and  Nicholson'],  21  June  1709;  PRO,  ADM  51/269,  Part  vi, 
unpaginated,  Dragon,  28  Fcb.  -30  Apr.  1709;  CSPC,  1708-1709,  nos.  580,605,671  pp.  349,406,409-10: 
Gookin  to  Nicholson  and  Vetch,  17  June  1709;  Nicholson  and  Vetch  to  the  Council  of  Trade  and  Plantations, 
28  June  1709;  Cockerill  to  Popplc,  2  July  1709.  It  is  noteworthy  that  on  p.  ix  of  his  Preface,  the  editor  of  the 
CSPC  1708-1709,  Cecil  Headlam,  stated  that  Pennsylvania  gave  neither  men  nor  money;  while  Morgan, 
'Some  Imperial  Attempts  at  Co-operation',  p.  182,  claimed  that  it  voted  E2000.  Curiously,  the  document 
Hcadlam  cites  as  evidence  -  CSPC,  1708-1709,  no.  580,  p.  406:  Gookin  to  Nicholson  and  Vetch,  17  June 
1709,  -  refers  to  the  Pennsylvanian  Assembly  raising  L500  as  a  present  for  Queen  Anne;  he  does  not  seem  to 
have  considered  that  this  might  have  been  looked  upon  as  funding  for  the  expedition.  It  is  not  clear  whether 
the  E2000  Morgan  refers  to  was  voted  in  a  bloc  or  whether,  taking  into  account  the  above  L500,  an  additional 
L1500  was  subsequently  found.  Nonetheless,  on  the  substantive  question  as  to  whether  Pennsylvania  did  vote 
this  sum,  Morgan,  'Some  Imperial  Attempts  at  Co-operation',  p.  182  n.  3,  cites  an  impressive  list  of  local 
evidence  unavailable  to  this  study. 
79  PRO,  CO  5/9,  fos.  96-9,100-1:  'Journal  of  Vetch  and  Nicholson';  Nicholson  to  Sunderland,  8  July  1709. 337 
Vctch  that  the  opportunity  to  begin  the  operation  had  passed  and  he  convened  a  governors' 
conference  to  decide  what  to  do  next.  80 
Vetch's  instinct  that  the  squadron  was  not  going  to  appear  was  correct.  London  had 
tried  to  maintain  the  momentum  of  its  preparations  begun  in  February  with  the  appointment 
of  Vice-Admiral  John  Baker"  and  Brigadier  MacCartney  to  the  squadron  and  the  land  force 
commands;  meanwhile  vessels  were  brought  down  to  Spithead  and  five  regiments  were 
identified  to  form  the  land  force.  Progress  slowed  in  April  however  as  a  new  land 
commander  -  Brigadier  Whetham  -  had  to  be  appointed  upon  MacCartney's  embroilment  in 
criminal  proceedings  following  an  allegation  of  rape  by  his  housekeeper.  When,  in  May, 
Whctham  was  issued  with  two  sets  of  Instructions,  it  was  no  longer  assumed  that  the 
operation  against  Canada  would  take  place.  Given  the  increasing  lateness  of  the  season,  a 
Council  of  War  to  be  convened  by  Whetham  on  his  arrival  at  Boston  was  now  to  determine 
upon  its  practicability.  The  Ministry's  evident  and  increasing  scepticism  about  the  departure 
of  the  force  was  manifest  towards  the  end  of  May  when  Baker  was  told  to  wait  with  his 
squadron  for  further  orders.  Ten  days  later,  he  attended  the  Queen  in  Council  to  be  told  that 
the  Canadian  expedition  had  been  abandoned  and  that  his  squadron  was  to  depart  with  seven 
regiments  for  the  Mediterranean.  The  lateness  of  the  year,  the  prospects  for  peace  and  the 
demands  of  the  Peninsula  including,  in  particular,  another  proposal  to  reduce  CAdiz  were 
given  as  the  reasons.  82  Of  these  three,  only  the  first  stands  up  to  scrutiny.  Ever  since  the 
failure  of  the  Rooke-Ormonde  expedition  in  1702,  Cddiz  had  been  a  perennial  paper  target  for 
the  allies  and  1709  was  no  different  in  that  the  operation  never  occurred.  Contrary  winds 
delayed  Baker's  departure  until  the  middle  of  August  by  which  time  it  was  thought  to  be  too 
late  for  operations  against  the  Spanish  coast  and,  on  entering  the  Mediterranean,  Byng 
80  PRO,  CO  5/9,  fos.  96-9,102-5:  'Journal  of  Vetch  and  Nicholson';  Vetch  to  Sunderland,  2  Aug.  1709  and 
'Postscript  Letter',  12  Aug.  1709;  Dudley  to  Sunderland,  13  Aug.  1709. 
g'  Snyder  wrongly  claimed  in  The  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  iii,  1269  n.  3  that  Baker  was  to 
convey  the  force  to  America  to  capture  Port  Royal.  It  is  clear  from  Baker's  journal  -  NMM,  JOD/22,  unf  : 
Journal  of  Vice-Admiral  John  Baker,  1709-1711,19  Mar.  1709  -  that  his  orders  required  his  participation  in 
the  assault  against  Quebec. 
82  NMM,  JOD/22,  unf.:  Journal  of  Vice-Admiral  John  Baker,  1709-1711,19  Mar.  -5  June  1709;  PRO,  ADM 
1/4092,  fos.  20  8-10,224-5:  Sunderland  to  the  Admiralty,  26,28  Feb.,  20  Mar.  1709;  PRO,  ADM  1/4093,  fos. 
8,14,44:  Addison  to  Burchett,  3  Apr.  1709;  Sunderland  to  'My  Lord',  12  Apr.  1709;  Sunderland  to  the 
Admiralty,  9  May  1709  and  enclosure,  'Copy  of  Her  Majesties  Additional  Instructions  to  Brigadier 
Whetham',  9  May  1709;  PRO,  WO  4/8,  pp.  138:  Walpole  to  Bridges,  2  Mar.  1709;  PRO,  WO  4/9,  p.  39: 
Walpole  to  Whetham,  II  June  1709;  7he  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  ii.  1180  n.  1;  The 338 
directed  Baker  to  land  the  troops  at  Barcelona.  Peace  negotiations  were  admittedly  current 
but  to  abandon  one  operation  on  the  basis  that  these  talks  showed  signs  of  success  only  to 
promote  another  (the  Cddiz  proposal)  suggested  either  muddled  thinking  or 
disingenuousness.  Marlborough  certainly  thought  it  inappropriate  to  be  planning  operations 
in  Spain  when  peace  was  under  discussion,  though  notably  he  omitted  to  apply  this  stricture 
to  Flanders.  83  The  time  of  year  was  however  crucial  for  with  the  squadron  still  at  Spithead 
well  beyond  the  date  previously  set  for  the  start  of  the  operation  across  the  Atlantic, 
dispatching  it  now  would  probably  result  in  a  waste  of  resources.  As  was  to  be  discovered  at 
great  cost  in  1711,  the  St  Lawrence  River  -  up  which  the  squadron  would  have  to  pass  to 
reach  Quebec  -  was  navigable  in  only  the  most  seasonable  conditions. 
On  27  July,  Sunderland  wrote  officially  to  inform  the  colonists  of  the  recent  decision 
but  the  slowness  of  communication  meant  that  the  news  did  not  reach  them  unta  the  second 
week  of  October.  Dudley  conveyed  the  information  to  a  conference  of  senior  New  England 
colonists  and  general  officers,  including  Vetch  and  Nicholson,  and  they  began  to  consider 
Sunderland's  suggestion  in  his  letter  that  they  use  the  force  amassed  to  target  Acadia,  with  an 
attack  on  Port  Royal  especially  recommended.  Reluctant  to  see  all  their  preparations  put  to 
waste  the  colonists  agreed  that  some  of  the  forces  should  be  used  against  Port  Royal  but  the 
participation  of  the  naval  vessels  then  on  the  North  American  station  had  to  be  sought  first. 
Although  some  of  the  Captains  were  personally  sympathetic  to  an  action,  only  one  -  the 
Captain  of  the  Chester  -  agreed  on  the  basis  that  his  ship's  station  was  to  attend  to  the 
Governor  of  New  England  whereas  the  others  claimed  that  their  Instructions  did  not  allow  for 
it.  Perhaps  because  both  operations  for  1709  had  now  fallen  through,  the  colonists 
maintained  the  pressure  upon  London  by  petitioning  for  another  expedition  to  be  organised 
early  in  1710.  This  time  however  their  demands  were  scaled  back  inasmuch  as  they  promoted 
the  assault  against  Port  Royal  rather  than  the  conquest  of  Canada.  It  was  reckoned  that  for 
the  former  operation  Britain  need  only  supply  four  men-of-war  and  a  bomb  vessel  plus  some 
Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  iii,  nos.  1295,130  1,  pp.  1269,1275:  Godolphin  to  Marlborough, 
31  May,  5  June  1709. 
83  The  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  iii,  nos.  1317,1324,1353,1375,1376,  pp.  1287  n.  2,1293, 
1319  1342-3:  Godolphin  to  Marlborough,  26  June,  20  July,  14  Aug.  1709;  Marlborough  to  Godolphin,  15 
Aug.  1709. 339 
500  marines  or  army  troops  with  a  couple  of  large  mortars.  "  The  Conference's  implicit 
calculation  that  London  would  be  more  likely  to  deliver  on  this  reduced  provision  by  the 
beginning  of  March  thereby  allowing  Port  Royal  to  be  quickly  captured,  meant  that  there  still 
might  be  time  to  revive  plans  for  the  expulsion  of  the  French  from  Canada. 
In  the  new  year,  Nicholson  returned  to  England  accompanied  by  Schuyler  and  four  of 
the  Five  Nation  Indian  Chiefs  to  present  the  Conference's  petition  to  the  Ministry.  The 
Chiefs  aroused  some  interest  in  London  and  their  exotic  presence  may  have  encouraged 
ministers  to  begin  planning  the  dispatch  of  another  expedition  to  conquer  Canada,  despite  the 
colonists  having  limited  their  ambitions  to  Port  Royal.  Godolphin  reported  that  the  failure  of 
the  peace  negotiations  then  taking  place  at  Gcrtruydenberg  had  persuaded  the  Cabinet 
Council  to  renew  hostilities  and  make  another  attempt  in  North  America.  "  Such  an  operation 
was  thought  to  be  'of  great  consequence  and  also  very  feisible'.  86  It  was  clear  though  the 
Lord  Treasurer  was  unconvinced  and  that  Marlborough  was  positively  hostile,  though  he  kept 
his  opposition  private.  The  Duke  argued  that  experience  showed  that  little  was  gained  from 
such  expeditions  except  great  expense  and  the  ruin  of  the  regiments  involved.  87 
Marlborough's  opinion  was  not  necessarily  directed  against  combined  army-navy  operations 
as  an  instrument  of  warfare  -  he  had  after  all  been  a  proponent  of  them  since  the  1690 
campaign  in  Ireland.  Rather,  his  opposition  was  focused  on  the  fact  that  this  operation  was  to 
be  an  overseas  colonial  expedition  which,  due  to  the  distances  involved,  would  deprive  him  of 
the  troops  for  the  whole  of  the  campaign  season;  whilst  it  was  also  rooted  in  the  changing 
political  background  against  which  war  policy  was  being  formulated.  Inearlyl.  710,  the 
84  PRO,  C0519,  fos.  111-16,123,125-6,125A,  127-8:  Dudley,  Nicholson,  Vetch  and  Moody  to'My  Lord' 
[Sunderland],  24  Oct.  1709;  Dudley,  Vetch  and  Moody  to  'My  Lord'  [Sunderland],  25  Oct.  1709  and 
enclosure,  'Votes  at  the  Congress';  Dudley,  Nicholson,  Vetch  and  Moody  to  Ingoldsby,  18  Oct.  1709;  Dudley, 
Nicholson,  Vetch  and  Moody  to  Mathews,  Tate,  Clifton,  Smith  and  Davis  [Commanders  of  Her  Majesties 
Ships  at  Nantucket],  19  Oct.  1709;  Dudley,  Nicholson,  Vetch  and  Moody  to  Martin,  19  Oct.  1709;  Smith  to 
Dudley,  20  Oct.  1709;  Martin  to  Dudley,  20  Oct.  1709;  BL,  Add  MSS  61500,  f  22:  Minutes  of  the  Cabinet 
Council,  II  June  1709. 
25  Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen  Anne,  iii.  162;  Morgan,  'Some  Attempts  At  Imperial  Co-operation',  pp. 
188-9;  The  Marlhorough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  iii,  nos.  1504,1510,  pp.  1467-8,147  1:  Godolphin  to 
Marlborough,  20,25  Apr.  1710.  See  The  Marlhorough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  iii.  1467  n.  9  for  an 
explanation  regarding  Godolphin's  curious  tendency  to  refer  to  this  proposed  expedition  to  Canada  in  North 
America  as  one  bound  for  the  West  Indies. 
"'  The  Afarlhorough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  iii,  no.  15  10,  p.  147  1:  Godolphin  to  Marlborough,  25  Apr. 
1710. 
"  The  Marlhorough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  iii,  nos.  1504,1510,1515,1522-4,  pp.  1467-8,1471,1475, 
1483-5:  Godolphin  to  Marlborough,  20,25,28  Apr.,  2  May  1710;  Marlborough  to  Godolphin,  5,8  May  1710. 340 
Tories  were  reviving  as  a  political  force.  Their  effective  exploitation  of  the  Ministry's  crass 
handling  of  the  impeachment  of  the  Popular  high-flying  divine  Dr  Sacheverell,  combined  with 
their  subtle  reflection  of  the  increasing  national  war  weariness,  persuaded  the  Queen  (deftly 
guided  by  Robert  Harley)  in  the  early  spring  of  17  10  to  remodel  her  Ministry  incrementally  in 
their  favour.  Despite  being  inclined  to  the  Tories  during  their  early  years  as  courtiers  and 
then  attempting  to  rise  above  the  political  party  fi-ay,  Marlborough  and  Godolphin  had  firmly 
identified  with  the  Whigs  since  1708  largely  on  the  basis  of  the  support  that  party  gave  to  the 
European  continental  war.  The  Duke  and  the  Lord  Treasurer  were  therefore  becoming 
increasingly  isolated  within  the  Government  and  could  not  rely  on  popular  support  as  a 
bolster.  88  Consequently,  their  domination  of  war  policy  was  no  longer  total  and,  for 
Marlborough,  the  Canadian  expedition  pointed  to  a  reduction  of  his  military  efforts  on  the 
continent  with  the  emphasis  to  be  more  exclusively  upon  the  maritime  and,  specifically,  the 
colonial  context. 
From  the  outset,  Godolphin  had  suggested  to  Marlborough  that  he  should  propose  an 
alternative  fon-n  of  employment  for  the  selected  regiments  in  the  hope  that  the  Cabinet 
Council  would  opt  for  his  suggestion  instead.  Initially  the  Duke  failed  to  respond  to 
Godolphin's  invitation  as  he  did  not  wish  to  be  blamed  for  the  failure  of  the  Canadian  venture 
but  eventually  there  was  a  suggestion  of  a  project  that  Godolphin  had  long  advocated,  namely 
a  landing  of  troops  on  the  north  eastern  French  coast  which  might  then  link  up  with 
Marlborough's  Flanders  army.  89  The  Cabinet  Council  had  meanwhile  been  pressing  ahead 
with  the  preparations  for  the  North  American  venture.  Just  as  was  the  case  with  the  1709 
operation,  the  colonists  -  Nicholson  and  Schuyler  -  were  quickly  returned  home  to  raise  the 
quotas  of  men  and  material  before  the  arrival  of  the  British  contribution.  Prior  to  his 
departure  in  mid-March,  Nicholson  was  issued  with  Instructions  appointing  him  Commander 
of  all  forces  directed  against  any  French  possessions  in  the  region,  with  Port  Royal 
specifically  mentioned.  Doubtless  this  was  a  response  to  the  colonists'  complaint  that  in  1709 
"  G.  Holmes,  The  Trial  ofDoctor  Sacheverell  (London,  1973),  pp.  238-9,250-1;  B.  Hill,  Robert  Harley., 
Speaker,  Secretary  ofStateandPremier  Minister  (New  Haven&  London,  1988),  pp.  125-8;  G.  Holmes, 
British  Politics  in  iheAge  ofAnne,  (revised  edn,  London,  1987),  pp.  75-6;  Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen 
Anne,  iii.  84-8 
19  The  mariborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  iii,  nos.  1510,1521-4,1584,1589,1593,  pp.  1471,1481-5, 
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their  inability  to  command  the  participation  of  the  naval  captains  in  the  action  against  Port 
Royal  had  caused  it  to  be  abandoned.  90  Nonetheless,  although  the  Ministry  had  seemingly 
conferred  on  Nicholson  a  supreme  command  for  any  action  in  North  America,  they  had  no 
intention  that  this  would  extend  to  the  principal  attempt  to  expel  the  French  from  Canada. 
Upon  Nicholson  sailing  with  six  vessels  and  some  400  marines,  arrangements  were  begun  for 
the  force  that  was  to  follow  him.  In  addition  to  Nicholson's  small  squadron  and  those  already 
on  station,  the  Admiralty  was  ordered  to  provide  three  men-of-war  and  sufficient  transports 
to  carry  the  five  regiments  which  had  been  selected  to  form  the  mainstay  of  the  land  force. 
The  command  of  these  soldiers  along  with  the  troops  that  were  to  be  raised  by  the  colonial 
authorities  was  given  to  Lord  Shannon.  He  received  his  Instructions  in  July  and  these  further 
circumscribed  Nicholson's  command  by  directing  Shannon  on  his  arrival  in  Boston  to 
convene  a  Council  of  War  of  senior  British  and  colonial  land  and  sea  officers.  Just  as  with 
Whetham's  Instructions  in  1709,  this  Council  was  to  decide  the  viability  of  the  Canadian 
operation  and  also  what  else  might  be  undertaken  in  the  event  of  its  early  success  or 
abandonment.  "  Nicholson's  command  was  therefore  confmed  to  much  smaller  and 
provincial-dominated  operations  against  targets  such  as  Port  Royal. 
in  the  event,  Nicholson  was  to  exercise  this  authority  as  the  progress  of  the  operation 
against  Canada  followed  the  same  pattern  as  the  previous  year.  It  was  mid-July  before  he 
arrived  back  in  Boston  and  could  set  the  provincial  authorities  to  raising  their  quotas  and 
procuring  the  necessary  war  materials.  The  belated  start  to  these  tasks  caused  them  not  to  be 
completed  until  the  second  week  of  September,  which  was  too  late  to  begin  any  credible 
action  against  Quebec.  92  This  second  successive  failure  to  make  an  attempt  to  expel  the 
French  from  Canada  should  not  however  be  wholly  be  blamed  on  the  slowness  of  the  colonial 
preparation.  Some  ten  days  after  Nicholson's  return  to  New  England,  London  decided  to 
cancel  the  dispatch  of  Shannon's  force.  The  regiments  were  encamped  on  the  Isle  of  Wight 
but  their  embarkation  and  the  squadron's  departure  was  being  prevented  by  the  current 
90  BL,  Add  MSS  61500,  fos.  80,85,87,96  107:  Minutes  of  the  Cabinet  Council,  4,28  Dec.  1709,3,26  Jan., 
21  Feb.  1710;  PRO,  C05/865  unf.:  Boston  News-Letter,  No.  345,3OOct.  -6  Nov.  1710;  PRO,  C05/9,  E  106: 
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prevailing  winds.  On  II  July,  the  Cabinet  Council  met  to  consider  advice  about  sailing  times 
to  Boston  and  Quebec  and  consequently,  Godolphin  expressed  his  doubts  that  the  operation 
could  proceed  given  the  current  time  of  year.  He  restated  this  view  a  week  later  as  the  winds 
remained  contrary  and  then  fmally  reported  to  Marlborough  on  24  July  that  Shannon's  force 
was  definitely  not  going  to  depart.  93 
The  letter  informing  the  colonists  of  this  decision  was  not  sent  until  the  last  day  of 
August,  by  which  time  the  Queen  had  finally  been  persuaded  to  dismiss  Godolphin  and  to  put 
the  Treasury  under  a  Commission  headed  by  the  First  Commissioner,  Lord  Poulett,  but 
controlled  by  Robert  Harley  as  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer.  Fearing  a  lack  of  political 
support,  Marlborough  had  never  responded  specifically  to  Godolphin's  invitation  to  suggest 
alternative  employment  for  Shannon's  troops  and  despite  the  possibility  that  they  might  have 
comprised  the  landing  force  for  a  descent  upon  the  northern  French  coast  which  was  then 
being  canvassed,  these  soldiers  were,  as  in  1709,  sent  to  Spain.  94  It  is  not  clear  exactly  when 
Nicholson  received  this  news  but  the  Boston  News-Letter  implies  that  he  was  in  any  event 
intent  on  using  his  own  Instructions  to  mount  an  attack  against  Port  Royal.  95  In  possession  of 
the  authority  to  compel  the  station  naval  captains  to  participate  -  though  there  is  no 
suggestion  that  he  had  to  exercise  it  -  Nicholson  had  by  18  September  gathered  in  Nantucket 
Bay  a  five-strong  squadron  with  one  bomb  vessel  and  a  number  of  transports  and  auxiliaries. 
Embarked  aboard  were  four  colonial  regiments  and  the  400-odd  marines  from  Britain  along 
with  the  necessary  war  supplies.  The  squadron  stood  out  to  sea  that  day  and  reached  the 
Wolves  islets  at  the  entrance  to  Passmaquoddy  Bay  on  21  September.  There  it  remained  until 
the  early  hours  of  24  September  when  the  ships  crossed  the  Bay  of  Fundy  to  the  estuary  of 
the  Port  Royal  river.  The  combination  of  a  calm  and  an  ebb  tide  forced  the  squadron  to  come 
temporarily  to  anchor  but,  once  the  tide  was  spent,  the  ships  proceeded  up  river  except  for 
the  Cceser  which  ran  aground  after  sailing  too  close  to  the  shore.  On  reaching  an  anchorage 
93  The  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  iii,  nos.  1605,1609,1622,1630,  pp.  1560,1566  n.  2,1572, 
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just  above  Goat  Island,  Nicholson  convened  an  evening  Council  of  War,  which  decided  that 
two  reconnaissance  parties  commanded  by  Colonels  Vetch  and  Reading  would  go  ashore  in 
the  early  morning  to  determine  whether  the  north  or  the  south  side  of  the  river  would  provide 
the  better  landing  site  and  camp.  Their  reports  recommended  the  south  side,  where  Port 
Royal's  fort  was  situated,  and,  despite  cannon  fire  from  the  fort  as  they  put  ashore,  the  troops 
were  by  the  evening  encamped  in  a  nearby  wood. 
At  day  break  on  26  September,  Nicholson  marched  his  force  from  the  wood  upon 
Port  Royal  town.  This  was  easily  taken  despite  the  ambush  of  the  marine  vanguard 
commanded  by  Major  Livingston  as  they  ascended  the  hill  overlooking  the  town.  Skirmishing 
increased  as  the  force  neared  the  fort,  when  they  were  also  subjected  to  its  cannon  fire. 
Nicholson  however  detached  an  advanced  guard  of  grenadiers  which  managed  to  entrench 
themselves  some  400  paces  from  the  walls  and  in  so  doing  swept  many  of  the  enemy  back 
inside  the  fort.  That  night,  while  the  bomb  vessel  maintained  the  pressure  upon  the  fort's 
garrisons,  Vetch  led  a  party  of  100  men  to  Spurs  Point  where  he  hoped  to  construct  a  twelve 
mortar  battery  to  cover  the  passage  up-river  of  the  boats  loaded  with  cannon  and  stores.  The 
ground  proved  unsuitable  however,  and  the  landing  of  the  field  artillery  was  temporarily 
suspended.  Fortunately,  no  substantive  delay  ensued  as  the  war  materials  were  brought  up 
over  the  course  of  the  following  two  days  under  the  cover  of  a  more  effectively  deployed 
bomb  vessel.  Although  only  a  few  hundred  men,  the  Port  Royal  garrison  kept  up  a  fire 
disproportionate  to  their  number  ensuring  that  the  movement  of  artillery  cost  Nicholson  a 
number  of  men.  Nonetheless,  by  the  end  of  the  month,  a  thirteen  cannon  battery  supported 
by  some  24  coehoorn  mortars  and  two  land  mortars  had  begun  to  play  against  the  fort  and 
Governor  Subercasse  quickly  sought  terms.  These  were  concluded  within  the  week  and  on  6 
October  the  French  marched  out  of  the  fort  with  the  full  honours  of  war.  Upon  taking 
control,  the  colonists  raised  the  Union  Flag  and  renamed  the  fort  Annapolis  Royal  in  honour 
of  the  Queen.  Its  possession  and  the  immediate  environs  held  the  key  to  the  whole  of  Acadia, 
which  also  now  fell  to  the  British  and  was  renamed  Nova  Scotia.  The  combined  action  of  the 
Royal  Navy,  marines  and  colonial  troops  had  therefore  secured  some  success  from  the  plans 
for  the  1710  campaign.  Nonetheless,  it  was  the  expulsion  of  the  French  from  Canada  which 
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the  colonials  sought  above  all  else  and,  leaving  Vetch  to  organise  a  new  garrison  at  Annapolis, 
Royal,  Nicholson  departed  for  England  to  press  again  the  case  for  the  more  ambitious 
operation. 
Nicholson  was  to  return  to  much  changed  political  circumstances  in  Britain.  The 
Tories  had  consolidated  their  political  revival  with  a  crushing  General  Election  victory  over 
the  Whigs  in  October  1710,  which  meant  that  they  now  dominated  Parliament  and  the 
Ministry.  Although  led  by  the  moderate  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer,  and  later  Lord 
Treasurer,  Robert  Harley,  the  more  politically  aggressive  side  of  the  Party  was  represented  at 
a  senior  level  by  Henry  St  John,  who  had  been  appointed  Secretary  of  State  for  the  Northern 
Department  a  month  before  the  election,  while  there  were  also  numerous  vigorous  partisans 
on  the  backbencheS.  96  These  political  developments  had  important  implications  for  the 
direction  of  war  policy.  Previously,  mixed  and  Whiggish  governments  had  pursued  both  the 
traditional  maritime  and  continental  strategies,  but  it  was  now  probable  that  the  new  Tory 
government  would  alter  the  strategic  emphasis.  Their  election  campaign  had  exploited  an 
increasing  national  war  weariness  that  was  largely  founded  upon  the  discontent  with  the  four 
shillings  in  the  pound  land  tax  and  the  inability  of  the  continental  campaigning  (which 
necessitated  the  high  tax)  to  bring  victory.  In  1709,  Marlborough  had  again  defeated  the 
French  on  the  battlefield  but  this  victory  at  Malplaquet  (31  August  1709)  was  considered 
pyrrhic  by  many  inasmuch  as  it  had  not  brought  the  French  to  peace  in  17  10,  despite  the  huge 
loss  of  life.  Moreover,  by  the  end  of  that  year,  the  allies  had  effectively  lost  the  war  on  the 
Peninsula.  The  campaign  had  begun  well  with  the  Archduke  occupying  Madrid  for  a  second 
time  following  victories  at  Almenara  (17  July  17  10)  and  Saragossa  (8  August  17  10),  but  the 
city  rose  for  Philip  and,  to  avoid  being  cut  off  in  Castile,  the  allied  commander,  Starhcmberg, 
decided  to  withdraw  eastwards  towards  Catalonia.  This  retreat  turned  into  a  rout  however 
with  the  rear  of  his  army  commanded  by  James  Stanhope  defeated  at  Brihuega  (28  November 
1710);  while  the  remainder  was  badly  galled  and  pinned  back  into  Catalonia,  despite  a  tactical 
victory  against  Vend6me  at  Villa  Viciosa  (29  November  1710).  Thus,  although  there  were 
few  advocating  immediate  withdrawal  from  the  war,  there  was  undoubtedly  a  sense  that  war 
policy  should  now  reflect  such  discontent  and  aspirations  towards  peace;  while  also 
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recognising  that  a  strong  military  showing  would  enhance  Britain's  negotiating  position  as 
informal  peace  contacts  with  the  French  were  re-established  in  the  winter  of  17  10/1  1.97 
For  St  John,  an  expedition  to  capture  Canada  seemed  an  ideal  operation  in  such 
circumstances.  Its  distance  from  Europe  and  the  possible  deployment  of  some  of  the  best 
regiments  from  Marlborough's  Flanders  army  would  send  the  double  signal  that  the  Ministry 
was  now  less  concerned  with  European  continental  campaigning  but  also  aware  that  a 
significant  military  victory  which  captured  territory  was  required  as  negotiating  collateral. 
There  was  also  the  possible  party  political  advantages  to  be  reaped  from  undertaking  an 
operation  which  appealed  to  the  City  and  the  merchants,  who  had  never  been  traditional 
supporters  of  the  Tories.  "  Accordingly,  St  John  described  it  as  a  project  about  which  he  was 
neither  'light  nor  whimsical'.  99  Although  keenly  supported  by  the  Board  of  Trade,  which  had 
been  a  proponent  of  the  action  since  reading  Vetch's  'Canada  Survey'd',  it  was  not  clear  in 
early  1711  that  St  John  had  convinced  Harley.  There  was  little  trust  between  the  two  men 
and  though  at  this  stage  their  relationship  remained  intact,  each  desired  to  limit  the  other's 
role  in  the  Ministry.  Harley  moreover  suspected  St  John's  avarice  inasmuch  he  might  aim  to 
make  money  from  the  expeditionary  victualling  contracts,  particularly  those  concerning  the 
clothing.  100  As  the  senior  of  the  two  and  with  greater  access  to  the  Queen,  Harley  possessed 
the  advantage  in  the  long  term  if  he  wished  to  frustrate  the  proposal  and  there  was 
undoubtedly  a  plaintive  tone  in  St  John's  appeal  to  him  that  'I  hope  you  will  support  me  in  it 
since  I  have  gone  so  far.  "01  Luck  was  however  with  the  Secretary  when  during  a  Privy 
Council  examination  of  the  dissident  French  Huguenot,  Guiscard,  the  suspect  stabbed  Harley 
with  a  pen-knife.  Although  the  wound  was  not  life  threatening,  Harley  was  forced  into 
several  weeks  convalescence  and  St  John  seized  the  opportunity  of  his  absence  to  push 
forward  the  expedition  to  Canada.  102 
The  Secretary  built  on  the  proposal  of  previous  years,  which  meant  that  there  was  no 
97  Homes,  British  Politics  in  the  Age  ofAnne,  pp.  76-7;  Churchill,  Marlborough,  iv.  144,148-9,159,280; 
Lynn,  The  Wars  ofLouis  XIV,  pp.  339-41 
98  W.  T.  Morgan,  'Queen  Anne's  Canadian  Expedition  of  171  P,  QQ  xxxv  (1927-1928),  463-4;  Me  Walker 
Expedition  to  Quebec,  ed.  G.  S.  Graham  (London,  1953),  p.  12. 
99  HMC,  Portland  MSS,  iv.  656:  St  John  to  [Harley],  17  Jan.  1711. 
100  HMC,  Portland  MSS,  v.  465:  The  Earl  of  Oxford's  Account  of  Public  Affairs;  Trevelyan,  England  Under 
Queen  Anne,  iii.  139 
101  JIMC,  PortlandMSS,  iv.  656:  St  John  to  [Harley],  17  Jan.  1711. 
102  Morgan,  'Queen  Anne's  Canadian  Expedition',  p.  464;  Trevelyan,  England  Under  Queen,  4nne,  iii.  140-1. 346 
change  to  the  basic  operational  structure.  A  detachment  of  colonial  troops  was  to  march 
overland  from  Albany  to  attack  Montreal,  while  a  combined  army-navy  force  sent  from 
Britain  would  put  in  first  at  Boston  and  then  sail  around  the  north  American  coast  to  proceed 
up  the  St  Lawrence  river  for  an  assault  on  Quebec.  The  capture  of  both  places  would  allow 
the  two  forces  to  combine  and  complete  the  expulsion  of  the  French  from  Canada.  St  John 
was  nonetheless  able  to  mould,  and  arguably,  determine  the  fate  of  the  operation  through  the 
choice  of  the  commanders  and  by  effecting  its  preparation  under  a  blanket  of  secrecy.  With 
respect  to  the  former,  the  charge  that  personal  and  party  politics  influenced  his  choice  cannot 
be  evaded.  G.  S.  Graham  clearly  made  the  point  that  Rear-Admiral  Sir  Hovenden  Walker's 
naval  career  hardly  recommended  him  to  the  command  of  the  squadron  to  be  dispatched  from 
Britain,  while  his  expedition  to  the  Caribbean  in  1703  had  not  only  failed  to  achieve  its 
objectives  but  had  also  descended  into  a  squabble  amongst  senior  commanders.  Walker's 
friendly  relations  with  St  John  and  the  fact  that  he  was  a  known  Tory  were  strongly  suspected 
as  having  caused  his  selection  in  place  of  Sir  Thomas  Hardy,  who  was  reputedly  the  first 
preference.  103  Complex  political  and  personal  calculations  undoubtedly  underlay  the  choice 
of  Brigadier  John  Hill  to  command  the  land  forces  aboard  the  fleet.  Hill  had  proved  himself  a 
reasonably  capable  regimental  soldier  but  that  did  not  mean  he  was  suited  to  general 
command.  Marlborough  certainly  did  not  think  so  and  Hill's  promotion  in  June  17  10  had 
been  forced  upon  him  by  the  Queen.  Marlborough  had  earlier  that  year  successfully  vetoed 
the  Brigadier's  translation  to  the  Colonelcy  of  the  late  Earl  of  Essex's  Dragoon  Regiment. 
His  opinion  of  Hill  was  nonetheless  coloured  by  his  wife's  estrangement  from  the  Queen, 
which  the  Duchess  blamed  on  Abigail  Masham,  one  of  Anne's  bedchamber  maids  and  sister 
of  John  Hill.  Sarah  Churchill's  animosity  was  especially  bitter;  she  had  as  Mrs  Masham's 
cousin  recommended  her  to  the  Queen,  but  Abigail  proved  politically  to  be  strongly  inclincd 
to  the  Tories.  This  was,  of  course,  antithetical  to  the  Duchess's  staunch  Whiggism  and 
Abigail  had  made  matters  worse  by  acting  as  a  conduit  between  the  Queen  and  I  larlcy  when 
the  latter  began  intriguing  against  the  Whig  government  soon  after  his  dismissal  from  the 
Secretaryship  in  1708.104  In  these  circumstances,  and  with  flaricy  absent  from  Court,  St  John 
"'  7he  Walker  Expedition  to  Quebec,  pp.  14-16,59;  for  a  relation  of  Walker's  expedition  to  Quebec  in  1703, 
see  Chapter  2,  Section  11.  ii. 
104  The  Marlborough-Godolphin  Correspondence,  iii,  nos.  1446A,  1447A-B,  1449,1499,1526,1559,  pp. 
1408,1410-13,1415-16,1461-2  n.  6,1488  n.  2,3,4,1522:  Cowper  to  Marlborough,  17  Jan.  1710; 347 
saw  opportunities  in  Hill's  appointment  inasmuch  as  it  might  through  Abigail  interest  the 
Queen  in  the  expedition  and,  more  generally,  offer  the  prospect  that  he  could  replace  Harley 
as  the  Queen's  principal  contact  with  the  Tories.  He  achieved  the  first  objective  as  Anne 
gave  the  expedition  such  strong  support  that  upon  his  return  to  work  Harley  was  unable  to 
prevent  its  deployment.  This  remained  the  case  even  when  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Joseph  I 
in  April  undermined  the  strategic  wellsprings  of  British  policy.  The  'election'  of  Joseph's 
brother  the  Archduke  Charles  as  Emperor  Charles  VI,  meant  that  Britain  was  no  longer 
fighting  against  Bourbon  domination  of  France  and  Spain  to  ensure  a  balance  of  power  in 
Europe  but  for  Hapsburg  domination  of  Spain  and  central  Europe.  Upon  this  development, 
the  Earl  of  Rochester  changed  his  mind  about  the  expedition  and  Harley  encouraged  him  to 
persuade  the  Cabinet  Council  to  do  likewise  but  Rochester's  efforts  proved  unsuccessful. 
Nonetheless,  despite  the  support  St  John  received  from  the  Court  on  the  specific  issue  of  the 
expedition,  he  did  fail  to  reduce  the  Chancellor's  standing  with  the  Queen  and  in  May  1711 
Harley  was  elevated  to  an  earldom  and  the  Treasurership.  'O' 
The  experience  of  the  previous  two  years  had  demonstrated  that  the  squadron  would 
have  to  depart  Britain  by  early  spring  if  the  operation  was  to  be  viable.  St  John  therefore 
pressed  forward  the  preparations  throughout  March.  The  land  force  was  to  comprise  some 
seven  infantry  regiments  and  half  a  marine  regiment.  Of  the  seven,  five  battalions  were  to  be 
withdrawn  from  Marlborough's  army  in  Flanders.  106  Perhaps  understandably,  given  the 
recent  contention  over  Hill's  promotion,  the  Duke  was  reluctant  to  relinquish  these  men  as  it 
would  demonstrate  his  diminishing  control  over  military  affairs  at  the  start  of  what  would  be 
his  last  campaign  as  Anne's  Captain-General.  St  John  had  not  however  chosen  the  regiments 
to  embarrass  Marlborough  personally  as  he  had  liked  and  respected  the  Duke  since  serving  as 
Secretary-at-War  from  1704  to  1708.  The  Secretary  did  however  want  seasoned  and 
experienced  troops,  while  withdrawing  them  from  Flanders  would  underline  the  strategic 
importance  of  the  expedition  compared  with  the  European  continental  campaigns.  In  this,  St 
John  had  the  Queen's  express  support  and  so  the  troops  were  brought  over  from  Ostend  in 
Marlborough  to  the  Queen,  [18  Jan.  1710];  Godolphin  to  Marlborough,  [21  Jan.  17101;  Marlborough  to  the 
Duchess,  8  May  1710;  Marlborough  to  Godolphin,  9  June  1710. 
10'  JIMC,  Portland  Mn  iv.  675-6:  Rochester  to  [Harley],  18,19  Apr.  1711;  St  John  to  Harley,  19  Apr.  1711; 
Gregg,  Queen  Anne,  pp.  337-8;  Hill,  Robert  Ilarley,  pp.  150-3. 
106  The  seven  regiments  were  Hill's,  Kirk's,  Clayton's,  Kane's  Seymour's,  Windresse's  and  Disney's. 348 
good  time  to  join  the  fleet  at  Spithead  by  the  beginning  of  April.  107 
St  John's  obsession  to  keep  the  expedition  secret  went  far  beyond  the  customary 
desire  that  the  enemy  be  kept  in  ignorance.  On  this  occasion  even  the  Admiralty  were 
unaware  as  to  the  exact  purpose  or  destination  of  the  squadron  and,  although  this  did  not 
necessarily  impede  preparations,  it  meant  that  in  order  to  maintain  the  mystery,  St  John 
requested  that  the  squadron  be  victualled  for  only  three  months  rather  than  for  the  eight 
months  projected  to  complete  the  operation.  St  John's  intention  was  that  further  provision 
could  be  taken  on  board  when  Walker  reached  Boston  but  the  implications  of  this  additional 
colonial  supply  were  not  considered  and,  as  will  be  seen,  the  problems  which  arose  over  this 
arrangement  damaged  the  prospects  of  success  at  an  early  stage.  108  Another  aspect  of  St 
John's  secrecy  was  that  he  shared  the  contents  of  the  operational  Instructions  with  only  a 
very  few  people  and  Walker  and  Hill  were  not  among  them.  The  Admiral's  initial 
commission  referred  to  a  'secret  expedition"09  and,  although  both  men  attended  the  Queen  in 
person  to  receive  their  Instructions,  these  were  to  remain  sealed  until  the  squadron  was  at 
sea.  Upon  opening  them,  Walker  was  likely  to  have  been  disappointed.  During  his 
expedition  to  the  Caribbean  in  1703,  the  Admiral  had  possessed  some  discretion  -  albeit 
mediated  through  a  Council  of  War  -  on  targeting  and  the  conduct  of  any  attack.  However, 
his  Instructions  for  the  expedition  to  North  America  laid  out  in  considerable  detail  how  the 
operation  was  to  progress  after  his  arrival  in  Boston  and  also  on  its  return  voyage  when 
Placentia  was  to  be  reduced.  Perhaps  more  significantly  Article  V11  placed  him  subordinate 
to  Hill  in  respect  of  the  landing  at  Quebec  and  also  in  terms  of  command  authority  over  the 
marines.  "o  Walker's  inferior  role  was  confirmed  by  Article  X  of  Hill's  Instructions  which, 
after  outlining  the  action  to  be  taken  at  Quebec,  stated  that  the  Ministry's  determination  was 
that  the  Admiral  'do  give  speedy  and  full  assistance  to  you  in  all  these  matters,  or  in  any  other 
107  The  Walker  Expedition  to  Quebec,  pp.  13  n.  2,9  1;  Letters  and  Correspondence,  Public  and  Private,  of  the 
Right  Honourable  Henry  St  John,  Lord  TIscount  Bolingbroke,  ed.  G.  Parke  (London,  1798).  i.  94,129:  St 
John  to  Marlborough,  13,27  Mar.  1711. 
108  Letters  and  Correspondence,  Public  and  Private,  of  the  Right  Honourable  Henry  St  John,  Lord  Viscount 
Bolingbroke,  i.  106-7,111-12:  St  John  to  Drummond,  16,20  Mar.  1711;  The  Walker  Expedition  to  Quebec, 
pp.  19-21. 
'09  The  Walker  Expedition  to  Quebec,  p.  159:  Hovenden  Walker's  Commission,  3  Apr.  1711. 
110  The  Walker  Expedition  to  Quebec,  pp.  91-2,97,163-8:  A  Journal  And  Full  Account  of  the  Expedition  to 
Canada  [hereafter  'Walker's  Journal'],  6-14  Apr.,  9  May  1711;  Instructions  for  our  trusty  and  well  beloved 
Sir  Hovenden  Walker,  Knt,  II  Apr.  1711;  Additional  Instructions  for  our  trusty  and  well-belovcd  Sir 349 
matter  or  thing'.  III  Notably,  a  Council  of  War  was  not  on  this  occasion  expressively  referred 
to  in  either  Instructions  as  the  sovereign  command  authority  and,  although  a  Council  meeting 
might  have  seemed  the  implication  of  the  references  to  Hill  advising  with  the  Admiral  or  that 
they  act  together  on  a  particular  task,  it  seemed  that  the  Government  (or  more  likely  St  John) 
sought  to  exercise  pre-determined  tactical  control  though  the  Instructions.  Where  this  was 
not  possible,  the  Brigadier  was  to  exercise  a  superior  command.  112 
These  various  efforts  by  the  Secretary  to  conceal  the  operation  had  mixed  results  as 
far  as  the  French  were  concerned.  Their  intelligence  provision  picked  up  in  early  spring  the 
preparations  being  completed  in  England  and  also  the  transfer  of  regiments  from  Flanders  - 
though  at  this  stage  Quebec  and  Canada  were  simply  listed  among  a  number  of  possible 
targets.  Nonetheless,  a  renegade  French  sailor  who  wished  to  join  the  expedition  told  Walker 
that  he  had  heard  he  was  bound  for  Canada  and,  by  July,  Governor  Vaudreil  knew  that  his 
jurisdiction  faced  attack.  Vaudreil's  information  had  doubtless  been  bolstered  by  the 
increasing  activity  within  the  American  colonies  following  Nicholson's  return  on  8  June.  A 
conference  of  colonial  authorities  was  convened  in  New  London  towards  the  end  of  that 
month  during  which  Nicholson  presented  the  Queen's  orders  that  the  colonists  raise  men  and 
material  both  for  the  overland  force  to  Montreal  and  also  to  augment  the  British 
expeditionary  squadron.  Despite  the  large  amounts  of  money  they  had  invested  to  no  return 
in  the  previous  two  years,  the  colonists  responded  enthusiastically  once  again.  Also  tabled  at 
this  conference  were  the  detailed  Instructions  for  the  New  York  Governor,  Robert  Hunter, 
who  had  additional  responsibility  for  co-ordinating  the  dispatch  of  the  purely  colonial  force 
commanded  by  Nicholson,  which  was  to  attack  Montreal.  '  13 
Following  the  conclusion  of  the  conference,  the  Massachusetts  Governor,  Joseph 
Dudley,  returned  to  find  the  expeditionary  force  had  already  arrived.  Under  increasing 
pressure  from  St  John  and  Hill,  Walker  had  weighed  from  Plymouth  Sound  on  5  May  with  a 
Hovenden  Walker,  Kt.,  II  Apr.  1711;  for  details  on  the  nature  of  Walker's  command  in  the  Caribbean  in 
1703  see  above  Chapter  2,  Section  11.  ii,  pp.  309,314,321-2,324. 
"'  The  Walker  Expedition  to  Quebec,  p.  282:  Queen  Anne's  instructions  to  General  Hill,  II  Apr.  1711. 
112  The  Walker  Expedition  to  Quebec,  pp.  163-8,279-86:  Instructions  for  our  trusty  and  well  Moved  Sir 
Hovenden  Walker,  Knt,  II  Apr.  1711;  Additional  Instructions  for  our  trusty  and  well-beloved  Sir  I  lovenden 
Walker,  Kt.,  II  Apr.  1711  Queen  Anne's  instructions  to  General  Hill,  II  Apr.  1711;  Additional  Instructions 
to  General  Hill,  15  Apr.  1711. 350 
squadron  of  some  64  vessels,  including  ten  warships.  Although  the  crossing  of  the  Atlantic 
had  been  bedevilled  by  changeable  weather  and  the  thick  fogs  which  were  common  to  the 
north  American  coastline,  the  squadron  had  put  into  Nantucket  Bay  at  the  end  of  June.  The 
soldiers  were  disembarked  on  Noddles  Island  for  exercise,  while  Walker  and  Hill  travelled  to 
Boston.  An  immediate  departure  for  Quebec  was  not  possible,  for  the  colonists  had  onlyjust 
begun  their  preparations  while  Walker  and  Hill  had  to  procure  the  expeditionary  force's 
provisions  for  the  following  months.  It  was  now  that  St  John's  decision  that  the  fleet  would 
proceed  from  Britain  without  full  supply  began  to  have  a  damaging  impact  upon  the 
operation.  With  the  colonial  authorities  trying  to  provide  for  their  own  troop  quotas  and  the 
British  commanders  not  only  seeking  food  for  the  immediate  subsistence  of  their  men  but  also 
a  future  supply,  demand  in  the  Boston  area  simply  outstripped  supply.  As  a  result  prices  rose 
and  it  was  believed  that  some  merchants  were  deliberately  stockpihg  goods  in  order  to 
increase  them.  In  such  a  market,  London's  Exchequer  Bills  were  devalued  and  it  was  quickly 
clear  to  Walker  that  he  would  have  to  raise  some  hard  cash  and  also  request  the  colonial 
authority  to  issue  him  some  Bills  of  Credit.  Sterling  was  however  set  at  an  unfavourable 
exchange  rate  with  the  colony's  currency  and  this  reduced  Walker's  purchasing  power  with 
the  colonial  Bills.  Eventually,  provisions  of  reasonable  quality  were  secured  but  the  issue  had 
caused  about  a  months  delay  and  had  strained  relations  between  the  British  commanders  and 
the  colonial  authorities.  '  14 
While  trying  to  sort  out  the  procurement  problem,  Walker  also  became  aware  how 
little  knowledge  both  within  the  squadron  and  Massachusetts  there  was  on  the  navigation  of 
the  St  Lawrence  river.  In  Boston  he  stayed  with  Cyprian  Soutack,  who  had  been  appointed 
to  command  the  lead  ship,  the  Province  Galley,  up  river.  However,  Soutack  made  it  known 
to  Walker  that  he  had  been  no  higher  up  the  St  Lawrence  than  the  Sept  fies,  which  layjust 
inside  the  river  estuary.  Moreover,  contrary  to  expectations,  there  was  a  lack  of  willing  local 
pilots  to  join  the  expeditionary  force.  The  Boston  pilot,  Captain  Bonner,  for  example, 
113  The  Walker  Expedition  to  Quebec,  pp.  17-19,95,238-47,268-76,302-7:  'Walker's  Journal'.  3  May  1711; 
Da  Costa  Bella  to  Pontchartrain,  23,24  July  1711;  Instructions  for  Robert  Hunter,  6  Feb.  1711;  Minutes  of  a 
Council  of  War,  21  June  1711;  Walker,  'Queen  Anne's  Canadian  Expedition',  pp.  468-70. 
'"  7he  Walker  Expedition  to  Quebec,  pp.  23-5,101-22,319-24,340-6:  'Walker's  Journal',  26  June-20  July, 
1711;  Colonel  King's  Journal  -  Part  One,  28  June-20  July  1711;  General  Hill's  Journal,  28  June-20  July 
1711;  PRO,  CO  5/9,  fos.  52-7:  Hill  to  Dartmouth,  31  July  1711;  Morgan,  'Queen  Anne's  Canadian 
Expedition',  pp.  478-81. 351 
although  reputed  to  posses  the  best  knowledge  of  the  route,  had  only  previously  made  the 
sailing  in  a  sloop  and  was  therefore  unwilling  to  guide  any  larger  vessel.  A  Governor's 
warrant  was  eventually  issued  to  compel  those  trying  to  avoid  the  service  but,  given  that 
Walker  subsequently  came  to  rely  upon  a  French  Master  captured  near  to  the  mouth  of  the  St 
Lawrence,  it  would  seem  that  this  local  action  had  proved  largely  ineffective.  '  15  Bythe 
middle  of  July,  both  Walker  and  Hill  believed  the  prospects  for  success  so  remote  that  they 
considered  abandoning  the  operation  against  Quebec  and  undertaking  an  attack  elsewhere. 
However,  not  only  did  they  find  their  Instructions  strictly  drafted  to  prohibit  such  a  decision, 
but  also  that  there  was  no  provision  for  them  to  call  a  Council  of  War,  which  would  probably 
have  countenanced  an  abandonment  of  the  action.  Indeed,  Walker  was  later  to  believe  that 
London  had  deliberately  omitted  to  provide  for  a  Council  for  that  reason,  and  also  in  order  to 
ensure  that  the  two  commanders  would  have  to  bear  full  responsibility  for  any  operational 
decisions.  Despite  their  strong  reservations,  both  commanders  agreed  therefore  that  they 
would  at  least  have  to  make  an  attempt  on  Quebec.  116 
Over  the  course  of  the  next  fortnight,  the  final  arrangements  for  the  operation  were 
completed.  Nicholson  arrived  in  Boston  with  Colonel  Vetch,  who  was  to  sail  with  Walker, 
and  reported  that  the  French  had  drawn  the  majority  of  their  forces  down  to  Montreal  and 
that  there  was  a  lack  of  powder  in  Canada.  Walker  had  hoped  that  Nicholson's  visit  would 
speed  the  preparations  along  but  with  the  problems  over  victualling  and  pilots  continuing  and 
an  increasing  desertion  rate  amongst  the  ships'  crews,  particularly  those  of  the  auxiliary 
vessels,  there  was  no  quickening  of  the  pace.  In  an  attempt  to  stem  the  flow  of  deserters, 
Walker  secured  a  proclamation  from  the  colonial  authorities  but  he  did  little  for  his  relations 
with  them  by  complaining  when  they  informed  him  that  they  had  exceeded  their  quota  of  men 
for  the  land  forces  that  it  was  sailors  he  needed.  Thus  on  20  July  -a  good  deal  later  than 
anticipated  -  the  soldiers  began  re-embarking  from  Noddles  Island  and  eleven  days  later  the 
squadron  weighed  from  Boston.  '  17 
The  expeditionary  force,  comprising  nine  warships  and  two  bomb  vessels  along  with 
115  The  Walker  Expedition  to  Quebec,  pp.  102,110,115,196-7:  'Walker's  Journal',  26  June,  2  July  1711; 
Walker  to  Dudley,  9  July  1711;  Dudley  to  Walker,  9  July  1711;  The  Warrant  to  summon  the  Pilots,  9  July 
1711. 
116  The  Walker  Expedition  to  Quebec,  pp.  116-17:  'Walker's  Journal',  II  July  1711. 
117  The  Walker  apedition  to  Quebec,  Pp.  117-31,323-6,344-8:  'Walker's  Journal',  12-30  July  1711;  Colonel 
King's  Journal  -  Part  One,  11-30  July  1711;  General  Hill's  Journal,  12-29  July  1711. 352 
around  7500  troops  and  marines  aboard  about  60  transports,  made  steady  progress  to  reach 
Cape  Sable  on  the  eastern  coast  of  Nova  Scotia  by  3  August.  '  18  Walker  then  asked  Colonel 
Vetch  to  sail  ahead  in  the  Dispatch  along  with  three  smaller  rates  to  identify  potential 
anchorages  and  to  wam  of  possible  dangers.  To  help  with  the  navigation,  the  Admiral  sent 
Vetch  a  French  pilot  he  had  taken  aboard  at  Plymouth;  Vetch  however  formed  a  low  opinion 
of  the  man's  abilities  and  relied  instead  upon  his  own  local  knowledge  to  bring  the  squadron 
safely  round  to  the  i  les  St  Pauls,  just  north  of  Cape  Breton  island  -a  remarkable  feat 
considering  that  Vetch's  service  experience  had  been  predominately  military.  According  to 
the  Colonel,  it  was  while  lying  off  St  Pauls  on  12  August  that  he  again  boarded  the  Flagship 
to  consult  with  Walker  about  the  progress  up  the  St  Lawrence.  The  Admiral  apparently 
asked  Vetch  to  join  the  squadron's  smallest  vessel,  the  Sapphire,  to  lead  the  sail  up-river. 
Vetch  felt  that  it  would  be  too  much  trouble  to  transfer  his  equipage  from  the  Dispatch  and 
on  leaving  the  Edgar  he  believed  that  Walker  had  concurred  with  his  refusal  to  switch  ships. 
Yet,  the  following  day  he  received  a  note  from  the  Admiral  informing  him  to  await  the  signal 
to  take  up  the  lead  position.  This  might  of  course  have  meant  Vetch  in  the  Dispatch  but  as 
the  signal  was  not  then  forthcoming  and  Captain  Rouse  of  the  Sapphire  began  to  enquire  as 
to  Vetch's  whereabouts,  it  seemed  that  Walker  had  aimed  to  bounce  his  colleague  into 
transferring  ships.  This  approach  lacked  subtly  and  Vetch  simply  informed  Rouse  that 
Walker  had  already  sanctioned  him  remaining  in  the  Dispatch;  the  signal  never  was  posted 
and  the  squadron  proceeded  onwards  through  the  Gulf  of  St  Lawrence.  Walker  made  no 
mention  of  these  events  in  his  journal  and  the  whole  affair  might  have  remained  a  digression 
of  Vetch's  recollections  if  the  squadron  had  not  subsequently  foundered  in  the  St  Lawrence. 
Because  it  did,  however,  it  raised  the  question  that  Walker's  intransigence  about  Vetch 
transferring  ships  may  have  deprived  the  squadron  of  a  guide  whose  piloting  skills  had  most 
recently  been  tested.  This  was  certainly  Vetch's  view  but  equally,  given  the  circumstances, 
his  punctiliousness  over  having  his  equipage  about  his  person  seemed  small-minded. 
"  The  ensuing  account  of  the  attempt  to  capture  Quebec  is  based  on  the  following  primary  sources  and 
secondary  authorities:  The  Walker  Expedition  to  Quebec,  pp.  30-8,132-43,329-31:  'Walker's  Journal',  3-27 
Aug.  1711;  Colonel  King's  Journal  -Part  Two,  15-26  Aug.  1711;  PRO,  C05/9,  fos.  70-5,219-220:  1  fill  to 
Dartmouth,  9  Sept.  1711;  Lee  to  'Hon.  Sir',  12  Sept.  1711;  'Journal  of  a  Voyage  designed  to  Quebeck  from 
Boston  in  New  England  in  July  1711',  30  July-25  Aug.  1711;  PRO,  SP  42/68,  unf.:  Walker  to  Burchett,  14 
Aug.,  12  Sept.  1711;  'At  a  Council  of  Sea  Officers',  25  Aug.  171;  Morgan,  'Queen  Anne's  Canadian 
Expedition',  pp.  483-5;  Churchill,  Marlborough,  iv.  330-1. 353 
Walker  was  now  principally  relying  on  the  skills  and  knowledge  of  another  French 
sailor  -  Captain  Paradis  -  who  had  been  bribed  to  pilot  the  squadron  after  being  captured  by 
the  Chester  while  sailing  off  Nova  Scotia.  Although  there  is  no  substantive  evidence  that 
Paradis  sought  to  frustrate  the  squadron's  progress,  two  circumstantial  events  remain 
persuasive.  First,  in  conversation  with  Walker  he  caused  the  Admiral  to  be  even  more  fearful 
and  thus  cautious  of  proceeding  up  the  St  Lawrence  to  Quebec.  Second,  while  the  squadron 
lay  north  of  the  Bird  Islands  near  to  Cape  St  Lawrence  on  13  August,  he  was  one  of  three 
who  advised  that  Walker  tack  southwards  so  as  to  run  by  Anticosti  Island  safely.  This  caused 
the  squadron  to  sail  backwards  for  some  six  hours  when,  according  to  Vetch,  the  wind  was 
favourable  to  take  them  into  the  St  Lawrence.  A  calm  subsequently  descended  for  several 
days  and  when  on  18  August  a  north-westerly  blew  up,  it  was  too  strong  for  the  squadron  to 
weather  Cape  Gaspd.  Forced  to  ride  out  the  elements  in  Gaspd  Bay,  the  squadron  missed  out 
on  a  wind  which  would  have  been  particularly  favourable  for  its  progress  up  river. 
On  20  August,  Walker  weighed  from  Gaspd  and  two  days  later  the  squadron  had 
turned  past  the  north-westerly  point  of  Anticosti  Island  into  the  St  Lawrence.  During  the 
evening  of  23  August,  with  the  wind  veering  and  a  thick  fog  descending  which  obscured  the 
land,  Walker  consulted  with  his  pilots  and  senior  officers  and  brought  the  squadron  too  on  a 
larboard  tack.  The  Admiral  had  however  misjudged  his  position  inasmuch  as  a  powerful 
north-westerly  current  from  Anticosti  had  driven  the  squadron  much  further  westwards 
towards  the  iles  aux  CEufs  and  the  'north'  or  west  bank  of  the  river.  This  misunderstanding 
was  compounded  later  in  the  evening  when  Walker's  Flag  Captain,  Paddon,  reported  a  land 
sighting.  The  Admiral  erroneously  assumed  that  this  was  the  southern  shore  and  thus  the 
order  to  tack  to  the  leeward  simply  brought  the  squadron  even  closer  to  the  north  shore. 
Twice  after  retiring  to  bed,  Walker  was  roused  by  Captain  Goddard  of  Seymour's  Regiment 
who  told  him  that  he  had  spotted  breakers  around  the  ship.  On  the  first  occasion  Walker 
dismissed  the  Captain  on  the  grounds  that  an  anny  officer  would  know  nothing  of  the  sea  and 
that  Paddon  had  not  yet  mentioned  the  breakers.  However,  on  Goddard's  second  appearance 
at  Walker's  cabin,  a  commotion  above  caused  him  to  ascend  immediately  to  the  quarter  deck 
in  his  dressing  gown  and  slippers.  It  quickly  became  clear  that  the  north  shore  was  looming 
to  the  leeward  and  it  was  only  Walker's  quick  order  to  cut  the  anchor  cable  and  make  all  sail 
that  brought  the  Edgar  safely  out  into  mid-channel.  Nine  auxiliary  vessels  were  however  not 354 
so  fortunate  and  during  the  night  of  23/24  August  they  foundered  on  the  north  shore  of  the  St 
Lawrence.  Seven  of  these  vessel  were  transports  and  nearly  900  soldiers  from  the  regiments 
of  Windress,  Clayton,  Kane,  and  Seymour  were  lost.  This  represented  nearly  half  of  the  land 
force  and  when  Walker  met  Brigadier  Hill  on  25  August,  the  latter  insisted,  despite  their 
Instructions,  that  a  Council  of  War  be  convened  to  determine  the  next  course  of  action. 
The  Council,  comprising  the  naval  Captains  with  the  senior  army  officers  attending, 
met  later  that  day.  Taking  evidence  from  the  available  pilots,  it  concluded  that  it  was  not 
practicable  to  continue  up  the  St  Lawrence  due  to  a  lack  of  knowledge  about  the  river.  Only 
Colonel  Vetch  protested,  though  not  during  the  Council  meeting  but  subsequently  in  a  letter 
to  Walker  so  that  it  appeared  as  if  he  was  seeking  a  personal  insurance  policy  against  the 
failure  of  the  expedition.  Nonetheless,  the  points  Vetch  made  in  his  letter  were  pertinent. 
Even  with  some  900  soldiers  lost,  the  strength  of  the  expeditionary  force  was  thought  to 
exceed  the  French  garrison  at  Quebec;  while  the  fact  that  the  pilots'  ignorance  of  the  river 
had  been  known  before  departing  Boston  meant  that  to  abandon  the  attempt  now  on  this 
pretext  would  cast  the  earlier  decision  to  proceed  in  a  very  unfavourable  light.  Perhaps  most 
significantly,  however,  Vetch  noted  the  poor  consequences  the  expedition's  failure  would 
have  for  the  British  colonial  empire  in  North  America.  His  fellow  colonist  Colonel  Nicholson 
clearly  agreed  with  him  and  on  hearing  the  news  while  with  his  troops  at  Lake  George,  he 
was  reported  to  be  enraged  at  having  once  again  to  return  the  colonial  force  to  Albany  for 
disbandment.  The  relationship  between  imperial  parent  and  the  colony  suffered  another  set- 
back  and  was  the  culmination  for  the  colonists  of  four  years  of  disappointment  and  missed 
chances.  Professor  Morgan  is  doubtless  right  to  suggest  an  inclusion  of  these  Canadian 
expeditions  in  any  broad  assessment  of  the  causes  of  the  American  Revolution.  '  19 
Although  the  operation  against  Quebec  had  been  abandoned,  there  was  still  the 
reduction  of  Placentia  to  be  considered.  Both  Hill's  and  Walker's  Instructions  had  directed 
them  to  this  task  on  the  returnjourney  from  Canada,  though  significantly  it  was  recognised 
that  the  time  of  year  would  determine  whether  the  action  could  go  ahead.  By  4  September, 
when  the  squadron  was  safely  congregated  in  the  Spanish  Road  north  of  Cape  Breton,  the 
senior  commanders  began  to  consider  the  next  stage.  Walker  wrote  subsequently  in  his 
journal  of  his  reluctance  to  return  home  without  having  attempted  Quebec  and  that  with  the 
"9  Morgan,  'Some  Attempts  at  Imperial  Co-operation',  p.  171. 355 
increasing  lateness  of  the  season  rendering  action  against  Placentia  unlikely,  he  suggested 
returning  to  New  England  for  the  winter.  The  Admiral  claimed  that  both  his  Flag  Captain  and 
the  Colonel  of  the  Artillery  Train,  Richard  King,  agreed  with  him,  whereas  Hill  was 
determined  to  make  the  return  voyage.  King'sjournal  does  not  corroborate  Walker's  record 
but,  in  any  event,  it  was  quickly  apparent  that  the  Admiral  was  principally  motivated  by  the 
fear  of  a  political  and  professional  storm  on  his  return.  When  Hill  suggested  that  they 
convene  another  general  Council  of  War,  thereby  holding  out  the  prospect  of  spreading  the 
responsibility  for  any  operational  decisions,  Walker  readily  agreed.  Recently  captured  letters 
indicating  that  the  French  knew  about  the  imminent  action  against  Placentia  formed  the 
background  to  the  meeting  of  the  Council  on  8  September;  and,  although,  this  intelligence 
highlighted  Placentia's  weakness,  the  Council's  deliberations  were  dominated  by  the 
anticipated  lack  of  provisions.  With  only  ten  weeks  short  allowance  remaining  from  12 
September,  which  was  considered  the  earliest  sailing  date  from  the  Spanish  Road,  and  no 
prospect  of  supply  from  New  England  until  November,  it  was  doubtful  if  there  was  sufficient 
supply  to  mount  an  attack  against  Placentia.  Such  doubts  about  the  viability  of  the  operation 
were  only  reinforced  by  reports  that  the  Newfoundland  coast  was  difficult  to  navigate  in  late 
season.  Accordingly,  the  Council  resolved  that  it  was  not  practicable  to  attempt  the 
reduction  of  Placentia  and  that  the  expeditionary  squadron  should  return  to  Britain.  120 
Walker  and  Hill  arrived  home  in  mid-October,  though  not  to  the  expected  row.  it 
was  not  in  the  Tories'  interest  to  begin  enquiring  about  the  conduct  of  the  operation  and  their 
political  stranglehold  was  still  sufficiently  strong  a  year  after  the  General  Election  to  prevent 
the  Whigs  making  political  mischief  out  the  operation.  Indeed,  despite  the  failure  of  the 
operation  which  was  to  have  embodied  a  shift  in  strategy  from  the  military  campaigns  on  the 
continent,  the  Tories  still  managed  to  demonstrate  their  inclination  on  this  issue  by 
engineering  the  dismissal  of  Marlborough  barely  a  month  following  the  expedition's  return. 
Moreover,  Walker  and  Hill  were  both  employed  within  the  year:  the  Admiral  sailed  as 
Commodore  of  the  Jamaican  squadron,  while  Hill  was  promoted  to  Major-General  in 
command  of  the  force  rendered  as  security  at  Dunkirk  for  the  duration  of  the  Utrecht  peace 
negotiations.  Such  blame  as  was  apportioned  in  Britain  tended  to  fall  on  the  colonists,  with 
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the  problems  over  supply  alluded  to  in  particular.  121  That  specific  issue  however  originated 
with  St  John's  decision  that  the  fleet  was  not  to  carry  the  full  complement  of  provisions  for 
the  whole  of  the  expedition,  and  it  raised  the  important  point  that  any  credible  assessment  of 
the  operation's  failure  must  perforce  take  into  account  the  preparatory  role  of  the  Secretary 
of  State. 
Not  only  had  St  John's  desire  for  secrecy  caused  problems  with  respect  to  provisions, 
his  tight  control  produced  Instructions  so  strictly  drafted  that  Whitehall  had  effectively 
regulated  the  tactical  direction  of  the  operation  before  it  had  begun.  Admittedly,  Councils  of 
War  were  perceived  to  dilute  command  authority  and,  in  the  context  of  combined  operations, 
they  had  proved  to  lack  dynamism  with  respect  to  in-theatre  command.  Equally,  however, 
the  antidote  to  these  problems  was  a  unitary  command  vested  in  either  the  naval  or  land 
commander  and  not  pre-set  executive  control  from  home.  Brigadier  Hill  did  hold  a  superior 
command  to  Admiral  Walker,  but  it  was  not  unitary;  and  the  command  discretion  afforded 
him  could  only  have  been  put  to  effective  use  by  a  vigorous  commander  who  was  resolute  in 
pursuit  of  the  operational  objectives.  Hill  did  not  fit  that  mould  and  his  failing  in  this  respect 
proved  critical  when  Walker  mismanaged,  and  ultimately  gambled  on,  the  piloting  of  the 
squadron  up  the  St  Lawrence.  The  dearth  of  pilots  and  the  lack  of  knowledge  of  those 
available  was  obvious  prior  to  departing  from  Boston  and  Walker  simply  compounded  these 
problems  by  a  display  of  unthinking  seamanship  once  in  the  river.  St  John  was  responsible  for 
the  appointment  of  both  commanders  and  it  is  especially  here  in  which  he  is  vulnerable  to 
criticism. 
The  common  theme  linking  combined  operations  in  the  context  of  the  North 
American  continent  between  1708-1711  was  the  negative  impact  of  London's  political  and 
governmental  process.  Twice  in  1709  and  1710,  a  failure  of  political  and  administrative  will 
caused  planned  operations  to  be  abandoned;  while  on  the  third  occasion  in  1711,  the  party 
political  and  personal  motivations  of  the  Secretary  of  State  impaired  his  judgement  when 
preparing  the  expeditionary  force  so  that  the  seeds  of  its  failure  had  been  sown  even  before  it 
crossed  the  Atlantic.  It  was  for  these  reasons  that  during  the  Spanish  Succession  War,  there 
was  a  notable  failure  of  combined  operations  on  the  very  continent  which  would  several 
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Section  III:  Combined  Operations  and  the  War  of  the  Spanish 
Succession,  1702-1713. 
The  largely  static  set-piece  battle  on  land  or  at  sea  undoubtedly  dominated  the  operational 
history  of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession  and,  consequently,  current  historiography  tends 
to  concentrate  on  the  military  successes  of  Marlborough  in  Flanders  or  the  allied  failings  on 
the  Iberian  Peninsula.  Nonetheless,  one  of  the  first  operational  deployments  of  the  war  was 
the  Rooke-Ormonde  operation  against  Cddiz  in  1702.  This  proved  be  the  first  of  thirteen 
combined  army-navy  actions  deployed  throughout  the  war  with  a  number  of  others  planned 
but  not  executed.  Quantitatively  at  least,  successive  ministries  demonstrated  a  sustained 
commitment  to  combined  operations  and  hence  a  clearer  definition  of  them  as  an  instrument 
of  warfare  should  be  possible.  In  this  respect,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  these  examples 
within  the  context  of  the  five  categories  of  definition  -  objectives,  theatre  of  war,  composition 
of  force,  bureaucratic  control  and  command  structure  -  which  were  established  when 
considering  the  operational  history  of  the  Nine  Years  War.  In  so  doing,  the  form,  function 
and  strategic  purpose  of  combined  operations  in  the  early  eighteenth  century  should  be 
Hluminated. 
Although  there  was  a  greater  functional  equivalence  between  those  operations 
dispatched  to  capture  Spanish  coastal  towns  and  the  colonial  expeditions  -  Walker's  army- 
navy  detachment  for  the  Caribbean  was  after  all  initially  part  of  the  Rooke-Ormonde  force  - 
than  similar  overseas  operations  and  the  'descents'  during  the  Nine  Years  War,  operational 
form  was  still  dependent  upon  the  specific  objectives  and  the  theatre  of  the  war.  In  the 
Mediterranean,  the  fleet  could  be  instructed  to  capture  or  destroy  enemy  territory  without 
necessarily  having  been  dispatched  from  England  with  a  dedicated  land  force.  The  attack  on 
Toulon  in  1707,  for  example,  involved  the  co-ordination  of  a  free  standing  army  and  naval 
forces.  On  that  occasion  the  combined  service  relationship  was  partially  a  product  of  the 
recent  success  of  the  Duke  of  Savoy  against  the  French  in  the  Italian  theatre,  which  enabled 
him  to  march  an  army  over  the  Maritime  Alps  into  Provence,  and  also  the  lack  of  a  safe 
landing  site  near  to  Toulon  harbour.  There  seemed  a  greater  potential  for  success  if  the  navy 
acted  in  conjunction  with  a  land  force  already  advancing  through  the  interior  rather  than  one 
it  projected  from  the  fleet.  The  relief  of  Gibraltar  in  November  1704  and  in  March  1705  and 
Barcelona  in  April  1706  were  also  examples  of  combined  operations  that  were  shaped  by  the 359 
objective  and  the  war  theatre.  Securing  the  allied  garrisons  in  both  places  from  the  French 
besieging  force  on  land  and  at  sea  could  not  simply  be  a  question  of  the  navy  transporting  to 
them  additional  manpower  and  supplies.  Instead,  the  respective  service  commanders  had  to 
engage  in  ajoint  operational  relationship  to  neutralise  the  French  threat.  Even  when  French 
capability  at  sea  was  dealt  with  first,  the  army-navy  co-operation  in-theatre  had  to  be 
maintained  to  beat  off  the  landward  attack  and,  in  this  respect,  seamen  and  naval  ordnance 
were  often  put  ashore  to  bolster  the  landward  defences.  These  operations  lasted  several 
months,  affording  them  an  attritional  quality  not  present  at  the  earlier  first  strike  to  gain 
control  of  the  towns;  but,  as  secure  capture  was  the  overriding  objective,  both  phases  should 
be  considered  together  to  form  one  long  combined  operational  campaign. 
This  broadening  of  the  definition  of  combined  operations  by  the  object  and  theatre  of 
war  is  furthered  by  a  consideration  of  the  composition  of  the  force.  The  combination  of  the 
regular  army  and  navy  remained  a  benchmark  but,  during  the  Spanish  Succession  war,  the 
marine  soldiers  assumed  an  increasingly  prominent  role.  These  troops  often  formed  a  large 
part  of  the  land  force  set  ashore  or,  as  at  the  initial  assault  on  Gibraltar  in  July  1704, 
comprised  -  save  for  a  number  of  Spanish  irregulars  and  latterly  some  seamen  -  the  whole. 
The  marines  at  Gibraltar  were  those  of  the  regiments  raised  for  'sea  service'  in  April  1702, 
which  was  the  third  time  since  the  Restoration  that  this  type  of  soldier  had  been  mobilised. 
The  ambiguities  between  the  legislation  which  made  the  navy  responsible  for  their 
administration  and  command,  and  their  regimentation  as  infantry  battalions  which  undertook 
soldierly  functions  ashore,  suggested  that  actions  completed  by  them  in  conjunction  with 
naval  vessels  could  be  considered  as  combined  operations.  In  this  respect,  it  is  the  question 
of  whether  there  was  operational  co-operation  between  at  any  rate  some  form  of  military 
force  on  land  and  a  navy  at  sea  which  defimes  the  combined  operation.  The  composition  of 
the  force,  including  its  function,  as  a  category  of  definition  must  therefore  be  widened  to 
incorporate  operations  that  are  not  strictly  undertaken  by  the  regular  English  army  and  the 
Royal  Navy. 
The  two  categories  -  bureaucratic  control  and  command  structure  -  which  principally 
emerged  during  the  Nine  Years  War  as  integral  to  the  definition  of  combined  operations 
continued  to  be  of  use  during  the  Spanish  Succession  war.  The  former  was  not  however 
subject  to  any  notable  development.  A  non-personal  administrative  process  to  prepare  the 
army  and  naval  components  was  still  lacking  and,  although  certain  individuals  -  Admiralty 360 
Secretary  Burchett  and  successive  Secretaries  of  State,  for  example  -  appreciated  the 
necessity  and  importance  of  their  bureaucratic  relationships,  the  organisation  of  operations 
continued  to  suffer  delay,  no  consistent  trend  of  increased  efficiency  emerged  as  the  war 
progressed.  Debates  over  command  structure  continued,  with  the  contributions  from  the 
service  commanders  and  members  of  the  Cabinet  Council  demonstrating  its  enduring 
contemporary  relevance  to  operational  design.  Unlike  the  question  of  bureaucratic  control, 
the  issue  of  command  became  even  more  germane  due  to  the  increasing  complexity  and 
interplay  of  the  theatres  of  the  war  in  which  such  operations  were  deployed.  Overseas, 
colonists  such  as  Christopher  Codrington  and  Francis  Nicholson  again  sought  a  determinate 
voice;  while  in  the  Mediterranean,  and  specifically  on  the  Peninsula,  London  had  to  devolve  a 
certain  amount  of  operational  authority  to  the  Archduke  Charles  as  'King  of  Spain'.  The 
response  of  the  various  service  commanders,  including  in  particular  the  Earl  of  Peterborough 
and  Sir  John  Leake,  to  this  shaped  historical  perceptions  of  combined  operational  endeavour 
both  in  terms  of  its  substance  and  spirit. 
The  devolved  command  structure  in  the  Peninsula  emerged  from  the  strategic 
considerations  of  war  policy.  As  was  the  case  in  the  Nine  Years  War,  the  frequency  of 
combined  operations  (broadly  deffied)  demonstrated  that  they  comprised  part  of  the  military 
component  of  Grand  Strategy  as  a  support  to  the  maritime  and  continental  strategic  traditions 
favoured,  as  previously  explained,  by  the  Tories  and  the  Whigs  respectively.  As  Queen 
Anne's  ministries  -  until  the  exclusively  Tory  government  of  1710  -  were  led  by  the  political 
'undertakers'  Godolphin  and  Marlborough,  and  supported  for  a  good  part  of  the  war  by  the 
instinctive  political  manager  Robert  Harley,  war  policy  tended  to  blend  both  strategies. 
Combined  operations  were  therefore  concurrently  deployed  overseas  in  the  maritime  context 
and  planned  against  the  French  coast  to  facilitate  the  progress  of  the  continental  land  war. 
Professor  Hattendorf  has  argued  that  Britain's  strategic  touchstone  during  this 
conflict  was  the  future  role  and  governance  of  Spain  in  the  European  states  system.,  To  this 
he  might  have  added  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  strategic  presence  in  the 
Mediterranean.  When  in  1703,  Britain  committed  itself  to  placing  the  Archduke  Charles  on 
the  Spanish  throne,  this  concern  with  Spain  and  the  Mediterranean  reinforced  the 
simultaneous  application  of  both  the  continental  and  maritime  strategies  to  the  same  end. 
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Armies  fought  on  the  Spanish  mainland  and  the  navy  strove  to  command  the  Mediterranean 
as  a  line  of  communication  and  also  to  safeguard  trade.  Within  this  military  and  strategic 
context,  combined  operations  were  consistently  deployed.  The  capture  of  Gibraltar  and, 
more  particularly,  Barcelona,  provided  the  Archduke  with  a  vital  foothold  on  the  mainland 
whence  military  operations  might  be  begun  from  a  base  other  than  the  Portuguese  border. 
Army-navy  actions  were  also  frequently  used  as  the  means  to  capture  an  appropriately  sized 
Mediterranean  port  where  the  main  fleet  could  be  based  permanently.  It  might  be  argued  that 
when  an  island  such  as  Minorca  was  targeted  then  a  combined  operation  would  perforce  have 
to  be  deployed  for  the  soldiers  could  only  be  put  ashore  from  the  sea.  But  at  Minorca  and 
elsewhere,  there  was  a  planned  and  continuing  combined  operational  relationship  beyond  the 
initial  projection  of  the  land  force.  Conversely  where  mainland  ports  like  Cddiz  could  have 
been  attacked  solely  from  the  landward,  an  army-navy  conjunction  was  still  deemed  to  be  the 
more  appropriate  instrument  of  warfare. 
Professor  Lynn's  'war-as-process"  paradigm  can  be  applied  to  the  operational  history 
of  the  War  of  the  Spanish  Succession,  but  it  does  not  fully  account  for  the  frequent  planning 
and  deployment  of  combined  operations  nor  their  component  strategic  role.  An 
understanding  of  their  form  and  function  remained  dependent  upon  the  five  categories: 
objectives,  theatre  of  war,  composition  of  force,  bureaucratic  control  and  command  structure; 
but  as  the  content  of  each  was  broadened  by  the  operational  examples,  a  universal  definition 
of  combined  operations  remained  elusive.  During  the  Spanish  Succession  war,  combined 
army-navy  actions  -  broadly  defined  -  were  more  obviously  an  elemental  part  of  the  war 
policy.  They  were  consistently  deployed  in  pursuance  of  Britain's  ambition  to  gain  a 
permanent  presence  in  the  Mediterranean,  while  also  integrated  within  the  continental  land 
campaigns,  particularly  on  the  Peninsula.  Again  there  can  be  no  claims  that  these  combined 
actions  were  at  this  stage  considered  as  an  independent  strategic  instrument  of  war;  rather, 
they  were  conceived  as  support  for  both  the  maritime  and  continental  approaches. 
Nonetheless,  their  integration  within  both  strategic  traditions  combined  with  the  fact  that  the 
lineaments  of  British  war  policy  looked  set  to  maintain  both  a  continental  commitment  and 
also  command  of  the  sea,  meant  that  combined  operations  can  be  perceived  in  the  early 
eighteenth  century  to  be  evolving  as  a  strategic  instrument  of  warfare. 
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Conclusion 
This  study  has  shown  that  it  is  impossible  to  arrive  at  a  blanket  definition  for  British 
combined  operations  as  an  instrument  of  warfare  during  the  wars  of  1688-1713.  Instead, 
five  categories  of  definition  -  objectives,  theatre  of  war,  composition  of  force, 
bureaucratic  control  and  command  structure  -  have  been  advanced  and,  against  these,  the 
historical  experience  of  combined  army-navy  actions  can  be  set  to  illuminate  their  form 
and  function.  Although  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  combined  operations  were  neither 
conceived  nor  deployed  as  independent  strategic  actions,  they  formed  a  fundamental  role 
in  support  of  both  the  continental  and  maritime  strategic  traditions  embedded  within 
Grand  Strategy.  Moreover,  with  respect  to  certain  policies,  such  as  the  penetration  of  the 
Mediterranean,  these  operations  often  came  to  provide  the  mainstay  of  Britain's  military 
contribution.  At  the  end  of  the  Spanish  Succession  War,  therefore,  it  was  possible  to  look 
ahead  to  a  later  period  when  Britain's  practised  expertise  in  combined  operations  as  an 
instrument  of  warfare  was  recognised  and  thought  distinct  from  the  anny-centred  and 
infantry-dominated  continental  campaigning  of  other  European  powers.  However,  this 
raises  the  question  of  whether  it  is  possible  to  identify  the  reasons  for  success,  and 
conversely  for  failure,  of  the  operations  of  the  late  seventeenth  and  early  eighteenth 
centuries,  which  would  make  it  possible  to  comprehend  in  some  detail  the  historical 
development  of  the  form  and  function  of  combined  operations  as  amphibious  warfare. 
Over  the  course  of  the  two  wars  considered  in  this  study  only  seven  operations 
were  wholly  successful  inasmuch  as  they  fully  achieved  their  objectives:  the  two  actions  in 
Ireland  (1689  and  1690);  Gibraltar  (1704-5);  Barcelona  (1705-6);  Ibiza  and  Majorca 
(1706);  Sardinia  (1708)  and,  finally,  Minorca  (1708).  This  is  clearly  a  diverse  fist  of 
combined  operations  which  do  not  conform  to  one  operational  mould.  For  example, 
unlike  Cork  or  Kinsale,  Gibraltar  never  featured  as  the  sole  target  of  a  set  of  operational 
instructions  determined  by  the  Ministry;  nor  did  its  capture  involve  the  use  of  regular 
army  regiments,  which  were  to  participate  to  a  great  extent  in  the  action  which  seized 
control  of  Barcelona.  Moreover,  it  has  been  argued  that  the  capture  of  both  Gibraltar  and 
Barcelona  should  be  seen  as  the  product  of  attritional  combined  operations  extending  over 
the  course  of  a  year,  rather  than  the  first-strike  action  which  proved  sufficient  to  take  the 
Balearics.  IdentSying  specific  common  reasons  for  the  success  of  combined  operations 
which  might  shape  the  future  development  in  this  form  of  warfare  is  thus  an  elusive  task. 
Equally,  of  the  eight  actions  which  failed  entirely  to  meet  any  of  their  objectives  - 
captain  Wrenn's  expedition  to  the  West  Indies  (1692);  the  descent  on  Brest  (1694); 363 
Admiral  Russell  Mediterranean  expedition  (1694-5);  the  expeditions  of  Admirals  Wheler 
and  Walker  to  the  Caribbean  and  North  America  (1693,1702  and  1711);  the  Rooke- 
Ormonde  assault  on  Cddiz  (1702);  and  the  attack  on  Toulon  (1707)  -  their  operational 
forms  were  sufficiently  distinct  to  prohibit  a  universal  explanation  for  their  failure. 
Discord  between  the  respective  service  commanders  evidently  hindered  the  actions  in  the 
colonies  but,  even  then,  the  failure  of  Wheler's  expedition  to  the  Caribbean  was 
principally  dictated  by  the  strict  chronological  framework  set  down  in  his  Instructions. 
This  forced  him  to  leave  the  region  by  a  specific  date  and  therefore  rendered  him  unable  to 
continue  operations  against  either  Guadeloupe  or  Martinique,  even  though  there  were 
reasonable  prospects  for  success  despite  his  bickering  with  Governor  Codrington. 
Similarly,  although  in  the  European  theatres  inter-service  conflict  undermined  joint 
operations,  it  has  been  shown,  for  example,  that  at  the  assault  on  Cddiz  in  1702  this  factor 
was  less  important  than  has  been  previously  thought;  while  it  was  wholly  absent  from 
operations  such  as  the  descent  on  Brest  in  1694.  Failure  on  that  occasion  resulted  from 
the  Ministry's  prioritising  of  targets,  which  caused  the  commanders  to  continue  at  Brest 
despite  the  increasing  realisation  that  the  French  defences  and  (more  importantly)  the 
inability  to  land  a  significant  body  of  troops  with  momentum  meant  that  that  the  tactical 
conditions  were  not  propitious.  A  similar  argument  about  the  lack  of  common 
characteristics  defining  success  or  failure  might  be  made  about  those  three  operations  - 
Commodores  Wright's  and  Wilmot's  expeditions  to  the  Caribbean  (1690-1  and  1695 
respectively),  and  Commodore  Norris's  action  at  Newfoundland  (1697)  -  which 
ultimately  failed  but  which  notched  up  some  partial  successes  along  the  way. 
To  a  large  extent,  the  fact  that  it  is  difficult  to  isolate  some  common  operational 
characteristics  to  explain  success  or  failure  is  inherent  in  the  already  recognised  inability  to 
arrive  at  a  comprehensive  definition  for  combined  operations  in  the  late  seventeenth  and 
early  eighteenth  century.  The  operations  related  in  this  study  can  be  viewed,  and  were  so 
viewed  by  contemporaries,  as  joint  land  and  sea  actions;  but  they  took  many  forms,  and 
their  operational  history  therefore  yields  only  very  general  characteristics  which  made  a 
consistent  positive  contribution  to  the  progress  of  the  operations.  The  importance  of 
leadership  and,  in  particular,  the  ability  of  personal  command  to  respond  effectively  to  the 
exigencies  of  combined  operations  should  not  be  underestimated.  Although  similar  to  all 
military  and  naval  conmmders  in  that  they  faced  operational  circumstances  contingent 
upon  factors  outside  their  direct  control,  the  leaders  of  combined  operations  had  from  the 
outset  to  establish  and  to  maintain  a  cohesive  joint  operational  momentum  of  the  land  and 364 
sea  forces.  Moreover,  it  was  rare  for  these  commanders  to  be  afforded  an  unitary 
command  structure  in  which  to  effect  this;  instead,  it  was  customary  for  them  to  have  to 
accommodate  a  Council  of  War  of  diverse  opinions.  Mercurial  and  talismanic 
commanders  like  the  Earl  of  Peterborough  and  Prince  George  of  Hesse-Darmstadt  could 
immediately  transform  the  progress  of  an  operation.  Hesse-Darmstadt's  (ultimately  fatal) 
demonstration  that  it  was  essential  to  cut  the  enemy's  line  of  communication  between 
Barcelona  and  the  Montjuich  fortress  along  with  Peterborough's  charge  up  the  hill  of 
Montjuich  to  rally  Lord  Charlemont's  retreating  troops  were  turning  points  in  the  first- 
strike  phase  of  the  operation  in  1705  to  capture  the  city.  The  dominant  personalities  of 
such  commanders  ensured  that  they  were  well  equipped  to  push  at  the  parameters  of  their 
operational  Instructions  and  more  importantly  to  dominate  the  membership  of  the 
Councils  of  War,  which  were  typically  prescribed  by  the  Ministries  as  the  sovereign 
command  authority.  The  failure  of,  respectively,  Sir  Francis  Wheler  in  1693  and 
Commodore  Norris  in  1697  to  impose  their  wills  on  their  Councils  of  War  left  the  former 
bound  to  his  prescriptive  Instructions  directing  his  departure  from  the  Caribbean  and  the 
latter  circumscribed  by  timidity.  Instinctive  and  dominating  commanders  were,  of  course, 
often  difficult  to  work  within  the  context  of  ajoint  service  action;  hence  the  equally 
positive  contribution  made  by  the  more  methodical  and  steadily  resolute  commanders 
should  also  be  noted.  Britain's  successes  in  the  Mediterranean  between  1705-1708  was  in 
a  large  part  due  to  the  stolid  leadership  of  Admiral  Sir  John  Leake.  Where  others  failed, 
he  forged  a  tense  but  effective  partnership  with  Peterborough.  His  determined 
seamanship  preserved  and  ensured  the  deployment  of  the  squadron  during  the  successive 
winters  of  1704-5  and  1705-6,  when  he  established  an  operational  relationship  over  the 
longer  term  with  the  land  commanders  in  besieged  Gibraltar  and  Barcelona. 
Naturally,  a  commander  from  either  service  who  genuinely  understood  the 
necessity  of  the  co-ordination  of  the  land  and  sea  forces  and  who  actively  promoted  their 
interplay  could  only  be  beneficial  to  the  progress  of  such  operations.  However,  in  the 
wars  concerned  with  here,  only  the  Duke  of  Marlborough  demonstrated  such  an  ability. 
This,  though,  was  only  glimpsed  during  his  actions  in  Ireland  in  1690  when  he  had  in  any 
event  the  benefit  of  a  near  unitary  command  structure.  Later,  during  the  Spanish 
Succession  War,  although  he  undoubtedly  promoted  the  strategic  role  of  combined 
operations  as  part  of  Britain's  attempt  to  penetrate  the  Mediterranean,  he  was  never 
actively  involved  in  the  operations.  In  that  respect,  no  clear  model  of  a  joint  service 365 
commander  emerged;  notwithstanding,  leadership  remained  a  positive  constituent  in 
ensuring  the  success  of  a  combined  operation.. 
During  the  wars  concerned  in  this  study,  the  pamphlets  by  Edward  Littleton  were 
the  only  significant  attempts  to  theorise  on  the  practice  of  combined  operations.  Their 
focus  was  not,  however,  upon  the  techniques  of  landing  troops  and  then  upon  the  conduct 
of  the  two  services  as  progress  was  made  upon  the  target  but  rather  upon  the  immediate 
strategic  and  tactical  benefits  which  night  accrue  from  the  joint  actions  that  Littleton 
termed  'descents'.  This  absence  of  a  theoretical  model  of  the  conduct  of  a  combined 
operation  was,  of  course,  consonant  with  the  lack  of  a  comprehensive  definition  of  them 
as  a  type  of  warfare.  It  also  reflected  the  nature  of  success  and  failure  as  contingent  on 
the  quality  of  the  command.  Some  commanders  were  developing  techniques  peculiar  to 
combined  operations  -  such  as  the  landing  of  troops  in  sequential  waves,  as  intended  by 
Tollemache  at  Camaret  Bay,  or  the  increasing  practice  amongst  naval  commanders  to 
detail  frigates  to  shepherd  and  provide  fire  cover  for  the  ships'  boats  as  they  neared  the 
shore  -  and  it  might  be  suggested  that  over  the  course  of  the  two  wars  the  conduct  of  the 
commanders  was  increasingly  informed  by  the  practices  and  experience  of  others. 
Certainly,  at  Cddiz,  Ormonde  deployed  a  modified  version  of  Tollemache's  landing 
disposition  at  Brest  in  1694.  This  sought  to  reap  the  maximum  momentum  afforded  by 
landing  in  sequential  waves,  while  also  avoiding  the  more  obvious  errors  committed 
during  the  Brest  operation  such  as  the  disorderly  progress  of  the  forward  landing  craft. 
There  remains,  however,  no  evidence  to  suggest  that  the  failings  at  Brest  had  been 
absorbed  at  an  institutional  level  and  specifically  vouchsafed  to  Ormonde;  nor  is  it  possible 
to  know  for  certain  whether  Ormonde  had  studied  Tollemache's  command  prior  to  the 
Cddiz  expedition  in  1702.  Nonetheless,  the  Duke's  instruction  for  landing  indicated  a 
familiarity  with  the  earlier  operation  and  this  underscores  the  individual  and  experiential 
foundation  of  learning  in  combined  operational  command.  In  a  similar  manner,  the 
positive  quality  of  Sir  John  Leake's  stolidness  in  command  (referred  to  above)  was  as 
much  a  product  of  his  prolonged  service  in  the  Mediterranean  where  he  was  the  lead 
Admiral  in  several  combined  operations  as  it  was  of  his  naval  personality.  Overall,  the 
absence  of  a  theoretical  framework  and  a  structured  learning  process  for  commanders 
meant  that  the  dominant  contingent  nature  of  their  conduct  kept  the  execution  of 
combined  operations  largely  ad  hoc. 
This  essential  improvisation  placed  a  premium  upon  the  commanders'  avaHable 
resources,  which  were  usually,  though  not  exclusively,  a  product  of  the  preparatory 366 
activity  back  in  Britain.  It  is  therefore  the  appropriateness  and  the  quality  of  the 
operations'  resource  base  which  comprises  another  general  characteristic  that  across  the 
broad  spectrum  of  operations  could  have  a  constant  positive  or  negative  effect.  For 
example,  Secretary  St  John's  expeditionary  preparations  in  the  early  spring  of  1711  left 
Walker  without  sufficient  provisions  on  arrival  at  Boston  with  which  to  maintain  an 
operational  momentum;  while  governments  in  general  rarely  seemed  to  take  account  - 
despite  the  evidence  -  of  the  high  attrition  of  manpower  in  the  Caribbean  through 
sickness.  When  resources  were  sufficient  for  the  operational  purpose,  as  in  the  case  of 
Stanhope's  operation  which  captured  Minorca  in  1708,  then  a  serious  potential  obstacle 
to  the  success  of  the  operation  was  removed. 
It  is  not  possible  to  foreshadow  in  detail  the  form  and  function  of  combined 
operations  as  practised  to  considerable  effect  in  the  wars  of  the  nid-to-late  eighteenth 
century.  This  was  largely  a  product  of  the  amorphous  nature  of  such  operations  in  the 
earlier  part  of  the  century;  although  they  could  be  identified  as  a  type  of  warfare  with  a 
strategic  role,  there  was  then  no  one  successfid  operational  mould  to  be  developed  or, 
conversely,  a  common  failing  form  to  be  avoided.  Nonetheless,  laying  to  one  side  the 
often  essential  contribution  of  good  fortune,  it  can  be  argued  that  overall  operations  were 
positively  influenced  by  the  leadership  of  commanders  who  were  either  mercurial  or 
stolidly  determined,  or  who  genuinely  embraced  the  combined  action  of  both  services; 
equally,  due  to  these  contingencies  of  command,  successful  operations  were  required  to 
posses  a  sufficient  resource  base  for  the  set  objectives.  Such  conclusions  night  seem 
straightforward  but,  ironically,  it  is  this  straightforwardness  which  is  noteworthy. 
Appropriate  operational  command  and  sufficient  resource  provisions  would  be  considered 
a  pre-requisite  for  the  successful  direction  of  the  conventional  types  of  warfare,  whether  a 
set-piece  land  battle  or  a  naval  engagement.  It  is  therefore  a  measure  of  the  development 
in  the  form,  function  and  acceptance  of  the  strategic  utility  of  combined  operations  in  the 
late  seventeenth  and  early  eighteenth  centuries  that  as  a  instrument  of  warfare  they  were 
demonstrating  the  same  characteristics  for  success  as  the  more  orthodox  forms  of  combat 
in  the  early  modem  period.  Moreover,  as  this  progress  became  increasingly  understood  at 
the  highest  levels  of  the  government  and  the  military,  combined  operations  became 
throughout  the  eighteenth  century  a  dominant  form  of  warfare  upon  which  Britain's 
imperial  reach  and  exercise  of  world  power  rested.  It  is  of  considerable  significance  that 
the  wellsprings  and  nascent  growth  of  this  development  can  be  traced  to  Britain's  naval 
and  military  co-operation  in  the  wars  of  1688  to  1713. 367 
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